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Visit of India's Prime Minister Modi to the Oval Office, on February 13, 2025 [White House].
Donald Trump's momentous comeback in 2024 has brought back uncertainty regarding the future of international relations, security cooperation, and the interdependence of nations. One partnership that could be potentially affected by Trump's foreign policy is the Quad, the association between the US, India, Japan, and Australia and has a focus on China.
The need for a multilateral security system has never been more necessary than under Trump's isolationist administration. Security partnerships, international trade, and cooperation between states lie at risk even across international waters, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. The future of international alliances and strategic partnerships appears hinged on whether they should align with Trump's objectives, as the US may withdraw its support if they do not. One partnership that remains uncertain in terms of its potential benefit to Trump is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).
This article explores the characteristics of the Quad and whether the alliance would fulfill Trump's controversial plans, and if not, what the Quad would look like without the presence of the US. It analyzes the transformation of the Quad from focusing primarily on humanitarian assistance post the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and disaster relief to adopting a relatively militaristic posture against the rise of China. The study also considers the implications of the latest presidential administrations on the Quad's trajectory and anticipates its future, particularly in the context of Trump's second term. Through this analysis, the article aims to understand what the Quad might look like without the leadership of the United States.
A response to China's assertiveness
The Quad is a grouping of four countries: the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, which envision "a region that is governed by accepted rules and norms". The Quad was initially established for disaster reliefandhumanitarian aid during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Subsequently, the humanitarian partnership became institutionalized with the initiative of the Japanese Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo, during his first term in 2007, highlighting the need for a coalition counterforce against China's rising threat. However, the Quad disbanded in 2008, when Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd decided to withdraw from the dialogue, claiming that it did not represent Australia's strategic outlook. After a surge in Chinese coercive behavior in the years leading up to Trump's first term, the Quad was formally reestablished in 2017, much to China's dismay,which claims that the Quad is a thinly-veiled attempt at containment. Although President Biden continued the dialogue and expanded the United States' Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, Trump's return to power could threaten it.
Trump's evolving relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin is one of concern. If Trump fails to broker an end to the Russia-Ukraine war as he promised to and Russia claims victory, China might have anincentive to make changes of its own in the Indo-Pacific. China could be motivated to attempt 'reunification'with Taiwan if it perceives that attempts to prevent this would be unsuccessful. This situation could also be exacerbated by the new Trump Administration's policies toward Taiwan and its increasingly ambiguous stance toward the defense of the island should any instance of Chinese aggression occur.
Trump's desire to reinvigorate the US' semiconductor industry, which he claims Taiwan stole from the US, andfurther target Taiwan through tariffs and a pressure to increase defense spending could also have both positive and negative impacts toward the Quad itself. In his few months in office, Trump has already proven to keep up his hard-handed foreign and economic policy, which could potentially benefit the Quad in some ways. Hispolicies toward Taiwan might pull the US closer to other Quad members, as Trump has mostly targeted China with his tariff policies, and the Quad was initially formed as a way to balance China's dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Further, Taiwan has invested heavily in the US' semiconductor industry under Trump's commands, and could be fearful of losing the US' support and defense if it does not comply. This could turn Taiwan into a closer, albeit informal and unofficial, ally of the Quad and a further line of defense against China.
However, Trump's actions of taking business-and potentially defense-away from Taiwan might actually encourage China to attempt to retake the island. Although he has not stated that the US will not defend Taiwan in the case of Chinese aggression, Trump's history of unpredictability and easily changing policies are cause for concern, especially among Taiwanese people. Moreover, if China does attempt something of this kind, the other Quad countries will be forced to take action alongside their ally and become involved in an international conflict.
Options
Ultimately, Trump's reelection as US president will have implications for the Quad whichever way his policyleans:
i) If Trump chooses to pursue the alliance, especially in a more defensive context as a barrier against China, the Quad could potentially become more interdependent as a result of Trump's outspoken hatred for the emerging superpower. The other three Quad countries might not be affected as much if Trump decides to takethis route, although they could face potential repercussions for being US allies if Trump's tariffs on China cause more damage than they already have.
ii) However, the Quad would have to readjust its outlook and strategy should Trump choose to pursue an isolationist policy. Isolationism could either lead to the US diminishing its support to the Quad or leaving it entirely, much like Australia did in 2008.
Either way, both of these options would mean that the Quad would be left almost defenseless in an arena with a rapidly growing superpower. The disappearance of the US could imply that the three remaining stateswould have to input more money and defense capabilities toward the alliance, and India would most likely be burdened with the weight of being the Quad's new biggest defender against China. Furthermore, the Quadmight look to other emerging powers in the Indo-Pacific region to be new allies against China, such as South Korea.
However, Trump has not made any moves that would indicate the US will pull out of the Quad. He has notmade any changes to his predecessor Biden's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, which affirms the state's readiness to address challenges in the region, and the foreign ministers of all four Quad countries met in Washington almost immediately after Trump's second inauguration to reassess and strengthen diplomatic ties between the group. Furthermore, Trump has met with several of the Quad members individually, such as his February meeting with Indian Prime Minister Modi, in an effort to advance the US' foreign policy in the region.
This demonstrates that Trump, though he might be volatile in some matters, is still willing to commit the United States to the Quad and the protection of the Indo-Pacific in the coming future. While Trump's return to power introduces uncertainty and potential volatility to the Quad's future, his administration has thus far demonstrated a willingness to maintain and even strengthen strategic ties in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad's endurance will ultimately depend on its ability to adapt to shifting US policies while reinforcing its shared commitment to regional security and balancing China's rise.