[Eric Rutkow, The Longest Line on the Map: The United States, the Pan-American Highway and the Quest to Link the Americas. Scribner. New York, 2019. 438 p.]

REVIEW / Marcelina Kropiwnicka

Though the title tries to convince the reader that they will merely be exploring the build-up to the largest link between the United States of America and its southern neighbors, The Longest Line on the Map: The United States, the Pan-American Highway and the Quest to Link the Americas covers much more. The book is written in more of a novel-fashion than a textbook-fashion. Author Eric Rutkow, rather than simply discussing the nitty-gritty development of the highway alone, is able to cover historical events from political battles in the homeland of the US to economic hardships encountered among the partner countries. Divided into three main blocks, the book chronologically introduces the events that took place during the Pan-American Highway's construction, beginning with the dream that a railway would connect the two hemispheres.

With the New World just barely beginning to grasp its potential, writer Hinton Rowan Helper's first-hand experience of traveling from the United States to Argentina in the mid-1800s made him come to the realization that there must be an alternative method of traveling between the two countries. After enduring the long voyage, he came to the conclusion, "Why not by rail?" The first quarter of the book hence explains the early attempts made towards linking the wide span between North America and Southern Argentina through the use of a railroad. Thus, when in 1890 the Intercontinental Railway Commission was created, the idea of a Pan-American railway began to flourish and preliminary work began.

The idea was passed on from one indefatigable supporter to another, keeping in mind the cooperative aim of pan-Americanism and the potential for US economic expansion. Yet still by the early 1900s, over half of the projected length of the railway remained unassembled. Despite multiple attempts and investment in building and rebuilding the rail (mainly due to logistical purposes), the project came to a final halt with the realization that the Pan-American Railway was beginning to look like what it was: an unfeasible dream. President Theodore Roosevelt had concluded similarly in 1905, when he gave preference to developing the Panama Canal, regulating the rules of the railway and building the US Navy. In the subsequent and comparatively short chapter of the book, Rutkow introduces the era when automobiles and bicycles were on the rise, causing a demand for the increased construction of roads and exhaustive efforts to build decent thoroughfare within the US. Also made note of in the book was the diverging attention from the railroad as a result of the outbreak of the First World War. These events combined would ultimately cease continuation of the railroad's assembly.

The second half of the book is dedicated to the continuation of the dream of connecting the two spheres using a different method: the building of the Pan-American Highway. Although only a sister to the railway project, the two ideas arise from the same ideal. The new project seemed especially tangible due to the growth of the 'motoring generation' and the strengthened advocacy of Pan-Americanism. The belief was that the highway would foster "closer and more harmonious relations" among the nations in the Americas. Nevertheless, the highway remains unfinished due to a mere 50-mile wide gap, known as the Darien Gap, located between Panama and Colombia ("mere" considering the highway today stretches more than 20,000 miles, connecting Alaska to the southern tip of Argentina).

The most engaging part of the book emerges in the last chapter, when Rutkow attempts at connecting the missing link between the two worlds, but isn't able to, which reminds us that the road remains unfinished. The chapter, which is committed to the Darien Gap, is able to give light to the idea that once, the two spheres had a dream of connecting, contrasting to what we see today with the pressure of erecting walls along the southern US border. Though the dream continues to overcome the gap and finish the road, a new challenge had finally emerged: Panama had changed its policy and refused to finish the pavement.

As for such a well-researched book of one of the largest projects on the American continent, there's a peculiar laxity: the coverage on South America is far less complete in comparison to all the focus that the United States' government efforts to organizing and funding the link received. In terms of critiquing the book as a literary piece, not every quotation within the book would be considered absolutely necessary to telling the story. Ironically there's a certain scarcity when it comes to describing the road itself or its surrounding environment. Perhaps the author makes up for this blunder with his meticulous choosing of maps and images to provide the reader with a context of the environment and era in which the dream was being pursued.

Geothermal energy already accounts for 7.5% of the Central American electricity mix, with installed capacity still far below the estimated potential.

Central America's volcanic activity and tectonic movement offer optimal conditions for the region's small countries to take advantage of an alternative energy source to imported hydrocarbons or an ever more polluting coal. For the time being, installed capacity - the largest in Costa Rica and El Salvador - is barely 15% of the most likely estimated potential.

▲ San Jacinto-Tizate geothermal plant in Nicaragua [Polaris Energy Nicaragua S. A.] [Polaris Energy Nicaragua S. A.].

article / Alexia Cosmello

Central America currently has an installed geothermal capacity of 645 megawatts (MW), far from the potential attributed to the region. This may reach, in the highest band of estimates, almost 14,000 MW, although the most likely estimates speak of around 4,000 MW, which means a current utilization of approximately 15%, according to World Bankdata published in 2018.

The energy obtained constitutes 7.5% of the total electricity generation in Central American countries: a not insignificant figure, but one that still needs to grow. Forecasts point to an expanding sector, although attracting the necessary foreign investment has so far been limited by the risks inherent in this industry and national legal frameworks.

Geothermal energy is a clean, renewable energy that does not depend on external factors. It consists of harnessing the heat of the earth's interior - high temperature resources in the form of hot subway fluids - for electrical and thermal generation (heating and domestic hot water). It is governed by the magmatic movement of the earth, which is why it is a scarce resource and limited to certain regions with a significant concentration of volcanic activity or tectonic movement.

Latin America

These characteristics of the American isthmus are also shared by Mexico, where the geothermal sector began to develop in the 1970s and has reached an installed capacity of 957 MW. The friction of the tectonic plates along the South American and eastern Caribbean coast also gives these subregions an energy potential, although less than that of Central America; its exploitation, in any case, is small (only Chile, with 48 MW installed, has really begun to exploit it). The total geothermal potential of Latin America could be between 22 GW and 55 GW, a particularly imprecise range given the few explorations carried out. Installed capacity is close to 1,700 MW.

The World Bank estimates that over the next decade, Latin America would need an investment of between US$2.4 billion and US$3.1 billion to develop various projects, which would add a combined generation of some 776 MW, half of which would correspond to Central America.

Attracting private capital is not easy, considering that since the 1990s the Latin American geothermal sector has had less than US$1 billion in private investment. Financing difficulties are partly related to the very nature of the activity, as it requires a high initial investment, which is high risk because exploration is laborious and it takes time to reach the energy production stage. Other aspects that have made it less attractive have been the policies and regulatory frameworks of the countries themselves and their deficiencies in local and institutional management .

Geothermal energy, in any case, should be a priority for countries with high potential such as Central America, given that, as the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) points out, it constitutes a source of low-cost electricity generation and also stimulates low-carbon economic growth. For this reason, this organization has order on the governments of the Central American region to adopt policies that favor the use of this valuable resource , and to develop legal and regulatory frameworks to promote them.

The World Bank and some countries with special technological expertise are involved in international promotion and advice. Thus, Germany has been carrying out a geothermal potential development program under the German Climate Technology Initiative (DKTI) since 2016. Cooperating in the project are the Geothermal development Fund (GDF), implemented by the German development bank KfW, and the Central American Geothermal Resource Identification Program, supported by the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR). The initiative is also supported by the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), which has organized technical courses, together with the LaGeo business , located in El Salvador, for geothermal plant operators, teachers and researchers in the subject, with the goal of achieving better management of the installations and more efficient development of the energy projects.

By country

Although Central American countries have shown a high dependence on imported hydrocarbons as an energy source , in terms of electricity generation the sub-region has achieved a significant development of renewable alternatives, made available to all members of the Central American Integration System (SICA) through the Electrical Interconnection System for Central American Countries (SIEPAC). The executive director of the administrative office General of SICA, Werner Vargas, highlighted at the beginning of 2019 that 73.9% of the electricity produced at the regional level is generated with renewable sources.

However, he indicated that in order to cope with the growing electricity demand, which between 2000 and 2013 increased by 70%, the region needs to make greater use of its geothermal capacities. Greater integration of geothermal energy would save more than 10 million tons of CO2 emissions per year.

The share of geothermal energy in the electricity mix varies from country to country. The highest share corresponds to El Salvador (26%), Nicaragua (15%) and Costa Rica (12.5%), while the share is small in Honduras (3%) and Guatemala (2.5%).

In Costa Rica, the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) delivered last July the Las Pailas II geothermal plant, in the province of Guanacaste, at a total cost of US$ 366 million. The plant will contribute a maximum of 55 MW to the electricity network , so that when fully operational it will raise the total installed capacity in the country from 207 MW to 262 MW.

Costa Rica is followed by El Salvador in electricity generation from geothermal energy. The national leader in production is the business LaGeo, manager of almost all of the 204 MW installed in the country. This business has two plants, one in Ahuachapá, which produces 95 MW, and the other in Usulután, with a production of 105 MW. With lower electricity consumption than Costa Rica, El Salvador is the Central American country with the highest weight of geothermal generation in its electricity mix, 26%, double that of Costa Rica.

Nicaragua has an installed capacity of 150 MW, thanks to the geothermal interest of the Pacific volcanic mountain range. However, production levels are clearly below, although they account for 15% of the country's electricity generation. Among the geothermal projects, the San Jaciento-Tizate and Momotombo projects are already being exploited. The first, operated by the Polaris Energy business , was built in 2005 with the initial intention of producing 71 MW, to reach 200 MW by the end of this decade; however, it is currently producing 60 MW. The second, controlled by the ORMAT business and the participation of ENEL, was launched in 1989 with a capacity of 70 MW, although it has been producing 20 MW since 2013.

Guatemala is slightly behind, with an installed capacity of 49 MW, followed by Honduras, with 35 MW. Both countries recognize the interest of geothermal exploitation, but have lagged behind in promoting it. The Guatemalan government's ownprograms of study highlight the profitability of geothermal resources, whose production cost is US$ 1 per MW/hour, compared to US$ 13.8 in the case of hydroelectric power or 60.94 percent for coal.

Brazilian congress approves ratification of the Technology Safeguards agreement signed by Trump and Bolsonaro

With the reactivation of its Alcantara launch center, the best located in the world due to its proximity to the Equator, the Brazilian space industry expects to reach a business Issue of 10 billion dollars per year from 2040, with control of at least 1% of the world sector, especially in the area of space launches. Jair Bolsonaro's government has agreed to guarantee technological confidentiality to the US, reaching an agreement that Washington had already tried unsuccessfully before the Workers' Party came to power.      

▲ space launch area of the Brazilian Alcântara space center [AEB].

article / Alejandro J. Alfonso [English version].

Brazil wants to be part of the new space era, in which private initiative, especially that of the United States, will play a major role, along with the traditional role of the national agencies of the major powers. With the Technology Safeguardsagreement , signed last March by Presidents Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro, the strategic Alcantara base will be able to launch rockets, spacecraft and satellites equipped with U.S. technology.

The guarantee of technological confidentiality - access to certain parts of the base will only be authorized to U.S. staff , although jurisdiction will remain with the Brazilian Air Force - will mean that Alcantara will no longer have to negotiate contracts with only 20% of the world market, as has been the case until now, something that hindered the economic viability of the base. However, the agreement also has a limiting aspect, since it only authorizes Brazil to launch national or foreign rockets and aircraft that contain technological parts developed by the US.

The new political context in Brazil meant that the agreement was ratified without problems on October 22 by the Chamber of Deputies and on November 12 by the Senate, a very different status from that experienced in 2000, when congress blocked a similar agreement promoted by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The subsequent arrival of the Workers' Party to power, with the presidencies of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, cooled relations between the two countries and Washington momentarily set aside its interest in Alcântara.

Brazil's space aspirations go back a long way; its aerospace industry is the largest in Latin America. In the 1960s it developed a first launch base, Hell's Barrier, near Natal. In 1994 the military matrix of the research was transformed into the civilian Brazilian Space Agency (AEB). In addition to the development of satellites, in 2004 AEB launched its first rocket. In 2006 a Brazilian astronaut joined the International Space Station, of which Brazil is a partner.

The Alcântara launch center is located in Maranhão, a state in northeastern Brazil. Alcántara is a small colonial town located 100 kilometers from São Luís, the state capital. The town has 22,000 inhabitants and has access to the sea. The launch center was built during the 1980s and has an area of 620 square kilometers. In addition, the launch base is located 2.3 Degrees south of the equator, making it an ideal location for launching satellites into geostationary orbit. The unique geographic conditions of the launch site attract companies interested in launching small to medium-sized satellites, generally used for communications or surveillance satellites. Unfortunately, the facility suffered a bad reputation when operations were briefly halted due to a failed launch in 2003, resulting in the death of 21 technicians and the destruction of some of the facilities. In 2002 the Agency

The United States is interested in Alcantara because of its strategic location. As mentioned above, the launch site is 2.3 Degrees south of the Equator, which allows U.S. rockets to save up to 30% in fuel consumption compared to launches from Cape Canaveral, Florida. Also, due to its proximity to the Equator, the drag to reach orbit is lower than Cape Canaveral, which means that companies can increase the weight of the rocket or the cargo it carries without adding additional fuel. Thus, this location offers U.S. companies the same advantages enjoyed by their European counterparts who use a launch site in French Guiana, located nearby, north of the equator. The Technology Safeguards agreement signed between Presidents Bolsonaro and Trump in March is intended to attract these U.S. companies by assuring them that U.S. companies that do use the Alcantara facility will have the necessary protection and safeguards so that their technology is not stolen or copied by Brazilian operators or engineers.

The Brazilian government is clearly interested in having the Americans use the Alcantara site. The global space industry is worth approximately $300 billion, and Brazil, which still has a space agency in development, could use the funds from leasing the launch site to further develop its space capabilities. The Brazilian Space Agency has been underfunded for many years, so additional revenue is especially convenient for it. In addition, Brazilian officials have speculated that the investment in the launch site will bring more investment to the Alcantara region in general, improving the quality of life in the area. For example, the Kourou base in French Guiana generates 15% of the GDP of that French overseas territory, directly or indirectly employment 9,000 people. In conclusion, the Bolsonaro government hopes that this agreement will deepen the relationship with the USA, and that it will also provide monetary means to invest in the launch site and its surroundings, and to invest in the Brazilian Space Agency.

However, this agreement has also been criticized. In 2000, President Cardoso's government attempted to sign a similar agreement with the George W. Bush administration which was ultimately blocked by the Brazilian congress for fear that Brazil would cede its sovereignty to the US. These same fears are still present today. Former Brazilian Foreign Minister Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães Nieto stated that the US is seeking to establish a military base in Brazil, thus injuring the sovereignty of the Brazilian people. Criticism is also directed at the essay of the agreement itself, which states that the money the Brazilian government earns from the US use of the launch center cannot be invested in rockets of exclusively Brazilian development , but can be invested in other areas related to the Brazilian Space Agency.

In addition to arguments about the integrity of Brazilian sovereignty, there is also a defense of the Quilombolas, descendants of Brazilian slaves who escaped their masters, who were displaced from their coastal lands when the base was built. Currently, the government is proposing to increase the size of the Alcantara launch site by 12,000 hectares, and Quilombo communities fear that they will once again be forced to move, causing them further impoverishment. This has been the subject of discussion in both the Brazilian congress and the U.S.congress , with Democratic House representatives introducing a resolution calling on the Bolsonaro government to respect the rights of the Quilombolas.

The Technology Safeguards agreement is mainly a commercial agreement in order to attract more U.S. companies to Brazil for the Alcantara site, which would save money for these companies due to the ideal location of the launch site, while they would have the opportunity to invest in the Brazilian space program. However, due to the controversies mentioned above, some may consider this as a unilateral agreement where only U.S. interests prevail, while the Brazilian government and people lose sovereignty over a strategic site. However, it should be noted that Brazil has traditionally developed an important aeronautical industry (Embraer, recently bought by Boeing, is an excellent example) and the Alcantara base provides the opportunity for Brazil to leap into the new space age.

For decades, the U.S. closed its doors to Mexican avocados; today it needs them to meet its growing demand.

In 2019, there will be a record of Mexican avocado imports in the United States: almost 90% of the million tons of avocados consumed by Americans will come from the neighboring country, which leads world production. After being banned for decades in the US -alleging phytosanitary issues, mainly invoked by California producers-, the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement opened the doors of the US market to this Mexican product, first with reservations and since 2007 without restrictions. The arrival of Trump to the presidency marked a drop in imports, but then they have not stopped rising.

▲ Interest in healthy food has increased avocado consumption around the world

article / Silvia Goya

Social trends such as veganism or "real fooding" have increased the world production of avocado, a fruit valued for its healthy fat and vitamin contribution, which is a good complement to a multitude of dishes. In the United States, moreover, the food tradition of millions of Hispanics - the avocado comes from a tree native to Central and South America(Persea americana) - has encouraged the consumption of a product that, like few others, marks the relations between the United States and Mexico.

The US department Agriculture (USDA) forecasts that to meet the growing domestic consumption of avocado (which has increased 5.4 times since 2000, from 226,000 tons to 1.2 million in 2018), in 2019 the country will have to increase its imports significantly, so that they will go from 87% to 93% of the availability product. That will mean an increase in imports from Mexico, which in 2018 already contributed 87% of the avocado from abroad. This need for imports is partly due to production problems recorded in California, the state with the highest production in the US (about 80%), well ahead of the second, Florida, and a great litigator in the past to prevent the skill of Mexican avocados.

Donald Trump's first year in the White House meant a slight decline in Mexican avocado imports, which in 2017 dropped to 774,626 tons. However, in 2018, a new record was reached, with 904,205 tons, up 17%, in a context of non-materialization of the trade threats launched by the Trump Administration, which finally agreed to the renewal of the free trade agreement with Mexico and Canada. Last year, imports from Mexico accounted for 87% of total avocado purchases abroad; the rest, up to 1.04 million tons, corresponded to those from Peru (8%), Chile (2.5%) and Dominican Republic (2.5%).

History of a veto

The B in avocado sales in the US has attracted the attention of drug cartels, which have clashed for control of the business in some Mexican states such as Michoacán - the major producer of avocados, especially the Hass variety, which is the most widely marketed - giving rise to a "new drug trade". However, the history of controversy between the two countries over this berry goes back a long way. It was in 1914 when the then US Secretary of Agriculture signed a quarantine notice declaring the need to prohibit the importation of avocado seeds from Mexico due to a weevil that the seed carried. In 1919 the "Quarantine of nurseries, plants and seeds" was enacted. This regulatory framework was in force for decades.

During the period of the 1970s, the discussion on the entrance of Mexican avocados into the U.S. market remained in the political limelight due to the insistence of Mexican Plant Health Service officials. Investigations in several Mexican avocado-producing states, however, found weevils in some of the seeds, which did not allow a change in the regulatory policy of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the USDA department Therefore, in 1976 the USDA, in a letter to its Mexican counterpart, stated that it should continue "as in the past, against the issuance of permits for the importation of avocados from Mexico".

Following these events, U.S. policy toward avocados from its neighboring country remained restrictive until trade liberalization and harmonization of sanitary and phytosanitary measures began to change the context in which governments considered plant health problems and imports. For most of the 20th century, the policy of protection had been to deny access to products that might harbor pests; in the last decade, however, the rules began to change.

The creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 and the World Trade Organization in 1995 paved the way for new Mexican requests for access to the U.S. avocado market. Although NAFTA's main goal was the elimination of tariffs by 2004, it also provided for the harmonization of sanitary and phytosanitary measures between trading partners. However, this free trade agreement explicitly recognizes that each country can establish regulations to protect human, animal and plant life and health, so when the risk of pest infestation is high, the country has the legitimacy to place restrictions on trade.

With the implementation of NAFTA in 1994, the U.S. government came under increased pressure to facilitate the importation of agricultural products from Mexico, including avocados. This led to a shift in USDA's phytosanitary policy to a new policy of "mitigation or technological solutions". APHIS is the branch of government charged with implementing the phytosanitary provisions of NAFTA in the case of the US. APHIS considered that fruit flies - present in a wide variety of species - could also be found in Mexican avocados, so Mexican Plant Health Service officials had the difficult task of proving that the insect was not present in their avocados and that those of the Hass variety were not susceptible to Mexican fruit fly attack. Between 1992 and 1994, Mexico submitted two work plans with their respective research. The first was rejected while the second, despite pressure from the California Avocado Commission (CAC), was accepted.

This second plan called for access of Mexican avocados to 19 of the 50 U.S. states during the months of October through February. In late June 1995, the USDA issued a proposal rule outlining the conditions under which Hass avocados grown on approved plantations in Michoacán could enter the United States. It was in late 1997 that the USDA issued a final rule authorizing the importation of such avocados into the US. This was the first time that the USDA used the so-called "systemsapproach " to manage the risks posed by quarantine pests.

At the conclusion of the second shipping season in February 1999, Mexico requested an expansion of the program to increase the issue of U.S. states to which it could export and allow the shipping season to begin one month earlier (September) and end one month later (March). In 2001, the USDA met with the Mexican Plant Health Service and agreed to consider expanding the importing states to 31 and the import dates from October 15 to April 15. The good relationship established between Presidents George W. Bush and Vicente Fox had a clear influence on this expansionary movement.

Imports in tons. In 2018, imports of 1.04 million tons (87% from Mexico)source: USDA].

Liberalization

For five years Mexican avocados had been shipped to the U.S. without detecting a single pest. Although the expansion of Mexican avocado imports seemed inevitable, the CAC filed a lawsuit against the USDA from California, alleging that Mexican avocados did have pests. In response, the USDA conducted an research and published a draft "pest riskassessment " in 2003 confirming that Mexican avocados did not carry the fruit fly.

The USDA had shifted from its previous position of domestic protection to a new position that benefited importation. Thus, in 2004 the USDA issued a new rule to expand the import program to all 50 states for 12 months of the year. This rule provided for California, Florida and Hawaii to delay the importation of avocados for up to one year in order to test the effectiveness of the proposed regulations. Therefore, it was not until January 2007 that Mexico was allowed to export avocados to California and Florida; since then it has been allowed to export to all states year-round, thus quickly making the US the world's largest importer of Mexican avocados.

Until 2017, the import of Mexican avocados remained stable; however, as previously indicated, with Trump's arrival to the White House, US-Mexico relations again faltered around various issues, one of them being the export of food from Mexico to the US, with avocados as an emblematic case. The new US president threatened a 20% tariff on Mexican avocados to finance the wall he intended to build on the border.

In June 2018 Trump again threatened to place a 25% tariff on avocados and later in May 2019 threatened to impose a 5% tariff on all goods from Mexico.

In March 2019, when the migratory wave occurred, the US president threatened to close the border with Mexico and consecutively withdrew his decision, however, the mere fact that Trump threatened to close the border already escalated the price of avocado by 34%.

U.S.-Mexico avocado relations remain unstable. Although much progress has been made since the implementation of NAFTA, various interests are still at stake that could lead the US to reduce imports of Mexican avocados. Avocados can hardly escape the uncertainty of the U.S.-Mexico relationship.

▲ US border patrol vehicle near the fence with Mexico [Wikimedia Commons].

ESSAY / Gabriel de Lange

I. Current issues in the Northern Triangle

In recent years, the relationship between the Northern Triangle Countries (NTC) -Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador- and it's northern neighbors Mexico and the United States has been marked in mainstream average for their surging migration patterns. As of 2019, a total of 977,509 individuals have been apprehended at the Southwest border of the US (the border with Mexico) as compared to 521,093 the previous year (years in terms of US fiscal years). Of this number, an estimated 75% have come from the NTC[1]. These individuals are typically divided into three categories: single adults, family units, and unaccompanied alien children (UAC).

As the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) reports, over 65% of the population of the NTC are below 29 years of age[2]. This is why it is rather alarming to see an increasing number of the youth population from these countries leaving their homes and becoming UAC at the border.

Why are these youths migrating? Many studies normally associate this to "push factors." The first factor being an increase in insecurity and violence, particularly from transnational organized crime, gangs, and narco-trafficking[3]. It is calculated that six children flee to the US for every ten homicides in the Northern Triangle[4]. The second significant factor is weak governance and corruption; this undermines public trust in the system, worsens the effects of criminal activity, and diverts funds meant to improve infrastructure and social service systems. The third factor is poverty and lack of economic development; for example in Guatemala and Honduras, roughly 60% of people live below the poverty line[5].

The other perspective to explain migration is through what are called "pull factors." An example would be the lure of economic possibilities abroad, like the high US demand for low-skilled workers, a service that citizens of NTC can provide and be better paid for that in their home countries. Another pull factor worth mentioning is lax immigration laws, if the consequences for illegal entry into a country are light, then individuals are more likely to migrate for the chance attaining better work, educational, and healthcare opportunities[6].

II. US administrations' strategies

A. The Obama administration (2008-2015)

The Obama administration for the most part used the carrot and soft power approach in its engagement with the NTC. Its main goals in the region being to "improve security, strengthen governance, and promote economic prosperity in the region", it saw these developments in the NTC as being in the best interest of US national security[7].

In 2014, in the wake of the massive surge of migrants, especially UACs, the administration launched the reform initiative titled the Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity (A4P). The plan expanded across Central America but with special focus on the NTC. This was a five year plan to address these "push factors" that cause people to migrate. The four main ways that the initiative aims to accomplish this is by promoting the following: first, by fostering the productivity sector to address the region's economic instability; second, by developing human capital to increase the quality of life, which improves education, healthcare and social services; third, improving citizen security and access to justices to address the insecurity and violence threat, and lastly, strengthening institutions and improving transparency to address the concerns for weak governance and corruption[8].

This initiative would receive direct technical support and financing from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). In addition, major funding was to be provided by the US, which for the fiscal years of 2015-2018 committed $2.6 billion split for bilateral assistance, Regional Security Strategy (RSS), and other regional services[9]. The NTC governments themselves were major financiers of the initiative, committing approximately $8.6 billion between 2016-2018[10].

The administration even launched programs with the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The principle one being the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), with a heavy focus on the NTC and it's security issues, which allotted a budget of $1.2 billion in 2008. This would later evolve into the larger framework of US Strategy for Engagement in Central America in 2016.

The Obama administration also launched in 2015 the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which currently allows individuals who were brought to the US as children, and have unlawful statuses to receive a renewable two-year period of deferred action from deportation[11]. It is a policy that the Trump administration has been fighting to remove these last few years.

Although the Obama administration was quite diplomatic and optimistic in its approach, that didn't mean it didn't make efforts to lessen the migration factors in more aggressive ways too. In fact, the administration reportedly deported over three million illegal immigrants through the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the highest amount of deportations taking place in the fiscal year of 2012 reaching 409,849 which was higher than any single one of the Trump administration's reported fiscal years to date[12].

In addition, the Obama administration used educational campaigns to discourage individuals from trying to cross into the US illegally. In 2014 they also launched a Central American Minors (CAM) camp targeting children from the NTC and providing a "safe, legal and orderly alternative to US migration"[13]. This however was later scrapped by the Trump Administration, along with any sense of reassessment brought about by Obama's carrot approach. 

Number of apprehensions and inadmissibles on the US border with Mexico [Source: CBP].

B. The Trump administration (2016-present)        

The Trump administration's strategy in the region has undoubtedly gone with the stick approach. The infamous "zero tolerance policy" which took place from April-June 2018 is a testimony to this idea, resulting in the separation of thousands of children from their parents and being reclassified as UAC[14]. This was in an attempt to discourage individuals in the NTC from illegally entering the US and address these lax immigration laws.

From early on Trump campaigned based on the idea of placing America's interests first, and as a result has reevaluated many international treaties and policies. In 2016 the administration proposed scaling back funds for the NTC through the A4P, however this was blocked in Congress and the funds went through albeit in a decreasing value starting with $754 million in 2016 to only $535 million in 2019.

Another significant difference between the two administrations is that while Obama's focused on large multi-lateral initiatives like the A4P, the Trump administration has elected to focus on a more bilateral approach, one that goes back and forth between cooperation and threats, to compliment the existing strategy.

Towards the end of 2018 the US and Mexico had announced the concept of a "Marshal Plan" for Central America with both countries proposing large sums of money to be given annually to help improve the economic and security conditions in the NTC. However in this last year it has become more apparent that there will be difficulties raising funds, especially due to their reliance on private investment organisations and lack of executive cooperation. Just last May, Trump threatened to place tariffs on Mexico due to its inability to decrease immigration flow. President López Obrador responded by deploying the National Guard to Mexico's border with Guatemala, resulting in a decrease of border apprehensions by 56%[15] on the US Southwest border. This shows that the stick method can achieve results, but that real cooperation cannot be achieved if leaders don't see eye to eye and follow through on commitments. If large amount of funding where to be put in vague unclear programs and goals in the NTC, it is likely to end up in the wrong hands due to corruption[16].  

In terms of bilateral agreements with NTC countries, Trump has been successful in negotiating with Guatemala and Honduras in signing asylum cooperative agreements, which has many similarities with a safe third country agreement, though not exactly worded as such. Trump struck a similar deal with El Salvador, though sweetened it by granting a solution for over 200,000 Salvadorans living in US under a Temporary Protection Status (TPS).[17]

However, Trump has not been the only interested party in the NTC and Mexico. The United Nations' ECLAC launched last year its "El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras-Mexico Comprehensive Development Program", which aims to target the root causes of migration in the NTC. It does this by promoting policies that relate to the UN 2030 diary and the 17 sustainable development goals. The four pillars of this initiative being: economic development, social well-being, environmental sustainability, and comprehensive management of migratory patters[18]. However the financing behind this initiative remains ambiguous and the goals behind it seem redundant. They reflect the same goals established by the A4P, just simply under a different entity.

The main difference between the Obama and Trump administrations is that the A4P takes a slow approach aiming to address the fundamental issues triggering migration patterns, the results of which will likely take 10-15 years and steady multi-lateral investment to see real progress. Meanwhile the Trump administration aims to get quick results by creating bilateral agreements with these NTC in order to distribute the negative effects of migration among them and lifting the immediate burden. Separately, neither strategy appears wholesome and convincing enough to rally congressional and public support. However, the combination of all initiatives -investing effort both in the long and short run, along with additional initiatives like ECLAC's program to reinforce the region's goals- could perhaps be the most effective mechanism to combat insecurity, weak governance, and economic hardships in the NTC.

U.S. agreements with the Northern Triangle may have had a deterrent effect before entering into force

In the first month following the extension of the Asylum Cooperation Agreements (ACA) to the three Northern Triangle countries, apprehensions at the US border have fallen below recent years. The actual reduction in migrant inflows evidenced by this has to do with Mexico's increased control over its border with Guatemala, but may also be due to the deterrent effect of the advertisement the agreements, whose implementation has not yet fully begun and therefore has yet to demonstrate whether they will be directly effective.

▲ Honduran migrants held by Guatemalan border guards, October 2018 [Wikimedia Commons].

article / María del Pilar Cazali

Attempts to entrance the United States through its border with Mexico have not only returned to the levels of earlier in the year, before the number of migrants soared and each month set a new record high, reaching 144,116 apprehensions and inadmissions in May( U.S.Border Guard figures that provide an indirect assessment of the evolution of migration), but have continued to decline to below several previous years.

The month of October (the first month of the 2020 US fiscal year), there were 45,250 apprehensions and inadmissions at the US southern border, below the figure for the months of October 2018, 2015 and 2016 (though not 2017). This allows us to predict that the total number of apprehensions and inadmissions in the new fiscal year will fall clearly below the record of 977,509 recorded in 2019. This boom had to do with the migrant caravans that began at the end of 2018 in the Central American Northern Triangle (Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala), following a migratory flow that, with different intensities, began in the 1980s due to political and economic instabilities in those countries.

This migration crisis led President Trump's U.S. administration to implement harsher deportation policies, including changing conditions for expedited deportations. In addition, the White House pressured Mexico with the threat of tariffs on its products if it did not help reduce the flow of migrants crossing Mexican soil, prompting President López Obrador to deploy the newly created National Guard to the border with Guatemala. Trump combined these measures with the negotiation with the Northern Triangle countries of Asylum Cooperation Agreements (ACAs), which were initially improperly referred to as "safe third countries", adding to the controversy they generated.

agreement with Guatemala

Due to US threats to impose tariffs on Guatemala if it failed to reduce the issue of migrants from or passing through Guatemala on their way to the US, the Guatemalan government accepted the terms of an attention announced by Trump on July 26, 2019. The agreement provides that those seeking asylum in the US but who have previously passed through Guatemala will be brought back to the US so that they can remain there as asylees if they qualify. The United States sees this as a safe third country agreement .

A safe third countryagreement is an international mechanism that makes it possible to receive in one country those seeking asylum in another. The agreement signed in July prevents asylum seekers from receiving U.S. protection if they passed through Guatemala and did not first apply for asylum there. The U.S. goal is to prevent migrants from Honduras and El Salvador from seeking asylum in the United States. The responsibility for processing protection requests will fall on Washington in only three cases: unaccompanied minors, persons with a U.S.-issued visa or admission document, or persons who are not required to obtain a visa. Those who do not meet the requirements will be sent to Guatemala to await resolution of their case, which could take years. On the other hand, the agreement does not prevent Guatemalan and Mexican applicants from seeking asylum in the United States.

The president of Guatemala, Jimmy Morales, had previously announced that a similar agreement could become part of the immigration negotiations being carried out with the US. In Guatemala, after the advertisement the agreement, multiple criticisms arose, because the security conditions of both countries are incomparable. To this were added rumors about the true content of the agreement that Morales had signed, since it was not immediately revealed to the public. Faced with this uncertainty, the Minister of the Interior, Enrique Degenhart, declared that the agreement was only for Hondurans and Salvadorans, not for nationals of other Latin American countries, and that the text did not explicitly mention the term "safe third country".

The week following the advertisement, three appeals for legal protection against the agreement were filed before the Constitutional Court of Guatemala, arguing that the country is not in a position to provide the protection it supposedly offers and that the expense it would entail would weaken the economic status of the population itself. However, Degenhart defended the agreement saying that the economic repercussions would have been worse if the pact with Washington had not been reached, because the U.S. tariffs would endanger half of Guatemala's exports and the jobs that accompany these sectors.

These criticisms came not only from Guatemalan citizens, but also from public figures such as Guatemala's Human Rights Ombudsman, Jordán Rodas, citing a lack of transparency on the part of the government. Rodas insisted that Guatemala is not fit to be a safe third country because of its low production, Education, public health and security indicators. Similar ideas have also been expressed by organizations such as Amnesty International, for which Guatemala is not safe and cannot be considered as a safe haven.

In its pronouncement, the Constitutional Court of Guatemala affirmed that the Guatemalan government needs to submit the agreement to the approval of congress in order for it to be effective. This has been rejected by the government, which considers that international policy is the direct skill of the country's president and therefore will begin to implement the decision made with Washington without further delay.

Apprehensions and inadmissions made by U.S. border guards, distributed by month during the last fiscal years (FY) [Taken from CBP].

Also with El Salvador and Honduras

Despite all this controversy generated since July as a result of the pact with Guatemala, the US developed similar efforts with El Salvador and Honduras. On September 20, 2019, the president of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, signed an agreement assimilable to the figure of the safe third country, although it was not explicitly called as such either. It commits El Salvador to receive asylum seekers who cannot yet enter the U.S., similar to the agreement with Guatemala. El Salvador's agreement has the same three assumptions in which the U.S. will have to make a position migrant protection.

The Salvadoran government has received similar criticism, including a lack of transparency in the negotiation and denial of the reality that the country is unsafe. Bukele justified the signature by saying it would mean the extension of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for the more than 190,000 Salvadorans living in the US. In October 2019, the Salvadoran Foreign Ministry said that this agreement is not a safe third country because El Salvador is not in the serious migratory situations in which Guatemala and Honduras are in terms of the flow of people, so it is only an agreement of non-violation of rights to minimize the number of migrants.

On September 21, 2019 the Honduran government also made public the advertisement of an agreement very similar to the one accepted by its two neighbors. It states that the U.S. will be able to deport to Honduras asylum seekers who have passed through Honduras. Like the other two countries, the Honduran government received criticism that it is not a safe destination for migrants as it is one of the countries with the highest homicide fees in the world.

Despite the criticism generated over the three agreements, in late October 2019 the Donald Trump administration announced that it was in final preparations to begin sending asylum seekers to Guatemala. However, by the end of November, the sending of non-Guatemalan asylum seekers had yet to occur. The inauguration in early January of President-elect Alejandro Giammattei, who announced his desire to rescind certain terms of the agreement, may introduce some variation, although perhaps his purpose is to extract some more concessions from Trump, in addition to the agricultural visas that Morales negotiated for Guatemalan seasonal workers.

[Michael E. O'Hanlon, The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War over Small Stakes. Brookings Institution Press. Washington, 2019. 272 p.]

review / Jimena Puga

After the end of the Cold War, in which it confronted the Soviet Union bloc defending the values of the Western order, the United States remained the hegemonic country in the world. Today, however, it is rivaled by Russia, which, despite its weak Economics , is struggling not to lose any more influence on the international scene, and by China, which, although still a regional power, aspires to replace the United States at the global pinnacle. The challenge is not only for Washington, but for the West as a whole, as its own values are being challenged by the advance of Moscow and Beijing's diary .

The West must respond firmly, but how far should it go, when should it say enough is enough, and is it ready for war even if the cumulative steps taken by Russia or China are themselves relatively minor or occur on the periphery? That is the question posed by Brookings Institution researcher Michael E. O'Hanlon in The Senkaku Paradox: Risking Great Power War over Small Stakes. The book addresses a series of possible scenarios in the context of a global hegemonic shift and competition for power among the world's major powers.

The scenarios put forward by O'Hanlon consist, on the one hand, of a possible annexation of Estonia or Latvia by Russia, without prior consent and by means of a military attack. On the other hand, China's military conquest of one of the larger islands that make up the Senkaku, the name Japan gives to an archipelago it administers in the vicinity of Taiwan and which Beijing calls Diaoyu. In both cases, it is difficult to assess which side would have a better military strategy or to predict which side would win a hypothetical war. In addition, there are many unknown variables about cyber vulnerabilities, submarine operations or the accuracy of missile attacks on each country's strategic infrastructure.

Thus, the author wonders whether both the United States and its allies should respond directly with a military offensive in response to an initial attack, or whether they should limit themselves to an asymmetric response, focused on preventing future attacks, combining such responses with economic retaliation and certain military actions in different scenarios. What is clear is that while remaining vigilant in the face of the possible need to strengthen their positions on the international chessboard, Western countries must remain prudent and provide proportionate responses to possible crises, aware that their values - the defense of freedom, justice and the common good - are the greatest assets of their democratic systems.

At present, Western democratic systems are under strong populist pressure, although there is nothing to suggest that countries with well-established democracies such as France, Germany or Spain will generate conflicts among themselves, much less within the European Union, which has been a guarantee of peace and stability since the 1950s. For its part, it would be advisable for the Trump Administration to react more prudently in certain situations, in order to avoid an escalation of diplomatic tension that unnecessarily increases the risks of conflict, at least regional or economic.

Neither Moscow nor Beijing today pose an immediate threat to US world hegemony, but China is the fastest growing power in the last fifty years. Such rapid growth could lead China to dispense with multilateralism and regional cooperation and to regional influence through economic or military imposition. This would make the People's Republic a threat.

Although it is true that the United States has the best military force, it is expected that around the year 2040 there will be both military and economic parity between the Middle Empire and the American country. Thus, Europe and the United States, faced with possible aggression from China - or from Russia, despite its state of gradual decline - should respond appropriately and, as the White House says, be "strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable". And they seek to do allies at the international level and to put military pressure on the aggressor in regions where the aggressor is compromised.

As the author argues, the White House needs better and more credible options for designing an asymmetric defense based on deterrence and containment plans, with the use of force as an option. For example, article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is not the best deterrence weapon for the US and its allies, as it poses a danger to stability and leaves no room for action in the event of deterrence failure. However, with the proposed new defense subject , NATO member countries would not be obliged to "fire the first bullet", so that other collateral actions would be possible, without the need to resort to direct confrontation to stop a possible escalation of more serious hostilities.

What is clear, argues O'Hanlon, is that both China and Russia seek to challenge the international order through any subject conflict and the West must adopt strategies aimed at anticipating possible future scenarios, so that they can be prepared to face them with guarantees of success. These measures need not be solely military. For example, they will have to prepare for a long and painful economic war by means of defensive and offensive measures, while the U.S. puts the brakes on the imposition of tariffs on aluminum and steel on its allies. In addition, the US has to be careful about overusing the economic sanctions applied to financial transactions, especially the ban on access to the SWIFT banking communication system, otherwise Washington's allies will end up creating alternatives to SWIFT, which would be a disadvantage and a sample of weakness vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing.

▲ Operations in cyberspace may be part of a hybrid warfare status carried out by state or non-state actors [Pixabay].

December 2, 2019

essay / Ana Salas Cuevas

Hybrid threat is a term that encompasses all subject of coordinated actions to influence the decision making of states, making use of political, economic, military, civilian and information means. These actions can be carried out by both state and non-state actors.

The term "Grey Zone" is used to determine the boundary between peace and war. It is a new tactic that has nothing to do with the real war that pits armies of different states against each other. Hybrid warfare consists of achieving results by directly influencing society by demoralizing it. It is an undoubtedly effective tactic and much simpler for the attacking countries, since both the economic and human investment is less than in real warfare. Resources such as propaganda, manipulation of communications, economic blockades, etc. are used... And since there is no strict international legislation in relation to these conflicts, many countries consider this subject actions as tolerable.

Introduction: The hybrid threat

The term hybrid threat became popular after the 2006 clash between Israel and Hezbollah to designate "the integration of unconventional and irregular tactics, techniques and procedures, mixed with terrorist acts, propaganda and connections with organized crime"[1].

The essential goal of the hybrid threat is to achieve results without resorting to real war, confronting societies and not armies, almost completely breaking down the distinction between combatants and citizens. The military goal takes a back seat.

The actions carried out within this subject of conflicts are focused on the employment means such as cyber-attacks, disinformation and propaganda. Their goal to exploit economic, political, technological and diplomatic vulnerabilities, disrupting communities, national parties, electoral systems and having a major effect on the energy sector. These actions are not random, they are planned and organized. These attacks are not linear in nature. They can have direct consequences elsewhere. For example, the drone strike on wells in Saudi Arabia in September 2019 had a direct impact on global Economics .

Cyberspace has become a novel aspect of this scenario. Thanks largely to the technological and information revolution, we are now facing a changing world order, in which the information provided by the media is accessible to anyone from anywhere in the world. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the Internet is one of the most important fronts when talking about hybrid warfare. In this field, the rules are not clearly established and States and non-State actors have a greater margin for action compared to the classic power of States. Fake news, disinformation and opinion-based facts are instruments at anyone's fingertips to influence public order.

Through manipulation in these areas, the hybrid enemy manages to considerably weaken one of the most important pillars of the State or community at which its actions are aimed: the trust of citizens in its institutions.

Ambiguity is one of the distinguishing characteristics of cyber activity. The hybrid enemy not only exploits to its advantage the difficulty inherent in the global network to attribute hostile actions to a specific actor, but reinforces it through the use of hybrid strategies such as synchronization.

Cyberterrorism and hacktivism

As we have just seen, cyberspace is one of the preferred domains of the hybrid enemy. In it, he will frequently resort to cyberthreats, a cross-cutting threat that is very difficult to attribute authorship to. In most cases, it is not possible to substantiate it reliably, and in most cases there are only suspicions, making it very difficult to obtain proof. These cyberthreats can be divided into four blocks, which we will analyze one by one.

First of all, cyberespionage is goal the political, economic and military spheres. Many states routinely resort to cyber espionage. These include China, Russia, Iran and the United States. States can carry out cyberespionage actions directly, using their intelligence services, or through interposed agents such as companies influenced by these states.

Secondly, cybercrime, which in most cases is committed for profit, and whose impact on global Economics is estimated at 2% of the world's GDP. The main objectives of cybercrime are theft of information, fraud, money laundering, etc. It is often carried out by terrorist organizations, organized crime and hackers.

Thirdly, cyberterrorism, whose main objectives are to obtain information and all subject communications to citizens. The main agents, as can be deduced, are terrorist organizations and intelligence agencies.

Cyberterrorism has a number of advantages over conventional terrorism, and is that it guarantees greater security over anonymity, in addition, there is a greater cost-benefit ratio and in the geographical scope there is a great advantage in terms of delimitation. In Spain, a reform of terrorist crimes was given through Organic Law 2/2015, in which articles 571 to 580 of the Penal Code were reformed in their entirety. At the same time, Organic Law 1/2015 also approved the reform of the Criminal Code, affecting more than 300 articles[2].

Finally, in fourth place, hacktivism, whose main targets are web services, along with the theft and unauthorized publication of information. When hacktivism is used for the benefit of terrorism, it becomes terrorism. The Islamic terrorist group DAESH, for example, uses cyber means to recruit fighters to its ranks. Two groups stand out as agents, the "Anonymus" group and "Luizsec," in addition to the intelligence services themselves.

Cyberterrorism has very specific aims: to subvert the constitutional order, seriously disrupt social peace and destroy our global model . It is an emerging threat of leave probability, but high impact. The main problem of all this is the little existing legislation on the subject, but which is gradually emerging; for example, in 2013 the starting point was given with the publication of a communication of the European Union committee on security - the "Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union"[3]- from which every 5 years the strategies must be reviewed. This is in addition to Regulation 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the committee (EU) of 17 April 2019.

Gray zone

The concept of the gray zone has recently been coined in the field programs of study strategic programs of study to describe the framework of action of the hybrid enemy. The term describes a state of tension alternative to war, operating in a stage of formal peace.

The conflict in the gray zone is centered on civil society. Its cost, therefore, falls directly on the population. It operates in any case within the limits of international legality. The protagonist is generally a State of major international importance (a power) or a non-State actor of similar influence.

The actions of an enemy operating in the gray zone are aimed at dominating certain "zones" that are of interest to it. The types of response within what is defined as a gray zone will depend on the threat faced by the country in question.

Legal point of view

If we speak from a legal point of view, it is more accurate to use the term hybrid warfare, only when there is a declared and not a covert armed conflict.

Indeed, a major problem arises from the difficulty of applying the appropriate national or international legislation to hybrid threat actors. The actors involved, as a rule, deny hybrid actions and try to escape the legal consequences of their actions, taking advantage of the complexity of the legal system. They act by skirting the boundaries, operating in unregulated spaces and never exceeding the legal thresholds.

Hybrid threat responses

The response to the hybrid threat can take place in different, but not mutually exclusive, spheres. In the military sphere, even a direct military confrontation can be conceived, which can be seen as "tolerable" if it avoids a confrontation with a great power such as the United States or China. In the same way, these military confrontations are respected because of the defenselessness of the occupied territories in the face of the threat that the occupying state intends to prevent.

In the economic sphere, response makes it possible to impose financial subject costs on an enemy, which are sometimes more direct than military responses. In this field, one way of adopting non-provocative defensive measures is through the imposition of immediate and formal economic sanctions on an aggressor.

An example of this is the economic sanctions that the United States imposed against Iran for considering this country as a nuclear threat. To this end, it is important to highlight the background of this issue.

In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran's nuclear program was signed, committing Iran to comply with the agreement and the United States to remove the economic sanctions imposed. However, in 2018 Trump announced the withdrawal of the agreement and the reinstatement of sanctions. In the course of these events, various countries have spoken out about these unilateral decisions taken by the US government. China and Russia, for their part, have expressed their disagreement, making official statements in favor of Iran.

The Iranian case is a clear example of an economic response on the gray zone, in which we see how States use this element of power to deny the aggressor's participation in different institutions or agreements and to control its zone of influence.

The United States, like many other powers, finds this status of superiority a decisive advantage in conflicts within the gray zone. Due to the importance of the financial and political power of the United States, the rest of the countries, including the European Union, cannot but accept this subject unilateral actions.

Conclusions

In closing, we can conclude that hybrid activity in the gray zone has important consequences for society as a whole in one or more States, and produces effects that can be global in scope.

Hybrid threats primarily affect civil society and can have a demoralizing effect that can lead to the psychological collapse of a state. The employment this tactic is often referred to as "formal peace". Although there is no direct confrontation between armies, this technique is much more effective because the attacking country does not need to invest as much money, time and people as in real warfare. In addition, the application of international law or the intervention of third countries in the conflict is minimal, as many consider this subject actions as "tolerable".

Undoubtedly, the gray zone and hybrid threats have become the new military technique of our era due to their effectiveness and simplicity. However, there should be a tighter control so that this subject of such harmful military techniques no longer goes unnoticed.

A characteristic aspect of hybrid warfare is the manipulation of communications and the use of propaganda. With these actions it is possible to sow the distrust of citizens in their institutions, as is happening today in the relationship between China and the United States, weighed down by American statements to the press about the plan presented by Xi Jinping in 2014 on the New Silk Road, and which denote a high Degree distrust and rejection towards the Empire of the Center.

It is therefore desirable that States and international institutions establish "rules of the game" for this subject of action in order to maintain world order and peace.
 

A first essay of this text was presented as a communication at the XXVII International Defense Course held in Jaca in October 2019.

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Lyle J. Morris, Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Stephanie Pezard, Anika Binnendijk, Marta Kepe (2019). Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Grey Zone. 2019, from RAND CORPORATION. Website.

Josep Barqués (2017). Towards a definition of the concept "Grey Zone". 2019, from Spanish Institute programs of study Strategic programs of study . Web site

Javier Jordán (2017). Hybrid warfare: a catch-all concept. 2019, from University of Granada. Website.

Javier Jordan (2018). International conflict in the grey zone: a theoretical proposal from the perspective of offensive realism. 2019, from Revista Española de Ciencia Política. Website.

Javier Jordan (2019). How to counter hybrid strategies. 2019, from University of Granada. Website.

Guillem Colom Piella (2019). The hybrid threat: myths, legends and realities. 2019, from Instituto Español de programs of study Estratégicos. Web site

Murat Caliskan (2019). Hybrid warfare through the lens of strategic theory. 2019, from Defense & Security Analysis, 35:1, 40-58. Website.

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Publisher: Geert Cami Senior Fellow: Jamie Shea Programme Manager: Mikaela d'Angelo Programme Assistant: Gerard Huerta publisher: Iiris André, Robert Arenella Design: Elza Lőw. (2018). HYBRID AND TRANSNATIONAL THREATS. 2019, by Friends of Europe. Website.

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With the agreement reached between the EU and Johnson and the polls favorable to Johnson in the December 12 elections, a possible end to Brexit is in sight.

▲ Installation against Brexit, during a protest in Manchester in 2017 [Robert Mandel, Wikimedia Commons].

COMMENT / Pablo Gurbindo

Since June 23, 2016, the date on which the referendum on the United Kingdom remaining in the European Union was held, the British exit has overshadowed any other topic, such as the momentous past European elections, and has caused the division of the British political spectrum between those who support remaining and those who support leaving.

 The "Brexit" has also taken two prime ministers by surprise: David Cameron, after the referendum, and his successor, Theresa May, who left the position after failing to get her agreement reached with the EU to be C the British Parliament. And it may be her successor, Boris Johnson, the controversial former Mayor of London who campaigned for the vote to leave the Union, who manages to lead his country out of these more than three years of uncertainty.

Johnson's arrival at 10 Downing Street caused great concern in European capitals. From the outset, he stated that he would get his country out of the European Union, agreement or no agreement, before October 31. And, in September, he did not hesitate to temporarily fail the Parliament so that the civil service examination could not veto a possible exit without agreement. This closure was declared illegal by the Supreme Court and the civil service examination succeeded in ensuring that the hypothetical exit without agreement could only be agreed by Parliament. Despite all this, negotiations in Brussels did not stop and, on October 17, it was announced that an agreement had been reached. agreement.

The agreement reached is, to a large extent, similar to the one reached with Theresa May. The main change has been the Irish "safeguard", the section most criticized at the time by the civil service examination and by the hardest wing of the "Tories". This measure implied that, if the European Union and the United Kingdom did not reach an agreement by 2020, Northern Ireland would remain in the single market and the customs union, while the rest of the United Kingdom would leave.

This system provoked a great rejection, especially in the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). May and Johnson depended on this Northern Irish Unionist party to approve the agreement in the British Parliament. This concern about the new border between the two Irelands responds to the risk it poses to the Good Friday Agreements. Thanks to these agreements, peace was restored to Northern Ireland, which was at war in the last century between Catholic groups, who advocated unification with Ireland, and Protestant unionists, who advocated maintaining ties with the United Kingdom. The breakdown of these agreements could provoke the return of violence to the island.

agreement reached

This new agreement on Northern Ireland, proposed by Johnson, is based on three main elements, according to the European Union's Brexit negotiator, the Frenchman Michel Barnier:

(1) Northern Ireland will continue to comply with certain EU customs rules, especially those related to goods and products. However, in order to avoid any border subject with Ireland, checks will only be carried out on goods arriving at Northern Irish ports. These checks will be carried out by the British in compliance with EU rules.

(2) However, it will continue to be part of the British Customs Union, so any trade agreement reached by the United Kingdom after Brexit will include Northern Ireland. The problem is that these two elements conflict: Northern Ireland would be part of both the British and EU customs unions. In order to solve the problem that this "customs bicephaly" could produce, products from third countries - which will not then move to another country in the common market - will be taxed in the United Kingdom. However, if the products are at risk of entering the common market, the UK authorities will apply the EU tariffs.

(3) Finally, the agreement with Johnson will be a permanent agreement unless the Northern Ireland Assembly decides otherwise. The agreement enables this body to vote on whether to maintain or abandon the agreed status, once four years have elapsed since the protocol came into force. In the event that they ratify the agreement , it will be extended by four or eight years, depending on whether it is a simple majority or whether it has majority support (with the support of the Protestant and Catholic communities). Otherwise, European laws will continue to apply for two more years, during which time the EU and the UK will have to reach a new agreement.

Extension and call for elections

After the advertisement the agreement reached, the most complicated part remained: ratifying it in the British Parliament, and in record time, since the deadline was October 31. Johnson was forced by Parliament to ask Brussels for an extension until January 31, 2020, contrary to his wishes to keep his promise to leave on October 31. This request was not without controversy as Johnson sent two letters: one requesting the extension, which he did not sign, and another signed in which he expressed that he would see the extension as a "mistake" and that it would be "deeply corrosive" for his country.

On October 29, the European committee accepted the extension to January 31, 2020 to allow time for the ratification of the Exit agreement . The United Kingdom could leave the Union earlier, on December 1, 2019 (a date which has already passed) or on January 1, 2020 in the event of both parties ratifying the support. This extension was unanimously approved by the 27, despite France's reluctance. France argued that this long extension should be granted only if there was certainty that there would be elections in the United Kingdom; otherwise, they advocated a shorter technical extension, so that there would be time to ratify the Exit agreement .

To carry out the Brexit, Johnson, faced with "parliamentary obstructionism", called for early elections to change the arithmetic of the Parliament and to be able to approve the agreement reached with the EU. This call was rejected twice by Jeremy Corbyn's Labour Party, the main party of the civil service examination. But after learning that the European committee accepted the extension, it supported the call.

Conclusion

With elections scheduled for next December 12, the wind seems to be blowing in Johnson's favor. The polls favor him with a percentage of 40% of the vote. Far behind, Labour, with 29%, would lose support to Jo Swinson's Liberal Democrat Party, which would rise to 15% (from 7.4% in the previous election). This rise of the "Lib Dems" would be mainly due to their strong support for remaining in the EU, unlike Corbyn, who has maintained a neutral position despite the fact that 70% of Labour voters support remaining. On the other hand, the Conservative majority would allow the "Tories" to stop depending on the DUP to achieve sufficient parliamentary majorities.

As if that were not enough, the leader of the Brexit Party, Nigel Farage, has announced that in order to facilitate a Conservative majority, his party will not stand in the constituencies where the Conservative Party won in the previous elections. In order to ensure the exit of the United Kingdom from the Union and to avoid a new referendum.

If these polls come true, Johnson would obtain his long-awaited majority to be able to approve the exit.

After more than three years, a plausible end to Brexit is in sight.

The avalanche of unaccompanied foreign minors suffered by the Obama administration in 2014 has been overcome in 2019 by a new immigration peak

In the summer of 2014, the United States suffered a migration crisis due to an unexpected increase in the number of unaccompanied foreign minors, mostly Central Americans, who arrived at its border with Mexico. What has happened since then? Although oscillating, the volume of this type of immigration fell, but in 2019 a new record has been registered in the wake of the recent "caravan crisis", which has increased again total apprehensions on the border.

▲ US Customs and Border Protection agents processing unaccompanied children, in Texas, at the border with Mexico, in 2014 [Hector Silva, USCBP-Wikimedia Commons].

ARTICLE / Marcelina Kropiwnicka [English version] [Spanish version].

The United States hosts more immigrants than any other country in the world, with more than one million people arriving every year either as permanent legal residents, asylum-seekers and refugees, or in other immigration categories. While there is no official measure of tracking how many people successfully cross the border illegally, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) authorities measure the changes in illicit immigration using the amount of apprehensions per fiscal year; apprehensions being an indicator of total attempts to cross the border illegally. Looking at data, it can be concluded that there have been B in the demographics of illegal migration on the southwest border with Mexico (or Southwest border) over the last few years.

The soaring peak of apprehensions on the Southwest border was in 2000 when 1.64 million persons were detained for trying to enter the US illegally. The figures have generally declined since. Interestingly enough, in recent years, there have been more overall seizures of non-Mexicans than Mexicans at US borders, reflecting a decline in the number of unauthorized Mexican immigrants coming to the US over the past decade. The surge, in fact, was largely due to those fleeing violence, gang activity and poverty in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, known collectively as the Northern Triangle.

The nations included in the Northern Triangle are among the poorest in Latin America-a high percentage of the population still lives on less than $2 a day (the international poverty line is $1.90)-with minimal advancement occurring to reduce poverty in recent years. Within Latin America and the Caribbean, Honduras has the second-highest share with 17% of the population living below the international poverty line, after Haiti, according to the latest data from the World Bank.

Unaccompanied Alien Children

Far fewer single adults have been attempting to cross the border without authorization over the past decade, and a surge of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) crossing the Southwest border occurred. The migration of minors without an adult is not new; the novelty today is the size of this migration and the generation of policies in response to the issue. The spike of UAC apprehensions in FY2014 caused alarm and prompted average scrutiny and policy responses, and attention remained even as the number decreased; numbers dropped back down to just under 40,000 UAC apprehensions the following year.

The international community defines an unaccompanied migrant child as a person, "who is under the age of eighteen" and who is "separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who by law or custom has responsibility to do so" (UNHCR 1997). Many of these unaccompanied children immediately present themselves to US-border security whereas others enter the US unnoticed and undocumented. Not only this, the children have no parent or legal guardian available to provide care or physical custody which swiftly overwhelms local border patrols.

In 2014, many of the unaccompanied children claimed they were under the false impression that the Obama Administration was granting "permits" to children who had family members in the US, as long as they arrived by June. These false claims and "sales pitches" have become more potent this past year, especially when President Trump continues to reinforce the idea of restricting migrant access to the US. Cartels have continued transporting soaring numbers of Central American migrants from their countries to the United States.

Critical moments of 2014 and 2019

During Obama's second term, in FY2014, total apprehensions along the Southwest border reached the number of 569,237 (the figure includes "inadmissibles"), a record only surpassed now. The apprehensions soared 13% compared to FY2013, but the main increase was for UAC seizures, which surged immensely from 38,759 in FY2013 to 68,541 in FY2014, a nearly 80% increase, as well as more than four times as many UAC as in FY2011. In a year, the figure of minors from Honduras increased from 6,747 to 18,244; minors from Guatemala rose from 8,068 to 17,057, and those from El Salvador, from 5,990 to 16,404 (minors from Mexico, on the other hand, dropped from 17,240 to 15,634). Apprehensions were highest along the Southwest border in the month of May, where 17% was made up by UAC seizures.

Since FY2014, UAC apprehensions have fluctuated considerably. In FY2019, however, apprehensions of UAC reached 76,020, a level that now exceeds the peak reached in FY2014. The maximum level was registered in May; however, that month they accounted for only 9% of total apprehensions, because this time it was not properly a UAC crisis, but a remarkable peak of total apprehensions. Although overall apprehensions decreased significantly during the first six months of Trump's tenure, they rose alarmingly in FY2019, reaching a total of 851,508 (977,509 if the "inadmissibles" are added). Current data shows that seizures along the Southwest border have more than doubled from the previous FY2018. The number of overall apprehensions increased by 72% from FY2014 to FY2019 (in the case of UAC increased 11%).

Apprehensions of Unaccompanied Alien Children on the US-Mexico border, between 2012 and 2019 (figure 1), and comparison between 2014 and 2019 by month (figure 2). Source: US Customs and Border Patrol.

US Policies

The US had established numerous domestic policies which dealt with the massive rise in immigration. With the overwhelming peak in 2014, however, Obama requested funding for "the repatriation and reintegration of migrants to countries in Central America and to address the root causes of migration from these countries". Though funding was fairly consistent the past years for the program, the budget for FY2018 proposed by President Trump would cut aid to these countries by approximately 30%.

While Trump's administration has made B in its immigration diary, from beginning the construction of the wall to enforcing new programs, the hardline policies that were promised before inauguration have thus far been unsuccessful in stopping thousands of Central American families from trekking across the Southern Border into the US. With extreme gang violence being rampant and the existence of "loopholes" in the US immigration system, the pull-factor for migrants will remain.