[Pablo Pérez López, Charles de Gaulle, el estadista rebelde (Ciudadela: Madrid, 2020), 218 pp.]
review / Jairo Císcar
Coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the death of Charles de Gaulle and the 75th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II, Professor Pablo Pérez López publishes this new biography of "the most illustrious of the French", as he is sometimes referred to. When one undertakes the writing of a biography, and even more so when it is about a character about whom an infinite number of books and articles have been written, one runs the risk of becoming diluted in what has gone before and not contributing anything new. However, this volume presents the character from a different perspective: his rebelliousness. Rebelliousness understood as a struggle for what is believed to be just, as an active nonconformism that pushes to overcome mediocrity, as love and service to France in its darkest moments. Precisely, I believe that this is one of the greatest achievements of the book: to present, in barely 200 pages and with a kind and direct style, a new portrait of the French general, who is praised -beyond the excusable chiaroscuros of every person- as a model to follow and an example of bravery that counts with full actuality.
The book presents De Gaulle's life chronologically, from his childhood to his death. It is essential, in order to understand the great man he would later become, to analyze his early life. We are presented with a restless and dreamy young man, a devout Christian from a very early age. A young man who, at the age of 14, discovered a vocation, that of military life, which would mark his whole life and the lives of millions of his compatriots, and who would apply himself to it to the point of becoming a leader A . Also noteworthy in the book is the extensive use of passages from his memoirs or handwritten texts of the protagonist, which reveal the most unknown facet of the character: his psyche, his love, his devotion, his rebelliousness. Because it must be emphasized that sample is a self-conscious (but not overbearing) De Gaulle who is clear that he has a mission statement.
We soon move on to introduce the then captain, who stood out during the Great War for his wise analysis and foresight, whose love for France never clouded his judgment when it came to pointing out his own and others' failures. A young man who, despite the humiliation of being taken prisoner (despite his heroic efforts that earned him the Legion of Honor), never ceased to learn and examine the enemy, taking advantage of every moment of his 32 months of captivity.
His evolution is followed after the Great War, already as a promising member of Petáin's entourage. But not everything is success. De Gaulle's life is traced in the greatness of men who know how to overcome difficulties. Perhaps the most special, and where his true character is appreciated, is in the life of his daughter Anne, who suffered from Down syndrome, and with whom De Gaulle developed an extraordinary bond and closeness. It was with her that the thoughtful general dressed as an affable and affectionate father.
This training of his character seems to me essential to understand the rest of the book, and therefore the rest of his life. Without wanting to end up making a complete summary of the volume (which, as mentioned above, covers his entire life, with special and necessary emphasis on his "political life"), I felt it necessary to reflect the singular proposal and goal of this book, which is none other than to show that more unknown side of the French general, that rebelliousness and nonconformism that pushed him to have a very important weight in the creation of the current form of the French Republic and whose imprint, 50 years after his death, is still alive in Europe and in French politics.
Personally, I was very attracted to the style and organization of the writing. It makes the proposal enjoyable and easy to read, while at the same time a very serious and profound work , which invites constant reflection. sample the intimacy and loneliness of a man faced with the incomprehension of his contemporaries, with respect to whom he was always ahead. A man who, in final, always put the greater good, his beloved France, before his own good. An expert tankman who knew how to lead his country in such different moments: the Free French government in London, the parade on the Champs Elysées, the revolt of Algiers, the birth of the Fifth French Republic, May '68 and his last resignation, as a man of honor, after losing the referendum on the Senate and the regions that he called, in one of his last acts of rebellion, against all his advisors.
Finally, De Gaulle was a rebel until death, refusing any state funeral and resting, together with his beloved daughter, in a small French village. His tombstone - which simply reads: Charles de Gaulle, 1890-1970 - merely shows his final rebellion. The man died, but the myth was born.
China, Russia and Iran have increased their relationship with needier Latin America due to Covid, which has also provided an opportunity for organized crime.
► Nicolás Maduro Guerra, after getting the Sputnik V vaccine, with the Russian ambassador in Caracas, in December 2020 [Russian Embassy].
report SRA 2021 / summary Executive [PDF version] [PDF version].
MAY 2021-The serious health and economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic has accentuated Latin America's vulnerabilities, also in terms of regional security. On the one hand, it has increased dependence on external powers, whose influence has grown through the shipment of vaccines (China and Russia) or gasoline and food (Iran). On the other hand, it has reduced the means for states to combat organized crime, which has made some strategic moves, such as the consolidation of Paraguay as an important focus of drug trafficking. Although the status of prolonged confinements has allowed reducing in some places the issue of homicides, as in the case of Colombia, the deterioration of regional stability has led to a greater attention of the United States towards the rest of the Western Hemisphere, with a clear alert given by the U.S. Southern Command.
The needs imposed by Covid-19 around the globe have made some safety requirements more pressing in certain countries. With international trade disrupted by movement limitations, China's food security has pushed its long-distance fishing fleets to adopt more aggressive behavior. Although a growing influx of Chinese fishermen has been detected in the waters off South America for several years, in 2020 the status took a qualitative leap forward. The presence of more than 500 vessels created concern due to the continuous evasion of radars, the use of non-permitted extraction systems and disobedience to coastguards. The governments of Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru issued a joint statement calling for oversight of an activity that Beijing refuses to submit to international inspection. The intimidation is reminiscent of the use of Chinese fishermen as a "shock force" in the South China Sea, although here the goal is not about gaining sovereignty, but about fishing. Washington has expressed concern about China's activity both around the Galapagos and in the South Atlantic.
The pandemic has been a propitious occasion for the consolidation of penetration in Latin America by China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. Thanks to "vaccine diplomacy", Beijing is now a fully global partner : not only commercial and credit provider for infrastructure, but also on a par with the United States and Europe in terms of pharmaceutical excellence and health provider . While it is true that Latin America is getting more "Western" vaccines - only Peru, Chile and Argentina have contracted more Chinese and Russian doses - the export of injectables from China and Russia has allowed it to increase its influence in the region. Huawei has managed to enter the 5G tender in Brazil in exchange for vaccines, and Beijing has offered them to Paraguay if it abandons its recognition of Taiwan. In addition to clinical trials in several Latin American nations in the second half of 2020, Argentina and Mexico will produce or package Sputnik V starting in June.
The worsening of the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela throughout 2020, on the other hand, made it easier for Iran to strengthen its ties with the regime of Nicolás Maduro, resuming a special relationship already in place during the presidencies of Chávez and Ahmadinejad. With no more credits from China or Russia, Venezuela looked to the Iranians to try to reactivate the country's paralyzed refineries. With no particular success in that endeavor, Iran ended up becoming a supplier of more than 5 million barrels of gasoline through cargo ships; it also delivered food to supply a supermarket opened by the Iranians in Caracas. With oil production at a minimum, Maduro paid for Tehran's services with shipments of gold, worth at least 500 million dollars.
All this activity of extra-hemispheric powers in the region is pointed out by the US Southern Command, the US military structure in charge of Latin America and the Caribbean, as a cause of serious concern for Washington. In his annual appearances before the congress, the head of SouthCom has progressively raised the threat Degree . In his last appearance, in early 2021, Admiral Craig Faller was particularly alarming about China's advance in the region: he referred to the controversy over Chinese fishermen - their alleged encroachment on exclusive economic zones and illegal activity - and to the $1 billion credit announced by Beijing for financial aid in sanitary material against Covid-19. Faller said that the US "is losing its positional advantage" and called for "immediate action to reverse this trend".
Another of Washington's concerns relates to transnational crime, specifically that perpetrated by Latino gangs in the United States. In the last year, US federal prosecutors have for the first time charged members of the Mara Salvatrucha with national security crimes. The U.S. continues to classify the gangs as a criminal organization, not as group terrorists, but in charges filed in July 2020 and January 2021 against the MS-13 leadership imprisoned in El Salvador, some of its leaders have been upgraded to terrorists. The department of Justice considers proven the connection between the decisions taken in Salvadoran prisons with crimes committed in the United States. In the last five years, U.S. courts have convicted 504 gang members, 73 of whom received life sentences.
In terms of citizen security, the prolonged confinements for Covid-19 have allowed for a slight reduction in violence figures in some countries, especially in the first half of 2020. In the case of Colombia, that conjunctural effect joined the trend to leave in the issue of homicides that has been observed in the country since the beginning of the negotiations for the peace process in 2012, so that the 2020 figures have represented a historic low, with a rate of 24.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the most leave since 1975. Several programs of study consider that there is a link between the demobilization of the FARC and the consistent drop in the level of violence that the country is experiencing. This is a positive evolution that is overshadowed by the murder of social leaders and former guerrillas, which at the beginning of 2021 already amounted to more than a thousand since the signature of the agreement de Paz in 2016.
The drug trafficking chapter has seen two notable developments in the last year. One is the increase in "trials" of coca cultivation in Honduras and Guatemala, which were previously only transit countries for cocaine. Both are consolidating their beginnings as producer countries, which is an important qualitative leap despite the fact that production is still very limited. After cocaine processing laboratories were located in both countries, the first plantations were discovered in 2017 in Honduras and in 2018 in Guatemala; since then, more than 100 hectares of coca bush have been detected, a very small number for the time being. Throughout 2020, Honduras eradicated 40 hectares of cultivation and Guatemala 19. Part of this own production infrastructure came to light in the trial held in the US against Tony Hernandez, brother of the president of Honduras, who in March 2021 was sentenced to life imprisonment.
For its part, Paraguay is on the rise on the drug trafficking map, as South America's biggest marijuana producer and a distributor of cocaine from Peru and Bolivia. Most of the marijuana cultivation takes place around Pedro Juan Caballero, near the border with Brazil, which is the country's criminal center. The plantations reach some 8,000 hectares, with production reaching 30,000 tons, of which 77% goes to Brazil and 20% to Argentina. At the beginning of 2021, more than 30 tons of cocaine shipped from Paraguay were located in northern European ports, making it a decisive "hub" for the distribution of this drug.
Behind the tension between Qatar and its neighbors is the Qatari ambitious foreign policy and its refusal to obey
Recent diplomatic contacts between Qatar and Saudi Arabia have suggested the possibility of a breakthrough in the bitter dispute held by Qatar and its Arab neighbors in the Gulf since 2017. An agreement could be within reach in order to suspend the blockade imposed on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain (and Egypt), and clarify the relations the Qataris have with Iran. The resolution would help Qatar hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup free of tensions. This article gives a brief context to understand why things are the way they are.
▲ Ahmad Bin Ali Stadium, one of the premises for the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar
ARTICLE / Isabelle León
The diplomatic crisis in Qatar is mainly a political conflict that has shown how far a country can go to retain leadership in the regional balance of power, as well as how a country can find alternatives to grow regardless of the blockade of neighbors and former trading partners. In 2017, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain broke diplomatic ties with Qatar and imposed a blockade on land, sea, and air.
When we refer to the Gulf, we are talking about six Arab states: Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. As neighbors, these countries founded the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 to strengthen their relation economically and politically since all have many similarities in terms of geographical features and resources like oil and gas, culture, and religion. In this alliance, Saudi Arabia always saw itself as the leader since it is the largest and most oil-rich Gulf country, and possesses Mecca and Medina, Islam's holy sites. In this sense, dominance became almost unchallenged until 1995, when Qatar started pursuing a more independent foreign policy.
Tensions grew among neighbors as Iran and Qatar gradually started deepening their trading relations. Moreover, Qatar started supporting Islamist political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, considered by the UAE and Saudi Arabia as terrorist organizations. Indeed, Qatar acknowledges the support and assistance provided to these groups but denies helping terrorist cells linked to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State or Hamas. Additionally, with the launch of the tv network Al Jazeera, Qatar gave these groups a means to broadcast their voices. Gradually the environment became tense as Saudi Arabia, leader of Sunni Islam, saw the Shia political groups as a threat to its leadership in the region.
Consequently, the Gulf countries, except for Oman and Kuwait, decided to implement a blockade on Qatar. As political conditioning, the countries imposed specific demands that Qatar had to meet to re-establish diplomatic relations. Among them there were the detachment of the diplomatic ties with Iran, the end of support for Islamist political groups, and the cessation of Al Jazeera's operations. Qatar refused to give in and affirmed that the demands were, in some way or another, a violation of the country's sovereignty.
A country that proves resilient
The resounding blockade merited the suspension of economic activities between Qatar and these countries. Most shocking was, however, the expulsion of the Qatari citizens who resided in the other GCC states. A year later, Qatar filed a complaint with the International Court of Justice on grounds of discrimination. The court ordered that the families that had been separated due to the expulsion of their relatives should be reunited; similarly, Qatari students who were studying in these countries should be permitted to continue their studies without any inconvenience. The UAE issued an injunction accusing Qatar of halting the website where citizens could apply for UAE visas as Qatar responded that it was a matter of national security. Between accusations and statements, tensions continued to rise and no real improvement was achieved.
At the beginning of the restrictions, Qatar was economically affected because 40% of the food supply came to the country through Saudi Arabia. The reduction in the oil prices was another factor that participated on the economic disadvantage that situation posed. Indeed, the market value of Qatar decreased by 10% in the first four weeks of the crisis. However, the country began to implement measures and shored up its banks, intensified trade with Turkey and Iran, and increased its domestic production. Furthermore, the costs of the materials necessary to build the new stadiums and infrastructure for the 2022 FIFA World Cup increased; however, Qatar started shipping materials through Oman to avoid restrictions of UAE and successfully coped with the status quo.
This notwithstanding, in 2019, the situation caused almost the rupture of the GCC, an alliance that ultimately has helped the Gulf countries strengthen economic ties with European Countries and China. The gradual collapse of this organization has caused even more division between the blocking countries and Qatar, a country that hosts the largest US military base in the Middle East, as well as one of Turkey, which gives it an upper hand in the region and many potential strategic alliances.
The new normal or the beginning of the end?
Currently, the situation is slowly opening-up. Although not much progress has been made through traditional or legal diplomatic means to resolve this conflict, sports diplomacy has played a role. The countries have not yet begun to commercialize or have allowed the mobility of citizens, however, the event of November 2019 is an indicator that perhaps it is time to relax the measures. In that month, Qatar was the host of the 24th Arabian Gulf Cup tournament in which the Gulf countries participated with their national soccer teams. Due to the blockade, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain had boycotted the championship; however, after having received another invitation from the Arabian Gulf Cup Federation, the countries decided to participate and after three years of tensions, sent their teams to compete. The sporting event was emblematic and demonstrated how sport may overcome differences.
Moreover, recently Saudi Arabia has given declarations that the country is willing to engage in the process to lift-up the restrictions. This attitude toward the conflict means, in a way, improvement despite Riyadh still claims the need to address the security concerns that Qatar generates and calls for a commitment to the solution. As negotiations continue, there is a lot of skepticism between the parties that keep hindering the path toward the resolution.
Donald Trump's administration recently reiterated its cooperation and involvement in the process to end Qatar's diplomatic crisis. Indeed, US National Security Adviser Robert O'Brien stated that the US hopes in the next two months there would be an air bridge that will allow the commercial mobilization of citizens. The current scenario might be optimistic, but still, everything has remained in statements as no real actions have been taken. This participation is within the US strategic interest because the end of this rift can signify a victorious situation to the US aggressive foreign policy toward Iran and its desire to isolate the country. This situation remains a priority in Trump's last days in office. Notwithstanding, as the transition for the administration of Joe Biden begins, it is believed that he would take a more critical approach on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, pressuring them to put an end to the restrictions.
This conflict has turned into a political crisis of retention of power or influence over the region. It is all about Saudi Arabia's dominance being threatened by a tiny yet very powerful state, Qatar. Although more approaches to lift-up the rift will likely begin to take place and restrictions will gradually relax, this dynamic has been perceived by the international community and the Gulf countries themselves as the new normal. However, if the crisis is ultimately resolved, mistrust and rivalry will remain and will generate complications in a region that is already prone to insurgencies and instability. All the countries involved indeed have more to lose than to gain, but three years have been enough to show that there are ways to turn situations like these around.
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS REPORT / Marina Díaz, Lucía Montón and Paula Mostajo
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May 2021
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
South Korea is considered to have a middle power status, not only in the North-East Asian region but internationally. In this sense, this paper aimed to provide a comprehensive understanding of the stance South Korea might take regarding key international, regional, peninsular and domestic issues in ten years time.
In the international sphere, this paper has focused on the US-ROK stating the plausibility of a further enhancement, in view of the new Biden's Administration need to reduce the breach created by former President Trump.
Regarding the regional sphere, the present report addresses South Korea's relations with China, in economic matters; Japan, alliance-wise, and Russia, in relation with energy. These bilateral engagements are clearly impacted by South Korea's proximity to the United States, the country's historical memory and North Korea's willingness to be part of a trilateral understanding, respectively.
Second to last, the peninsular approach of the script assesses the development of inter-Korean relations in views of the two incompatible ideologies and approaches coming from the North and the South of the peninsula and presents the maintenance of the current status has the most plausible scenario.
To end up, there is an allusion to domestic concerns as they play an important role in South Korea's development capabilities. In this section the paper discusses the country's SARS-CoV-2 disease successful management and assess why export possibilities might not be taken for granted, the big South Korean concerns on the ever-worsening demographic situation and, lastly, the country's satisfactorily progression towards renewable energy sources.
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS REPORT / Corey J. Hubbard and Paula Mora Brito
May 2021
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Intense military pressures on South Korea have been present for half a century, with the country being at the center of numerous regional conflicts. The government's technique for addressing external security threats differs depending on its nature, varying from assuming the position of great foreign powers to implementing its independent policy. The Republic of Korea's reliance on foreign assistance for defense and protection shows no signs of ending, especially concerning North Korea. The incitement of Kim Jong Un's government risks hostility in the region.
The country is under growing domestic pressures to find solutions for a rapidly aging population and record low birthrates, one of the world's weakest. Failure to do so compromises South Korea's status as a growing power in East Asia, one of the four Asian Tigers, and risks leading the country to economic stagnation. Suppose the South Korean government does not find a way to make immigration more palatable to the Korean people. In that case, it is unlikely that South Korea will avoid a significant population decline.
Well-established antagonism with Japan could worsen as Japanese nationalist policies conflict with the South Korean government's goals. However, the recent signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership opens up several possible developments in Korean-Japanese relations, extending from an unlikely reset in their bilateral ties to an equally unlikely economic confrontation. The Liancourt Rocks dispute also stands to be influenced by recent events, which may incline South Korea to turn to foreign mediation on the issue.
South Korean relations with the United States are evolving, with the Biden Administration recently inking a new cost-sharing deal with the South Korean Government to cover the expenses of American troops stationed on the Peninsula. Nevertheless, China's growing influence threatens to overturn the established order in the region, and a rapprochement of South Korea to China may take place over the coming decades.
The future security of South Korea is directly tied to developments on the Korean Peninsula. Suppose relations with the North Korean Regime significantly improve, which most expect to be unlikely in the near future. In that case, reunification may result, but North Korea's nuclear weapons development could destabilize the region as well. Scenarios relating to these events vary from an unlikely reunification to an equally unlikely nuclear war.
South Korea's attempts at navigating the growingly tense feud between the United States and China may force the country to choose a side in the conflict, which will have severe ramifications for its security architecture.
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS REPORT / María G. Fajardo, Marcelina Kropiwnicka and Matilde Romito
May, 2021
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Korean Peninsula is central to the political, economic and military policies of several actors in the East Asia region. Due to its geographical location, the peninsula has seen the involvement of major powers throughout history, like the United States, China, Russia and Japan. Currently, the peninsula is a contested territory between the U.S. and China. The latter is the only country capable of challenging American interests and uses its economic power to increase its sphere of influence in the region.
The DPRK has built and maintained capabilities to target areas as far as U.S. soil. The North has always represented one of the biggest challenges for South Korea and its security guarantor, the U.S. President Biden will nevertheless sway for establishing a network line for Kim to potentially cross and instead, new sanctions could be expected despite their lack of effectiveness.
For the U.S. to maintain its dominant role in the East Asia region, deter North Korea, and keep China in check, it must reaffirm its military and economic alliances which entered into a period of uncertainty during the Trump administration. Currently, China is South Korea's principal trading partner and is openly evading international sanctions imposed on North Korea being its principal trading partner as well.
The prosperous South Korea will remain neutral in many aspects related to China, yet if put in a situation where it has to choose between the U.S. and China, it will incline towards the former, which remains its security guarantor. When it comes to Russia, its role in the Korean conflict is now secondary but over the years, Russia has used the U.S.-China battle to increase relations with the latter. In the case of Japan, a close U.S. ally, a shift in relations with the ROK is unlikely to happen any time soon since their political issues have evolved into legal ones. This will remain detrimental to the U.S' New East China Sea policy which requires cooperation between U.S. allies.
Diplomacy, openness and potential reunification in the peninsula depend on external actors. Neither reunification nor openness are likely to take place in the short term due to Kim's personality and the preference of external actors to maintain the status quo. A reunification led under peaceful terms would be most desirable and would ultimately lead to an even larger economic powerhouse in the region. For the U.S., this pathway would be most beneficial if a reunified Korea would align with the U.S. This would be detrimental, however, to China's geopolitical interests in the region. Russia could come out as being the greatest benefactor from a peaceful reunification. Lastly, Japan could continue to feel threatened by a reunified Korea, which is united by hatred over a colonial past under Japanese savage rule.
The project of electrical interconnection between Ceuta and the Peninsula, of the network Spanish Electricity, is already five years behind schedule. Its execution should be a priority in order to integrate the autonomous city in the future routes of the Europe-Africa connection.
article / Ignacio Urbasos Arbeloa
19.05.2021. In 1997 the submarine electrical interconnection between Tarifa and Punta Fardioua in Morocco was completed. This new connection joined the gas pipeline inaugurated in 1996 that crossed Morocco from Algeria to Spain and Portugal, forging a Spanish-Moroccan energy alliance that would allow the economic development and security of energy supply for both partners. This infrastructure, with a capacity of 700 MW, was capable of supplying Morocco with nearly 50% of its annual electricity needs. It was a strategic link for the Maghreb country, which experienced a 5.8% annual growth in electricity demand during the 1990s. In 2006, this interconnection doubled its capacity to 1.4 GW, the first international interconnection between two continents in the world to reach this size. Despite recent frictions between Spain and Morocco over illegal immigration, fishing agreements and above all the Perejil incident, the recently arrived Socialist government led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was committed to strengthening ties between the two sides of the Strait of Gibraltar, continuing with the energy interconnection. Although at the beginning the submarine cable was mainly used for the export of electricity from Spain, in recent years bilateral exchanges have been balancing out, result of the Moroccan strategy of energy autonomy.
From Ceuta, the route of the submarine cable has always been considered a lost historical opportunity. The autonomous city produces electricity from old diesel generators, which apart from being inefficient and expensive, have high levels of particulate emissions in the air and greenhouse gases. The city of Ceuta is the only region in Spain that does not produce renewable electricity, status with little room for improvement considering the scarcity of space for its development. Since network Eléctrica Española there is already a plan to develop a submarine cable between La Línea (Cádiz) and Ceuta, which has found civil service examination of Cadiz environmental groups and the mayor of the area himself, which has forced to delay its installation from 2016 to the present. The CNMC granted in February 2021 at the request of network Eléctrica Española the character of project singular to this interconnection, which should facilitate the beginning of the installation that already raises alternative routes to reach the necessary social consensus. The submarine cable will have a rapid amortization, since it will eliminate the costs associated with the isolated electricity system in Ceuta, and will allow reducing the carbon emissions of this City, in line with the Spanish Climate Strategy, which aims to achieve zero net greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The cable will join other similar interconnection infrastructures in Spain, such as those existing between the Balearic electricity system and the Peninsula or the submarine cable linking the Bay of Biscay with the French region of Aquitaine.
The cable will also diversify future interconnections between Spain and Morocco, which should grow as Morocco increases the amount of renewable energies in its electricity mix. Morocco, which has an ambitious decarbonization strategy, is committed to the development of renewable energies as a driver of future national economic growth and as a lever to ensure its regional leadership. Morocco already has interconnections with Algeria of 1.2 GW, and is planning a connection line with Portugal and Mauritania.
In any case, it is clear that Spain is a necessarily vital partner for the Moroccan green project , which aims to export both electricity and renewable hydrogen in the future to the European Union. Spain' s position as a necessary energy bridge should serve as a strong argument in bilateral negotiations. In this sense, Ceuta should become a strategic point for future extensions in the electrical interconnection on both sides of the strait. The Moroccan strategy of implicit pressure on Ceuta and Melilla by closing cross-border trade or allowing the crossing of illegal immigrants is a move that clearly meets the definition of a gray zone offensive. The Alaouite dynasty has been making public and palpable for decades, specifically since its independence in 1956, its traditional longing and strategic interest in the only two non-insular territories that Spain has in North Africa. Connecting the peninsular electricity system with Ceuta should be considered as a strategic project for the benefit of national energy security, the reduction of greenhouse gases and the improvement of air quality. In addition, raising Ceuta as a necessary crossing point in the future electricity interconnections between Africa and Europe would offer Spain deterrence and negotiation capacity against a Morocco that does not hesitate to use direct pressure on the cities of Ceuta and Melilla to achieve its objectives in the bilateral relations Spain-Morocco.
[Juan Tovar Ruiz, La doctrina en la política exterior de Estados Unidos: De Truman a Trump ( Madrid: Catarata, 2017) 224 pages.]
review / Xabier Ramos Garzón
Every change in the White House leads to an analysis of the outgoing president's policies and to speculation about the policies of the incoming president. Given the weight of the United States in the world, the vision on international affairs of each administration is decisive for the world order. Juan Tovar Ruiz, professor of International Relations at the University of Burgos, deals in this book with the essence of the foreign policy of each president - mainly from Truman to Trump (Biden's, logically, is yet to be defined) - which in many cases follows a defined road map that has come to be called "doctrine".
Among the book's strengths are the fact that it combines several points of view: on the one hand, it covers, from the realist point of view, the structural and internal effects of each policy, and on the other, it analyzes the ideas and interactions between actors taking into account the constructivist point of view. The author explores the decision-making processes and their consequences, considers the ultimate effectiveness of American doctrines in the general context of international relations, and examines the influences, ruptures and continuities between different doctrines over time. Despite the relatively short history of the United States, the country has had an extensive and complex foreign policy which Tovar, focusing on the last eight decades, synthesizes with special merit, adopting a mainly general point of view that highlights the substantive.
The book is divided into seven chapters, organized by historical stages and, within each, by presidents. The first chapter, by way of introduction, covers the period following U.S. independence until the end of World War II. This stage is sample as an antecedent core topic in the future American ideology, with two particularly determining positions: the Monroe Doctrine and Wilsonian Idealism. The second chapter deals with the First Cold War, with the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson doctrines. Throughout the chapter the different postulates are contextualized and the issues that were core topic in the creation of doctrines that only affected the foreign policy of the moment, but were imbricated in the core of American political thought are pointed out. The third chapter deals with the Distension, the period between 1969 and 1979 in which the doctrines of Nixon and Carter took place. The fourth chapter takes us to the Second Cold War and the end of the US-USSR confrontation, a time when we find the doctrines of Reagan and Bush senior. From this point, the following chapters (fifth, sixth and seventh) deal with the Post-Cold War period, with the doctrines of Clinton, Bush junior and the most recent ones - therefore still subject to study - of Obama and Trump.
In the conclusions the author summarizes each of the chapters on the basis of academic or political characterizations and makes some qualifications, such as warning that in his opinion Obama's foreign policy is rather a "non-doctrine", since it combines elements of different ideologies and is partly contradictory. Obama dealt with various conflicts in different ways: he dealt realistically with "wars of necessity" (Afghanistan) and agreement with the liberal internationalist approach to conflicts such as Libya. Although the flexibility carried out by Obama may be considered a weakness by some, as he did not follow a firm and marked policy, it can also be seen as the necessary adaptation to a continuously changing environment. There are many occasions when a U.S. president, such as Bush Jr. has pursued a rigid foreign policy, ideologically speaking, that ultimately written request achieved little practical success.
Another example of a variant of the conventional doctrine that sample the author is the "anti-doctrine" carried out by Trump. Whoever was president until 2021 executed a policy characterized by numerous contradictions and variations with respect to the role that the US had been exercising in the world, thereby casting doubts and uncertainties on the expected performance of the American superpower. This was due to Trump's political inexperience, both domestically and domestically, which caused concern not only among international actors but also in the core of Washington itself.
From the analysis of the different doctrines presented in the book, we can see how each one of them is adapted to a specific social, historical and political context, and at the same time they all respond to a shared political tradition of a country that, as a superpower, manifests certain constants when it comes to maintaining peace and guaranteeing security. But these constants should not be confused with universal aspects, since each country has its own particularities and specific interests: simply adapting U.S. positions to the foreign policy plans of other countries can lead to chaotic failures if these differences are not recognized.
For example, countries such as Spain, which depend on membership of the European Union, would not be able to enter into random wars unilaterally as the United States has done. However, Spain could adopt some elements, such as in subject of decision making, since this subject of doctrines greatly facilitates objectifying and standardizing the processes of analysis and resolutions.