U.S.-China relations do not satisfy either country; they probably never will. They must try to manage them, peacefully, peacefully

▲meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump [White House video screebshot].

ANALYSIS / María Granados

The National Security Strategy unveiled in December by Donald Trump label formally lists China and Russia as "rivals" of the United States. It presents these two countries as actors that "challenge the power, influence and interests" of Washington and "seek to erode the security and prosperity" of Americans. Although the document also considers "rogue" states such as Iran and North Korea, and transnational organizations, both jihadist and organized crime, as threats, the arguments of the new U.S. Administration focus especially on China. The Asian nation appears as the great obstacle to the realization of the "America First" promised by Trump, because of its unfair trade and currency practices.

Thus, the first National Security Strategy document of the Trump era corroborates the speech that he had maintained as candidate. During the election campaign Trump spoke of China as a "currency manipulator" and accused it of keeping the yuan artificially low. He also threatened Beijing with starting a trade war, complaining about the economic consequences for the US of China's excessive trade surplus in bilateral relations, as well as the reduction of US manufacturing jobs. Shortly after being elected, before the inauguration of his term, Trump provoked a diplomatic friction with China by having a telephone conversation with the president of Taiwan.

However, since his arrival at the White House, Trump has taken care to iron out these differences with China. He committed to maintaining the One China Policy, retracted his criticisms, and met in Florida with President Xi Jinping, agreeing to respect each other's sphere of influence and not to intervene in the internal affairs of the other. This, together with an incipient partnership in the sanctions against North Korea, seemed to be giving birth to a rapprochement that has not materialized. In fact, the treatment of China as a "rival" that the US National Security Strategy officially gives it breaks in a way with a long period of mutual acceptance that began in the 1970s.

Nixon's opening

The United States and China had serious precedents: the Korean War (1950-1953), which pitted China and the USSR in the North against the American-supported South, of which the Vietnam War (1955-1975) was a collateral consequence; and the nuclear danger that began in 1949, the year in which the USSR carried out the first effective essay . For Washington, from an ideological and military point of view, China was an international actor that it was desirable to control. For Beijing, in alliance with the Soviet Union, it was urgent to propagate communism's speech about the "imperialist enemy", which it repeated with intensity throughout the first years of the Cold War.

speech In 1969, the new US President, Richard Nixon, included in his inaugural address reference letter against isolationism (1). From the other side of the world there were also new messages: the distancing that Mao began to establish in relation to the USSR due to its border conflicts. This disrupted the triangle of international relations existing in those years of the Cold War (China, USSR, USA), and began to create a link between Beijing and Washington.

Thus, the first signs of rapprochement began to appear. In 1971 the United States voted for Taiwan's seat on the United Nations Security committee to be taken by the People's Republic of China. In 1972 the Shanghai statement was drafted, which established the instructions for Sino-US rapprochement and was embodied in five principles:

1. The One China Policy: establishing diplomatic relations with China meant not being able to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and vice versa, since both claim to be the true and only China.

2. Do not support Taiwan's independence.

3. Not to support the possible invasion of Japan.

4. Peaceful resolution of the conflict with Taiwan, reducing military installations on the island.

5. The commitment to continue being peaceful allies in search of lasting cooperation.

Since the rapprochement of the 1970s, relations between the two countries have been heavily influenced by Washington and Beijing's attitude towards Taiwan and the two Koreas, in a sort of indirect Sino-American relations.

The Taiwan issue

The self-styled Republic of China had been the main obstacle to the complete normalization of relations, as seen with the Shanghai statement . Actual reunification by (mainland) China was prevented by U.S. troops.

After 1973 we find two important documents: the so-called Taiwan Relations Act, by which the US recognized the island as having the same privileges as before, but not as a sovereign nation, and the Joint statement (sometimes known as the "Second Shanghai statement ), which drastically cut arms sales to Taiwan. In 1979, Washington and Beijing exchanged ambassadors and the Americans ceased formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Around 1980, the policy advocated by the mainland Chinese government was "one country, two systems", offering Formosa the exceptionality of a different and economically independent political system, but being part of the one China. However, this formula did not meet the 23rd province's desire for independence. By 1985, the island's government was moving steadily towards democracy (2).

In the late 1990s, Beijing threatened Taiwan with military exercises in the surrounding waters, in which missiles were deployed, prompting a forceful response from the United States: the dispatch of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region; with this Washington showed a clear decision to protect the former ally because of its strategic importance.

The current status remains complex. No direct courier or telecommunications links have been established between China and its rebel province; no postal or parcel shipments are being sent, and there is no direct flight connection. Face-to-face meetings between delegates have been infrequent and not very productive.

The North Korea problem

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for its part, is a particularly critical point in Sino-American relations, which also affects South Korea and Japan, both US allies Pyongyang has already conducted six subway nuclear tests and continues its missile launches over the Sea of Japan.

China is North Korea's only ally: it is its largest trading partner and its main source of food and energy. Beijing has historically opposed tough international sanctions against its neighbor. The desire for the survival of communism is essential to understand the close relationship between the sui generis Korean dictatorship and China. It is easy to guess why: if Kim Jong-Un's regime falls, Xi Jinping's regime could be destabilized. A refugee crisis, with thousands of North Koreans crossing the 1,400-kilometer border between the two countries, would have serious effects on the Asian giant. Although they continue to be strongly linked to Pyongyang, the Chinese have pushed for the resumption of the Six-Party Dialogue and have accepted the application of certain international sanctions.

Trump's blunt assertion that "if China won't solve the North Korean problem, we will" does not really dispel doubts about what might happen if Pyongyang crosses the threshold of nuclear capability. Certainly as the Kim Jong-Un regime has moved closer to that threshold, Beijing has increased its diplomatic, financial and trade pressures on its neighbor (3). But the possibility that North Korea is already on the verge of reaching its strategic goal leaves the United States with the choice of military action, which can hardly be both effective and limited, or having to settle for a policy of containment.

Over the years, Washington has tried to encourage North Korea to irreversibly forget its nuclear program, offering in return a reward consisting of financial aid, diplomatic advantages and the normalization of relations. At the same time, South Korea hosts 29,000 U.S. military personnel. In March 2017, executive orders from the US President and congress went beyond sanctions: a defense system known as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) (4) was programmed as a preventive measure against a possible attack from the North and with the goal to ensure the stability of the region.

The THAAD battery is particularly interesting to analyze because of the dual perspective it presents. Because of its limited range and capability, it should not be of concern to China, as the interceptors would not be able to reach Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles at any point along the trajectory from almost any of the possible launch locations. Thus, neither Washington nor Seoul should portray the system as a form of retaliation against Beijing for its failed sanctions on North Korea. Unfortunately, U.S. and South Korean officials suggest that the purpose of installing the THADD system is to send a message to China as a warning. Degree This is counterproductive, as it only offers reasons to justify the nuclearization of the Asian hegemon in the face of the apparent degradation of its medium-range,second-strike capability technology.

Mutual dissatisfactions

If issues relating to Taiwan and North Korea have occupied much of the bilateral diary , the question of China's economic transformation, since its impetus by Deng Xiaoping, has been central to the direct relationship between China and the United States.

The Gǎigé kāifàng (reform and opening up) emphasized modernization and economic and political reform. This led to normalized diplomatic relations and the development of bilateral trade and investment. Cooperation on subject political, economic and security with the former "American imperialists" was based on the prevention of terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation, and the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula.

However, there are still unresolved issues. U.S. dissatisfaction is due to China's human rights policy and its financial moves to devalue its currency as a measure to control inflation. These currency movements call into question the control of the market by the American hegemon, which currently has greater weight and primacy, among other things, because the dollar is the international currency of exchange (it could thus "export its inflation" to Beijing). Also of concern in Washington is the dependence of the United States on imports from China, which generates a large bilateral trade deficit for the Americans. Another potential problem is the sale of missiles and nuclear technology to third states in the Middle East and Asia.

From the Chinese perspective, their dissatisfaction is due to US arms sales to the rogue province (Taiwan), the defense system established in South Korea (both the THAAD system and the military financial aid ), and a US international policy that Beijing calls threatening, imperialistic and domineering.

Cooperation channels

The U.S. view of China as a "rival," as reflected in the Trump Administration's first National Defense Strategy document, stems from the realization that the Chinese regime is not moving toward democracy as many in the rest of the world had hoped. "For decades, US policy was based on the belief that supporting China's rise and integration into the post-war international order would liberalize that country," the document says, noting that Beijing is not sliding towards a regime of political freedoms and respect for human rights, so Washington can no longer be as condescending to Beijing as it used to be.

Probably, without China's assumption of the values and principles that give meaning to the United States, a real and confident rapprochement between the two superpowers is impossible. Still, for the survival of both, extensive cooperation between them is necessary.

Although a war between the United States and China is not impossible, it is unlikely for a variety of reasons, as Steinberg and O'Hanlon argue in Strategic Reassurance and Resolve (2015):

The common goals of economic prosperity, trade exchange , and interdependence at the stock market, financial and business levels make a warlike confrontation very damaging for both countries. In addition, China has progressively adopted measures against fraud and destabilization by computer manipulation, at the behest of the United States; the issue of cyber espionage, although it continues to provoke mutual disagreements, is regularly addressed by both countries in their bilateral meetings, aware that it is likely to become more important over the years.

-The South China Sea is a trade route that has never been closed, although it is a source of disputes to be taken into account, as they remain unresolved even though they have been brought before the Court dealing with the Law of the Sea (following the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). The United States has strategic and commercial interests in the region that link it to its allies (Japan and South Korea), so this could be a source of tension. In any case, at present it does not seem that China wishes to provoke a military escalation in the area, even though it has established instructions on artificial islands and moved troops.

-ASEAN's code of conduct for the South China Sea, which precludes the use of force, may cause Beijing to rethink increasing its aggressiveness in the region. That ASEAN's push for China to stop claiming maritime sovereignty that has been rejected by the international community are points against war.

-There are several joint operations in the fight against terrorism (ISIS) and in the prevention of piracy, in which the two superpowers are involved.

China has increased its humanitarian financial aid and its work in support of UN peacekeeping missions.

In a scenario of non-understanding between Beijing and Washington, but at the same time of non-armed confrontation, the following actions may be suggested:

-A negotiation that would include reduced U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in exchange for increased coastal security, and a commensurate reduction by China of threats to the island.

-Greater cooperation and transparency in arms and troop movements, militarization, restructuring of armed forces and military exercises in the Pacific.

-Creation of joint organizations to fight organized crime and cyber-attacks, especially against threats to civilian infrastructure.

-Support and consistency in preventing nuclear escalation. Negotiation in reaching a firm conclusion on how to weaken the Pyongyang regime. Serious and consistent criticism, knowing the impossibility (as well as harm) of its direct overthrow.

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(1) "We seek an open world--open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people--a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.
We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy". Inaugural Address (January 20, 1969)

(2) It was the first time that the Democratic Progressive Party succeeded in pushing through the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan elections and forming a unified coalition against the Kuomintang. In 1992 the first free legislative elections took place in Taiwan.

(3) "China will be most likely to put diplomatic and financial pressure on North Korea if it believes that failing to do so will lead the United States to destabilize the regime," write Joshua Stanton, Sung- Yoon Lee, and Bruce Klingner in Foreign Affairs.

(4) The system typically has between 48 and 62 interceptor missiles with ranges of up to 200 kilometers, supported by radar with a range of up to about 1,000 kilometers.