▲ Qasem Soleimani receives an award from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in early 2019 [Khamenei's Office].

COMMENTARY* / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

The death in Iraq of General Qasem Soleimani, head of the Iranian Quds Force, at the hands of an American drone is one more link in the process of increasing deterioration of the already bad relations between the United States and Iran, whose latest chapter has been experienced since 2018, the year in which President Trump decided to break the so-called "agreement nuclear " (JCPOA) signed with Iran in 2015 by the Obama administration and the other members of the G 5+1.

The attack on Soleimani, executed in retaliation for the death of an American contractor in an attack reportedly launched by the Iraqi Shiite militia Kataib Hezbollah on the U.S. K1 base in Kirkuk last December 27, has meant a qualitative change in the subject response that the United States is accustomed to give to incidents of this subject since, for the first time, the goal has been a senior manager military of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Immediately after the assassination, during the funeral for the deceased general, Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, announced in somewhat apocalyptic terms that the attack would not go unanswered, and that it would come directly from Iranian hands, not through proxies. It did indeed come on the night of January 8 last in the form of a massive missile attack on two US military instructions located in western Iraq and in Iraqi Kurdistan. Contradicting Iranian declarations that the bombings had resulted in some eighty American deaths, the US administration hastened to assure that no leave had been registered as a result of the attacks.

Following this new attack, the world held its breath waiting for an escalation by Washington. However, President Trump's own statements on January 8 seemed to de-escalate the tension, arguing that the absence of US casualties was indicative of an Iranian attempt to de-escalate. The United States will not respond militarily, although it announced the intention to tighten the economic sanctions regime until the country changes its attitude. Thus, the risk of open war in the region seems to have been averted, at least for the time being.

Are we affected by the tension between the United States and Iran?

Evidently, yes, and in several ways. Firstly, we cannot ignore the fact that several European countries, including Spain, have large military contingents deployed in the region, operating within the frameworks of NATO, the United Nations and the European Union in missions such as "Inherent Resolve" in Iraq, "Resolute Support" in Afghanistan, UNIFIL in Lebanon, "Active Fence" in Turkey, or "Atalanta" in the Horn of Africa.

In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan in particular, Spanish troops deployed in the aforementioned missions work closely partnership with other NATO allies, including the United States. Although in principle Spanish soldiers -or, for that matter, those of other NATO nations- are not targeted by Iranian responses specifically directed against America and its interests, there is no doubt that any Iranian attack on U.S. units could collaterally affect the contingents of other nations operating with them, if only as a matter of mere geographical proximity.

It is less likely that Iran would attempt a response against a non-US contingent through one of its proxies in the region. This would be the case, for example, of Hezbollah in Lebanon, a country in which Spain maintains an important contingent whose security could be affected if this group, either on its own initiative or at the behest of Iran, were to attempt to attack any UNIFIL unit or facility. This option, as we have said, is considered unlikely because of the negative impact it would have on the international community in general, and because of the proximity of UNIFIL's deployment to Israel.

The escalation has produced an increase in the level of alert and a reinforcement of the troops that the United States maintains in the region. If the increase in tension continues, it would not be ruled out that Washington could articulate some kind of direct military response to Iran subject for which it could appeal to the support of its partners and allies, either with troops or resources. It is difficult to determine at what moment and under what conditions such a application could take place, with what purpose and, very importantly, what response Europe would give to it, bearing in mind the concern with which the Old Continent observes an escalation in which it is not interested, and the state of relative coolness in the relations between the United States and Europe.

As a result of the assassination, Iran has made public its intention to dissociate itself completely from the clauses of the nuclear agreement that it was still observing. In other words, it says it feels free to continue with its nuclear program. Undoubtedly, this last nail in the coffin of the JCPOA could lead to an open nuclear degree program in the region with negative consequences for regional security, but also for European security. The increase of the issue of nuclear powers is, in itself and from our point of view, bad news.

Finally, and as a side effect of the escalation, the price of a barrel of oil is beginning to show a worrying upward trend. If there are no corrective measures by way of increased production in other countries, the trend could continue. There is no need to dwell on what the increase in the price of oil means for the European Economics and, of course, for the national one.

Russia and China in the crisis

Russia is making efforts to replace the United States as the main power in the region and to portray America as an unreliable partner , abandoning its allies in difficulties. The escalation of the crisis may have a negative impact on that effort, slowing it down or, in the worst case, ending it if, finally, the United States were to reverse its policy of gradual withdrawal of the Middle East for the sake of increased tension with Iran. Russian rhetoric will be inimical to Washington. In the end, however, it will do nothing to increase U.S.-Iranian tension, but will probably keep it at a tolerable level or decrease it.

Russia is not so much a staunch ally of Iran as one of convenience. Iran is a competitor of Russia for influence in the region - in particular, in Syria - and may seek to negatively influence Islamism in the Russian Federation. On the other hand, Russia is not enthusiastic about Iran equipping itself with nuclear weapons.

China's position is conditioned by its heavy dependence on the steady flow of oil from the Middle East. For this reason, it has no interest in the instability brought about by this increase in tension. It is expected to act as an element moderator, trying to use the crisis as an opportunity to increase its influence in the region. China is not interested per se in becoming the arbiter of security in the region, but it is interested in a stable, trade-friendly region.

The project "One Belt, One Road" is another reason why China will try to keep the crisis within manageable limits. The Middle East is an element core topic in the Chinese project to recreate a sort of new Silk Road. An open war between the USA and Iran could negatively affect this project.

At summary, neither Russia nor China is interested in an escalation between the United States and Iran that could lead to an open war between the two nations that could jeopardize oil supplies, in the case of China, and the establishment as the main international power in the region, in the case of Russia. Both will try to temper the Iranian response, even if, at the level of statements, they speak out against Soleimani's assassination.

* This text extends a previous commentary made by the author to El Confidencial Digital.