The dialectician knows that Ideas are not ultimate entities, after which it is impossible to ask again. For this reason, precisely, the dialectician differs from the mathematician. The famous "Doctrine of Ideas", as it has been closely linked to Plato throughout the history of thought until today, responds to a representation that belongs to the perspective of the mathematician. As a mathematical formulation, with its useless duplication of reality, it has already been rightly criticized by Aristotle. However, what was subjected to criticism in this way was a doctrine of ideas without dialectics. To this extent, it remains detached from the idea of the Good. The Platonic treatment of the idea of the Good shows that the knowledge related to this idea can never be given entirely in the form of a knowledge related to objects. The idea of the good is not an object to be known, but the correlate of the practical competence of using all forms of knowledge, giving them purpose and making them useful for the agent. This point constitutes one of the lasting fruits of Platonic thought on the idea of the Good. Plato diagnosed the provisional character of all objective knowledge and warned that neither the best theory nor the best system of rules is of any use, if there is a lack of practical competence - whose acquisition requires a sustained and systematic exercise - to deal with theories and rules in a useful way, that is, in a way that serves the actual end of the agent/knower.

This work analyzes the central elements of the Platonic conception of moral knowledge in the dialogue Crito. First, it examines the characterization of moral knowledge that Socrates attributes to himself in the Apology, with the goal of offering a conceptual framework of reference letter in which to situate Socratic moral knowledge as it is presented in the Crito. The following epigraph is devoted to the study of the practical principles introduced by Socrates in his response to the escape proposal posed by his friend Criton and that will guide the deliberation on whether such action should be undertaken or not. This deliberation is the object of analysis in the fourth epigraph. Finally, in the fifth and last epigraph we analyze some dispositional aspects in which the dramatic representation of Socrates and Crito affects and which are essential in the characterization of moral knowledge in the Crito.

This contribution offers an analysis of the treatment of the experience of conflict between the pretensions of the realisation of human freedom, on the one hand, and the recognition of divine freedom and its power over life itself, on the other, as well as the nature of its resolution as presented by Fernando Inciarte in two of his works: Culture and Truth and The Transcendental Imagination in Life, Art and Philosophy. The main thesis is that reconciliation between both freedoms is impossible in human terms and that, nevertheless, a certain way of living oriented by the recognition of this same impossibility opens man to its resolution.

In the present article I first outline Kant's critique of Platonic ideas, in order to show the traditional interpretative budget that conceives of ideas in Plato as objective correlates of an act of intuition. I then set out in general terms the hermeneutical limits of such an interpretation, insofar as it fails to do justice to the non-objectivist forms of knowledge that Plato introduces as the place where ideas are originally known. Finally, development in its essentials Wieland's non-objectivist reading of the ideas and their knowledge .

The general aim of this contribution is to explore how Plato conceives the relationship between understanding and desire in human action and to establish, on this basis, the role that he attributes to the education of desire in his account of moral education. To this end, I will focus on the Symposium, where Plato pays unprecedented attention to the ethical value of desire and its distinctive place within the psychology of moral virtue. I shall argue that the role of understanding in Plato¿s moral education is not to control or to sublimate desires, but rather to inform them. It is only by integrating desires according to the understanding of beauty that the soul or moral character of the agent becomes genuinely beautiful and thus accomplishes its intrinsic er¿s.