Criticism of Maduro, the redimensioning of the Chinese embrace and greater immigration control mark the harmony with Washington after ten years of the FMLN

The surprising use of the army to pressure the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly in early February to approve a security appropriation has raised international alarm about what the presidency of Nayib Bukele, who came to power in June 2019, may hold. Having tightened relations with the United States in his first half year, after two decades of government by the former FMLN guerrillas, Bukele may have thought that his authoritarian gesture would be excused by Washington. The unanimous reaction in the region made him correct the shot, at least for the time being.

▲ Swearing in of Nayib Bukele as president, in June 2019, together with his wife, Gabriela Rodríguez [Presidency of El Salvador].

article / Jimena Villacorta

El Salvador and the United States had a close relationship during the long political dominance of the right-wing ARENA party, but the coming to power in 2009 of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) meant an alignment of El Salvador with the ALBA countries (Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, fundamentally), which led to occasional tension with Washington. In addition, in 2018, in the final stretch of the presidency of Salvador Sánchez Cerén, diplomatic relations with Taiwan were severed and the possibility of strategic investments by China was opened, which were viewed with suspicion by the United States (especially the option of controlling the Pacific port of La Unión, due to the risk of its military use in a crisis status ).

Nayib Bukele won the early 2019 elections presenting himself as an alternative to the traditional parties, despite the fact that he was mayor of San Salvador (2015-2018) leading a coalition with the FMLN and that for the presidential elections he stayed with the GANA acronym, created a few years earlier as a split from ARENA. His denunciation of the corruption of the political system, in any case, was credible for the majority of an electorate certainly tired of the Bolivarian tone of recent governments.

During his electoral campaign Bukele already advocated for improving relations with the United States, as it is a more economically interesting partner for El Salvador than the ALBA nations. "All financial aid that comes is welcome and better if it is from the United States", said one of his advisors. These messages were immediately received in Washington, and in July the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, visited El Salvador: it was the first time in ten years, precisely the time of the two consecutive presidencies of the FMLN, that the head of US diplomacy visited the Central American country. This trip served to accentuate the partnership in subject fight against drug trafficking and the gang problem, two shared problems. "We have to fight against the MS-13 gang, which has sown destruction in El Salvador and also in the United States, because we have its presence in almost forty of the fifty states of our country," said Pompeo.

In line with the change of orientation that was taking place, El Salvador began to align itself in regional forums against the regime of Nicolás Maduro. Thus, on September 12, the Salvadoran representation in the Organization of American States (OAS) supported the activation of the Inter-American Reciprocal attendance Treaty (TIAR), after years of abstaining or voting in favor of resolutions supporting Chavez's Venezuela. On December 3, Bukele announced the expulsion from El Salvador of Maduro's government diplomats, an action immediately replicated by Caracas.

In those same months El Salvador accepted the terms of the new immigration approach that the Trump Administration was outlining. During the summer, the White House negotiated with the countries of the Central American Northern Triangle agreements similar to the safe third country mechanism, whereby Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador agreed to process as asylum seekers those who had passed through their territory and ended up in the US by formalizing that application. Bukele met with Trump in September in the framework the United Nations General Assembly and signed the agreement, which was presented as an instrument to combat organized crime, strengthen border security, reduce illegal trafficking and human trafficking. 

The signature the agreement was controversial, as many authorities questioned the guarantees of security and protection of rights that El Salvador can offer, when it is the lack of such guarantees that is driving the emigration of Salvadorans. Rubén Zamora, former ambassador of El Salvador to the UN, criticized that Bukele was conceding a lot to the United States, with hardly anything in return.

Bukele, however, was able to exhibit in October a US counterpart: the extension for one year, until January 2021, of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) that gives legal coverage to the presence of 250,000 Salvadorans and their families in the US. The total number of Salvadorans residing in that country amounts to at least 1.4 million, the largest number of Latin American migrants after Mexicans. This sample the great link of the Central American nation, where 6.5 million people live, with the great power of the North, which is also the destination of 80% of its exports and whose dollar is the currency of use in El Salvador.

The new Salvadoran president seemed to truncate this harmony with Washington in December, when he made an official trip to Beijing and met with the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping. The US had warned of the risk of China taking strategic advantage of the door that was opening in Central America with the subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations with the countries of the American isthmus, which until a few years ago were a stronghold of support for Taiwan. Specifically, the US embassy in El Salvador had been particularly active in denouncing the alleged efforts of the Sanchez Ceren government to grant China the management of the Port of La Union, in the Gulf of Fonseca, which could be joined by a special economic zone.

However, what Bukele did on that trip was to resize, at least for the time being, that relationship with China, limiting expectations and calming U.S. suspicions. Not only does the question of the port of La Unión seem to have been shelved, but the Salvadoran president also confined Chinese attendance to the field of non-repayable financial aid to development and not to the granting of credits which, in the event of non-payment, condition national sovereignty. Bukele pointed out that the "gigantic cooperation" promised by China was "non-refundable" and referred to typical international cooperation projects, such as the construction of a library, a sports stadium and a sewage treatment plant to clean the sewage discharged into Lake Ilopango, near the capital.

▲ People in a rural area of Cameroon [Photokadaffi].

February 21, 2020

ESSAY / EMILIJA ŽEBRAUSKAITĖ

Introduction

In seeking to better understand the grounds of Islamic fundamentalism in Africa, it is worth to looks for the common denominators that make different areas prone to the insurgence of extremism. In the continent of boundaries that were mainly drawn by the Europeans, many countries contain a multitude of cultures and religions, all of them in constant interaction and more often than not - friction with each other. However, in order to classify the region as highly susceptible to the inter-religious or inter-cultural conflict to happen, there are more important factors that must be taken into consideration. Through quantitative study and document analysis, this article, with an example of the rise of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria and the expansion of the group to the neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, will underline the most important problems that paved the path for the emergence and spread of the Islamic fundamentalism, discussing its historical, social and ideological origins, at the same time providing possible long-time solutions on social and ideological ground.    

The brief history of Islam in Nigeria and Cameroon

The arrival of Islam to Nigeria dates back to the 11th and 12th centuries, when it spread from North Africa through trade and migration. It incorporated Husa and Fulani tribes into the common cultural ground of Islam which extended throughout North Africa, introducing them to the rich Islamic culture, art, Arabic language and teachings. In the 19th century, Fulani scholar named Usman Dan Fodio launched a jihad, establishing a Sokoto Caliphate ruled under a strict form of Shari'a law, further spreading Islamic influence in the region, introducing it for the first time to the area which today forms the Northern part of Cameroon, another country of our analysis.

The Sokoto Caliphate remained the most powerful state in Western Africa until the arrival of the European colonists. As opposed to the Southern part of Nigeria which was colonized and Christianized, the North received a lesser portion of Western education and values, as the Europeans ruled it indirectly through the local leaders. The same happened with Cameroon, which was indirectly ruled by the Germans in the North and experienced a more direct Westernization in the South. Even the indirect rule, however, brought great changes to the political and judicial processes, which became foreign to the local inhabitants. "This was viewed by Muslim northerners as an elevation of Christian jurisprudence over its Islamic judicial heritage" (Thomson, 2012) and the experience was without a doubt a humiliating and painful one - a foreign body destroying the familiar patterns of a lifestyle led for centuries, implementing a puppet government, diminishing the significance of a Sultan to that of a figurehead.

After their corresponding independence in 1960, both Nigeria and Cameroon became what American political scientist Samuel Huntington called cleft countries - composed of many ethnical groups and two major religions - Christianity in the South and Islam in the North. This situation, as described by Huntington, can be called the clash of civilizations between Islamic and Western tradition. He identifies the similarity between the two religions as one of the main reasons for their incompatibility: "Both are monotheistic religions, which, unlike the polytheistic ones, cannot easily assimilate additional deities, and which see the world in dualistic, us-and-them terms" (Huntington, 2002).

The independence also brought secularization of the two countries, thus undermining in both the political Islamism and the idea that Muslims should be ruled by the law of God, and not the law of men. However, the long-lasting Islamic tradition uniting the Northern Nigeria (and to some extent Northern Cameroon, although it was introduced to Islam much later) with the rest of North Africa and separating it from its Southern counterpart prevailed. "The Sokoto Caliphate remains a not-so-very distant and important reference point for Nigeria's Muslims and represents the powerful role that jihad and Shari'a law played in uniting the region, rejecting corruption, and creating prosperity under Islam" (Thomson, 2012).

Fertile ground for fundamentalism

Out of the romantic sentiments of long lost glory, it is not too difficult to incite resentment for modernity. To a certain extent, a distaste for the Westernization, which was an inevitable part of modernizing a country, is justifiable. After all, European imperialism selfishly destroyed indigenous ways of life enforcing their own beliefs and political systems, ethics, and norms a practice that continued even after decolonisation. Yet, the impetus for the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria as well as other places in Africa can be found as much in the current situation as in the past grievances. 

In Nigeria specifically, the gap was further enhanced by different European policies concerning the Northern and Southern parts of the country. Along with the more direct Westernization, the Southern part of Nigeria was also better educated, familiar to Western medicine, bureaucracy, and science. It had an easier time to adapt to forming part of a modern liberal state. According to the data published in Educeleb, by 2017 Nigeria's literacy rate was 65.1% (Amoo, 2018). All the Southern states were above the national average and all the Northern ones were below. The same statistics also depict the fact that the difference between literacy level between genders is barely noticeable in the Southern states, while in the Northern states the gap is much wider.

Apart from the differences mentioned above, the Southern region is the place where the oil-rich Niger delta, which in 2018 contributed to 87.7% of Nigeria's foreign exchange, is situated (Okpi, 2018). It can be argued that the wealth is not equally distributed throughout the country and while the Christian South experiences economic growth, it often does not reach the Northern regions with Muslim majority. "Low income means poverty, and low growth means hopelessness", wrote Paul Collier in his book The Bottom Billion: "Young men, who are the recruits for rebel armies, come pretty cheap in an environment of hopeless poverty. Life itself is cheap, and joining a rebel movement gives these young men a small change of riches" (Collier, 2007).

The rise of Boko Haram

In this disproportionally impoverished Northern part of the country and with the goal of Islamic purification for Northern Nigeria, a spiritual leader, Muhammad Yusuf, founded an organization which he called People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad. The locals, however, named it Boko Haram, which literally means books are forbidden and reflects the organization's rejection of Western education and values. Boko Haram was founded in 2002 in Borno state, Maiduguri, where Yusuf established a mosque and Koranic school in which he preached Islamic teachings with a goal of establishing an Islamic state ruled by Shari'a law. "Western-style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam" (Yusuf, 2009).

Although the organization seemed to be peaceful enough for Nigerian government to ignore it for the first seven years of its existence, from the start Boko Haram was antagonistic towards the secular government which they associated with corruption, Christian-domination and Western influence. In 2009 the confrontation between the group and Nigeria's security forces led to and extrajudicial killing of the Muhammed Yusuf in captivity (Smith, 2009). The event became an impetus for the pre-existing animosity Boko Haram felt for the state to grow into an actual excuse for violence. Since 2009 the group was led by Abubakar Shekau who replaced Muhammad Yusuf after his death.

The attacks of the organization became more frequent and brutal, killing many civilians in Nigeria and neighboring countries, Muslims and Christians alike. Although its primary focus laid on the state of Borno, after being pushed out of its capital Maiduguri, Boko Haram became a rural-based organization, operating in the impoverished region around Lake Chad basin (Comolli, 2017). Apart from Nigeria, the countries in which Boko Haram inflicted damage include Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and Cameroon, the latest being the subject of analysis in this essay.

Impact of Boko Haram in Nigeria and Cameroon

To illustrate the impact the terrorist group had on the partner development of the region, we will look at the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (Ibrahim Index of African Governance, n.d.). As an example, we will evaluate the perception of staff security and level of national security in Nigeria - a country in which the Boko Haram had originated, and Cameroon - one of the countries where it spread after Nigeria's government launched its counter-terrorism program. The timeline for the graphs runs from the year 2000 to 2016 in order to capture the changes in national security and staff safety in Cameroon and Nigeria. This aid the study in drawing concrete conclusions over a period of time.

Figure 1: Impact of Boko Haram on staff Safety and National Security in Nigeria.

Source: Mo Ibrahim Index

The perception of staff safety in Nigeria, according to Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, started decreasing since 2010. The tendency can be explained by the fact that in 2009 Nigerian government confronted the fundamentalist group, after which it became more active and violent. The perception of staff safety also dropped after 2014, the year that was marked by the infamous capturing of 276 Chibok schoolgirls out of their school dormitory. When it comes to the index portraying the level of national security, similar tendencies can be seen characterized by the drop of national security in 2009 and after 2014.

Figure 2: Impact of Boko Haram on staff Safety and National Security in Cameroon

Source: Mo Ibrahim Index

Another example can be Cameroon, the second most affected country after Nigeria which was infiltrated by Boko Haram in 2009. During that time, however, the presence of the terrorist group in the North of Cameroon was rather unassertive. At first the group was focusing on establishing their connections, gaining Cameroonian recruits, using the country as a transit of weapons to Nigeria (Heungoup, 2016). With the beginning of the kidnapping of foreigners, however, the year 2013 is marked by the drop of national security in the country. By 2014, the Cameroonian government declared war against Boko Haram, to which the group responded with a further increase of violence and thus - further drop of national safety.

An additional peak of terrorist attacks can be noticed after the renewed wave of governmental resistance after the 2015 elections in Nigeria which strongly weakened Boko Haram's influence, at the same time leading to increasingly asymmetric warfare. In Cameroon alone, Boko Haram executed more than 50 suicide bombers attacks, which killed more than 230 people (Heungoup, 2016). In the end, it is clear that despite the efforts of Nigerian and Cameroonian governments in fighting Boko Haram by declaring the war against terrorism, it cannot be said with certainty that the response of the governments of these countries were effective in eliminating or even containing the terrorist group. On the contrary, it seems that pure military resistance only further provoked the terrorist group and led to an increase of violence.

Response of the government

The outbreak of violence at the instigation of Boko Haram elicited a similar response from Nigerian armed forces in 2009 (Solomon, 2012). The office of president Goodluck Johnson launched a military mission in Maiduguri, which united the Nigerian Police Force with the Department of State Security, the army, the navy and the air force (Amnesty, 2011). Extra attention was bestowed upon the emergency regions of Borno, Niger, Plateau and Yobo (Economist, 2011).

In order to prevent Boko Haram from hiding and regrouping in the neighboring states after being actively fought in Nigeria, the government tightened the border security in the North, however, as it has already been explained, the tactics failed miserably as Boko Haram was able to hide and regroup in Nigeria's Northern neighbors after being pushed out of Nigeria. The effort to prevent Boko Haram from gaining foreign support, financing and reinforcement were also dysfunctional, as the terrorist group was successful in finding allies. With the support of other Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda, the previously local problem is becoming more globalized and requires equally global and coordinated efforts to fight it.

And yet, so far the policy of Goodluck Johnson was proven counterproductive due to the internal problems of Nigerian security process such as corruption, unjustified violence, extrajudicial killings as opposed to intelligence-based operations (Amnesty, 2011, p. 30). Another problem can be identified in the specific case of Nigeria being a melting pot of cultures and religions. Each region requires a unique approach based on the understanding of the culture, values and customs of the area. Yet, the Nigerian soldiers in charge of the safety of the Northern states were National instead of local, making the indigenous population feel controlled by the foreign body.

So far, the policy of president Muhammadu Buhari, who was elected in 2015, was not much more successful than his predecessor's. At the beginning of his presidency, Buhari was successful in reclaiming the territory occupied by Boko Haram and was quick to announce the defeat of the terrorist group. However, after losing their ground in Nigeria, Boko Haram again retreated to regroup in the neighboring countries, only to reemerge again multiplied into two distinct terrorist organization, further complicating the resistance. Overall, the use of force has proven to be ineffective in striking down terrorism. The previous examples lead to the conclusion that the use of dialogue and changes in national policies, as opposed to pure force, are crucial for the long term solutions.

Solution to Boko Haram

According to United Nations development program report "Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment" the main factors that make a person prone to get involved with fundamentalism are childhood circumstances, lack of state involvement in their surroundings, religious ideologies, and economic factors (UNDP, 2017). In order to prevent violent extremism, it must be tackled at the roots, because, as we have already seen before, facing violence with further violence approach provided little improvement on the status quo.

Childhood experience may be one of the fundamental reasons for joining extremism later. Members of marginalized communities, in which children were facing staff problems such as lack of parental involvement, lack of education, lack of exposure to different ethnicities and religions, are especially vulnerable. In these borderland areas, the children are rarely entitled to social security, they are often distrustful of the government and do not develop any sense of national belonging. The trust that the government favors some over others is only strengthened by staff witnessing of bribe-paying and corruption. The staggering 78% of the responders of the UN research reported being highly mistrustful of the police, politicians and the military (UNDP, 2017).

The isolation and minimum exposure to other ethnic and religious groups also contribute to the feeling of segregation and suspicion towards others. 51% of recruits have reported having joined due to religious beliefs, some in fear of their religion being endangered. However, even a higher percentage of 57 confessed their understanding of the sacred texts to be limited. This closes the circle of poverty and lack of education, with unemployment being the priority factor for 13% of the volunteer recruits questioned. In the end, are there any possible solutions for this continuous lemniscate (UNDP, 2017)? If there are any they must be in line with the theory of security-development nexus. By increasing the quality of the former, the later will be activated into motion and vice versa. Eliminate one of them and the other will stabilize itself naturally. 

The few solutions tackling both lack of security and slow development can be named, starting with combating the traumatizing childhood experiences. Long term solutions are undoubtedly based on the provision of education and social security which would aim to ensure the school attendance, community support for the parents and child-welfare services. The civil education is no less important to encourage the sense of national belonging and trust in the government, which also includes harsher anti-corruption regulations and more government spending directed to the marginalized communities. Strategies to promote a better understanding of the religion as a counterforce for the ignorance leading to easy recruitment, encouraging religious leaders to develop their own anti-extremism strategy, are also solutions that address the often expressed fears of religious groups who feel excluded, their faith being depreciated. The last but not least are the provision of work opportunities in the risk areas - promoting entrepreneurship, facilitating the access of the markets, upgrading infrastructure, basically creating economic opportunities of dignified employment and livelihood. 

Ideological background-check

In the end, underlying question when analyzing Islamic fundamentalism is this: when a Western liberal state, such as the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and Islamic faith meet, is there a possibility of reasonable conversation? Originating in Europe, liberalism, as a political doctrine, grew as an opposition to religious doctrines, seeking to establish a secular government founded on reason. And although functional in the Western societies, is liberalism really compatible with Christianity, and even more unlikely, is it compatible with Islam?

While liberal societies are open to freedom of religion, the Abrahamic Religions, being based on a notion of a singular truth, are not that welcoming of the freedom of thought, at least when it extends beyond the dogmas. Neither are they originally very tolerant of the beliefs that diverge from their own doctrines. Looking back at the Middle Ages, the time of prosperity of the Catholic Church, it can be said that Catholic social structure stands on the obedience to the Pope and the official doctrine of the Church. When it comes to Islam, following similar logic, one can argue that the caliphate with a society (ummah) ruled under the shari'a law is a basis of Islamic social order. In its fundamental forms, both are considered unalterable and divinely originated and neither is compatible with a relativist liberal state whose basis of legitimacy lies far from God's will. When the two religious doctrines meet in a nation-state, as in the case of Nigeria, there are arguably only two ends to the story.

The first one, which was already mentioned is Huntington's idea of the clash of civilizations. He argued that the conflict that happens when Islamic and Western civilizations meet is inherent in their doctrines. A secular modern state, being a Western creation, when incorporating Muslim societies only further enhances the friction due to the fact that "the Muslim concept of Islam as a way of life transcending and uniting religion and politics versus the Western Christian concept of the separate realms of God and Caesar" (Huntington, 2002). This makes it more difficult for the Muslims to adapt to the contemporary reality, as in Islam the idea of nation-state is undermined by the concept of ummah (Huntington, 2002).

And although Huntington's argument that the inherent beliefs of a single truth in both religions in their fundamental forms make them incompatible with each other as well as with the present-day reality of a nation-state based international order, this line of thinking does not promote any kind of solution to the continuous problem of religious and cultural differences, which often manifest themselves in the oppression of one group by another creating friction - a fertile ground for further religious fundamentalism. In a world where the colliding of the different religions in everyday situations are inevitable, we must search for a middle ground.

This brings us to the second outcome, which is arguably the only one that can ever lead to a peaceful end. It, of course, requires compromise from religious groups, a compromise which nobody is likely to make when it comes to their fundamental beliefs, and much needed yet the same, because only the dialogue can lead to mutual respect and understanding, two things that wipe out hostility and fear rooted into ignorance. The second outcome of inter-religious interaction would be what John Rawls called an overlapping consensus between different comprehensive doctrines (Rawls, 1933). As by definition comprehensive doctrines are those, which are compatible with political liberalism, it inherently carries an idea of the necessity of some doctrines to give up on the segments of their ideologies that are incompatible with the aforementioned system.

The capitalist system, for example, originally was not willingly received by the Catholic social teachings, being considered a source of injustice. However, the Church, although never particularly eager for it, learned to accept the dominance of capitalism as a current reality and live with it (Fred Kammer). But would it be possible with the doctrine of shari'a law, for example, which is, after all, a basis of Muslim faith, as some Muslims believe that being ruled by the law of God is the only righteous path? This kind of comparison is hardly just from the beginning, as Jesus, unlike Muhammad, was never a political leader and Christianity was always religious and never political tradition, while Islam was always both. Shari'a law, as the sovereignty of God over people, is completely incompatible with democracy which is based on the idea of the sovereignty of the people over themselves, and we are forced to come back to the question of willingness to compromise again.

John Rawls argues that "A modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines," (Rawls, 1933). The doctrines might as well be incompatible and coexist together, but in the end, they will still have to compromise in order to be compatible with liberalism. The modern world will have to learn to do so sooner or later, to give up their universalist beliefs and give them the benefit of the doubt. This is the price for peace everybody must pay: the weak will have to pay more than the strong, but even the strong cannot use the principle of coercion forever. 

Conclusion

In the end, it can be concluded that the insurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Africa is grounded in common traits such as historical and religious grievances, the relative poverty of one group in proportion to the other, lack of governmental presence and aid in some of the regions. On the micro-level, people are more willing to be recruited when they are uneducated, belong to segregated religious communities, live in relative poverty, do not receive support from the government and live without hope for a better future.

The solution to the spread of extremism, as it has been demonstrated by the example of Nigeria and Cameroon, cannot be rooted purely in the military missions, as they tend to get violent and further decrease the trust of the civilians in their government, closing a circle of us vs. them mentality. The means for solving the problem should include higher governmental presence and aid in the development of the afflicted regions, in the effort of further integration of currently segregated societies by helping them form a part of wider national identity. The idea of integration also transcends to the ideological, religious and cultural level as Islamic fundamentalism often arises from the rejection of Western culture and values that often feel imposed and foreign in the Muslim communities.

The key to the inter-religious conversation, especially when we are talking about Islam and Christianity, two religions that clash ideologically due to mutual assertiveness of sole truth, is the willingness to compromise and adapt to the current social order. If the roots of the problem are not cut off, the friction will continue on to transcend the ideological sphere and manifest itself in the military conflicts, terrorism, even big-scale wars. In an increasingly smaller world, in which the inter-religious interactions cannot be avoided, decisions must be made. After all, how long we can live in the clash of civilizations?

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▲ Shanghai night view [Pixabay].

COMMENT / Jimena Puga

China's new Foreign Investment Law, which came into force on January 1, 2020, is aimed goal accelerating the country's economic policy reforms to open up the domestic market and eliminate obstacles and contradictions of the previous law. As statement by the President of the People's Republic, the new rule aims to build a market based on stability, transparency, predictability and fair skill for foreign investors. Moreover, the Chinese authorities claim that this new law represents a fundamental part of the State's policy to open up to the world and attract more foreign direct investment.

The draft rule, drafted in 2015, created high expectations among Chinese reformers and foreign investors for a change in the country's foreign investment policy regime. And its publication in 2019, the year at the end of which the President of the United States and the President of the People's Republic agreed to a hiatus in the trade war in which both are protagonists, signaled a breakthrough in this change.

However, the reality is different. Beijing's stance on foreign investment remains significantly different compared to the existing conception of investment in the international arena, but part of the reformist sector of society knows that the government cannot afford to miss the opportunity for improvement following the gradual slowdown of domestic investment in the Chinese market over the past decade.

On the contrary, and taking into account the image that the Empire of the Center has wanted to project to the world since the opening of the regime, it could be thought that President Xi Jinping and the leaders of the Communist Party would have seized the opportunity to give a facelift to a new policy which, compared to the labyrinthine and previous law, would be systematic and perceived in a more friendly way by the investor countries, as a means to revive the decreasing rates of economic progress. The Asian power's new approach to the free market is therefore a smokescreen based on the establishment of protocols that vaguely define the limits of the rights enjoyed by foreign investors.

As a complement to the content of the foreign investment law, the regulation highlights its promotion and protection and details the necessary measures to ensure its effective implementation. It promotes investment by protecting the rights and interests of investors, standardizing the administration of foreign investment, improving the environment of commercial establishments, as well as promoting the advancement of market opening with a broader scope.

Specifically, the provision stipulates that foreign-invested enterprises shall enjoy the same favorable policies as domestic companies. In addition, it details measures to protect business confidentiality and improve the mechanism for the presentation suggestions from foreign firms to the authorities.

It also sets out and clarifies the implementation of a foreign investment negative list mechanism and details the registration and notification system for this investment subject Finally, it also regulates the investment policies for companies established in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and the legal responsibilities for violations of these regulations.

From a strictly legal point of view, article 2 of the precept defines the concept of foreign investment as "activity of investing directly or indirectly carried out by foreign individuals, companies or other foreign organizations", and also contemplates four circumstances that are considered part of this subject of investment:

• Who establishes a business in the Chinese territory either alone or with another investor

• Whoever acquires participations, shares... or other rights and interests of a business in the territory of China

• Who invests in any new project in China, either alone or with another investor

• Whoever invests in any other manner stipulated by law, administrative regulations or State committee provisions

The term "foreign-investedbusiness " refers to a business incorporated in the Chinese territory under Chinese law and with all or part of its investment financed by a foreign investor.

However, as mentioned above, despite the important innovations of this law, many questions remain unanswered. For example, it does not specify what indirect investment is. Nor does it specify the scope of "foreign natural person": what about Chinese who acquire another nationality, and what about foreigners who acquire Chinese citizenship? In addition, the legislator does not clarify whether investment from Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan will be considered foreign investment.

Articles 4 and 28 of the new law state that China will adopt the management system of pre-establishment of national treatment (a principle that guarantees foreign investors and their investments access to markets without disadvantages, and therefore under the same conditions as domestic investors). And the Negative List system for foreign investment, which consists of special administrative measures for foreign investment access to certain fields. In other words, the government will treat all foreign investments outside the Negative List as domestic.

This Negative List system was first tested in the Shanghai SEZ and expanded throughout the country in 2018. Both article 4 and 28 clarify that the new Negative List will be promulgated upon agreement of the State committee . This means that neither ministers nor local governments will be able to set restrictions on foreign investment. What's missing? If investors want to access the sectors restricted under the Negative List, they must receive authorization from the Ministry of Commerce, a procedure that the legislator does not include in the rules and regulations

On the other hand, articles 34 and 37 of the new law establish the system of communication on the establishment of new investments for their management and organization.

agreement with these items, foreign investors are obliged to communicate all relevant information to the trading department regulated by the Registration System business or the Credit Information advertising System business . Penalties for non-compliance are also included in these articles. But once again, in this field there is a lack of formal requirements as to how and what content is required for the communication of information to the trading department .

This new turn in economic policy translates, once again, into a strategy by which Beijing intends to project itself on the international scene as a powerful and innovative economic power, trying to hide the slowdown of its domestic market and the damage suffered by the trade war against Washington. However, taking into account the loopholes analyzed in the aforementioned articles and their vague and ambiguous wording, foreign companies will have to wait to determine what this reform really entails after its implementation internship

Georgian aspirations for European Union and NATO integration meet Western fears of Russian overreaction

▲ View of Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, with the presidential palace in the background [Pixabay].

ANALYSIS / Irene Apesteguía

In Greek times, Jason and the Argonauts set out on a journey in search of the Golden Fleece, with a clear direction: the current lands of Georgia. Later, in Roman times, these lands were divided into two kingdoms: Colchis and Iberia. From being a Christian territory, Georgia was conquered by the Muslims and later subjected to the Mongols. At this time, in the 16th century, the population was reduced due to the continuous Persian and Ottoman invasions.

In 1783, the Georgian kingdom and the Russian empire agreed to the Treaty of Georgiyevsk, by which both territories pledged mutual military support. This agreement failed to prevent the Georgian capital from being sacked by the Persians, which was allowed by the Russian tsar. And it was the Russian tsar, Tsar Paul I of Russia, who in 1800 signed the corresponding incorporation of Georgia into the Russian empire, taking advantage of the moment of Georgian weakness.

After the disappearance of the Federal Democratic Republic of Transcaucasia and thanks to the Russian collapse that began in 1917, the first modern state of Georgia was created: the Democratic Republic of Georgia, which between 1918 and 1921 fought with the support of Germany and the British forces against the Russian empire. The resistance did not last and the occupation of the Russian Red Army led in 1921 to the incorporation of Georgian territory into the Union of Soviet Republics. In World War II, seven hundred thousand Georgian soldiers had to fight against their former German allies.

In those Stalinist times, Ossetia was divided in two, constituting the southern part as an autonomous region belonging to Georgia. Later, the process was repeated with Abkhazia, thus forming today's Georgia. Seventy years later, on April 9, 1991, the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic declared its independence under the name of Georgia.

Every time has its "fall of the Berlin Wall", and this one is characterized by the disintegration of the former Russia. The major armed conflict that would unfold in 2008 as a result of the frozen conflicts between Georgia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia since the beginning of the last century came as no surprise.

Since the disintegration of the USSR

After the disintegration of the USSR, the territorial configuration of the country led to tension with Russia. With independence there was civil unrest and a major political crisis, as the views of the population of the autonomous territories were not taken into account and the laws of the USSR were violated in this regard. As twin sisters, South Ossetia wished to join North Ossetia, i.e. a Russian part, with Abkhazia again following in their footsteps. Moscow recognized Georgia without modification of borders, perhaps for fear of a similar action to the Chechen case, but for two long decades it acted as the protective parent of the two autonomous regions.

With independence, Zviad Gamsakhurdia became the first president. After a coup d'état and a brief civil war, Eduard Shevardnadze, a Georgian politician who in Moscow had worked closely with Gorbachev in the articulation of perestroika, came to power. Under Shevardnadze's presidency, between 1995 and 2003, ethnic wars broke out in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Around ten thousand people lost their lives and thousands of families fled their homes.

In 2003, the Rose Revolution against misgovernment, poverty, corruption and electoral fraud facilitated the restoration of territorial integrity, the return of refugees and the acceptance of different ethnic groups. However, the democratic and economic reforms that were proposed remained a longed-for dream.

One of the leaders of the Rose Revolution, lawyer Mikhail Saakashvili, became president a year later, declaring Georgian territorial integrity and initiating a new policy: friendship with NATO and the European Union. This rapprochement with the West, and especially with the United States, put Moscow on notice .

Georgia's strategic importance is due to its geographical centrality in the Caucasus, as it is in the middle of the route of new oil and gas pipelines. European energy security underpinned the EU's interest in a Georgia that was not subservient to the Kremlin. Saakashvili made nods to the EU and also to NATO, increasing the issue of military personnel and the expense on armaments, something which in 2008 did him no harm at all.

Saakashvili was successful with his policies in Ayaria, but not in South Ossetia. The maintenance of tension in that area and various internal disputes generated great political instability that led to the Withdrawal the president.

When Saakashvili's term ended in 2013, he was succeeded as president by the commentator and politician Giorgi Margvelashvili, as head of the Georgian Dream list. Margvelashvili maintained the line of rapprochement with the West, as has been done since 2018 by the current president, Salome Zurabishvili, a French-born politician, also from Georgian Dream.

Fight for South Ossetia

The 2008 war was initiated by Georgia. Russia also contributed to the previous bad relations, embargoing imports of Georgian wine, repatriating undocumented Georgian immigrants and even banning flights between the two countries. In the conflict, which affected South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Saakashvili had a modernized and prepared army, and also the full support of Washington.

The battles began in the main city of South Ossetia, Tskhinval, the majority of whose population is ethnic Russian. Air and ground bombardments by the Georgian Army were followed by Russian tanks entrance the territory. Moscow gained control of the province and expelled the Georgian forces. After five days, the war ended with a death toll of between eight hundred and two thousand, depending on the different estimates of each side, and multiple violations of the laws of war. In addition, numerous reports commissioned by the European Union showed that South Ossetian forces "deliberately and systematically destroyed ethnic Georgian villages". These reports also stated that it was Georgia that initiated the conflict, although the Russian side had engaged in multiple provocations and also overreacted.

After the cease-fire of August 12, diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia were suspended. Moscow withdrew its troops from part of the Georgian territory it had occupied, but remained in the separatist regions. Since then, Russia has recognized South Ossetia as an independent territory, as do some Russian allies such as Venezuela and Nicaragua. The Ossetians themselves do not acknowledge having cultural and historical ties with Georgia, but with North Ossetia, i.e. with Russia. For its part, Georgia insists that South Ossetia is within its borders, and the same government will take care of it as a matter of public order, thus solving a problem described as constitutional.

Given Georgia's rapprochement with the EU, the war conflict prompted European diplomacy to play an active role in the search for peace, with the deployment of two hundred observers on the border between South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia, replacing Russian peacekeepers. In reality, the EU could have tried earlier to react more forcefully to Russia's actions in South Ossetia, which some observers believe would have prevented what later happened in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. In any case, despite having initiated the conflict, this did not affect Tbilisi's relationship with Brussels, and in 2014 Georgia and the EU signed an association agreement . Today we can be sure that the West has forgiven Russia for its behavior in Georgia.

The war, although short, had a clear negative impact on the Economics of the Ossetian region, which in the midst of difficulties became dependent on Moscow. However, Russian financial aid does not reach the population due to the high level of corruption.

The war is over, but not the friction. In addition to a refugee problem, there is also a security problem, with murders of Georgians on the borders with South Ossetia. The issue is not closed, but although the risk is slight, everything remains in the hands of Russia, which in addition to controlling and influencing politics, directs tourism in the area.

This non-resolution of the conflict hinders the stabilization of democracy in Georgia and with it the possible entrance into the European institution, as ethnic minorities claim lack of respect and protection of their rights. Although governance mechanisms remain weak in these conflicts, it is clear that the reforms recently acquired in the South Caucasus have led to the promote inclusive dialogue with minorities and greater state responsibility for the issue. 

Last elections

November 2018 saw the last direct suffrage presidential elections in the country, as from 2024 it will no longer be citizens who vote for their president, but legislators and certain compromisers, due to a constitutional reform transforming the country into a parliamentary republic.

In 2018, the United National Movement candidate Grigol Vashdze and Georgian Dream candidate Salome Zurabishvili faced each other in the second round. With 60% of the vote, the center-left candidate became the first woman to hold the Georgian presidency. She won with a European bet: "more Europe in Georgia and Georgia in the European Union". Her inauguration was greeted with protesters alleging election irregularities. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) endorsed the electoral process, although it pointed out the lack of objectivity of the public media during the campaign.

Some Georgian media consider that Georgian Dream enjoyed an "undue advantage" because of the intervention in the campaign of former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, today a wealthy financier, who publicly announced a financial aid program for 600,000 Georgians. It became clear that Ivanishvili pulls the strings and levers of power in the country. This questioning of the cleanliness of the campaign led Georgia to drop in democratic quality in the 2018 indexes.

Public event presided over in January by Salome Zurabishvili at the Georgian presidential palace [Presidency of Georgia].

THE APPROACH TO THE WEST

Since the policies pursued by the Georgian presidency since Saakashvili came to power, Georgia has made a decisive entry into the Western world. Thanks to all the new measures that Tbilisi is implementing to conform to Western requirements and requests, Georgia has managed to profile itself as the ideal candidate for entrance the European Union. However, despite the pro-European and Atlanticist yearnings of the ruling Georgian Dream party and a large part of Georgian society, the country could end up surrendering to Russian pressure, as has happened with several former Soviet territories that had previously attempted a Western rapprochement, such as Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan.

Compliance with the European Union

Becoming the most favored country in the Caucasus to enter the European Union, with which it has a close and positive relationship, Georgia has signed several binding treaties with Brussels, following the aspiration of Georgian citizens for more democracy and human rights. In 2016, the EU-Georgia associationagreement came into force, something that allows for serious steps in political and economic integration, such as the creation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). This preferential trade regime makes the EU the country's main trading partner . The DCFTA financial aid Georgia to reform its trade framework , following the principles of the World Trade Organization, while eliminating tariffs and facilitating broad mutual access. This alignment with the EU legal framework prepares the country for eventual accession.

As for the association agreement , it should be mentioned that Georgia is a member country of the Eastern association within the European Neighborhood Policy. Through this association, Brussels issues annual reports on the steps taken by a given state to achieve greater alignment with the EU. The association committee is the formal institution dedicated to overseeing these partnership relations; its meetings have highlighted the progress made and the growing closeness between Georgia and the EU.

In 2016 the EU Permanent Representatives committee confirmed the European Parliament's agreement on visa-free travel with Georgia. This agreement was based on visa-free travel for EU citizens crossing the country's borders, and for Georgian citizens traveling to the EU for stays of up to 90 days.

Georgia, however, has been disappointed in its expectations when the EU has expressed doubts about the advisability of its membership. Some member countries claimed the danger that Georgian criminal groups could pose, something that several pro-Russian parties in the country took advantage of to wage an energetic campaign against the EU and NATO. The campaign had its results and anti-Russian opinion declined, leading Moscow to further assertion with military maneuvers, although in the 2016 elections citizen support for Georgian Dream continued.

Although there is no prospect of forthcoming accession, the EU continues to offer hope, as in German Chancellor Angela Merkel's tour of the Caucasus last summer. On her visit to Georgia, Merkel compared the Georgian conflict to the Ukrainian conflict due to the presence of Russian troops in the country's separatist regions. She visited the town of Odzisi, located on the border with South Ossetia, and in a speech at the University of Tbilisi said that both that territory and Abkhazia are "occupied territories", which was not well received by Moscow. Merkel pledged to do her utmost to keep this "injustice" in the international diary .

Georgian President Salome Zourachvili also believes that the UK 's exit from the European Union can be a great opportunity for Georgia. "It will force Europe to reform itself. And as I am an optimist I am sure it will open new doors for us," she has said.

Hope in the Atlantic Alliance

Russia's behavior in recent years, in addition to encouraging Georgia's rapprochement with the EU, has given a sense of urgency to its desire to join the Atlantic Alliance.

In 2016 there were several joint NATO-Georgia maneuvers in the Black Sea, where a coalition fleet made landfall. It was evidence of a growing mutual rapprochement that Georgia hoped would lead to its accession to the organization at the NATO summit in Warsaw later that year. But despite the great preparation the country received in terms of defense, security and intelligence, it was not invited to join the club: Russia was not to be inconvenienced.

NATO assured, however, that it would maintain its open-door policy towards the countries of the East and considered that Georgia remained an exemplary candidate . Pending future decisions, Tbilisi was left with strengthening military cooperation, offering as an incentive the "Black Sea format", a compromise solution involving NATO, Georgia and Ukraine and increasing the Alliance's influence in the Black Sea region.

Georgia, being the capital ally of NATO and the European Union in the Caucasus region, aspires to greater protection from Russia by the Atlantic Alliance. The European political center observes the efforts of the Georgian population to join the international organization and opts for a strategy of patience for the Caucasian zone, as in the years of the Cold War.

Approaching Russia's borders is problematic, and multiple criticisms have arisen towards NATO about the easy Georgian incorporation due to its geostrategic status . Russia has repeatedly expressed concern about such joint cooperation between the United States, NATO and neighboring Georgia.

President Zurabishvili's speech at the Holocaust remembrance events in Jerusalem in January [Presidency of Georgia].

A VIGILANT RUSSIA

The wounds of the 2008 South Ossetia war have not yet healed in Georgian society. Despite Georgia's political attempts at rapprochement with Western institutions, Russia remains suspiciously on guard, so that relations between the two countries continue to be conflictive. Thus, last summer saw the latest episode of tension, which led the Georgian president to describe Russia as an "enemy and occupier".

After some rapprochement in 2013 that saw an increase in food trade and Russian tourism coming to the country, Moscow has shifted to a strategy of attempting rapprochement at the religious and political level. With that intention, a small group of Russian lawmakers traveled to the Georgian capital for the Orthodox Interparliamentary Assembly. This international organization, led by Greece and Russia, is the only one that brings together the legislative bodies of Orthodox countries. The meeting took place in the plenary hall of the Georgian Parliament, where the Russian deputy Sergei Gabrilov took the seat of the Speaker of the House. Several politicians of the civil service examination did not take kindly to this and mobilized thousands of citizens, who staged serious public disorder in an attempted storming of the Parliament. The Russian delegation was forced to leave the country, but the attempt of Russian influence through religion was clear, when until then the Church had kept out of all political controversies.

The riots, in which numerous people were injured, caused the members of the government to cancel all their trips abroad and the president to interrupt her trip to Belarus, where she was to attend the opening of the European Games, a presence considered important in Western eyes. Demonstrators protested against the Georgian Dream headquarters, where they burned and stormed outbuildings. The ten days of riots were not only justified by the incident at the Assembly, but also as a reaction to the Russian occupation. In addition, the conflict between Georgian Dream and the opposing parties led by Saakashvili, currently in exile in Ukraine, may also have contributed.

The crisis ended with the departure of Prime Minister Mamuka and the appointment of Georgi Gaharia as his successor, despite the criticism he had received for his management of the unrest as Minister of the Interior.

The riots, although they may be well-intentioned, are against Georgia's interests, according to the country's president, because what the country needs is "tranquility and internal stability", both to progress internally and to gain sympathy among EU members, who do not want more tension in the region. Salome Zurabishvili warned of the risks of any internal destabilization that Russia could provoke.

On the occasion of the June protests, the Kremlin issued a decree banning the transport of nationals to Georgia by Russian airlines. It claimed to want to ensure "national security and protection of citizens", but it was clear that Moscow was reacting to an anti-Russian tinged revolt. The decision reduced the arrival of visitors from Russia, who had been accounting for one out of every four tourists, which according to the government could mean a loss of one billion dollars and a 1% reduction in GDP.

The tension reached the television media in the Georgian capital. Days after the riots, the host of the "Post Scriptum" program on Rustavi 2 channel intervened in the broadcast speaking Russian and made several insults against President Vladimir Putin, which Russia called unacceptable and "Russophobic". The channel apologized, admitting that its ethical and editorial standards had been violated, while several Georgian politicians, including the president, condemned the episode and regretted that such events only increase tensions between the two nations.

The events of last summer show the Georgians' rejection of an enmity with Russia which, in addition to accentuating the tension with the great neighbor to the north, may affect Georgia's relationship with the EU and other Western international organizations, since they are not going to tread on quicksand, and even less so with the great Russia in front of them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Asmus, Ronald D. A Little War That Shook the World. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010.

Cornell S. E. & Starr, F. The Guns of August 2008. Russia's War in Georgia. London: M.E. Sharpe, 2009.

De la Parte, Francisco P. The returning empire. The Ukrainian War 2014-2017: Origin, development, international environment and consequences. Oviedo: Ediciones de la Universidad de Oviedo, 2017.

Golz, Thomas. Georgia Diary: A Chronicle of War and Political Chaos in The Post-Soviet Caucasus.New York: Taylor and Francis, 2006.

[Myra MacDonald, Defeat is an Orphan. How Pakistan Lost the Great South Asia War. Penguin. London, 2016. 313 p.]

review / Ramón Barba

It could be thought that Myra McDonald's book rather confuses the reader, since the degree scroll speaks of a Great War in the Indian subcontinent of which there is no record as such. In reality, the financial aid book financial aid the reader to understand - especially the Western reader, more distant from the cultural and historical framework of that part of the world - the complexity of the relations between India and Pakistan. A Reuters correspondent for more than thirty years, with long experience in the region, McDonald knows how to add up concrete data , without getting bogged down in anecdotes, and to go quickly to the underlying force behind them.

Her thesis is that since the birth of the two states with the partition of the Jewel in the Crown, when the British Empire fell apart, Pakistanis and Indians have been engaged in a long confrontation, which has even had its moments of real fire. It has been a prolonged and bitter enmity between the two countries, with its sporadic battles: a Great War, according to the author, which Pakistan has finally lost.

In general, while India has sought its national affirmation in the exercise of democracy, Pakistan has based its national idiosyncrasy on Islam and conflict with India, which has in the dispute over control of Kashmir its bloodiest manifestation. This fixation with India, agreement to McDonald, has led Islamabad to use support for jihadist groups to create instability on the other side of the partition line, plunging Pakistan itself into an abyss from which it has so far been unable to extricate itself. McDonald follows a generally objective argument, but the book seems to be written from India, with little sympathy for the Pakistanis.

The story begins with the episode of the hijacking of the Indian Airlines plane between Christmas Eve and New Year's Eve 1999 by five Kashmiri guerrillas, with 155 people on board, which led to a serious conflict between Islamabad and New Delhi, as the Indian government interpreted that the operation had received some backing from the neighboring country. The episode serves to describe the dramatic standards of the strategic struggle between the two countries, which the previous year culminated their development of the atomic bomb.

The book pays special attention to this degree program to achieve the nuclear weapon - the Indians because the Chinese had it, the Pakistanis because they saw that the Indians were catching up - and which raised a core topic nuclear proliferation: is it possible to use weapons on a smaller scale between two deadly enemies when both have the atomic bomb? It has turned out that yes, and not only that, McDonald argues: Pakistan's lack of fear of an Indian nuclear attack, given that it is deterred by Pakistan's own arsenal, would have made Islamabad more confident in encouraging terrorist attacks against India.

In the early 1960s the status in India was somewhat delicate: in 1964 China had detonated the atomic bomb, which together with Pakistani pressure in Kashmir put the world's largest democracy at a complicated juncture. This led to India's launching of the Smiling Buddha in 1974 (as an unloaded bomb) and the beginning of a close competition with Pakistan to join the small nuclear club, as a consequence of the dialectical logic that then governed their relationship. Although it was believed that the bomb might be in the possession of one of the parties, it was not until the late 1998 detonations that this became clear.

The author considers that the two countries arrived that year on a very even footing: India, larger, had to resolve small internal crises in order to move forward, while Pakistan enjoyed a certain stability. However, the achievement of the atomic bomb meant that Pakistan, after misreading reality, did not know how to take advantage of its opportunities in the era of globalization that was then opening up, and remained stuck in a bellicose logic, while India took the leap that made it gain undoubted weight as a world power. This is the Pakistani "defeat" of which the book's degree scroll speaks.

In addition to this attention to the most recent decades, the text also looks back to 1947, when the two independent states were born, to explain many of the dynamics of the subsequent relationship between the two. Relations with China, Pakistan's ally, and with the United States, which had closer interests with Pakistan and is now closer to India, are also discussed.

The UN Conference did little to increase international commitment to climate change action, but did at least boost the assertiveness of the EU

In recent years, the temperature of the Earth has risen, causing the desertification of lands and the melting of the Poles. This is a major threat to food production and provokes the rise of sea levels. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has concluded that there is a more than 95% probability that human activities over the past 50 years are the cause of global warming. Since 1995 the United Nations has organized international meetings in order to coordinate measures to reduce CO2 emissions, which arguably are behind the increases in temperature. The latest meeting was the COP25, which took place in Madrid this past December. The COP25 could be labeled almost a missed opportunity.

February 10, 2020

ARTICLE / Alexia Cosmello and Ane Gil

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and United Nations Environment Programme. The IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report concluded that: "Climate change is real and human activities are the main cause". In recent years, rising temperatures on earth have contributed to the melting of the Polar Ice Cap and an increase in desertification. These developments have provoked the rise of sea levels and stresses on global food production, respectively.

In 1992, the IPCC formed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with the goal of minimizing anthropogenic damage to the earth's climate. 197 countries have since ratified the UNFCCC, making it nearly universal. Since 1995, the UNFCCC has held an annual Conference of the Parties (COP) to combat climate change. These COPs assess the progress of national governments in managing the climate crisis, and establish the legally binding obligations of developed countries to combat climate change. The most significant international agreements emerging from UNFCCC annual COPs are the Kyoto Protocol (2005) and the Paris Agreement (2016). The most recent COP25(25th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) took place in Madrid in December 2019.

The previous conference(COP24) marked a significant improvement in international regulation for implementing the Paris Agreement, but crucially ignored the issue of carbon markets (Article 6). Thus, one of the main objectives of COP25 was the completion of an operating guide for the Paris Accords that included provisions for carbon market regulation. However, COP25 failed to reach a consensus on carbon market regulation, largely due to opposition from Brazil and Australia. The issue will be passed onto next year's COP26.

Another particularly divisive issue in COP25 was the low level of international commitment. In the end, only 84 countries committed to the COP25 resolutions; among them we find Spain, the UK, France and Germany. Key players such as the US, China, India and Russia all declined to commit, perhaps because together they account for 55% of global CO2 emissions. All states will review their commitments for COP26 in 2020, but if COP26 goes anything like COP25 there will be little hope for positive change.

COP25 also failed to reach an agreement on reimbursements for damage and loss resulting from climate change. COP15 set the goal of increasing the annual budget of the Green Climate Fund to 100 billion USD by 2020, but due to the absence of sufficient financial commitment in COP25, it appears that this goal will not be met.

It is worth noting that in spite of these grave failures, COP25 did achieve minor improvements. Several new policies were established and a variety of multilateral agreements were made. In terms of policies, COP25 implemented a global "Gender Action Plan," which will focus on the systematic integration of gender equality into climate policies. Additionally, COP25 issued a declaration calling for increased consideration of marine biodiversity. In terms of multilateral agreements, many significant commitments were made by a vast array of countries, cities, businesses, and international coalitions. Notably, after COP25, the Climate Ambitious Coalition now counts with the impressive support of 27 investors, 763 companies, 393 cities, 14 regions, and 70 countries.

But by far the saving grace of COP25 was the EU. The EU shone brightly during COP25, acting as an example for the rest of the world. And this is nothing new. The EU has been a forerunner in climate change action for over a decade now. In 2008, the EU established its first sustainability goals, which it called the "2020 Goals". These goals included: reducing GHG emission by 20% (compared to 1990), increasing energy efficiency by 20%, and satisfying a full 20% of total energy consumption with renewable energy sources. To date, the EU has managed not merely to achieve these goals, but to surpass them. In fact, by 2017, EU GHG emissions had been reduced not just by 20%, but by 22%.

The EU achieved these lofty goals because it backed them up with effective policies. Note:

i) The launch by the EU Commission in June 2000 of the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP). Its main goal is to identify and develop all the necessary elements of an EU strategy to implement the UN Kyoto Protocol of COP3.

ii) The EU ECCP developed the ETS (EU emissions trading system), which has helped to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from energy-intensive industries and power plants.

iii)The EU adopted revised rules for the ETS in February 2018, which set the limits on CO2 emissions of heavy industry and power stations.

iv)The EU opted for a "circular economy." In May 2018, the EU decided on new rules for waste management and established legally binding targets for recycling. In May 2019, the EU adopted a ban on single-use plastic items.

v) The EU limited CO2 emissions on the roads. In April 2019, stricter emission limits for cars and vans were passed. By 2029, both cars and vans will be required to emit on average 15% less CO2.

vi) The EU approved new regulations in May 2018 for improved protection and management of lands and forests.

If the EU is anywhere near as successful at combating climate change in the decades to come as it has proved itself to be in the past decade, the EU seems primed to achieve both its 2030 Goals, and its 2050 Goals (the European Green Deal). The 2030 Goals include cutting GHG emissions by at least 40% by 2030 (compared to 1990). Such new measures will make the EU's economy and energy systems more competitive, more secure, and more sustainable. The 2050 Goals are even more ambitious: they include the complete elimination all CO2 emissions and the achievement of a climate-neutral EU by 2050. The EU's 2030 and 2050 Goals, if achieved, will be a remarkable step in the right direction towards achieving the Paris Agreement objective to keep global temperature increase stabilized at 1.5ºC and well below 2ºC.

The European Green Deal and 2030 and 2050 Goals will demand far more effort than the 2020 Goals, especially in the political and economic spheres. Poland has yet to commit to the Deal, which has led the European Council to postpone the matter until June 2020. But progress in the EU towards the 2050 Goals is already underway. The Just Transition Mechanism was proposed in December 2019 to provide support for European regions projected to be most affected by the transition to climate neutrality. (This measure will also hopefully serve to assuage the concerns of Poland and other members.) The EU Commission is to prepare a long-term strategy proposal as early as possible in 2020 with the intention of its adoption by the Council and its submission to the UNFCCC shortly thereafter. Furthermore, the EU Commission has also been tasked with a proposal, after a thorough impact assessment, for an update of the EU's nationally determined contribution for 2030 under the Paris Agreement. The EU's example is reason to hope for a bright and sustainable future for the developed world.

Unfortunately, not every developed country is as committed to sustainability as the EU. While many efforts have been made at both the global and regional levels to combat climate change, it is abundantly clear that these efforts are horrendously insufficient. In order to properly address climate change, consistent commitment to sustainability from all parties is imperative. Those countries such as the US, China, India and Russia that abstained from committing to the COP25 resolutions need to begin following in the EU's sustainable footsteps and start behaving like true global citizens as well. If they do not, even the EU's exemplary efforts will not be anywhere near enough to slow climate change.

The port of Chancay, to be position by the state-owned shipping company Cosco, will start operations in 2022.

The Chinese pronounce it almost like Shanghai, but it is not in China but in Peru. The port of Chancay, 75 kilometers from Lima, will become the first Chinese logistics hub for the Pacific side of Latin America. It is the only port in the region for the state-owned shipping company Cosco, which once established in Piraeus its entrance to Europe and is now preparing its access of goods to South America through Chancay. The infrastructure represents an investment of 3 billion dollars.

Computer-aided design of the facilities of the new port of Chancay, 75 kilometers north of Lima [Volcan].

article / Gabriela Pajuelo

The port of Chancay intends to become one of China's main connections with the countries on the west coast of South America, serving as a bridge for the growing trade of goods from this region with Asia-Pacific. Through the company Terminales Portuarios Chancay, China's Cosco Shipping Ports is contemplating an initial investment of US$1.2 billion, earmarked for the first phase of the project - construction of new dikes to gain ground to the sea, achieving a greater depth (16 meters) and surface area for operations (one million containers). The total investment will be US$3 billion; entrance into operation is scheduled for 2022.

China has been Peru's leading trading partner since 2014, replacing the United States. In 2017 China was the destination of 26% of Peruvian exports (US$11.7 billion) and the origin of 23% of its imports (US$8.75 billion). Chinese interest is focused on minerals, the largest Peruvian export sector, and therefore the port of Chancay is emerging as the main exit point for these raw materials to China. Return freight will bring Chinese manufactured goods, not only to Peru but also to neighboring countries.

Beijing's interest in Peru's raw materials already led to the signature in 2009 of a free trade agreement between the two countries, which was optimized last year. It is a relationship that has not been complicated by the granting of large loans that the recipient country then finds it difficult to refund: Peru has only received loans from Chinese public lending institutions amounting to US$ 50 million in 2009, which places it at the bottom of the list of recipients of Chinese loans in Latin America.

Cosco acquired 60% of Terminales Portuarios Chancay for US$225 million in the first half of 2019, sharing a partnership with the Peruvian mining company Volcan, which owns the remaining 40%. This is the first port that the large Chinese state-owned shipping company will control in its entirety in the Western Hemisphere, since its presence in the port of Seattle, in the USA, is limited to the operation of a terminal. Cosco has 34 terminals worldwide, 11 of which are outside China (in Spain it has a presence in the ports of Valencia and Bilbao). Other Chinese companies also have terminals in the region, such as at the mouths of the Panama Canal (China is the second largest Username of this inter-oceanic waterway, after the USA), or are involved in port expansion works, such as in Itaqui (Brazil). Beijing has also expressed interest in managing complete ports -the case of La Unión, in El Salvador-, but Chancay is the first project in this sense.

The new port of Chancay, covering almost 1,000 hectares, will include an entrance complex, a subway viaduct tunnel, and an operational port area. This will have a container terminal with two piers, and a bulk, general cargo, and roll-on/roll-off terminal with another two piers. According to the company, the port will have an annual cargo handling capacity of one million TEUs (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit). It should be added that the port complex will have the capacity to unload Triple E vessels, considered the second largest container ships in the world.

The multi-port is located 75 km north of Lima and will be connected to the center of the country via a highway to Oyón and Ambo, in the Peruvian Andes. This road infrastructure, with a public investment of US$450 million, represents a decentralization effort by the Peruvian government.

The port of Chancay could pose a serious skill to the Callao Port Terminal, managed by DP World Callaobusiness subsidiary of Dubai Ports World), APM Terminals and Transportadora Callao. It is the de facto port of Lima and is the country's main port in terms of traffic and storage capacity, with a port movement in 2018 of 2.3 million TEUs and 56 million tons, representing 51% of the national total.

Cosco Shipping Ports terminals worldwide [Cosco Group].

The Minister of Transport and Communications, María Jara Risco, has announced a plan to double the storage capacity of the port of Callao, but there are questions as to whether this will be enough to compete with the new port of Chancay. President Martin Vizcarra sample convinced that both facilities can work in a complementary way, and that the new infrastructure will allow decongesting truck traffic in the area of the capital.

Chinese investment, in any case, has given rise in some media to talk about "checkbook diplomacy", a concept that refers to the use of investments or loans to establish favorable relations with countries that occupy strategic positions in regions of geopolitical interest. Although an infrastructure such as that of Chancay is highly interesting for the beneficiary country, the latter may be obliged to refund the favor in other ways, perhaps by allowing the exploitation of mineral resources. Apart from that, there are the internal Chinese provisions, which oblige its companies with port terminals in the rest of the world to host the wartime navy if necessary.

China's growing influence in the Western Hemisphere worries the US. Its own Vice President, Mike Pence, warned Latin American countries that these investments represent a potential threat, because at the very least they establish an excessive dependence on trade and credit ties with China, also generating a high trade deficit and high debt. Also, according to Pence, they may negatively affect issues such as environmental care or respect for protected areas. 

In more dramatic terms, the Pentagon has spoken out. In February 2019, Admiral Craig Faller, head of Southern Command, warned that in the future "China could use its control of deepwater ports in the Western Hemisphere to increase its global operational position."

Brexit, with the departure from the EU of a free-market champion, has boosted the coordination of the free-trade countries of northern Europe.

▲ 16th century engraving showing a view of Lübeck, when it was part of the Hanseatic League.

ANALYSIS / Jokin de Carlos Sola

The Hanseatic League, made up of the small countries of the northern coast of Europe, controls the sea and the money that moves through it. This definition applies to two organizations, one medieval and the other recently created, ready to make its voice heard on the European stage.

In 2017, eight northern European countries (Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) began the process of creating the New Hanseatic League initiative. Its main goal is to maintain and increase economic orthodoxy, now that the United Kingdom - one of its main supporters - is leaving the European Union, and to prevent France from taking advantage of this moment to implement its expansive Economics policies.

The first League

The first Hanseatic League or simply the Hansa was a commercial and defensive alliance of trading cities and guilds of the major maritime cities of the Baltic and North Atlantic. Founded in Lübeck in 1158, the first alliance consisted of the free German maritime cities of Lübeck, Hamburg, Lüneburg, Wismar, Rostock and Stralsund.

Later many other cities joined the Hansa, such as Cologne, Groningen, Berlin or Stockholm. In addition, the Hansa established trading posts in the ports of almost all of northern Europe, and even established its own districts - called kontors -in other places such as London, Antwerp, Novgorod and Bruges.

This alliance acquired great commercial as well as military importance. Since its foundation the Hansa had maintained an almost symbiotic relationship with the monastic state of the Teutonic Knights, established in the Baltic. Later it would establish its own fleet. With the growth of the nation states and the decline of the guilds, the Hansa declined until it consisted only of Lübeck, Hamburg and Bremen, and was finally dissolved with the German unification.

Creation of the New Hansa

With the enlargement of the European Union, new opportunities have arisen to balance the power of the Franco-German bloc (also called the Aachen bloc), which is dominant in the European committee . Thus, the Visegrad group , the Three Seas Initiative or the Craiova group have been created in Central and Eastern Europe. In recent years, the New Hanseatic League has emerged in the north of the continent.

The latter initiative was born in the wake of Brexit. Being the third country by economic weight in the EU, the United Kingdom has had a great influence on the Union's economic policy, defending ideas such as economic stability, deficit cutting, debt reduction, economic deregulation and a stable monetary policy that avoids inflation, as well as a free trade policy.

These ideas clashed with the French economic policy of greater economic dirigisme and interventionism, which emphasized social projects and protectionism. Meanwhile, the cautious German attitude acted as a balance and a middle ground between the two positions. London's positions have also been supported by the Netherlands and Denmark, as well as by other countries with a maritime trade tradition, who, faced with the prospect of the United Kingdom's departure from the EU, decided to establish greater coordination among themselves.

Another cause for the training of the New Hansa is the coming to power of Emmanuel Macron and his rise as a strongman in the EU. Macron has abandoned part of the economic speech with which he was elected in 2017 to move closer to traditional French positions, also followed by countries such as Italy or Spain.

A final trigger for the Dutch and Irish-inspired initiative was the January 2018 replacement of Jeroen Dijsselbloem as Eurogroup president by Mario Centeno, Portugal's Socialist minister. For many northern European politicians Dijsselbloem's intransigence in the face of the Greek debt crisis in 2015 was correct and a way forward in EU and Eurozone economic and monetary policy.

This group was initially known by names such as "The Vikings" or "Bad Weather Coalition". In February 2018 the finance ministers of the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed the founding document of the New Hanseatic League.     

Political and economic values

The main objectives of the New Hanseatic League are based on free trade ideas, as well as on maintaining a balanced budget . Its main objectives are the development the European Stability Mechanism, established in Luxembourg. The idea would be that this development would eventually turn the ESM into a plenary session of the Executive Council European Monetary Fund, which would redistribute wealth between member states with surpluses and those with trade deficits. The Hansa is also in favor of giving the ESM more power to interfere in national budgets in order to avoid exceeding deficit limits.

However, although the founding document sticks to the European Stability Mechanism, the Hansa does not intend to stop there. Some representatives of these countries have spoken out against a eurozone budget , a eurozone finance minister and a common deposit insurance system, as proposed by Macron. They also criticized the European Commission for its decision not to initiate a disciplinary procedure against Italy for its deficit and debt.

The Hansa positions have achieved general popularity in their respective countries. On the one hand, the right-wing parties in those places have long advocated free-trade approaches, while the left-wing parties do not want the welfare state of their respective populations to be put at risk in order to help the countries of southern Europe.

The ideological origins of the New Hansa could be traced back to British Thatcherism in the 1980s. This political ideology included on the one hand a liberal approach to Economics, advocating ideas such as deregulation, privatization and free trade. Thatcherism did not advocate the breakup of the EU, but included a skeptical vision, defending a union limited to Economics, without advancing in political union. This thought, an adversary of traditional French dirigisme, has had a clear influence within British politics and within the Conservative Party. However, its influence on other European politicians, such as various leaders of the Netherlands and Denmark, is less well known.

The defense of a liberal and capitalist Europe, contrary to a strong central power, is shared by many countries, all of them located in the northern fringe of the Union. This pits them against the Mediterranean countries, which have required Community aid in recent years.

However, there are other elements that characterize these countries beyond their wealth and geographical position, such as their size and their dependence on trade, derived from their maritime nature. This makes them favorable to the growth of trade agreements and forces them to seek resources that they do not have in their own territory.

group leadership

The New Hanseatic League is an initiative and not an organization as such, so it has no official leader; decisions are taken in unofficial councils of heads of government and finance ministers. However, several personalities have been prominent, most notably Mark Rutte, the Dutch premier, and Wopke Hoekstra, his finance minister.  

Wopke Hoekstra is considered the architect of the New Hansa. Aged 41, he is a Christian Democrat, a practicing Protestant, a member of the Remonstrant Brotherhood and a former student of the Institut Européen d'Administration des Affaires (INSEAD), Europe's most prestigious business school. He has shown the most intransigent side of the Dutch government on economic issues in recent years. It has reached the point that Dijsselbloem himself has criticized the training of the New League because, according to him, it damages the idea of solidarity within the Union.

Mark Rutte, on the other hand, has used the creation of the New Hansa to increase the weight of the Netherlands in European politics. Rutte is considered one of the most active Dutch premiers in foreign policy since World War II and has tried to assert the Netherlands in the EU against France and Germany. At the same time Rutte has tried to occupy the British voice in the European committee by showing himself as one of the most Atlanticist leaders.

Other leaders who have shown their involvement in this project have been the Danish finance minister until 2019, Kristian Jensen, and the Irish deputy prime minister, Simon Coveney. Moreover, the role of Denmark and Sweden was a core topic for the Baltic countries to move away from the Visegrad group and join the New Hansa.

Economic, financial and technological weight

The Hansa has managed to bring together an economic weight that other initiatives of the same style have not been able to muster. Currently, the combined GDP of the Hansa countries is more than 2.2 trillion euros, close to the 2.5 trillion euros of the French GDP, the second largest economic force in Europe.

The group also has a clear financial clout. Cities such as Amsterdam, Stockholm and Dublin have been climbing up the list of Europe's leading financial capitals in recent years, although they have yet to overtake Paris and Frankfurt. In addition, these are countries where technological innovation exists, especially Estonia and the Netherlands.

The fact that the group does not exceed 10% of the European population somewhat mitigates its influence, since the votes of the countries and blocs in the European committee are partly based on the issue of inhabitants, but it is nonetheless a relevant political actor in the EU. In contrast, the southern European countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece) account for 30% of the European population, but are considered less decisive.

The positions of the Hansa represent a break with the EU principle that, for reasons of inter-territorial social cohesion, those countries that have more and are more developed contribute more. The ideas of the more radical sectors of the Hansa can even be labeled as a certain neo-colonialism, insofar as they intend to use the supranational mechanisms of the EU to ensure that the debtor countries of the South repay loans, which will keep them at certain levels of debt.

The Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Ireland are among the countries that contribute the most to the common European budget , behind the top four (Italy, the United Kingdom, France and Germany). From a per capita perspective, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark are at the top of the list. While Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are beneficiaries, they are less so than Poland, Greece and Romania.

Given its greater contribution to the EU, or less dependence on aid, the Hansa is demanding a greater say in the EU's management. For the time being, in the 2020 budget , it has succeeded in imposing various criteria, as opposed to those of the recipient countries.

Exercise of influence

One of the main objectives of the New Hanseatic League was to make sure that the two figures of major control over European Economics (the presidency of the Central Bank, and the leadership of the International Monetary Fund) were to its liking. In both cases it has failed, largely because of the intervention of Emmanuel Macron.

The Netherlands had a particular interest in the appointment of the ECB, as the outgoing president, Mario Draghi, had pressured the Dutch government to activate economic stimulus policies. The New Hansa's candidate was Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann, known for his criticism of Mario Draghi's stimulatory policies and for advocating a high-interest policy. Macron agreed with Germany that the European Commission would go to a German (Ursula von der Leyen) in exchange for the ECB to be chaired by Christine Laguard, who would continue Draghi's policies.

For the IMF Rutte proposed Dijsselbloem, despite his criticism of the Hansa. The final vote was between him and Bulgarian economist Kristalian Georgieva. Although Germany ended up voting for the Dutchman, Georgieva became the new head of the IMF. 

However, the Hansa has also had some victories, such as holding the Commission firm on the Italian budget , which was going to exceed the deficit limits; exerting influence on the European budget , which has suffered a drastic reduction; or slowing down, if not completely blocking, Macron's project for a common budget for the Eurozone.

visit of Dutch Finance Minister Wopke Hoekstra (right) to his Irish counterpart Paschal Donohoe (left) in late 2018 [Gov. of Ireland].

Expansion strategy and alliances

One of the problems previously mentioned for the Hansa has been its lack of weight in the European committee . For this reason, its leaders have sought the political harmony of countries with which there may be ideological coincidences.

One of the first countries to establish contact with the Hansa countries was Austria. This makes sense since Austria has a similar economic structure to the other Hansa countries due to its small size and population. In addition to that, the government of Sebastian Kurz, seemed to have a marked program towards Europe very much in line with the Hansa. Famous is the proposal of several Austrian politicians for the creation of two European currencies, one for the north and one for the south. This subject connections would be very important in order to later be able to influence Germany. In the new von der Leyen Commission, the Finance Commission was won for Austria by the economist Johannes Hahn.

The Austrian courtship also seems to have a strategic goal as a step to also start influencing Germany, which acts as a balancer of the balance. Several German politicians from the CDU and CSU are favorable to the Hansa's thinking and have been very influential throughout the Merkel government. But when Wolfgang Schäuble was removed from the Finance Ministry and replaced by the Social Democrat Olof Scholz these positions lost importance.

In a similar way, the Hansa (and especially the Netherlands) have been establishing contacts with the government of Flanders in Belgium. Although Flanders is just another state in the Belgian federation, the lack of government in Brussels gives it great importance, along with the government of Wallonia. In addition to that, the Flemish control the port of Antwerp and have always been closer to the ideas of the Hansa.

On the other hand, the Hansa seems to have started contacts also with Slovakia and the Czech Republic. This was seen when in March 2019 both countries signed a declaration together with the Hansa countries against the Italian budget . It would be unusual to see these countries getting very close to the Hansa because they are still natural recipients of European funds. However, considering that they are countries with healthy accounts they could be seen allied with the Hansa in some future actions.

In a way, we could see Hanseatic diplomacy as a partial evolution of Otto von Bismarck's diplomacy (to keep France out of power by training regional alliances). The aim is to form a sufficiently strong bloc that can present itself solidly in the European committee and convince Germany to tilt the balance towards budgetary orthodoxy and the interests of the northern countries. Alongside France are most of the countries of the South. It could be said very generally that the objectives of the Hansa are: "Mobilize the North, seduce Germany, silence the Mediterranean".

Strange alliances in front of the Hansa

The Hanseatic configuration of alliances around Europe and their influence on the new European budget seems to have created curious alliances, the largest of which is undoubtedly the one that may arise between Poland and France.

This may sound strange, because when it comes to foreign policy, social policy and on certain points of European construction, Poland and France have been poles apart. But when it comes to economic policy and the European budget , France and Poland coincide and this may result in a common front against the Hansa.

The reasons for the Franco-Polish rapprochement are varied. Both nations follow the tradition of the social welfare state, France because of its republican fraternal bequest and Poland because of its Catholic heritage, both opposed to the Hanseatic absentee state. Moreover, both countries have reasons to want to avoid restrictive budgets. The Polish government fears that a drastic reduction of investment in Poland would force it to make social cuts, which would lead to instability. France sample opposed for a more ideological reason: Macron has championed the idea of "A Europe that protects" and would have trouble sticking to this idea.

However, Poland and France maintain some sticking points, especially with Macron's attempt at a new Ostpolik to calm relations with Russia.

Conclusion

The creation of the New Hanseatic League is ultimately written request a reaction to two movements: the creation of European regional systems and the withdrawal economic policies favoring Northern Europe. 

If the countries of Europe organize themselves into blocs, it may be easier to carry out certain initiatives as there are fewer interlocutors to negotiate with.

On the other hand, the creation of an initiative with the specific goal of defending the interests of the North could pose a risk for the countries of the South, accentuating the North-South differences in Europe. This would put Germany, which wants to avoid being involved in such a compromise, in a complicated status .

The smartest thing would be to avoid these confrontations directly by looking for other sources of revenue for the EU that do not compromise the wealth of the Hansa countries, as Morawiecki expressed and Macron has also pointed out. Thus, some taxes have been discussed, such as on air travel, financial transactions and the digital world. But again, with the importance of the financial sector and new technologies in countries such as Ireland or Estonia, this may find civil service examination. It is not a simple task.

In any case, it should be ensured that European politicians have sufficient vision and understanding to make agreements that take into account all the idiosyncrasies of the European Union.

[Xulio Ríos. Xi Jinping's China. De la amarga decadencia a la modernización soñada. publishing house Popular. Madrid, 2018. 300 p.]

review / María Martín Andrade

Given the globally known growth of China in recent years and the uncertainty caused internationally by its giant steps in a rather short period of time, it is worth examining what underpins the Chinese modernization process in order to determine its solidity. Xulio Ríos, expert in sinology and director of the Observatory of Chinese Politics (jointly dependent on Igadi and Casa Asia), carries out this analysis in Xi Jinping's ChinaRíos' approach covers political, economic and social issues. Rios addresses China's role in globalization and how Xi Jinping's 2012 takeover of power has further accelerated the country's rapid modernization.

Ríos begins by identifying the three keys to China's success in the modernization process: the employment a sound economic policy, the implementation of its own strategy and a strong identity capable of adapting the major currents of international thought to the country's specific characteristics. This adaptation has been at the heart of China's modernization process, whose challenges in the coming years are to move from an Economics of imitation to an Economics of innovation, to invest in fair policies aimed at correcting the inequalities the country faces, and to carve out a niche for itself in the international system without having to abandon its identity.

The Chinese dream is the main element that characterizes this new path that Xi Jinping intends to follow since he became University Secretary of the CCP; a dream that reference letter the illusion and aspirations of a people who have seen their path to modernization hindered. Unlike Maoism, where traditional culture was seen as an expression of the old society, Xi stresses the importance of highlighting some of the values of popular culture that can help consolidate the nation's consciousness in this century.

The author does not fail to note that the main obstacles to this rapid Chinese evolution are the high social costs of the latest transformations and the environmental bankruptcy that is causing so much serious damage. For this reason, without ever taking his eyes off the Chinese dream, the University Secretary of the CCP and President of the country assures us that he wants a beautiful, environmental, rich and powerful China, with global influence, but without ever abandoning its own profile .

As part of the party's governance reform, Xi Jinping persists, like no other previous president, in the importance of the rule of law as an expression of modernization in the form of government. In tune with this, judicial reform has become one of the main thrusts of his mandate to combat the imbalance in the administration of justice throughout the country. On the economic front, the role of private Economics in modernization is making China the world's leading Economics . The diversification of its investment in foreign reserves and developments in sectors such as automobiles are proving to be an alternative to the Western model that is aimed at taking the lead in globalization.

Thus, the four modernizations of Xi's governance focus on industry, agriculture, science and technology, and defense. These advances are intended to be complemented by a remarkable drive to strengthen multipolarity, increasing its presence in foreign markets and seeking global recognition of its update through new objectives, such as the revitalization of the Silk Roads, the creation of economic corridors or the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank.

Having broken down the different elements that make up the change in China's image, the author concludes by pointing out that, despite economic development and increased political confidence, the country can become more involved and take on more responsibility. However, due to its structural circumstances and domestic conflicts, China is not yet sufficiently prepared to replace the US or the West in global leadership. Nevertheless, there is nothing to stop Xi Jinping's distinguished move, compared to other Chinese leaders, to assert interests more conspicuously and visibly, with the Silk Road being a clear example of the ambition of the Chinese process.

The success of several reforms is overshadowed by the impulsiveness and personal interests of a president with a deteriorated image.

▲ Jair Bolsonaro attends to the press in early January at the headquarters of the Ministry of Economics [Isac Nóbrega, PR].

ANALYSIS / Túlio Dias de Assis

One year ago, on January 1, 2019, a former Brazilian army captain, Jair Bolsonaro, climbed the steps of the Palácio do Planalto for the inauguration of his presidential mandate. He was the most controversial leader to assume Brazil's head of state and government since the presidency of the no less flamboyant populist Jânio Quadros in the 1960s. The more catastrophic ones announced the imminent end of the world's fourth largest democracy; the more deluded ones, that Brazil would take off and take its rightful place in the international arena. As was to be expected, neither extreme was right: Brazil continues to maintain the level of democracy of the last 30 years, without any military attempt , as some had feared; nor has Brazil become the world power that many Brazilians believe it is due to its exceptional territorial, population, cultural and political characteristics. As it usually happens, reality has been less simple than expected.

Economics

Among the most attractive aspects of Bolsonaro's candidacy to the public during the election campaign was the promise of economic recovery under the administration of Chicago Boy minister Paulo Guedes. In order to fulfill that purpose, as soon as he took office, Bolsonaro unified the former Ministries of Finance, Planning, development and management, Industry, work and Foreign Trade and Services under the Ministry of Economics, all under the command of the liberal Guedes. A person who became a sort of "superminister" manager of the entire economic diary of the new government.

From the outset, Guedes made it clear that he would do his utmost to lift the barriers of Brazilian trade protectionism, a doctrine adopted in varying Degree by every government for more than half a century. In order to deploy his crusade against statism and protectionism, Guedes has encouraged during this year the bilateral commercial rapprochement to several strategic allies, which, "unlike previous governments, will not be chosen based on ideological criteria", according to Bolsonaro. Already in January there was the advertisement a Novo Brasil at the World Economic Forum in Davos, defined by greater openness, zero tolerance to corruption and strengthening of Latin America as a regional bloc.

Trade

Despite his support for economic openness, Bolsonaro's team has never been overly favorable to trade with Mercosur -his regional multilateral trade bloc-, with Guedes even stating that it was a burden for Brazil, as he considered it an ideological rather than an economic alliance. However, this aversion to Mercosur, and mainly to Argentina, seems to have ended after the signature the Mercosur-EU tradeagreement , given that the potential trade Issue that would be generated with this pact would be enormously beneficial for Brazilian agricultural and livestock producers. An agreement was also signed with the countries of the European Free Trade area (EFTA), comprising Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.

Of these two agreements, the most controversial has been the one signed with the European Union, mainly due to the high levels of rejection in some Member States such as France, Ireland or Austria, as it is seen as a possible risk to the Common Agricultural Policy. On the other hand, some other countries were critical alleging Bolsonaro's environmental policy, since the agreement was signed during the summer, which coincided with the time of the fires in the Amazon. As a result, several member states have still not ratified the treaty and the Austrian parliament has voted against it.

However, the fact that multilateral trade relations do not seem to have advanced much, due to the obstacles imposed by Europe, has not prevented Brazil from expanding its commercial activity. Contrary to what one would think, due to the ideological closeness with Donald Trump and his foreign policy, the rapprochement in economic subject has not been with the US, but with the antagonistic Asian giant. In this process, Bolsonaro's trip to Beijing stands out, where he showed himself open to Chinese trade, despite his previous less favorable statements in this regard. During the visit , the proposal for a free trade agreement with China, which has yet to be approved by the Mercosur summit, and several minor agreements, including one on agricultural trade, came up.

This sudden Chinese interest in increasing agricultural imports from Brazil is due to the increase in demand for meat in China, caused mainly by the swine fever epidemic that devastated domestic production. This has led to an immediate rise in the price of beef and pork in Brazil, up to 30% in some cuts in little more than a month, which has distorted the domestic market, since meat, mainly beef, is usually very present in the average Brazilian's usual per diem expenses .

Public accounts

With regard to the country's internal accounts, the approval of the pension reform(Reforma da Previdência), which initially had a markedly liberal character, with the intention of eliminating privileges and disproportionate pensions for high-level public officials, stands out. However, several modifications during its passage through the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate meant that the savings for the public treasury were slightly less than Guedes had envisaged. All in all, it is a great advance considering that the pension system had a deficit of R$195 billion (about US$47 billion) in 2018. This deficit is due to the fact that Brazil had one of the systems with the highest benefits and the fewest demands in the world, as there were not few who retired at 55 years of age receiving 70% of the original salary.

This measure, together with several other adjustments in the public accounts, including the freezing of some ministerial expenditures, reduced the public deficit by US$ 138,218 million in January (6.67% of GDP) to US$ 97,680 million in November (5.91% of GDP), the leave figure since the economic recession began five years ago. Among other relevant data is the decrease in the Central Bank's base interest rate to a historic low of 4.5%, while the unemployment rate went from 12% to 11.2%.

As a result of the above, Brazilian GDP has increased by 1.1%, a timid but promising figure considering the huge recession from which Brazil has just emerged. Growth forecasts for 2020 vary between 2.3% and 3% of GDP, depending on the approval of the long-awaited tax and management assistant reforms.

Security

Another reason that led the controversial reservation captain to the presidency was Brazil's historic crime problem. Just as Bolsonaro came up with a strong name to tackle the economic status , for security he recruited Sergio Moro, a former federal judge known for his indispensable role in Operação Lava Jato, Brazil's largest anti-corruption operation that led to the imprisonment of former President Lula himself. With the goal of fighting corruption, reducing criminality and dynamiting the power of organized crime, Moro was put in charge of a merger of Departments, the new Ministry of Justice and Public Security.

In general, the result has been quite positive, with adecrease in the issue of violent crimes. Thus, there has been a 22% reduction in the case of homicides, which is one of the most worrying indicators in Brazil, since it is the country with the highest absolute issue of homicides in the world per year.

Among the factors that explain this drop in violent crime, the most important is the greater integration between the different state security force institutions (federal, state and municipal). The transfer of gang leaders to prisons with a higher level of isolation, thus preventing their possible communication with other members of organized crime, has also played a role. Another element has been the recent"anti-crime pack", which consists of a series of laws and reforms to the penal code to give more power to state security forces, in addition to establishing harsher penalties for violent crime, organized crime and corruption.

In addition to these advances, there has also been an increase in the number of accidental deaths in police operations. Some cases have echoed in public opinion, such as that of an artist who ended up shot in his car when the police mistook him for a drug trafficker, or those of children killed by stray bullets in shootouts between drug gangs and security forces. This, together with controversial statements by the head of state on the matter, has fueled criticism by most of the civil service examination and several human rights NGOs.

Social policy and infrastructure

In terms of social policies, the past year has been far from the apocalyptic dystopia that was expected (due to Bolsonaro's previous attitude in relation to homosexuals, Afro-Brazilians and women), although it has not been as remarkable as in the previously mentioned sections. There has been no progress in core topic areas, but neither have there been notable changes in terms of social policy with respect to 2018. For example, the emblematic social program Bolsa Família, created during the Lula government and which helped greatly in reducing extreme poverty, has not been cancelled.

Starting with Education, at the end of 2019 Brazil was ranked with one of the lowest scores in the PISA report , a fact that the Minister of Education, Abraham Weintraub, blamed on the "progressive MarxistEducation of previous administrations". As a result of the failure of the regular public system, and even the lack of security of some schools, the government has openly promoted the construction of new civic-military Education centers by state governments. In this subject of center, students receive an Education based on military values while the officers themselves provide protection in these public spaces. It should be noted that the existing centers are among the highest ranked in Brazil in subject of educational quality. However, this is not without controversy, as there are many who consider that this is not an adequate solution, as it may end up educating from a militaristic perspective.

In health subject , the most noteworthy event this year has been the end of the health cooperation program with Cuba, Mais Médicos. This agreement was initiated in 2013, during Dilma Rousseff's mandate, and its goal was to provide greater and more extensive universal medical attendance through the hiring of several doctors 'exported' by the Castro government. The program was criticized because the Cuban doctors only received 25% of the salary provided by the Brazilian government and the remaining 75% was retained by Havana. Bolsonaro broke the agreement, thus causing vacancies in health staff that could be filled in a short time. Cuban professionals were given the opportunity to remain in Brazil under political asylum if they revalidated their degree program in medicine in the Brazilian system. This incident has not brought about a relevant change in the precarious national health system; the only consequence of all this has been the deterioration of relations with Cuba.

Despite not making great progress on the social front, the Bolsonaro administration has made improvements in national logistics infrastructure. Under the command of military officer Tarcisio Gomes de Freitas, the Ministry of Infrastructure has stood out for its ability to conclude works not completed by previous governments. This led to a notable difference in the issue and quality of operational roads, railroads and airports compared to the previous year. Among the sources of financing for new works is the reopening of a common fund established in 2017 between Brazilian and Chinese financial entities, worth US$100 billion.

Bolsonaro with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during an official visit to New Delhi in late January [Alan Santos, PR].

Environment

One of the areas most feared to be harmed by Jair Bolsonaro's administration was environmental policy. Such concern was heightened by the controversial fires in the Amazon during July and August. To begin with, the Ministry of the Environment, like all the others, was affected by Paulo Guedes' austerity policies, in order to balance the public accounts, although according to Minister Ricardo Salles himself, it was the one that suffered the least from the budget cut. As a result, at the beginning of the drought period in the Amazon, forest protection was compromised.

Seeing the 278% increase in deforestation during the month of July, Bolsonaro reacted impulsively and fired the director of the National Institute of Space Research (INPE), accusing him of favoring civil service examination and conspiring against him. The status caused the departure of the Amazon Protection Fund from Germany and Norway, the two largest contributors, which was met with criticism from Bolsonaro, who also accused the NGOs of being the cause of the fires. Finally, under international pressure, Bolsonaro finally reacted and decided to send the army to fight the flames, a goal he achieved in just under a month, reaching the leave number on record in October.

In the end, the annual total ended up exceeding the previous year's figure by 30%, but still within the average of the last two decades. However, the damage to the national image was already done. Bolsonaro, thanks to his rivalry with the media, his vehement eagerness to defend "national sovereignty" and his lack of restraint when speaking, had managed to be considered the culprit of a distorted catastrophe.

Additionally, at the end of the year, one more controversy hit the Bolsonaro administration: the mysterious oil spill on the northeast coast of Brazil. Thousands of kilometers of beaches were affected and still to this day there is no official culprit for the crime. There were several hypotheses on the matter; the most accepted one, which was also supported by the government, was that the spill came from an illegal shipment of Venezuelan oil trying to circumvent the trade blockade imposed on Maduro's regime. According to analyses carried out by the Universidade da Bahia, the structure of the oil was indeed very similar to that of crude oil from Venezuelan fields.

Foreign policy

In foreign policy Bolsonaro may distinguish himself rhetorically from his predecessors, but not in terms of his actions. Although in that area he would like to apply his ideology, he himself has accepted that it is not possible to do so. In the face of the strength and interests of state institutions, such as the diplomatic tradition of Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Brazilian foreign policy has remained as pragmatic and neutral as in all previous governments of democracy, thus avoiding the closing of doors for ideological reasons.

A good example of Brazilian pragmatism is the economic rapprochement with China, despite Bolsonaro's rejection of communist ideology. Although this does not mean that he has distanced himself from his quasi-natural ally in terms of ideology, Donald Trump. However, the relationship with the US has been of a different nature, as there has been greater proximity in international cooperation and security. The US pushed for the designation of Brazil as a strategic partner of NATO, reached an agreement for the use of the Alcântara space base, very close to the Equator, and supports Brazil's entrance the OECD.

However, in the economic sphere, there does not seem to be such closeness, and there have even been certain frictions. One of them was Trump's threat to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum from Brazil and Argentina, which he finally withdrew, although the damage to trade relations and the São Paulo and Buenos Aires stock exchanges was already done. Some analysts even point out that the lack of US reciprocity in economic subject , as well as the rejection by some EU members of the agreement with Mercosur, was what pushed Bolsonaro to seek a compensatory relationship with the BRICS, whose 2019 summit took place in Brasilia.

Another peculiar point of Bolsonaro's foreign policy has been his position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which once again sample the inconsistency between rhetoric and action. During the election campaign Bolsonaro promised on several occasions the transfer of the Brazilian embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, something that so far has not happened and there has only been the transfer of an economic office. Bolsonaro probably feared trade reprisals from Arab countries, to whom Brazil exports products, mostly meat products, worth almost 12 billion dollars. Prudence in this matter even earned him the signature several agreements with Persian Gulf countries.

Despite the above, there has been one aspect of foreign policy in which Bolsonaro did manage to impose his ideology against the "historical pragmatism" of the Itamaraty, and this is the Latin American sphere. Brazil ceased to be the giant that in theory remains neutral to support, timidly, the so-called Socialism of the 21st Century during the governments of Lula and Dilma, and now coordinate with the governments of the other political side.

Most notable is his enmity with Nicolás Maduro, as well as with former President Evo Morales, whose request to pass through Brazilian territory was openly denied by Bolsonaro. There has also been a distancing with respect to the returned Peronism in Argentina, with the absence of Bolsonaro and of any high Brazilian representative in the inauguration ceremony of Kirchner's Alberto Fernandez. In the same context are the approaches to Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay and Colombia, as well as to the new provisional government of Bolivia, with which Bolsonaro sees more similarities. With them he has promoted the creation of PROSUR as opposed to the former UNASUR controlled by the Bolivarian left. Even and all, despite having adopted a more ideological policy in the region, Brazil continues to maintain diplomatic cordiality since, although its leader takes liberal conservatism to extremes in his rhetoric, his policies in the region hardly differ from the rest of the right-wing governments.

Bolsonaro

In general, as has been exposed, in its first year the Bolsonaro administration has obtained positive results, highlighting mainly its progress in the areas of security and Economics. However, while the work of various ministers improves the perception of the administration, Bolsonaro himself does not seem to be making a particularly positive contribution. Throughout the year, he has generated controversies over unimportant issues, which have accentuated his previous enmity with most of the press.

Because of this, the president's public image has gradually deteriorated. At the end of 2019, his popularity was 30%, compared to the 57.5% with which he began the year. That contrasts with the percentage of approval that members of his government have, especially Sergio Moro, who has managed to remain immovably above 50%. In addition, his son Flavio, who is a senator, has come under investigation for a possible corruption case, in a process that the president has sought to prevent. Bolsonaro also caused a scandal in the middle of the year when he tried to appoint his son Eduardo as ambassador to Washington, being accused of nepotism. To the tensions in his own party, which led to a rupture, must be added the poor rapport between Bolsonaro and the presidents of both chambers of the fractured National congress , both investigated in conveniently stalled anti-corruption operations.

Impeachment?

All this chaos caused by the president gives the impression of a Bolsonaro who goes against the current of his own government. The apparent success of the reforms already carried out ends up being tainted by the impulsiveness and personal interests of the man who once defended the impersonality of the State, which ends up causing the deterioration of his political image. In addition, there is the recent release of former president Lula, which entails the risk of the unification of the civil service examination, depending on how moderate the speech he adopts. This being the case, it is possible that the headless but efficient Bolsonaro government will not find it easy to stay in power until the end of its term. It should be remembered that the hand of the Brazilian congress does not usually tremble when it comes to impeachments; see that in little more than three decades there have already been two.