The bi-national Colombian-Venezuelan guerrilla character provides the Maduro regime with another shock force in the face of external military harassment or a coup d'état.

• ELN has reached some 2,400 fighters between the two countries; its main funding now comes from illicit businesses in Venezuela, such as drugs and illegal mining.

• FARC dissidents number at least 2,300; the group with the greatest projection is the one led in Venezuela by Iván Márquez, ex issue two of the FARC.

• Elenos' and ex-FARC cooperate operationally in certain activities promoted by the Maduro regime, but their future organic convergence is unclear.

▲ FARC dissidents led by Ivan Marquez announce their return to arms, August 2019 [video image].

report SRA 2020 / María Gabriela Farjardo[PDF version].

MAY 2020-The consolidation of the two main Colombian guerrilla groups -the ELN and some remnants of the former FARC- as active forces also in Venezuela, thus articulating themselves as Colombian-Venezuelan groups, constitutes one of the main notes of 2019 in the field of American regional security.

Both groups would have some 1,700 troops in Venezuela (two thirds would be from the ELN), of which one third (570) would correspond to recruitment among Venezuelans. Used by the Chavista regime for guerrilla training of its irregular forces and as a shock vanguard in case of external military harassment or coup, the ELN and the ex-FARC are involved in drug trafficking, smuggling and extraction of gold and other illegal mining, both in the areas close to the border with Colombia, where they have operated for many years, and in the Venezuelan interior, such as the mining-rich states of Amazonas and Bolivar.

Following the agreement peace deal signed between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in November 2016, the National Liberation Army (ELN) began a process of expansion that allowed it to fill the vacuum left by the FARC in various illicit activities, although its estimated issue of 2,400 troops falls far short of the more than 8,000 that the FARC had at the time of its demobilization. Although it has had to compete with FARC remnants that are still active as mafia elements, the ELN has become Colombia's main guerrilla force, also focused on organized crime. The ELN's January 17, 2019 attack in Bogota on the Police Cadet School, which killed 22 people, marked the end of an agonizing peace dialogue with the government and a flight forward as a criminal organization.

In this process, the ELN has also been establishing itself in Venezuela, not only in border areas and as a place of refuge and hiding place as before, but also in other parts of the neighboring country and as an area of activity. The same has happened with the FARC dissidents led by Iván Márquez, Jesús Santrich and El Paisa, who on August 29 announced their return to arms, in a video presumably recorded in Venezuela. The interest of Nicolás Maduro's regime to count on the help of armed elements of these characteristics has led the ELN and the ex-FARC of Márquez, who was the FARC's issue 2 and its chief negotiator in the peace negotiations held in Havana, to become binational groups, with recruitment of Venezuelans as well.

ELN

The growing presence of these groups in Venezuela has been noted by Colombian authorities. The commander of the Military Forces, General Luis Navarro, indicated in the middle of the year that some 1,100 ELN members (slightly more than 40% of 2,400 fighters of this organization, although other sources consider leave this total figure) were taking refuge in Venezuela and that group had at least 320 Venezuelan citizens in its ranks.

Meanwhile, while attending the United Nations General Assembly at the end of September, President Ivan Duque raised the ELN's presence in Venezuela to 1,400 troops. Duque indicated that there were 207 geographical points controlled by the ELN on Venezuelan soil, including several training camps and twenty airstrips for drug trafficking, as documented in a controversial dossier that was not released to the public because it contained some erroneous test photographs.

A few days earlier, Foreign Minister Carlos Holmes Trujillo told the OAS about the location of ELN fronts and FARC dissidents in Venezuela and referred to their close connections with the Chavista regime. "The links would be made with members of the armed forces, the national guard, military intelligence, as well as with irregular groups such as the Bolivarian Liberation Force," he said.

Other details were investigated by the Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP), which in its report stated that the ELN finances itself through criminal activities such as extortion and maintains control of gasoline smuggling and mining in several regions of Colombia and Venezuela. In Venezuelan territory, with a presence in at least twelve of its 24 states, it controls gold mines in Bolivar state, hundreds of kilometers from the Colombian border, and coltan mining activities in Amazonas state. These illicit acts would account for 70 percent of their profits according to information attributed to Colombian intelligence. Thus, the ELN's base of operations in Venezuela would currently be the largest source source of income for the insurgent group .

FARC Dissidences

As for FARC dissidents, Colombian government sources midway through 2019 put the number at around 2,300 individuals (including non-demobilized elements, others who returned to arms, and new recruits). While this is close to the figure offered for the ELN, it must be taken into account that FARC dissidents are atomized.

Some 600 of them are reportedly in Venezuela, including some 250 Venezuelans who have reportedly joined their ranks (almost 10 percent of their total strength). Although they are separate groups that operate on their own, most attention has been given to the one led by Iván Márquez, due to its coordination with the Maduro regime. One episode that has featured in this group was the alleged assassination attempt in Colombia of Rodrigo Londoño, who led the FARC as Timochenko and who has remained loyal to the peace accords. Londoño accused Márquez and El Paisa of ordering the action, foiled by Colombian security forces and unveiled in January 2020, so that other former guerrillas would return to arms as they ran out of leadership in civilian life.

Internal documentation of the Venezuelan secret services published by Semana reveals the close partnership relationship between the Maduro government, the ELN and the ex-FARC. "The regime went from hiding fugitive guerrillas in the early 2000s to serving as the headquarters of operations for these groups. Not only do they prepare themselves militarily, but they also train the militias and the so-called colectivos in guerrilla warfare tactics and strategies," the weekly indicated.

All this is producing an operational convergence in Venezuela between the ELN and the ex-FARC. However, the status does not necessarily lead to a merger of both groups, which in Colombia maintain their differences, further encouraged by the aspirations of the different criminal groups into which the FARC dissidents have split, which are referred to in the plural for a reason.

On the other hand, the implementation of the Peace Accords was framed in 2019 in a growing climate of insecurity caused by the murder throughout the year of 77 former FARC guerrillas (totaling 173 since the peace signature in 2016) and 86 local social leaders, according to the report of the UN University Secretary, António Guterres. Colombian organizations raise the latter figure, such as the programs of study Institute for development and Peace(Indepaz), which speaks of 282 homicides, often linked to the attempt to replace coca with legal crops in regions where drug trafficking is active. In any case, this is a decrease compared to 2018, something that can be attributed to the fact that the new territorial distribution of the armed groups has already been consolidated and they have less effective resistance.

U.S. Southern Command highlights Iranian interest in consolidating Hezbollah's intelligence and funding networks in the region

• Throughout 2019 Rosneft tightened its control over PDVSA, marketing 80% of production, but U.S. sanctions forced its departure from the country

• The arrival of Iranian Revolutionary Guard troops comes amidst a US naval and air deployment in the Caribbean, not far from Venezuelan waters.

• The Iranians, once again beset by Washington's sanctions, return to the country that helped them to circumvent the international siege during the era of the Chávez-Ahmadinejab alliance.

​

▲ Nicolas Maduro and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani at a meeting in Tehran in 2015 [Hossein Zohrevand, Tasnim News Agency].

report SRA 2020 / Emili J. Blasco [PDF version].

MAY 2020-In a short time Venezuela has gone from depending on credits from China, to throwing itself into the hands of the Russian energy sector (as was particularly evident in 2019) and then to asking for the financial aid of Iranian oil technicians (as seen at the beginning of 2020). If the Chinese public credits were supposed to keep the country running, the Rosneft aid was already only intended to save the national oil company, PDVSA, while the financial aid of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard only seeks to reactivate some refineries. Each time who assists Venezuela has a smaller size and the purpose is more and more reduced.

In just ten years the large Chinese public banks granted $62.2 billion in credits to the Venezuelan government. The last of the 17 credits came in 2016; since then Beijing has disregarded the knocks Nicolás Maduro has given at its door. Although already since 2006 Chavismo had also received credits from Moscow, (some $17 billion, for the purchase of weapons from Russia itself), Maduro turned to pleas to Vladimir Putin when the Chinese financial aid ended. Not wanting to give any more credits, the Kremlin articulated another way to help the regime that at the same time ensured the immediate collection of benefits. Thus began Rosneft's direct involvement in various aspects of the Venezuelan oil business, beyond the specific exploitation of some fields.

This mechanism was particularly relevant in 2019, when the progressive US sanctions on Venezuela's oil activity began to have a great effect. To circumvent the sanctions on PDVSA, Rosneft became a marketer of Venezuelan oil, controlling the placing on the market of most of the total production (between 60% and 80%).

Washington's threat to punish Rosneft also caused the company to shift its business to two subsidiaries, Rosneft Trading and TNK Trading International, which in turn gave up this activity when the United States pointed them out. Despite the fact that Rosneft generally serves the geopolitical interests of the Kremlin, the fact that its shareholding includes BP or Qatari funds means that the company does not risk its profit and loss account so easily.

The departure of Rosneft, which also saw no economic sense in continuing to get involved in reactivating the Venezuelan refineries, whose paralysis has plunged the country into a generalized lack of fuel supply to the population, left Maduro without many options. The Russians abandoned the Armuy refinery at the end of January 2020 and the following month the Iranians were already trying to restart it. Within weeks, Iran's new involvement in Venezuela became public: Tarek el Assami, the Chavista leader with the strongest connections to Hezbollah and the Shiite world, was appointed Oil Minister in April, and in May five cargo ships brought fuel oil and presumably refining machinery from Iran to Venezuela.

The supply did not solve much (the gasoline would barely be enough for a few weeks' consumption) and the Iranian technicians, at least some of them led by the Revolutionary Guard, were hardly going to be able to fix the refining problem. Meanwhile, Tehran was getting in return important shipments of gold as payment for its services (nine tons, according to the Trump Administration). The Iranian airline Mahan, used by the Revolutionary Guards in their operations, was involved in the transports.

Thus, stifled by the new outline of sanctions imposed by Donald Trump, Iran returned to Venezuela in search of economic oxygen and also of political partnership vis-à-vis Washington, as when Mahmud Ahmadinejad allied with Hugo Chávez to alleviate the restrictions of the first sanctions regime suffered by the Islamic nation.

U.S. naval and air deployment

Iran's "interference" in the Western Hemisphere had already been mentioned, among the list of risks for regional security, in the appearance of the head of the U.S. Southern Command, Admiral Craig Faller, on Capitol Hill in Washington (in January he went to the Senate and in March to the House of Representatives, with the same written speech ). Faller referred mainly to Iran's use of Hezbollah, whose presence in the continent has been helped by Chavism for years. According to the admiral, that activity linked to Hezbollah "allows Iran to gather intelligence and carry out contingency plans for possible retaliatory attacks against the United States and/or Western interests."

However, the novelty of Faller's intervention was in two other matters. On the one hand, for the first time, the head of the Southern Command placed China's risk ahead of Russia's, in a context of growing rivalry between Washington and Beijing, which is also manifested in the taking of positions on Chinese investments in strategic infrastructure works in the region.

On the other hand, he announced a forthcoming "increased U.S. military presence in the hemisphere", something that began to take place at the end of March 2020 when U.S. ships and aircraft were deployed in the Caribbean and the Pacific to reinforce the fight against drug trafficking. In the context of its speech, this increased military activity in the region was understood as a necessary notice towards extra-hemispheric countries.

"Above all, in this fight what matters is persistent presence," he said, "we have to be present on the field to compete, and we have to compete to win." Specifically, he proposed more joint actions and maneuvers with other countries in the region and the "recurring rotation of small special operations forces teams, soldiers, sailors, pilots, Marines, Coast Guardsmen and staff National Guard to help us strengthen those partnerships."

But the arrival of U.S. ships near Venezuelan waters, just a few days after the announcement on March 26 from New York and Miami of the opening of a macro-court case for drug trafficking and other crimes against the main Chavista leaders, among them Nicolás Maduro and Diosdado Cabello, gave this military deployment a connotation of physical encirclement of the Chavista regime.

That deployment also gave some context to two other developments that occurred shortly thereafter, offering misreadings: the failed Operation Gideon, on May 3, of a group of mercenaries who claimed to have the intention of infiltrating the country for Maduro (the increased transmission capabilities acquired by the US in the area, thanks to its maneuvers, were in principle not employed in that operation), and the arrival of the Iranian ships at the end of the month (the US deployment raised suspicions that Washington could intercept the advance of the vessels, which did not happen).

Regional security in the Americas has been the focus of concern over the past year in Venezuela. We also review the sale of arms by Russia and Spain to the region, the Latin American presence in peacekeeping missions, drugs in Peru and Bolivia, and homicides in Mexico and Brazil.

▲ Igor Sechin, director Rosneft executive, and Nicolás Maduro, in August 2019 [Miraflores Palace].

report SRA 2020 / summary executive[PDF version].

MAY 2020-Throughout 2019, Latin America had several hotspots of tension -violent street protests against economic measures in Quito, Santiago de Chile and Bogota, and against political decisions in La Paz and Santa Cruz, for example-, but as those conflicts subsided (in some cases, only temporarily) the constant problem of Venezuela as the epicenter of insecurity in the region re-emerged.

With Central American migration to the United States reduced to a minimum by the restrictive measures of the Trump Administration, it has been Venezuelan migrants who have continued to fill the shoulders of South American roads, moving from one country to another, and now numbering more than five million refugees. attendance The difficulties that this population increase entails for the host countries led several of them to increase their pressure on the government of Nicolás Maduro, approving in the OAS the activation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR). But that did not push Maduro out of power, nor did the assumption in January 2019 by Juan Guaidó of the position of president-in-charge of Venezuela (recognized by more than fifty countries), the failed coup d'état a few months later or the alleged Operation Gideon invasion of May 2020.

Although Maduro seems to have stabilized, the geopolitical background has been shifting. The year 2019 saw Rosneft gaining a foothold in Venezuela as an arm of the Kremlin, once China had moved away as a credit contributor. The risk of not recovering everything borrowed made Russia act through Rosneft, obtaining the benefit of commercializing up to 80% of the country's oil. However, the US sanctions finally forced the departure of the Russian energy company, so that at the beginning of 2020 Maduro had no other major extra-hemispheric partner to turn to than Iran. The Islamic Republic, in turn subjected to a second sanctioning regime, thus returned to the close relationship it maintained with Venezuela in the first period of international punishment, cultivated by the Chávez-Ahmadineyad tandem.

This Iranian presence is closely followed by the United States (it coincides with a deployment of the Southern Command in the Caribbean), always alert to any impulse that Hezbollah - Iranian proxy - may receive in the region. In fact, 2019 marked an important leap in the disposition of Latin American countries against that organization, as several of them qualified it as terrorist for the first time. Argentina, Paraguay, Colombia and Honduras approved that declaration, following the 25th anniversary in July of the AMIA bombing, attributed to Hezbollah. Brazil and Guatemala undertook to do so shortly. With this declaration, several of these countries have drawn up lists of terrorist organizations, making it possible to pool strategies.

The destabilization of the region by the status in Venezuela has a clear manifestation in the reception and promotion in that country of the Colombian guerrillas. In August the ex issue two of the FARC, Iván Márquez, and some other former leaders announced, presumably from Venezuelan territory, their return to arms. Both this dissident nucleus of the FARC and the ELN had begun to consolidate at the end of the year as Colombian-Venezuelan groups, with operations not only in the Venezuelan border area, but also in the interior of the country. Both groups together have some 1,700 troops in Venezuela, of which almost 600 are Venezuelan recruits, thus constituting another shock force at the service of Maduro.

Russia's exit from Venezuela comes at a time when Moscow is apparently less active in Latin America. This is the case, of course, in the field of arms sales. Russia, which had become an important exporter of military equipment to the region, has seen its sales decrease in recent years. If during the golden decade of the commodity boom various countries spent part of their important revenues on the acquisition of armaments (which also coincided with the spread of the Bolivarian tide, better related to Moscow), the collapse of commodity prices and some governmental changes made Latin America the destination of only 0.8% of total arms exports by Russia in the period 2015-2019. The United States has regained its position as the largest seller to the rest of the continent.

Spain occupies a prominent position in the arms market, as the seventh largest exporter in the world. However, it lags behind in the preferences of Latin American countries, to which it sells less defense material than it would be entitled to by the volume of overall trade it maintains with them. Nevertheless, the level of sales increased in 2019, after a year of particularly low figures. In the last five years, Spain has sold 3.6% of its global arms exports to Latin America; in that period, its main customers were Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru and Colombia.

The better provision of military equipment could suggest a greater participation in UN peacekeeping missions, perhaps as a way to maintain an active army, in a context of lack of regional deployments. However, of the total of 82,480 troops in the fourteen UN peacekeeping missions at the beginning of 2020, 2,473 came from Latin American countries, which is only 3% of the total contingent. Moreover, almost half of staff was contributed by one country, Uruguay (45.5% of the regional troops). Another small country, El Salvador (12%), is next in mission commitment, while large countries are underrepresented, notably Mexico.

In terms of citizen security, 2019 brought the good news of the reduction of homicides in Brazil, which fell by 19.2% compared to the previous year, in contrast to what happened in Mexico, where they rose by 2.5%. If in his first year as president, Jair Bolsonaro scored an important achievement, thanks to the management of the super minister of Security Sérgio Moro (a success tarnished by the increase in accidental deaths in police operations), in his first year Andrés Manuel López Obrador failed to fulfill one of his main electoral promises and was unable to break the upward trend in homicides that has invariably occurred annually throughout the mandates of his two predecessors.

In terms of the fight against drug trafficking, 2019 saw two particularly positive developments. On the one hand, the eradication of coca crops for the first time in the VRAEM, Peru's largest production area. Given its complicated accessibility and the presence of Shining Path strongholds, the area had previously been left out of the operations of this subject. On the other hand, the presidential change in Bolivia meant, according to the United States, a greater commitment by the new authorities to combat illicit coca cultivation and interdict drug shipments coming from Peru. In recent years Bolivia has become the major distributor of cocaine in the southern half of South America, connecting Peruvian and Bolivian production with the markets of Argentina and especially Brazil, and with its export ports to Europe.

Venezuelans leaving the country to seek a livelihood in a place of refuge [UNHCR UNHCR].

[download the complete PDF]

REPORT SRA 2020

May 2020

PRESENTATION

The Covid-19 pandemic has radically altered safety assumptions around the world. The emergence of the coronavirus moved from China to Europe, then to the United States and then to the rest of the Western Hemisphere. Already economically damaged by its dependence on commodity exports since the onset of the Chinese slowdown, Latin America was suffering from the successive restrictions of the different geographical areas, to finally enter also into a production and consumption crisis and a health and labor catastrophe. The region is expected to be one of the hardest hit, with effects also in the field of security.

This annual report , however, focuses on American regional security in 2019. Although in certain aspects it includes events of early 2020, and therefore some first effects of the pandemic, the impact of the pandemic on issues such as regional geopolitics, states' budgetary difficulties, organized crime or citizen security are left for next year's report .

To the extent that in recent months other developments that affected security in 2019 proved to be somewhat transitory, Venezuela remained the main focus of regional insecurity during the past year. In report we analyzed the return of Iran to the Caribbean country, after first China and then Russia preferred not to see their own economic interests harmed; we also noted the consolidation of the ELN and part of the ex-FARC as Colombian-Venezuelan binational groups.

In addition, we highlight the progress in the first time that Hezbollah has been identified as a terrorist group by several countries and we provide figures on the fall of Russian arms sales to Latin America and on the relatively low commercialization in the region of the defense material produced by Spain. We also quantify the contribution of Latin American troops to UN peacekeeping missions, as well as the success of Bolsonaro and the failure of AMLO in the evolution of homicides in Brazil and Mexico. Regarding drug trafficking, 2019 saw the first coca crop eradication operation in the VRAEM, the most complicated area of Peru in the fight against drug trafficking.

CONTENTS

SUMMARY EXECUTIVE

Latin America's largest insecurity hotspot persists in Venezuela

EXTRAHEMISPHERIC PRESENCE

Iran returns to Venezuela as a last resort after the end of credits from China and Russia

Emili J. Blasco

ISLAMIST TERRORISM

The designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist throughout the Western Hemisphere brings together strategies

Mauricio Cardarelli

GUERRILLAS

ELN and ex-FARC have 1,700 troops in Venezuela, with one-third local recruits

María Gabriela Fajardo

ARMS IMPORTS

Russia became an important arms supplier for Latin America, but its sells have dropped

Peter Cavanagh

ARMS PURCHASES

Spanish arms exports to Latin America, below the peak of 2015 

Álvaro Fernández

PEACE MISSIONS 

Latin America contributes only 3% of the contingent of UN peacekeeping missions

Jaime Azpiri

PUBLIC SAFETY

Bolsonaro reduces homicides by 19.2% and López Obrador sees them rise by 2.5%.

T. Dias de Assis, M. Kropiwnicka

NARCOTRAPHIC

Peru eradicates coca plants for the first time in the VRAEM, Shining Path's area of action

Eduardo Villa Corta

[Ming-Sho Ho, Challenging Beijing's Mandate of Heaven. Taiwan's Sunflower and Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement. Temple University Press. Philadelphia, 2019. 230 p.]

review / Claudia López

Taiwan's Sunflower Movement and Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement achieved international notoriety throughout 2014, when they challenged the Chinese regime's 'Mandate of Heaven', to use the image that gives degree scroll to the book. It analyzes the origins, processes and also the outcomes of both protests, at a time of consolidation of the rise of the People's Republic of China. Challenging Beijing's Mandate of Heaven provides a detailed overview of where, why and how these movements came into being and achieved relevance.

Taiwan's Sunflower Movement developed in March and April 2014, when citizen demonstrations protested against the approval of a free trade agreement with China. Between September and December of the same year, the Umbrella Movement staged 79 days of protests in Hong Kong demanding universal suffrage to elect the highest authority of this enclave of special status within China. These protests attracted international attention for their peaceful and civilized organization.

Ming-Sho Ho begins by describing the historical background of Taiwan and Hong Kong from their Chinese origins. He then analyzes the status of the two territories so far this century, when Taiwan and Hong Kong have begun to encounter increased pressure from China. It also reviews the similar economic circumstances that produced the two waves of youth revolts. In the second part of the book, the two movements are analyzed: the voluntary contributions, the decision-making process and its improvisation, the internal power shift, the political influences and the challenges of the initiative. The book includes appendices with the list of Taiwanese and Hong Kong people interviewed and the methodology used for the analysis of the protests.

Ming-Sho Ho was born in 1973 in Taiwan and has been a direct observer of the island's social movements; during his time as a student of doctorate in Hong Kong he also closely followed the political discussion in the former British colony. He is currently researching initiatives for promote renewable energy in East Asian nations.

Being from Taiwan gave him access to the Sunflower Movement and allowed him to develop a close relationship with several of its key activists. He was able to witness some of the students' internal meetings and conduct in-depth interviews with students, leaders, politicians, NGO activists, journalists and university professors. This provided him with a variety of sources for his research.

Although they are two territories with different characteristics - Hong Kong is under the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China, but enjoys autonomy management assistant; Taiwan remains independent, but its statehood is challenged - both represent a strategic challenge for Beijing in its consolidation as a superpower.

The author's sympathy for these two movements is obvious throughout the book, as is his admiration for the risk taken by these student groups, especially in Hong Kong, where many of them were convicted of 'public nuisance' and 'disturbing the peace' and, in numerous cases, ended up sentenced to more than a year in prison.

The two movements had a similar beginning and a similar development , but each ended very differently. In Taiwan, thanks to the initiative, the free trade agreement with China failed and was withdrawn, and the protesters were able to call hold a farewell rally to celebrate that victory. In Hong Kong, police repression succeeded in stifling the protest and there was a final massive raid that brought a disappointing end for the protesters. However, it is possible that without the experience of those mobilizations, the new student reaction that throughout 2019 and early 2020 has put the highest Chinese authorities on the ropes in Hong Kong would not have been possible.

▲ Artistic image of a Pakistani Rupee [Pixabay].

COUNTRY RISK REPORT / M. J. Moya, I. Maspons, A. V. Acosta

[Download the report]

April 2020

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The government of Prime Minister (PM), Imran Khan, was slowly moving towards economic, social, and political improvements, but all these efforts might be hampered by the recent outbreak of the COVID-19 virus since the government must temporarily shift its focus and resources to keeping its population safe. Additionally, high logistical, legal, and security challenges still generate an uncompetitive operating environment and thus, an unattractive market for foreign investment in Pakistan. 

Firstly, in relation to the country's economic outlook, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was expected to gradually recover around 5% in the upcoming years. However, according to latest estimates, this growth will suffer a negative impact and fall to around 2%, straining the country's most recent recorded improvements. On the other hand, in the medium to long-term, Pakistan will benefit from the success of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is a strategic economic project aiming to improve infrastructure capacity in the country. Pakistan is also facing an energy crisis along with a growing demand from a booming population that hinder a proper economic progress. 

Secondly, Pakistan's political future will be shaped by Khan's ability to transform his short-term policies into long-term strategies. However, in order to achieve this, the government must tackle the root causes of political instability in Pakistan, such as long-lasting corruption, the constant military influence in decision-making processes, the historical discussion among secularism and Islamism, and the new challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Still, PM Khan's progressive reforms could represent the beginning towards a "Naya Pakistan" ("New Pakistan").  

Thirdly, Pakistan's social stability is contextualized within a high risk of terrorist attacks due to its internal security gaps. The ethnic dilemma among the provinces along with the government's violent oppression of insurgencies will continue to impede development and social cohesion within the country. This will further aggravate in light of a current shortage of resources and the impacts of climate change. 

In addition, in terms of Pakistan's security outlook, the country is expected to tackle terrorist financing and money laundering networks in order to avoid being blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Nonetheless, due to a porous border with Afghanistan, Pakistan faces drug trafficking challenges that further destabilize national security. Finally, the turbulent Indo-Pakistani relation is the most significant conflict for the South Asian country. The disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir, a possible nuclear confrontation, and the increase of nationalist movements along the Punjab region, hamper regional and international peace.  

▲ Revolutionary Guard commandos naval exercises in the Strait of Hormuz in 2015 [Wikipedia].

essay / Ana Salas Cuevas

The Islamic Republic of Iran, also known as Persia, is a country of great geopolitical importance. It is a regional power not only because of its strategic location, but also because of its large hydrocarbon resources, which make Iran the fourth country in proven oil reserves and the first in gas reserves[1].

Thus, we are talking about one of the most important countries in the world for three fundamental reasons. The first, mentioned above: its immense oil and gas reserves. Secondly, because Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, which is the key to entrance and the exit from the Persian Gulf and through which most of the hydrocarbon exports of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain pass[2]. 2] Finally, for the nuclear program in which it has invested so many years.

The Iranian republic is based on the principles of Shiite Islam, although there is great ethnic diversity in its society. It is therefore essential to take into account the great "strength of Iranian nationalism" in order to understand its politics. By appealing to its dominant position over other countries, the Iranian nationalist movement aims to influence public opinion. Nationalism has been building for more than 120 years, since the Tobacco Boycott of 1891[4] was a direct response to outside intervention and pressure, and today aims to achieve hegemony in the region. Iran's foreign and domestic policies are a clear expression of this movement[5].

Byproxy agent(proxy armies)

Subsidiary war ( war by proxy) is a war model in which a country uses third parties to fight or influence in a given territory, instead of confronting each other directly. As David Daoud points out, in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Syria, "Tehran has perfected the art of gradually conquering a country without replacing its flag"[6]. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) is directly involved in this task, training or militarily favoring the forces of other countries.

The GRI was born with the Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in order to maintain the achievements of the movement[7]. It is one of the main political and social actors in the country. It has great capacity to influence national political debates and decisions. It is also the owner of numerous companies within the country, which guarantees it a source of its own financing and reinforces its character as an internal power. It constitutes a body independent of the armed forces, and the appointment of its senior officers depends directly on the Leader of the Revolution. Among its objectives is the struggle against imperialism, and it expressly commits itself to try to rescue Jerusalem in order to return it to the Palestinians[8]. Their importance is crucial to the regime, and any attack on these bodies represents a direct threat to the Iranian government[9].

Iran's relationship with the Muslim countries around it is marked by two main facts: on the one hand, its Shiite status; on the other, the preeminence it achieved in the past in the region[10]. 10] Thanks to the fact that its external action is supported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, Iran has managed to establish strong links with political and religious groups throughout the Middle East. From there, Iran takes advantage of different resources to strengthen its influence in different countries. Firstly, by using soft power tools. Thus, among other actions, it has participated in the reconstruction of mosques and schools in countries such as Lebanon and Iraq[11]. 11] In Yemen, it has provided logistical and economic aid to the Houthi movement. In 2006, it was involved in the reconstruction of southern Beirut.

However, the methods used by these forces reach other extremes, moving to more intrusive mechanisms(hard power). For example, following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Iran has been establishing a foothold there for three decades, with Hezbollah as a proxy, taking advantage of complaints about the disenfranchisement of the Shiite community. This line of action has enabled Tehran promote its Islamic Revolution abroad[12].

In Iraq, the GRI sought to destabilize Iraq internally by supporting Shiite factions such as the Badr organization during the Iranian-Iraqi war of the 1980s. Iran, on the other hand, involved the GRI in the uprising of Saddam Hussein in the early 1990s. Through this subject of influences and embodying the proxy army paradigm, Iran has been establishing very direct influences over these places. Even in Syria, this elite Iranian corps has great influence, supporting the Al Assad government and the Shiite militias fighting alongside it.

For its part, Saudi Arabia accuses Iran and its Guard of supplying weapons in Yemen to the Houthis (a movement that defends the Shiite minority), generating an important escalation of tension between the two countries[13].

The GRI is thus consolidating its position as one of the most important factors in the Middle East landscape, driving the struggle between two opposing camps. However, it is not the only one. Thus, we find a "cold war" scenario, which ends up transcending and becoming an international focus. On the one hand, Iran, supported by powers such as Russia and China. On the other, Saudi Arabia, supported by the US. This conflict is developing, to a large extent, in an unconventional manner, through proxy armies such as Hezbollah and the Shiite militias in Iraq, Syria and Yemen[14].

Causes of a confrontation

Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran have spread throughout the Middle East (and beyond), creating two well-defined camps in the Middle East, both with claims to hegemony in the area.

To interpret this scenario and better understand civil service examination it is important, first of all, to distinguish two opposing ideological currents: Shiism and Sunnism (Wahhabism). Wahhabism is an extreme right-wing Muslim religious tendency of the Sunni branch, which is today the majority religion in Saudi Arabia. Shiism, as previously mentioned, is the current on which the Republic of Iran is based. However, as we shall see, the struggle developing between Iran and Saudi Arabia is political, not religious; it is based more on the ambition for power than on religion.

Secondly, the control of oil traffic is another cause of this rivalry. To understand this reason, it is worth bearing in mind the strategic position that the countries of the Middle East play on the global map by hosting the largest hydrocarbon reserves in the world. issue A large number of contemporary struggles are due, in fact, to the interference of the major powers in the region, trying to play a role in these territories. Thus, for example, the Sykes-Picot agreement [15] of 1916 for the sharing of European influences continues to condition current events. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran, as we have been saying, have a special role in these confrontations, for the reasons described above.

Under these considerations, it is important to point out, thirdly, the involvement of external powers such as the United States in these tensions.

The effects of the Arab Springs have weakened many countries in the region. Not so Saudi Arabia and Iran, which in recent decades have sought to consolidate their position as regional powers, largely thanks to the support provided by their oil production and large oil reserves. The differences between the two countries are reflected in the way they try to shape the region and in the different interests they seek to achieve. In addition to the ethnic differences between Iran (Persians) and Saudi Arabia (Arabs), their alignment on the international scene is also opposite. Wahhabism presents itself as anti-American, but the Saudi government is aware of its need for US support, and both countries maintain a reciprocal convenience, with oil as a base. The same is not true of Iran.

Iran and the US were close allies until 1979. The Islamic Revolution changed everything and since then, with the US embassy hostage crisis in Tehran as a particularly dramatic initial moment, tensions between the two countries have been frequent. The diplomatic confrontation has become acute again with President Donald Trump's decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015 for Iran's nuclear non-proliferation, with the consequent resumption of economic sanctions towards Iran. Moreover, in April 2019, the United States placed the Revolutionary Guard on its list of terrorist organizations[16], holding Iran responsible for financing and promote terrorism as a government tool [17].

On one side, then, is the Saudi side, supported by the US and, within the region, by the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain and Israel. On the other side, Iran and its allies in Palestine, Lebanon (pro-Shiite side) and recently Qatar, to which could be added Syria and Iraq (Shiite militias). Tensions increased after the death of Qasem Soleimani in January 2020. In the latter camp we could highlight the international support of China or Russia, but little by little we can observe a distancing of relations between Iran and Russia.

When speaking of the struggle for hegemony in the control of oil traffic, it is essential to mention the Strait of Hormuz, the crucial geographical point of this conflict, where both powers are directly confronted. This strait is a strategic zone located between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Some 40% of the world's oil passes through it[18]. Control of these waters is obviously decisive in the confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as for any of the members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries of the Middle East (OPEC) in the region: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.

One of the objectives of the economic sanctions imposed by Washington on Iran is to reduce its exports in order to favor Saudi Arabia, its major regional ally. To this end, the U.S. Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, is tasked with protecting commercial shipping at area.

The Strait of Hormuz "is the escape valve used by Iran to relieve the pressure exerted from outside the Gulf" [19]. From here, Iran tries to react to the economic sanctions imposed by the US and other powers; this is what gives it a greater voice on the international scene, as it has the capacity to block the strategic passage. Recently there have been attacks on oil tankers from Saudi Arabia and other countries[20], something that causes great economic and military destabilization in each new episode[21].  

At final, the skill between Iran and Saudi Arabia has an effect not only regionally but also globally. The conflicts that could be unleashed in this area are increasingly reminiscent of a well-known Cold War, both in terms of the methods on the battle front (and the incidence of proxy armies on this front), and the attention it requires for the rest of the world, which depends on this result, perhaps, much more than it is aware of.

Conclusions

For several years now, a regional confrontation has been consolidating that also involves the major powers. This struggle transcends the borders of the Middle East, similar to the status unleashed during the Cold War. Its main agents are the proxy armies, which promote struggles through non-state actors and unconventional warfare methods, constantly destabilizing relations between states, as well as within states themselves.

To avoid the fighting in Hormuz, countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have tried to transport oil by other routes, for example by building pipelines. This tap is held by Syria, through which the pipelines must pass in order to reach Europe). In the end, the Syrian war can be seen from many perspectives, but there is no doubt that one of the reasons for the meddling of extra-regional powers is the economic interest in the Syrian coast.

From 2015 until now, Yemen's hushed civil war is being fought. At stake are strategic issues such as the control of the Mandeb Strait. Behind this terrible war against the Houthis(proxies), there is a latent fear that the latter will take control of access to the Red Sea. In this sea and near the strait is Djibouti, where the great powers have installed instructions military for better control over the area.

The most affected power is Iran, which sees its Economics weakened by constant economic sanctions. The status affects a population oppressed both by the government itself and by international pressure. The government itself ends up misinforming the society, causing a great distrust towards the authorities. This generates a growing political instability, which manifests itself in frequent protests.

The regime has publicized these demonstrations as protests against US actions, such as the assassination of General Soleimani, without mentioning that many of these revolts are due to the great dissatisfaction of the civilian population with the serious measures taken by Ayatollah Khamenei, more focused on seeking hegemony in the area than on solving internal problems.

Thus, it is often difficult to realize the implication of these confrontations for the majority of the world. Indeed, the use of proxy armies should not distract us from the fact of the real involvement of the major powers of the West and the East (in true Cold War fashion). Nor should the alleged motives for keeping these fronts open distract us from the true incidence of what is really at stake: nothing more and nothing less than the global Economics .

Logo of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence organization. It depicts Pakistan's national animal, Markhor, eating a snake [Wikipedia].

ESSAY / Manuel Lamela

Jihadism continues to be one of the main threats Pakistan faces. Its impact on Pakistani society at the political, economic and social levels is evident, it continues to be the source of greatest uncertainty, which acts as a barrier to any company that is interested in investing in the Asian country. Although the situation concerning terrorist attacks on national soil has improved, jihadism is an endemic problem in the region and medium-term prospects are not positive. The atmosphere of extreme volatility and insistence that is breathed does not help in generating confidence. If we add to this the general idea that Pakistan's institutions are not very strong due to their close links with certain radical groups, the result is a not very optimistic scenario. In this essay, we will deal with the current situation of jihadism in Pakistan, offering a multidisciplinary approach that helps to situate itself in the complicated reality that the country is experiencing.

1. Jihadism in the region, a risk assessment

Through this graph, we will analyze the probability and impact of various risk factors concerning jihadist activity in the region. All factors refer to hypothetical situations that may develop in the short or medium term. The increase in jihadist activity in the region will depend on how many of these predictions are fulfilled.

Risk Factors:

A1: US-Taliban treaty fails, creating more instability in the region. If the United States is not able to make a proper exit from Afghanistan, we may find ourselves in a similar situation to that experienced during the 1990s. Such a scenario will once again plunge the region into a fierce civil war between government forces and Taliban groups. The proposed scenario becomes increasingly plausible if we look at the recent American actions regarding foreign policy.

A2: Pakistan two-head strategy facing terrorism collapse. Pakistan's strategy in dealing with jihadism is extremely risky, it's collapse would lead to a schism in the way the Asian state deals with its most immediate challenges. The chances of this strategy failing in the medium term are considerably high due to its structure, which makes it unsustainable over the time.

R3: Violations of the LoC by the two sides in the conflict. Given the frequency with which these events occur, their impact is residual, but it must be taken into account that it in an environment of high tension and other factors, continuous violations of the LoC may be the spark that leads to an increase in terrorist attacks in the region.

R4: Agreement between the afghan Taliban and the government. Despite the recent agreement between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Albduallah, it seems unlikely that he will be able to reach a lasting settlement with the Taliban, given the latter's pretensions. If it is true that if it happens, the agreement will have a great impact that will even transcend Afghan borders.

R5: Afghan Taliban make a coup d'état to the afghan government. In relation to the previous point, despite the pact between the government and the opposition, it seems likely that instability will continue to exist in the country, so a coup attempt by the Taliban seems more likely than a peaceful solution in the medium or long term.

R6: U.S. Democrat party wins the 2020 elections. Broadly speaking, both Republican and Democratic parties are betting on focusing their efforts on containing the growth of their great rival, China.

R7: U.S. withdraw its troops from Afghanistan regarding the result of the peace process. This is closely related to the previous point as it responds to a basic geopolitical issue.

R8: New agreement between India and Pakistan regarding the LoC. If produced, this would bring both states closer together and help reduce jihadist attacks in the Kashmir region. However, if we look at recent events, such a possibility seems distant at present.

2. The ties between the ISI and the Taliban and other radical groups

Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been accused on many occasions of being closely linked to various radical groups; for example, they have recently been involved with the radicalization of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh[1]. Although Islamabad continues strongly denying such accusations, reality shows us that cooperation between the ISI and various terrorist organizations has been fundamental to their proliferation and settlement both on national territory and in the neighboring states of India and Afghanistan. The West has not been able to fully understand the nature of this relationship and its link to terrorism. The various complaints to the ISI have been loaded with different arguments of different kinds, lacking in unity and coherence. Unlike popular opinion, this analysis will point to the confused and undefined Pakistani nationalism as the main cause of this close relationship.

The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, together with the Intelligence Bureau and the Military Intelligence, constitute the intelligence services of the Pakistani State, the most important of which is the ISI. ISI can be described as the intellectual core and center of gravity of the army. Its broad functions are the protection of Pakistan's national security and the promotion and defense of Pakistan's interests abroad. Despite the image created around the ISI, in general terms its activities and functions are based on the same "values" as other intelligence agencies such as the MI6, the CIA, etc. They all operate under the common ideal of protecting national interests, the essential foundation of intelligence centers without which they are worthless. We must rationalize their actions on the ground, move away from inquisitive accusations and try to observe what are the ideals that move the group, their connection with the government of Islamabad and the Pakistani society in general.

The Afghan Taliban

To understand the idiosyncrasy of the ISI we must go back to the war in Afghanistan[2], it is from this moment that the center begins to build an image of itself, independent of the rest of the armed forces. From the ISI we can see the victory of the Mujahideen on Afghan territory as their own, a great achievement that shapes their thinking and vision. But this understanding does not emerge in isolation and independently, as most Pakistani society views the Afghan Taliban as legitimate warriors and defenders of an honorable cause[3]. The Mujahideen victory over the USSR was a real turning point in Pakistani history, the foundation of modern Pakistani nationalism begins from this point. The year 1989 gave rise to a social catharsis from which the ISI was not excluded.

Along with this ideological component, it is also important to highlight the strategic aspect; we are dealing with a question of nationalism, of defending patriotic interests. Since the emergence of the Taliban, Pakistan has not hesitated to support them for major strategic reasons, as there has always been a fear that an unstable Afghanistan would end up being controlled directly or indirectly by India, an encirclement strategy[4]. Faced with this dangerous scenario, the Taliban are Islamabad's only asset on the ground. It is for this reason, and not only for religious commitment, that this bond is produced, although over time it is strengthened and expanded. Therefore, at first, it is Pakistani nationalism and its foreign interests that are the cause of this situation, it seeks to influence neighboring Afghanistan to make the situation as beneficial as possible for Pakistan. Later on, when we discuss the situation of the Taliban on the national territory, we will address the issue of Pakistani nationalism and how its weak construction causes great problems for the state itself. But on Afghan territory, from what has been explained above, we can conclude that this relationship will continue shortly, it does not seem likely that this will change unless there are great changes of impossible prediction. The ISI will continue to have a significant influence on these groups and will continue its covert operations to promote and defend the Taliban, although it should be noted that the peace treaty between the Taliban and the US[5] is an important factor to take into account, this issue will be developed once the situation of the Taliban at the internal level is explained.

2.2. The Pakistani Taliban (Al-Qaeda[6] and the TTP)

The Taliban groups operating in Pakistan are an extension of those operating in neighboring Afghanistan. They belong to the same terrorist network and seek similar objectives, differentiated only by the place of action. Despite this obvious similarity, from Islamabad and increasingly from the whole of Pakistani society, the two groups are observed in a completely different way. On the one hand, as we said earlier, for most Pakistanis, the Afghan Taliban are fighting a legitimate and just war, that of liberating the region from foreign rule. However, groups operating in Pakistan are considered enemies of the state and the people. Although there was some support among the popular classes, especially in the Pashtun regions, this support has gradually been lost due to the multitude of atrocities against the civilian population that have recently been committed. The attack carried out by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)[7] in the Army Public School in Peshawar in the year 2014 generated a great stir in society, turning it against these radical groups. This duality marks Pakistan's strategy in dealing with terrorism both globally and internationally. While acting as an accomplice and protector of these groups in Afghanistan, he pursues his counterparts on their territory. We have to say that the operations carried out by the armed forces have been effective, especially the Zarb-e-Azb operation carried out in 2014 in North Waziristan, where the ISI played a fundamental role in identifying and classifying the different objectives. The position of the TTP in the region has been decimated, leaving it quite weakened. As can be seen in this scenario, there is no support at the institutional level from the ISI[8], as they are involved in the fight against these radical organizations. However, on an individual level if these informal links appear. This informal network is favored by the tribal character of Pakistani society, it can appear in different forms but often draw on ties of Kinship, friendship or social obligation[9]. Due to the nature of this type of relationship, it is impossible to know to what extent the ISI's activity is conditioned and how many of its members are linked to Taliban groups. However, we would like to point out that these unions are informal and individual and not institutional, which provides a certain degree of security and control, at least for the time being, the situation may vary greatly due to the lack of transparency.

2.3. ISI and the radical groups that operate in Kashmir

Another part of the board is made up of the radical groups that focus their terrorist attention on the conflict with India over control of Kashmir, the most important of which are: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Let) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Both groups have committed real atrocities over the past decades, the most notorious being the one committed by LeT in the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008. There are numerous testimonies, in particular, that of the American citizen David Haedy, which point to the cooperation of the ISI in carrying out the aforementioned attack.[10]

Recently, Hafiz Saeed, founder of Let and intellectual planner of the bloody attack, was arrested. The news generated some turmoil both locally and internationally and opened the discussion as to whether Pakistan had finally decided to act against the radical groups operating in Kashmir. We are once again faced with a complex situation, although the arrest shows a certain amount of willpower, it is no more than a way of making up for the situation and relaxing international pressure. The above coincides with the FATF's[11] assessment of Pakistan's status within the institution, which is of great importance for the short-term future of the country's economy. Beyond rhetoric, there is no convincing evidence that suggests that Pakistan has made a move against those groups. The link and support provided by the ISI in this situation are again closely linked to strategic and ideological issues. Since its foundation, Pakistani foreign policy has revolved around India[12], as we saw on the Afghan stage. Pakistani nationalism is based on the maxim that India and the Hindus are the greatest threat to the future of the state. Given the significance of the conflict for Pakistani society, there has been no hesitation in using radical groups to gain advantages on the ground. From Pakistan perspective, it is considered that this group of terrorists are an essential asset when it comes to putting pressure on India and avoiding the complete loss of the territory, they are used as a negotiating tool and a brake on Indian interests in the region.

As we can see, the core between the ISI and certain terrorist groups is based on deep-seated nationalism, which has led both members of the ISI and society, in general, to identify with the ideas of certain radical groups. They have benefited from the situation by bringing together a huge amount of power, becoming a threat to the state itself. The latter has compromised the government of Pakistan, sometimes leaving it with little room for maneuver. The immense infrastructure and capacity of influence that Let has thanks to its charitable arm Jamaat-ud-Dawa, formed with re-localized terrorists, is a clear example of the latter. A revolt led by this group could put Islamabad in a serious predicament, so the actions taken both in Kashmir and internally to try to avoid the situation should be measured very well. The existing cooperation between the ISI and these radical groups is compromised by the development of the conflict in Kashmir, which may increase or decrease depending on the situation. What is certain, because of the above, is that it will not go unnoticed and will continue to play a key role in the future. These relationships, this two-way game could drag Pakistan soon into an internal conflict, which could compromise its very existence as a nation.

▲ Vision on mineral extraction on an asteroid, from ExplainingTheFuture.com [Christopher Barnatt].

GLOBAL AFFAIRS JOURNAL / Mario Pereira

[14-page document. downloadin PDF]

INTRODUCTION

The American astrophysicist Michio Kaku recalls that when President Thomas Jefferson bought Louisiana from Napoleon (in 1803) for the astronomical sum of 15 million dollars, he spent a long period of time in deep fear. The reason for this lay in the fact that he did not know for a long time whether the referenced territory (mostly unexplored) hid fabulous riches or, on the contrary, was a wasteland of no great value... The passage of time has more than proved the former, just as it proved that it was then that the march of the American pioneers began: those people who - just like the "Adelantados" of Castile and Extremadura in the 16th century - set out for the unknown in order to obtain fortune, discover new wonders and improve their social position.

The Jeffersons of today are the Musks and Bezos, American businessmen, owners of huge financial, commercial and technological emporiums, who, hand in hand with new "pioneers" (a mix between Jules Verne/Arthur C. Clark and Neil Armstrong/John Glenn) seek to reach the new frontier of Humanity: the commercial and mining exploitation of Outer Space.

Faced with such a challenge, there are many questions that we can (and should) ask ourselves. Here we will try to answer (at least briefly) whether the existing international and national rules and regulations regarding the mining of the Moon and celestial bodies, constitutes -or not-, a sufficient framework for the regulation of such projected activities.

▲ proposal of lunar base for obtaining helium, taken from ExplainingTheFuture.com [Christopher Barnatt].

GLOBAL AFFAIRS JOURNAL / Emili J. Blasco

[8-page document. downloadin PDF]

INTRODUCTION

The economic interest in space resources, or at least the reasonable expectation about the profitability of obtaining them, explains to a large extent the growing involvement of private investment in space travel.

Beyond the industry related to artificial satellites, of great commercial strength, and also that which serves scientific and defense purposes, where the state sector continues to play a leading role, the possibility of exploiting high-value raw materials present in celestial bodies - from entrance, in the asteroids closest to the Earth and on the Moon - has awakened a kind of gold rush that is encouraging the new space degree program .

The epic of the new space barons -Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos- has monopolized the public narrative, but alongside them there are other New Space Players, with varied profiles. Behind all of them there is a growing group of capitalist partners and restless investors willing to risk assets in the expectation of profits.

To speak of a fever is certainly exaggerated because the real economic benefit that can be achieved from space mining - obtaining platinum, for example, or lunar helium - has yet to be demonstrated, because although the technology is becoming cheaper, which financially allows us to take new steps in outer space, bringing tons of materials to Earth has a cost that in most cases detracts from the monetary sense of the operation.

It would be enough, however, that in certain situations it would be profitable to increase the issue of space missions, and it is assumed that this traffic by itself would generate the need for an infrastructure abroad, at least with stations where to refuel fuel - so expensive to raise to the firmament -, manufactured from subject raw material found in space (the water of the lunar poles could be transformed into propellant). It is this expectation, with a certain basis of reasonableness, that fuels the investments being made.

In turn, the increased space activity and the skill to obtain the sought-after resources project beyond our planet the geopolitical concepts developed for the Earth. The location of countries (there are particularly suitable locations for space launches) and the control of certain routes (the succession of the most convenient orbits for flights) are part of the new astropolitics.