June 1, 2020

ANALYSIS / Salvador Sánchez Tapia [Brigadier General (Res.)].

The COVID-19 pandemic that Spain has been experiencing since the beginning of 2020 has highlighted the commonplace, no less true for having been repeated, that the concept of national security can no longer be limited to the narrow framework of military defense and demands the involvement of all the nation's capabilities, coordinated at the highest possible level which, in the case of Spain, is none other than that of the Presidency of the Government through the National Security committee .[1] In the case of Spain, this is none other than the Presidency of the Government through the National Security committee .

In coherence with this approach, our Armed Forces have been directly and actively involved in a health emergency a priori far from the traditional missions of the military arm of the nation. This military contribution, however, responds to one of the missions entrusted to the Armed Forces by the Organic Law of National Defense, as well as to a long tradition of military support to civil society in case of catastrophe or emergency.[2] In its execution, units of the three Armies have carried out tasks as varied and apparently unrelated to their natural activity, such as the disinfection of nursing homes or the transfer of corpses between hospitals and morgues.

This status has stirred up a certain amount of discussion in specialized and professional circles about the role of the Armed Forces in present and future security scenarios. From different angles, some voices are calling for the need to reconsider the missions and dimensions of the Armed Forces, in order to align them with these new threats, not with that of the classic war between states.

This vision seems to have one of its points of support in the apparently empirical confirmation of the current absence internship conventional armed conflicts - understood as those that pit armies with conventional means against each other maneuvering on a battlefield - between states. From this reality, it is concluded that this form of conflict is practically banished, being little more than a historical relic replaced by other less conventional and less "military" threats such as pandemics, terrorism, organized crime, fake news, disinformation, climate change or cybernetics.

The corollary is evident: it is necessary and urgent to rethink the missions, dimensions and equipment of the Armed Forces, since their current configuration is designed to confront outdated conventional threats, and not for those that are emerging in the present and future security scenario.

A critical analysis of this idea sample, however, a somewhat more nuanced picture. From a purely chronological point of view, the still unfinished Syrian civil war, admittedly complex, is closer to a conventional model than to any other subject and, of course, the capabilities with which Russia is making its influence felt in this war by supporting the Assad regime are fully conventional. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and occupied South Ossetia and Abkhazia in a conventional offensive operation. In 2006, Israel was confronted in South Lebanon by a hybrid enemy like Hezbollah - in fact, this was the model chosen by Hoffman as the prototype for coining the term "hybrid" - which combined elements of irregular warfare with fully conventional ones.[3] Earlier still, in 2003, the United States invaded Iraq in a massive armored offensive.[4] In 2007, the United States invaded Iraq in a massive armored offensive.

If the case of Syria is eliminated, considering it doubtfully classifiable as a conventional war, it can still be argued that the last conflict of this nature -which, moreover, involved territorial gain- took place only twelve years ago; a period of time short enough to think that conclusions can be drawn that would allow conventional warfare to be dismissed as a quasi-extinct procedure . In fact, the past has recorded longer periods than this without significant confrontations, which could well have led to similar conclusions. In Imperial Roman times, for example, the Antonine era (96-192 AD), involved a long period of internal Pax Romana briefly disrupted by Trajan's campaigns in Dacia. More recently, after Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo (1815), the Central Powers of Europe experienced a long period of peace of no less than thirty-nine years.[5] Needless to say, the end of both periods was marked by the return of war to the foreground.

It can be argued that the status is now different, since humanity today has developed a moral rejection of war as a destructive and therefore unethical and undesirable exercise. This distinctly Western-centric - if you prefer the neologism - or, if you prefer, Eurocentric stance, takes the part for the whole and assumes this view as unanimously shared at the global level. However, the experience of the Old Continent, with a long history of destructive wars among its states, with a highly aging population, and with little appetite to remain a relevant player in the International System, may not be shared by the whole world.

Western rejection of war may, moreover, be more apparent than real, being directly related to the interests at stake. It is conceivable that, faced with an immediate threat to its survival, any European state would be willing to go to war, even at the risk of becoming a pariah ostracized by the international system. If, when the time came, such a state had sacrificed its traditional military muscle in pursuit of the fight against more ethereal threats, it would have to pay the price associated with such a decision. It should be borne in mind that states choose their wars only to a certain extent, and that they may be forced into them, even against their will. As Trotsky said, "you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you".

The analysis of the historical periods of peace referred to above suggests that, in both cases, they were made possible by the existence of a moderator power stronger than that of the political entities that made up the Roman Empire and post-Napoleon Europe. In the first case, this power would have been that of Rome itself and its legions, sufficient to guarantee the internal order of the empire. In the second, the European powers, at odds for many reasons, nevertheless remained united against France in the face of the possibility that the ideas of the French Revolution would spread and undermine the foundations of the Ancien Régime.

Today, although it is difficult to find a verifiable cause-effect relationship, it is plausible to think that this "pacifying" force is provided by American military power and the existence of nuclear weapons. Since the end of World War II, the United States has provided an effective security umbrella under whose protection Europe and other regions of the world have been spared the scourge of war in their territories, developing feelings of extreme rejection towards any of its forms.

On the basis of its unrivaled military power, the United States - and we with it - have been able to develop the idea, supported by the facts, that no other power will be so suicidal as to engage in open conventional warfare. The conclusion is obvious: conventional warfare -against the United States, I might add- becomes, in the internship, unthinkable.

This conclusion, however, is not based on a moral preference, nor on the conviction that other forms of warfare or threat are more effective, but simply on the realization that, faced with the enormous conventional power of the United States, one can only seek asymmetry and confront it by other means. To paraphrase Conrad Crane, "there are two kinds of enemy: the asymmetrical and the stupid."[6] The enemy is the asymmetric.

In other words, classical military power is a major deterrent that financial aid in explaining the leave recurrence of conventional warfare. Not surprisingly, even authors who preach the end of conventional warfare advocate that the United States should retain its conventional warfare capability.[7] The United States has been a major force in conventional warfare for many years.

From North America, this idea has permeated the rest of the world or, at least, the European cultural sphere, where it has become a truth that, under the guise of incontestable reality, obviates the possibility of the United States initiating a conventional war - as occurred in 2003 - or of it occurring between two nations of the world, or within one of them, in areas where armed conflict continues to be an acceptable tool .

In an exercise of cynicism, it could be said that such a possibility does not change anything, since it does not concern us. However, in today's interconnected world, there will always be the possibility that we will be forced to intervene for ethical reasons, or that our security interests will be affected by what happens in countries or regions a priori geographically and geopolitically distant from us, and that, probably hand in hand with our allies, we will be involved in a classic war.

Although still in place, the commitment of U.S. military power to Western security is under severe strain as America is increasingly reluctant to assume this role alone, and is demanding that its partners make a greater effort on behalf of its own security. We are not suggesting here that the transatlantic link will break down immediately. It seems sensible, however, to think that its maintenance comes at a cost to us that may drag us into some armed conflict. It is worth asking, moreover, what might happen if one day the U.S. commitment to our security were to lapse and we had transformed our armed forces to focus exclusively on "new threats," dispensing with a conventional capability that would undoubtedly reduce the cost that someone would have to incur if they decided to attack us with such means subject

A final consideration has to do with what appears to be the unstoppable rise of China to the role of major player in the International System, and with the presence of an increasingly assertive Russia, which is demanding to be considered once again as a major global power. Both nations, especially the former, are in a clear process of rearmament and modernization of their military, conventional and nuclear capabilities, which does not exactly augur the end of conventional warfare between states.

To this must be added the effects of the pandemic, which are still difficult to glimpse, but among which there are some worrying aspects that should not be overlooked. One of these is China's effort to position itself as the real winner of the crisis, and as the international power of reference letter in the event of a repetition of a global crisis such as the present one. Another is the possibility that the crisis may result, at least temporarily, in less international cooperation, not more; that we may witness a certain regression of globalization; and that we may see the erection of barriers to the movement of people and goods in what would be a reinforcement of realist logic as a regulatory element in international relations.

In these circumstances, it is difficult to predict the future evolution of the "Thucydides trap" in which we currently find ourselves due to the rise of China. It is likely, however, to bring with it greater instability, with the possibility of it escalating into some conventional subject conflict, whether between great powers or through proxies. In such circumstances, it seems advisable to be prepared for the most dangerous scenario of an open armed conflict with China, as the best way to avoid it or, at least, to confront it in order to preserve our way of life and our values.

Finally, we cannot overlook the capacity that many of the "new threats" - global warming, pandemics, etc. - have as generators, or at least catalysts, of conflicts that could lead to a war that could well be conventional.

From all of the above it can be concluded, therefore, that, if it is true that the recurrence of conventional warfare between states is minimal today, it seems risky to think that it could be put away in some obscure attic, as if it were an ancient relic. However remote the possibility may seem, no one is in a position to guarantee that the future will not bring conventional warfare. Neglecting the ability to defend against it is therefore not a prudent option, especially considering that, if needed, it is not possible to improvise.

The emergence of new threats such as those referred to in this article, perhaps more pressing, and many of them non-military or, at least, not purely military, is undeniable, as is the need for the Armed Forces to consider them and adapt to them, not only to maximize the effectiveness of their contribution to the nation's effort against them, but also as a simple matter of self-protection.

In our opinion, this adaptation does not involve abandoning conventional missions, the true raison d'être of the Armed Forces, but rather incorporating as many new elements as necessary, and guaranteeing that the Armed Forces fit into the coordinated effort of the nation, contributing to it with the means at their disposal, considering that, in many cases, they will not be the first response element, but a support element.

This article does not argue -it is not its goaleither for or against the need for Spain to rethink the organization, dimensions and equipment of the Armed Forces in view of the new security scenario. Nor does it enter into the question of whether it should do so unilaterally, or in agreement with its NATO allies, or seeking complementarity and synergy with its European Union partners. Understanding that it is up to the citizens to decide what Armed Forces they want, what they want them for, and what effort in resources they are willing to invest in them, what this article postulates is that national security is better served if those who have to decide, and with them the Armed Forces, continue to consider conventional warfare, enriched with a multitude of new possibilities, as one of the possible threats that the nation may have to face. Redefining the adage: Si vis pacem, para bellum etiam magis.[8] The adage: Si vis pacem, para bellum etiam magis.