[Hebert Lin & Amy Zegart, eds. Bytes, Bombs, and Spies. The strategic dimensions of offensive cyber operations. The Brookings Institution. Washington, 2019. 438 p. REVIEW / Albert Vidal

September 23, 2019

review / Pablo Arbuniés

Just as in the second half of the 20th century the world experienced the nuclear weapons degree program between the US and the USSR for world hegemony, everything seems to indicate that the degree program that will mark the 21st century is that of cyberspace. Since the US department Defense included cyberspace as the fifth domain of the country's military operations (along with land, sea, air and space), it has become clear that its role in world security is of paramount importance.

However, the very nature of cyberspace makes it a completely different field from what might be called kinetic security fields. The only constant in cyberspace is change, so any study and strategic approach must be able to adapt quickly to changing conditions without losing efficiency and maintaining tremendous precision. This is a real challenge for all actors in cyberspace, both national and private. At the national level, the incorporation of cyber operations into the US National Security Strategy (NSS) and the development of a cyber warfare doctrine by the department Defense are the two main pillars on which the new cyberspace degree program will be built.

Bytes, Bombs, and Spies" explores the major issues raised by this new challenge, presenting very different approaches to different situations. Probably the greatest value offered by the book is precisely the different ways of tackling the same problem advocated by the more than twenty authors who have participated in its preparation, coordinated by Herbert Lin and Amy Zegart. These authors collaborate in the 15 essays that make up the book. They do so with the idea of converting a topic as complex as offensive cyber-operations into something accessible to readers who are not experts in the topic, but without renouncing the depth and detail of an academic work.

Throughout the Issue , the authors not only discuss what should be the approach of the theoretical framework . They also assess the U.S. government's policies in the field of offensive cyber operations and suggest what should be the core topic in the development of new policies and the adaptation of previous ones to the changing cyber environment.

The book attempts to answer the major questions raised about cyberspace. From the use of offensive cyber operations in a conflict framework to the role of the private sector, from escalation dynamics and the role of deterrence in cyberspace to the intelligence capabilities needed to conduct effective cyber operations.

One of the main questions is how to include cyber operations in the framework of the dynamics of a scale of conflict. Is it lawful to respond to a cyber attack with kinetic force? And with nuclear weapons? The current U.S. government cyber doctrine leaves both doors open, confronting a response based on the effects of the attack over the means. This idea is described as incomplete by Henry Farrell and Charles L. Glaser in their chapter, in which they suggest the need to take into account more factors, such as the perception of the threat and the attack by other actors, as well as public opinion and the international community.

Continuing with the theoretical approaches, the main question raised by this book is whether it makes sense to apply to the strategic study of cyberspace the same principles that were applied to nuclear weapons during the Cold War in order to answer the questions posed above. And since this is a relatively new field in which global hegemony and stability may be at stake from the outset, how this question is answered may mean the difference between stability or utter chaos.

This is precisely what David Aucsmith argues in his chapter. He argues that cyberspace is so different from classical strategic disciplines that its strategic dimensions need to be rethought from scratch. The disintermediation of governments, unable to cover the whole of cyberspace, opens up a niche for private companies specializing in cybersecurity, but they too will not be able to completely fill what in other domains is filled by the government. For his part, Lucas Kello tries to fill the sovereignty gap in cyberspace with the aforementioned private participation, proposing the convergence between governments and citizens (through the private sector) in cyberspace.

In conclusion, ˝Bytes, Bombs, and Spies" tries to answer all the main questions posed by cyberspace, without being unattainable for a non-expert public in the topic, but maintaining rigor, precision and depth in its analysis. .

▲ View of Doha, the capital of Qatar, from its Islamic Museum [Pixabay].

essay / Sebastián Bruzzone Martínez

I. Introduction. Qatar, emirate of the Persian Gulf.

In ancient times, the territory was inhabited by the Canaanites. From the 7th century A.D., Islam settled in the Qatari peninsula. As in the United Arab Emirates, piracy and attacks on the merchant ships of powers sailing along the coasts of the Persian Gulf were frequent. Qatar was ruled by the Al Khalifa family from Kuwait until 1868, when, at the request of the Qatari sheikhs and with financial aid from the British, the Al Thani dynasty was established. In 1871, the Ottoman Empire occupied the country and the Qatari dynasty recognized Turkish authority. In 1913, Qatar achieved autonomy; three years later, Emir Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani signed a treaty with the United Kingdom to establish a British military protectorate in the region, while maintaining the Emir's absolute monarchy.

In 1968, the United Kingdom withdrew its military force, and the Truce States (United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain) organized the Federation of Emirates of the Persian Gulf. Qatar, like Bahrain, became independent of the Federation in 1971, proclaimed a provisional constitution, signed a treaty of friendship with the United Kingdom and joined the Arab League and the UN.

The provisional Constitution was replaced by the 2003 Constitution of 150 articles, submitted to a referendum and supported by 98% of the voters. It came into force as a fundamental rule on April 9, 2004. It recognizes Islam as the official religion of the State and Sharia law as a source law (art. 1); the provision for adherence to and respect for international treaties, covenants and agreements signed by the Emirate of Qatar (art. 6); the hereditary rule of the Al Thani family (art. 8); executive institutions such as the committee of Ministers and legislative-consultative institutions such as theAl Shoura committee or Ruling Family committee . Also included are the possibility of regency through the Trustee Council (arts. 13-16), the institution of the Prime Minister appointed by the Emir (art. 72), the Emir as Head of State and representative of the State in Interior, Foreign and International Relations (arts. 64-66), a sovereign wealth fund (Qatar Investment Company; art. 17), judicial institutions such as the local courts and the Supreme Judicial committee , and its control over the unconstitutionality of laws (137-140)[1], among other aspects.

It also recognizes rights such as private property (art. 27), equality of rights and duties (art. 34), equality of persons before the law without discrimination based on sex, race, language or religion (art. 35), freedom of expression (art. 47), freedom of the press (art. 48), impartiality of justice and effective judicial protection (134-136), among others.

These rights recognized in the Qatari Constitution must be consistent with Islamic law, and their application is thus different from that observed in Europe or the United States. For example, although democracy is recognized in article 1 as the political system of the State, political parties do not exist and trade unions are prohibited, although the right of association is recognized by the Constitution. Similarly, 80% of the country's population is foreign, while these constitutional rights apply to Qatari citizens, who make up the remaining 20%.

Like the other countries in the region, oil has been a transforming factor in the Qatari Economics . Today, Qatar has a high standard of living and one of the highest GDP per capita in the world[2], and is an attractive destination for foreign investors and luxury tourism. However, in recent years Qatar has been experiencing a diplomatic crisis[3] with its neighboring Persian Gulf countries due to various factors that have condemned the Arab country to regional isolation.

II. The instability of the al thani family

The government of the Emirate of Qatar has suffered great instability due to the internal disputes of the Al Thani family. Peter Salisbury, a Middle East expert at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, spoke of the Al Thanis in an interview for the BBC: "It's a family that initially (before oil finding ) ruled a small, insignificant piece of land that was often seen as a small province of Saudi Arabia. But it managed to carve out a position for itself in that region of giants." [4]

In 1972, by means of a coup d'état, Ahmed Al Thani was deposed by his cousin Khalifa Al Thani, with whom Qatar followed an international policy of non-intervention and search for internal peace, and maintained a good relationship with Saudi Arabia. He remained in power until 1995, when his son Hamad Al Thani dethroned him, taking advantage of his absence while he was away in Switzerland. The Saudi government saw this as a bad example for other countries in the region also ruled by family dynasties. Hamad boosted the export of liquefied natural gas and oil, and dismantled an alleged Saudi plan to reinstate his father Khalifa. Countries in the region began to see the "little brother" grow economically and internationally very fast under the new emir and his foreign minister Hamam Al Thani.

The family is structured around Hamad and his wife Mozah bint Nasser Al-Missned, who has become an icon of fashion and female prestige of the international nobility, at the level of Rania of Jordan, Kate Middleton or Queen Letizia (precisely the couple is close to the Spanish royal family).

Hamad abdicated to his son Tamim Al Thani in 2013. The latter's ascension was a short-lived breath of hope for the international Arab community. Tamim adopted a very similar international policy position to his father, strengthening rapprochement and economic cooperation with Iran, and increasing tension with Saudi Arabia, which proceeded to close Qatar's only land border. Similarly, according to a WikiLeaks leak in 2009, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan accused Tamim of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, the economic, political, social and even staff rivalry between Qatar's Al Thani and Saudi Arabia's Al Saud goes back decades.

From my point of view, stability and family hierarchy in nations ruled by dynasties is a crucial factor to avoid internal power struggles that consequently have great negative effects for the country's society. Each person has different political, economic and social ideas that take time to implement. Frequent changes without an objective culmination end up being a terribly destabilizing factor. In the international arena, the country's political credibility and rigidity can be undermined when the emir's son carries out a coup d'état while his father is on vacation. Qatar, aware of this, sought legislative security and rigidity in article 148 of its Constitution by prohibiting the amendment of any article within ten years of its entrance into force.

In 1976, Qatar claimed sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, controlled by the Bahraini royal family, which became a focus of conflict between the two nations. The same happened with the artificial island of Fasht Ad Dibal, which led the Qatari army to raid the island in 1986. It was abandoned by Qatar in a peace agreement with Bahrain.

III. Alleged support to terrorist groups

This is the main cause why neighboring states have isolated Qatar. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Libya and the Maldives, among others, cut diplomatic and trade relations with Qatar in June 2017 over its alleged funding and support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which it considers a terrorist organization. In 2010, WikiLeaks leaked a diplomatic grade in which the U.S. called Qatar the "worst in the region in subject of cooperation to eliminate funding for terrorist groups."

The Muslim Brotherhood, which originated in 1928 with Hassan Al Bana in Egypt, is a political activist and Islamic movement, with principles based on nationalism, social justice and anti-colonialism. However, within the movement there are several currents, some more rigorous than others. The founders of the Muslim Brotherhood see the Education of society as the most effective tool to reach state power. For this reason, the indoctrinators or evangelists of the movement are the most persecuted by the authorities of the countries which condemn membership of the group. It is endowed with a well-defined internal structure, whose head is the supreme guide Murchid, assisted by an executive body, a committee and an assembly.

From 1940, the paramilitary activity of the group began clandestinely with Nizzam Al Khas, whose initial intention was to achieve the independence of Egypt and expel the Zionists from Palestine. They carried out attacks such as the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud An Nukrashi. The creation of this special section final sentenced the reputation and violent character of the Muslim Brotherhood, which continued its expansion around the world in the form of Tanzim Al Dawli, its international structure.[5] The Muslim Brotherhood's international structure, the Tanzim Al Dawli, was created by the Muslim Brotherhood.

Khaled Mashal,[6] former leader of the militant organization Hamas, is in exile in Qatar's capital, Doha, and the Taliban of Afghanistan has a political office. It is important to know that most Qatari citizens are followers of Wahhabism, a puritanical version of Islam that seeks the literal interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah, founded by Mohammad ibn Abd Al Wahhab.

During the political crisis following the Arab Spring in 2011, Qatar supported the Muslim Brotherhood's electoral efforts in North African countries. The Islamist movement saw the revolution as a useful means to gain access to governments, taking advantage of the power vacuum. In Egypt, Mohamed Mursi, linked to the movement, became president in 2013, although he was overthrown by the military. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain negatively rated the support and saw it as a destabilizing Islamist element. In those countries where they were unsuccessful, their members were expelled and many took refuge in Qatar. Meanwhile, in neighboring countries in the region, alarms were raised and every pro-Islamist move by the Qatari government was closely followed.

Similarly, Dutch sources and Human Rights lawyer Liesbeth Zegveld accused Qatar of financing the Al Nusra Front[7], the Syrian branch of Al Qaeda involved in the war against Al Assad, declared a terrorist organization by the United States and the UN. The Dutch lawyer claimed in 2018 to possess the necessary evidence to prove the flow of Qatari money to Al Nusra through companies based in the country and to hold Qatar judicially responsible before the court in The Hague, for the victims of the war in Syria. It is important to know that, in 2015, Doha obtained the release of 15 Lebanese soldiers, but in exchange for the release of 13 detained terrorists. Other sources claim that Qatar paid 20 million euros for the release of 45 Fijian blue helmets kidnapped by Al Nusra in the Golan Heights.

According to the BBC, in December 2015, Kataeb Hezbollah or the Islamic Resistance Movement of Iraq, recognized as a terrorist organization by the United Arab Emirates and the United States, among others, kidnapped a group of Qataris who went hunting in Iraq.[8] Among the group s hunters were two members of the Qatari royal family, the cousin and uncle of Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Qatari Foreign Minister since 2016. After 16 months of negotiations, the hijackers demanded a chilling $1 billion from the Qatari ambassador to Iraq to free the hostages. According to Qatar Airways officials, in April 2017 a Qatar Airways plane flew to Baghdad with the money to be delivered to the Iraqi government, which would act as an intermediary between Hezbollah and Qatar. However, the business has never commented on the facts. The official version of the Qatari government is that the terrorists were never paid and the release of the hostages was achieved through a joint diplomatic negotiation between Qatar and Iraq.

Qatar's financing of the armed group Hamas in the Gaza Strip is a real fact. In November 2018, according to Israeli sources, Qatar paid fifteen million dollars in cash as part of an agreement with Israel negotiated by Egypt and the UN, which would cover a total of ninety million dollars divided into several payments[9], with the intention of seeking peace and reconciliation between the political parties Fatah and Hamas, considered a terrorist group by the United States.

IV. Qatar's relationship with Iran

Qatar has good diplomatic and commercial relations with Iran, mostly Shiite, which is not to the liking of the Quartet (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain), mostly Sunni, especially Saudi Arabia, with whom it maintains an obvious confrontation - subsidiary, not direct - for the predominant political and economic influence in the Persian region. In 2017, during his last visit to Riyadh, Donald Trump asked the countries of the region to isolate Iran because of the military and nuclear tension it is experiencing with the United States. Qatar acts as an intermediary and a turning point between the US and Iran, trying to open the way for dialogue in relation to the sanctions implemented by the American president.

Doha and Tehran have a strong economic relationship around the oil and gas industry, as they share the world's largest gas field, the South Pars-North Dame, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have followed the US lead in their foreign policy agendas towards Iran. One of the conditions the Quartet demands of Qatar to lift the economic and diplomatic blockade is the cessation of bilateral relations with Iran, reinstated in 2016, and the establishment of trade conduct with Iran in compliance with U.S.-imposed sanctions.

V. Al Jazeera Television Network

Founded in 1996 by Hamad Al Thani, Al Jazeera has become the most influential digital media in the Middle East. It positioned itself as a promoter of the Arab Spring and was present in the climates of violence in the different countries. As a result, it has been criticized by Qatar's antagonists for its positions close to Islamist movements, for acting as a mouthpiece for the fundamentalist messages of the Muslim Brotherhood and for becoming a vehicle for Qatar's diplomacy. Its closure was one of the requirements requested of Qatar by the Quartet to lift the economic blockade, the transit of people and the opening of airspace.

The United States accuses the network of being the mouthpiece of extremist Islamic groups since the former head of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, began to disseminate his communiqués through it; of being anti-Semitic in nature; and of adopting a position favorable to the armed group Hamas in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In 2003, Saudi Arabia, after several failed attempts to cause the closure of the Qatari television network, decided to create a competing television station, Al Arabiya TV, initiating a disinformation war and vying over which of the two has the most reliable information.

VI. The position of Washington and London

On the one hand, the United States seeks to have a good relationship with Qatar, since there it has the large military base of Al-Udeid, which has an excellent strategic position in the Persian Gulf and more than ten thousand troops. In April 2018, the Qatari emir visited Donald Trump at the White House, who said that the relationship between the two countries "works extremely well" and considers Tamim a "great friend" and "a great gentleman". Tamim Al Thani has stressed that Qatar will not tolerate people who finance terrorism and confirmed that Doha will cooperate with Washington to stop the financing of terrorist groups.

The contradiction is clear: Qatar confirms its commitment to the fight against the financing of terrorist groups, but its track record does not back it up. So far, it has been proven that the small country has helped these groups in one way or another, through political asylum and protection of its members, direct or indirect financing through controversial negotiation techniques, or by promoting political interests that have not been to the liking of its great geopolitical rival, Saudi Arabia.

The United States is the great mediator and impediment to direct confrontation in the tension between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Both countries are members of the United Nations and allies of the United States. Europe and American presidents have been aware that a direct confrontation between the two countries could prove fatal for the region and their commercial interests related to oil and the Strait of Hormuz.

On the other hand, the UK government has remained aloof in taking a position in the Qatar diplomatic crisis. Emir Tamim Al Thani owns 95% of The Shard building, 8% of the London Stock Exchange and Barclays bank, as well as apartments, stocks and shares in companies in the English capital. Qatari investments in the capital of the United Kingdom total around sixty billion dollars.

In 2016, former British Prime Minister David Cameron showed concern about the future when the London mayoralty was held by Sadiq Khan, a Muslim, who has appeared on more than one occasion alongside Sulaiman Gani, an imam who supports the Islamic State and the Muslim Brotherhood.[10] In 2016, former British Prime Minister David Cameron showed concern about the future when the mayoralty of London was held by Sadiq Khan, a Muslim, who has appeared on more than one occasion alongside Sulaiman Gani, an imam who supports the Islamic State and the Muslim Brotherhood.[10

VII. Civil war in Yemen

Since the start of foreign military intervention in Yemen's civil war in 2015, at the request of Yemeni President Rabbu Mansur Al Hadi, Qatar has aligned itself alongside the states of the Cooperation committee for the Arab States of the Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), backed by the United States, the United Kingdom and France, to create an international coalition to help restore Al Hadi's legitimate power, which has been under siege since the coup d'état promoted by Houthis and forces loyal to former president Ali Abdala Saleh. However, Qatar has been accused of clandestinely supporting the Houthi rebels[11], and its actions are viewed with great caution by the rest of the committee countries.

Today, the Yemeni civil war has become the largest humanitarian crisis since 1945.[12] On August 11, 2019, South Yemeni separatists, backed by the United Arab Emirates, which initially supports al-Hadi's government, seized the port city of Aden, storming the presidential palace and military instructions . The president, in exile in Riyadh, has called the attack by his allies a coup against the institutions of the legitimate state, and has received direct support from Saudi Arabia. After a few days of tension, the separatists of the Southern Movement left the city.

The Emirates and Saudi Arabia, together with other neighboring states such as Bahrain and Kuwait, of Sunni belief, seek to halt the advance of the Houthis, who dominate the capital, Sana'a, and a possible expansion of Shi'ism promoted by Iran through the conflict in Yemen. Likewise, the great geopolitical interest of the Strait of Bab el Mandeb, which connects the Red Sea with the Arabian Sea and is a great alternative to the commercial flow of the Strait of Hormuz, off the coast of Iran, has an influence. This interest is shared with France and the United States, which seeks to eliminate the presence of ISIS and Al Qaeda from the region.

The day after the capture of Aden, and in the midst of Eid Al-Adha celebrations, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed met in Mecca with Saudi King Salman bin Abdelaziz and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, in an apparent effort to downplay the significance of the event, call on the warring parties in the city to safeguard Yemen's interests, and reaffirm regional cooperation and unity of interests between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.[13] The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi has posted on his official Twitter accounts comments and photographs of the meeting in which a positive attitude can be seen on the faces of the leaders.

A contrario sensu, if the partnership and understanding on the Yemen issue between the two countries were total, as they claimed, there would be no need to create an apparently "ideal" image through official communications from the Abu Dhabi government and the publication of images on social networks.

Although the UAE supports the separatists, the latest developments have caused a sense of mistrust, opening the possibility that the southern militias are disregarding Emirati directives and beginning to execute a diary of their own in line with their own particular interests. Likewise, foreign sources are beginning to speak of a civil war within a civil war. Meanwhile, Qatar remains close to Iran and cautious about the status the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula.

[John J. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, Yale University Press, September 2018, 328 pp.]

September 4, 2019

REVIEW / Albert Vidal

"For better or for worse, liberal hegemony is history". With such a statement John J. Mearsheimer concluded his talk about his recently published book "The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities" at SOAS University of London.

In this book Mearsheimer argues that the foreign policy of liberal hegemony which was adopted by the US at the end of the Cold War failed miserably. He explains that it happened because nationalism and realism always overrun liberalism.

In the first part of the book he defines liberalism, nationalism and liberal hegemony. He then explains why the US pursued liberal hegemony, and what is its track record. Finally, he reveals why liberal hegemony failed, and what can we expect in the future. Let's take a more detailed look into it.

Liberalism

Mearsheimer casts light on liberalism's two fundamental assumptions underpinning human nature: first, it assumes that the individual takes precedence over the group; second, liberalism assumes that individuals cannot reach universal agreement over first principles, and such differences often lead to violence.

In order to deal with this potential for violence, liberalism offers a solution that includes three parts: everybody has individual rights that are inalienable; tolerance receives a special emphasis, and a state becomes necessary to limit the threat of those who do not respect other people's rights. Such features make liberalism a universalistic theory, which is what turned the US into a crusader state.

Nationalism

According to the author, nationalism has its own core assumptions: first, humans are naturally social animals; second, group loyalty is more important than individualism, and third, aside from the family, the most important group is the nation. He then goes on to say that nations (bodies of individuals that have certain features that make them distinct from other groups) want their own states.

After that, Mearsheimer says that nationalism beats liberalism because human beings are primarily social animals. To show this, he recalls that the entire planet is covered with nation states, and liberal democracies do not even comprise a 50% of those nation-states.

Liberal hegemony

This is just an attempt to remake the world in America's image and has several components: to spread liberal democracy across the planet, to integrate more countries into the open international economy and into international institutions. In theory, this would be extremely beneficial, since it would eliminate significant human rights violations (here the author assumes that liberal democracies do not engage in great human rights violations), it would make for a peaceful world (following the democratic peace theory) and it would eliminate the threat of foreign support to those who want to overthrow liberal democracy at home.

Why did the US pursue liberal hegemony?

After the Cold War, a moment of unipolarity made it possible, says Mearsheimer, for the US to ignore balance of power politics and pursue a liberal foreign policy. To this we need to add that the US is a liberal country, which oftentimes thinks itself as exceptional. This clearly prompted the US to try to remake the world into its image.

In this part of the book, Mearsheimer shows different failures of the US foreign policy. The first one is the Bush Doctrine and the Greater Middle East, which was a plan to turn the Middle East into a sea of democracies. The result was a total disaster. The second example is the awful relations between the US and Russia and the Ukraine crisis, which were the result of NATO's expansion. Thirdly, Mearsheimer criticizes the way the US has engaged with China, helping it grow quicker while naively thinking that it would eventually become a liberal democracy.

Why did liberal hegemony fail?

The reason is that the power of nationalism and realism always overrun liberalism; in words of Mearsheimer: "the idea that the US can go around the world trying to establish democracies and doing social engineering is a prescription for trouble". Countries will resist to foreign interference. Also, in large parts of the world, people prefer security before liberal democracy, even if that security has to be provided by a soft authoritarianism. 

Liberal hegemony is finished, because the world is no longer a unipolar place. Now the US needs to worry about other powers.

A critique of his theory

Although Mearsheimer's thesis seems solid, several critiques have been formulated; most of these are directed toward issues that contradict some of Mearsheimer's arguments and assumptions and that have been left unaddressed.

1) In his introduction, Mearsheimer argues that individuals cannot reach an agreement over first principles. I believe that is an over-statement, since some values tend to be appreciated in most societies. Some examples would be the value of life, the importance of the family for the continuation of society and the education of the upcoming generations, the importance of truth and honesty, and many others.

2) When he describes the US foreign policy since the 1990s as liberal hegemony, Mearsheimer chooses to ignore some evident exceptions, such as the alliance with Saudi Arabia and other authoritarian regimes which do not respect the most basic human rights.  

3) Many of the failures of the US foreign policy since the 1990s do not actually seem to derive from the liberal policies themselves, but from the failure of properly implementing them. That is, those failures happened because the US deviated from its liberal foreign policy. A clear example is what happened in Iraq: although the intervention was publicly backed by a liberal rhetoric, many doubt that Washington was truly committed to bring stability and development to Iraq. A commonly pointed example is that the only Ministry effectively protected was the Oil Ministry. The rest were abandoned to the looters. A true liberal policy would have sought to restore the education and health systems, state institutions and infrastructure, which never really happened. So blaming the failure to the liberal policy might not be adequate.

4) Although Mearsheimer proves the urge to intervene that comes with liberal hegemony, he doesn't show how a hegemon following realist principles would restrain itself and intervene on fewer occasions and with moderation. The necessity to protect human rights would simply become a willingness to protect vital interests, which serves as an excuse for any type of intervention (unlike human rights, even if they have sometimes been the origin of a disastrous intervention). 

As a final thought, this book suggests a clear alternative to the mainstream views of most of today's foreign policy, especially in Western Europe and in the United States. Even if we disagree with some (or most) of its tenets, it is nevertheless helpful in understanding many of the current dynamics, particularly in relation to the everlasting tension between nationalism and universalism. We might even need to rethink our foreign policies and instead of blindly praising liberalism, we should accept that sometimes, liberalism isn't able to solve every problem that we face.

▲ Almagro's speech at the opening of the 49th OAS General Assembly in Medellin, Colombia in June 2019 [OAS].

COMMENTARY / Ignacio Yárnoz

At the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) held in Medellin last June, the tensions and divisions that currently exist within this international organization became evident. In the first place, these discrepancies were evident in the Venezuelan issue, an issue that took center stage at the meeting with the presentation of migration reports, criticism of the Bolivarian regime and the presence of the Venezuelan delegation representing the Guaidó government headed by Ambassador Gustavo Tarre.

These facts were met with the rejection of most of the Caribbean countries, who left the conference room at the presentation of the reports and declared their refusal to comply with any OAS resolution in which the Venezuelan delegation voted in favor. And the fact is that, in the opinion of the Caribbean countries, Venezuela formally left the organization in March and the presence of Guaidó's delegation as the legitimate representative of Venezuela contravenes international law and the principles of the OAS Charter, given that it represents a government without effective control of the territory or legal legitimacy. But the Caricom countries were not the only ones to express their protest, the delegation of Uruguay also left the conference room and that of Mexico expressed its displeasure at the presence of the Venezuelan opposition as a delegation of plenary session of the Executive Council right.

The controversy, however, not only revealed discrepancies on how to deal with the Venezuelan crisis, but also reflected another underlying reality, which is that Luis Almagro's candidacy for reelection as University Secretary of the organization hangs in the balance.

In December of last year, Uruguay's Almagro formally announced that, at the request of Colombia and the United States, he had decided to run for reelection with the assurance of having the necessary votes. Since then, however, the re-election landscape has darkened. The vote will take place in the first semester of 2020 and to get re-elected Almagro needs at least 18 votes from the 35 countries of the OAS (if we include Cuba, even if it does not actively participate).

Variables

The future of Almagro, who came to the position in May 2015, depends on several factors that will unfold this year. Mainly, the general elections in Argentina, Canada, Uruguay and Bolivia, which will be held between October and November. However, there are other variables that may also affect his reelection, such as the support he obtains from the Lima group countries or the possible division among Caricom members in this regard. Below, we will review these assumptions one by one.

In the case of the Bolivian elections, Almagro has already played his cards and has been accused of having used a double standard by harshly criticizing the Maduro regime, but then not being critical of the possibility of re-election of Evo Morales for a third time. Such re-election is supposedly not legal according to the Bolivian Constitution and was vetoed by the population in a referendum, but President Evo Morales has ignored it under the pretext that preventing him from being a candidate again is against human rights, an argument later endorsed by the Bolivian Supreme Court. The administrative office General administrative office of the OAS, despite not agreement with the "right to be reelected", did not raise any criticism or position against such election supposedly due to the possible Bolivian vote in favor of Almagro, something that could happen if Evo Morales is finally reelected but is not completely certain either. However, if not, he has already earned the animosity of civil service examination candidates such as Carlos Mesa or Óscar Ortiz and opposition leader Samuel Doria Medina who, if elected, would not vote for him.

Regarding Guatemala, the first round of the presidential elections gave the victory to Sandra Torres (22.08% of the votes) and Alejandro Giammattei (12.06% of the votes), who will face each other in the second round on Sunday, August 11. Should Torres be elected, she may align her stance with that of Mexico by adopting a less interventionist policy towards Venezuela and therefore against Almagro. In the case of the victory of Giammattei, a center-right politician, it is likely that he will align his positions with Almagro and vote in favor of him. Guatemala has always been aligned with US positions, so it is doubtful that the country would vote against a candidacy supported by Washington, although not impossible.

As for Argentina and Canada, the position will depend on whether the winning candidate in their respective elections is conservative or progressive. Even in the case of Canada, the possibility of a rejection of Almagro is open regardless of the political orientation of the new government, since while Canada has been critical of the Maduro regime, it has also criticized the internal organization of the OAS under the current University Secretary As far as Argentina is concerned, there is a clear difference between the presidential candidates: while Mauricio Macri would represent continuity in support for Almagro, the Alberto Fernández-Cristina Kirchner ticket would clearly represent a rejection.

Uruguay represents a curious case of how internal politics and political games affect even members of the same party. We must not forget that Luis Almagro was a minister in the government of Pepe Mujica and that his first candidacy for University Secretary was presented by Uruguay. However, given the division in the political training to which he belonged, Frente Amplio, he earned some enemies such as those of the current government of Tabaré Vázquez. That is why Uruguay has been so critical of Luis Almagro despite being a compatriot and fellow party member. However, we should not doubt that he will also have his friends in the party that will change Uruguay's position. If so, no matter which candidate is elected (Luis Lacalle Pou for the National Party or Daniel Martinez for the Frente Amplio), Almagro would have a guaranteed vote: that of the right wing of the National Party by having a more critical thesis with Maduro (in fact, they recognized the Guaidó government as a party and criticized Uruguay's neutrality), or that of the left wing of the Frente Amplio by the contacts Almagro may have, although the latter is still a hypothesis given that the most extreme wing of the party is the one that still has the majority of votes within the Frente Amplio.

Another applicant

However, Almagro's chances for reelection could be frustrated if another aspirant presents his candidacy who could win the sympathy of the Lima group , created in August 2017 and integrated by a dozen countries of the Americas to coordinate their strategy in relation to Venezuela. Peru sounds like the one that could possibly present a candidate: Hugo de Zela, a Peruvian diplomat with 42 years of degree program who in April was appointed Peru's ambassador in Washington and who has played a very relevant role within the Lima group as coordinator. In addition, De Zela knows the structure of the OAS since he has served as chief of staff of the administrative office General on two occasions: first, between 1989 and 1994, when the head of the organization was the Brazilian Joao Clemente Baena Soares; and then between 2011 and 2015, with the Chilean José Miguel Insulza. This candidate, apart from his wide political experience, has the advantage of having been coordinator of the Lima group , which could give guarantees about the partnership between this group and the OAS on the Venezuelan issue.

If De Zela decides to run, the Lima group could break up and split its votes, which could favor the interests of the 14 countries of the Caribbean Community (Caricom), which usually vote as a bloc and have been dissatisfied with Almagro's management of the Venezuelan crisis. In fact, Caricom is already thinking of presenting a candidate that takes into account the interests of these countries, mainly climate change. The names that sound among Caricom members are the ambassador to the OAS of Antigua and Barbuda, Ronald Sanders, or the representative of Barbados to the UN, Liz Thompson.

However, there remains one hope in the Caricom community for Almagro. Saint Lucia, Haiti, Jamaica and the Bahamas broke ranks at the time of voting for the admission of Ambassador Gustavo Tarre appointed by the Guaidó government to represent Venezuela before the OAS (although technically what they supported is that he be appointed as "permanent representative appointed by the National Assembly, pending new elections and the appointment of a democratically elected government"). These four countries, although with a more moderate position than that of the Lima group , joined their position by accepting the designation of said representative with the aforementioned nuance. This is the third occasion so far this year that Caricom has broken ranks on the Venezuelan topic . This could give the University Secretary a trump card with which to play in order to obtain the support of some of these four countries, although he will need skillful negotiation techniques and give something in exchange to these countries, whether it be positions in the general administrative office or benefits in new programs and scholarships for integral development or climate change, for example.  

In conclusion, in the best possible scenario for Almagro and assuming that no country of the Lima group presents an alternative candidate , the candidacy for reelection of the current University Secretary would have 12 assured votes, 4 negotiable votes from St. Lucia, Jamaica, Haiti and Bahamas and 5 pending elections (Guatemala, Canada, Uruguay, Argentina and Bolivia). It is clear that Mexico, a large part of Caricom (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago) and Nicaragua will vote against. In addition, we must add the fact that any candidacy can be presented up to 10 minutes before the extraordinary General Assembly, which gives even more room for political games in the shadows and last-minute surprises. As we can see, it is a very difficult status for the University Secretary and it will surely mean more than one headache in this arithmetic of votes to get the position. Undoubtedly a fight for the position that will give much to talk about between now and February 2020.

[I. H. Daalder & James M. Lindsay, The Empty Throne. America's Abdication of Global Leadership. Public Affairs. New York, 2018. 256 p.]

review / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

The arrival of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States in January 2017 has unleashed a significant flow of publishing house that continues to this day, and in which numerous pens question, in substance and form, the new tenant of the White House from different angles.

In this case, two authors from the field of American think tanks , close to Barack Obama - one of them served during his presidency as US ambassador to NATO - offer us a very critical view of President Trump and his management at the head of the US executive branch. With the solid support of numerous quotes, statements and testimonies collected from the media, and in an agile and attractive language, they compose the portrait of an erratic, ignorant - in one passage they highlight without palliation his "ignorance on many issues, his unwillingness to accept advice from others, his impulsiveness, and his lack of critical thinking skills" -, arrogant and irresponsible president.

The authors of The Empty Throne argue that President Trump's deeds and words show how he has broken with the traditional line of U.S. foreign policy since Franklin Delano Roosevelt, based on the exercise of leadership oriented toward collective security, the opening of global markets and the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and which has result highly beneficial to the United States. Trump, they argue, would have abdicated that leadership, embracing instead another purely transactional policy, made by a simple calculation of interest.

This new way of conceiving international politics, based on the logic of competition and domination, would be justified by the Trump administration with the argument that the old one has been highly pernicious for the United States, since it has allowed friends and allies to obtain important profits at the expense of American prosperity.

Paraphrasing Trump's America First campaign slogan, the authors argue that this new policy will result, rather, in an America Alone, and will instead benefit China, assuming that it will be to China that nations will look for a new leader.

To support their thesis , the authors review the management of Donald Trump in the year and a half between his inauguration in early 2017 and the book's publication date in 2018. In their argument they review the management of the presidents the nation has had since the end of World War II, and compare it to that put in internship by the Trump administration.

An important part of the criticism is directed at the controversial presidential style displayed by Donald Trump, which has been evident even before the elections, and which is evident in facts such as the withdrawal of the usual label in the world of international relations, especially hurtful in his relations with friends and allies; the lack of interest shown in coordinating an orderly transition with the Obama administration, or the making of certain decisions against his national security team or even without consulting its members.

Not to acknowledge these facts would be to deny the evidence and question the inescapable reality of the unease that this new way of dealing with nations with which America shares so many interests and values, such as those of the European Union, or others such as Japan, Canada or Australia, firm allies of the United States for decades, produces in many people. However, there is room for some criticism of the arguments.

First of all, and leaving aside the lack of time perspective to make afinal evaluation of Trump's presidency, the authors make a comparison between the first year and a half of the current president's term and those of all his predecessors since the end of World War II to demonstrate Trump's return to the America First policy prevailing until Roosevelt. This contrast requires certain nuances because, based on the common denominator of the international leadership strategy that all of Trump's predecessors practiced, the country experienced in this time moments of greater unilateralism such as that of George W. Bush's first term, along with others of lesser global presence of the country such as, perhaps, those of the presidencies of Eisenhower, Ford, Carter and, even, Obama.

In Obama's case, moreover, the fundamental differences with Trump are not as great as they seem. Both presidents are trying to manage, in order to mitigate, the loss of relative American power caused by the long years of military presence in the Middle East and the rise of China. It is not that Trump believes that the United States should abandon the ideas of global leadership and multinational interaction; in fact, while he is accused of leaving traditional allies to their fate, he is reproached for his rapprochement, almost complicity, with others such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. Rather, what he intends is to exercise leadership, but, of course, dictating his conditions so that they are favorable to the United States. From inspirational leadership to leadership by imposition.

The question is, is it possible to maintain leadership under these conditions? According to the authors, no. In fact, as a consequence of this "abdication of American leadership", they offer two scenarios: the return to a world in which no nation leads, or the emergence of another nation - China, obviously - that will fill the vacuum created by this abdication.

The authors do not consider a third option: that of traditional allies adapting to the new style of leadership, albeit reluctantly, out of necessity, and in the confidence that one day, the Trump presidency will be history. This idea would be consistent with the premise set out in the book, and with which we concur, that American leadership remains indispensable, and with the very recognition at the end of the book that there is some substance to the grievances that Trump presents and that the president's attitude is leading many of America's friends and allies to reconsider their defense spending, to rethink the rules of international trade to make them more palatable to America, and to take a more active role in resolving major global challenges.

Time will tell which of the three options will prevail. Even considering the challenges of attention with the current White House incumbent, the United States remains bound to its traditional partners and allies by a dense network of common interests and, above all, shared values that transcend individuals and will outlast them.

[Amil Saikal, Iran Rising: The survival and Future of the Islamic Republic. Princeton University Press. Princeton, 2019. 344 p.]

review / Ignacio Urbasos Arbeloa

Since its constitution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been a conflictive actor, isolated and misunderstood by the international community and, to a greater extent, by its regional neighbors. Its origin, revolutionary in character and antagonistic to the Shah's pro-Western model , completely changed the geopolitics of the Middle East and the role of the US in the region. Both the Hostage Crisis and the bloody war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq left deep wounds in Iran's foreign relations. More than 40 years after the Revolution, the country remains in a dynamic that makes the normalization of its international relations impossible, always under the threat of armed conflict or economic sanctions. In this book, Amin Saikal describes in depth the ideological and political nature of the Ayatollahs' regime with the intention of generating a better understanding of the motivations and factors that explain their behavior.

The first chapters develop the concept of governance devised by Ayatollah Imam Khomeini, known as Velayat-E Faqih or Governance of the Guardian of Islam. A model defended by a non-majority faction of the revolution that managed to impose itself by the charisma of its leader and the enormous repression on the rest of the political groups. The political system resulting from the 1978 Revolution tries to confluence the Shiite teachings of Islam and a representative model with institutions such as the Majlis (parliament) or the President that to some extent simulates Western liberal democracy. This model is unique and has never been imitated despite the efforts of the Islamic Republic to export it to the rest of the Muslim world.

In the internship, the system has proven to subject Iranian politics to schizophrenia, with a constant struggle between the power of the clerics -Supreme Leader and committee of Guardians- versus the executive and legislative power elected through elections. This tension, dubbed as Jihadi-Itjihadi (conservatism-flexibility) by Khomeini himself, has result be a resounding failure. The lack of clarity in the roles that religious groups play in the system results in unlimited power to repress and eliminate political opponents, as the house arrest of Khatami or Moussaoui demonstrates. This struggle generates duplicities at all levels with the omnipresence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) in the armed forces, intelligence, social services and public enterprises. The lack of political transparency generates corruption and inefficiencies that hinder the development of an Economics that does not lack the human capital and natural resources to prosper.

Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the evolution of the system after the death of leader Khomeini in 1988 and the end of the war against Iraq. This new context allowed new ideas to entrance the Iranian political discussion . The controversial appointment of the ultraconservative Ali Khamenei in 1989 as the new Supreme Leader meant reinforcing authoritarianism and the rigidity of religious power, but now without the undisputed leadership exercised by Khomeini. The presidency of Rafsanjani, a pragmatic conservative, marked the beginning of a trend within Iran that advocated normalizing the country's international relations.

However, it was Khatami who, since 1997, bet on a reconversion of the system towards a real democracy respecting Human Rights. His staff bid to improve relations with the US failed when it was met with excessive distrust on the part of the Bush Administration. Not even Iran's exemplary response to the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York with an official condemnation of the attack and even a minute's silence observed by 60,000 people in Tehran on September 13, 2001 was enough for G.W. Bush to reconsider Iran as a part of the United States. Bush to reconsider Iran as part of the famous Axis of Evil that it constituted along with Syria, North Korea and Sudan. Despite achieving an average economic growth of 5% of GDP under his presidency, the lack of reciprocity from the international community created a complete rift between the reformist president and the conservative faction led by the Supreme Leader.

The period from 2005 to 2013 was marked by the presidency of the ultra-conservative Ahmadinejad, who ended without Khamenei's confidence after failing in economic subject and bringing Iran to the brink of armed conflict. During this period the IRGC grew to dominate a large part of the ministries and 70% of Iran's GDP. His controversial reelection in 2009 with accusations of fraud by the civil service examination generated the green movement, the largest protests since 1979, which were harshly repressed.

Rouhani's arrival in 2013 could have been a historic occasion by aligning for the first time since 1988 the vision of a moderate president with that of the Supreme Leader. Rouhani, a pragmatic moderate, assumed the position with the goals of improving the living conditions of Iranians, reconciling relations with the West, increasing minority rights and relaxing control over society. In foreign policy subject , the Supreme Leader assumed the need to reach an agreement on the nuclear program knowing that, in its absence, an economic improvement in Iran would be very difficult. The JCPOA, although imperfect, allowed for a rapprochement between the West and Iran. The arrival of Donald Trump blew up the agreement and with it the harmony between Supreme Leader Khamenei and Rouhani, who now faces a growing conservative civil service examination as he considers his foreign policy a failure.

For the author, it is essential to understand the battle between elected institutions and religious institutions. Iranian politics works like a pendulum between the dominance of conservative factions protected by the religious and reformist factions boosted by elections. If benefits are offered to reformist moderates when they are in power, the chances of bringing about political change in Iran are greater than if conservatives are treated as harshly, argues Amin Saikal in the fourth and fifth chapters. Moreover, there is a correlation between those who know the West and those who do not. Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, the main representatives of the hardliners, have never visited Europe or the USA, while Rouhani, Khatami or Sharif are fluent in English and Western culture.

With a population under 30 years of age accounting for 50% of the total and a growing modernization of society in Tehran, the demands for reforms seem unstoppable. According to Amin Saikal, an intransigent policy with Iran when there is a willingness to open up only generates mistrust and reinforces the most conservative positions. Trump's policy with Iran, he concludes, demonstrates a lack of knowledge and understanding of its society and political system.

▲ Dubai Air Visa [Pixabay].

essay / Sebastián Bruzzone Martínez

I. ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

In ancient times, the territory was inhabited by Arab tribes, nomadic farmers, artisans and traders, accustomed to plundering merchant ships of European powers that sailed along its coasts. Islam became established in the local culture in the 7th century AD, and Sunni Islam in the 11th century AD. From 1820, the United Kingdom signature a peace treaty with the leaders or sheikhs of the area to put an end to piracy. In 1853, both parties signed another agreement by which the United Kingdom established a military protectorate in the territory. And in 1892, due to the pretensions of Russia, France and Germany, they signed a third agreement that guaranteed the monopoly on trade and exploitation only for the British. The Emirate zone was renamed from "Pirates' Coast" to "Trucial States " (the current seven United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain).

During World War I, the airfields and ports of the Gulf played an important role in the development the conflict in favor of the United Kingdom. At the end of World War II in 1945, the League of Arab States (Arab League) was created, formed by those who enjoyed some colonial independence. The organization attracted the attention of the Truce States.

In 1960, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created, with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela as founders and headquartered in Vienna, Austria. The seven emirates, which would later form the United Arab Emirates, joined in 1967.

In 1968, the United Kingdom withdrew its military force from the region, and the Truce States organized the Federation of Emirates of the Persian Gulf, but it failed when Qatar and Bahrain became independent. In the following years, the exploitation of the enormous oil wells discovered years earlier began.

In 1971, six Emirates became independent from the British Empire: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaywayn and Fujairah, forming the federation of the United Arab Emirates, with a legal system based on the 1971 constitution. Once consolidated, they joined the Arab League on June 12. The seventh emirate, Ras Al-Khaimah, joined the following year.

After the 1973 oil crisis, the UAE began to accumulate enormous wealth, because OPEC members decided not to export any more oil to the countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur war. Today, 80-85% of the UAE population is immigrant. The UAE became the third largest oil producer in the Middle East, after Saudi Arabia and Libya.

II. POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEM

By the constitution of 1971, the United Arab Emirates is constituted as a federal monarchy. Each State is governed by its emirdegree scroll of the sheikhs, Sheikh). Each emirate has great political, legislative, economic and judicial autonomy, each having its own executive councils, always in correspondence with the federal government. There are no political parties. The federal authorities are composed of:

Supremecommittee of the Federation or of Emirs: it is the supreme authority of the State. It is composed of the governors of the 7 Emirates, or those who replace them in their absence. Each Emirate has one vote in the deliberations. It establishes the general policy in the matters entrusted to the Federation, and studies and establishes the objectives and interests of the Federation.

President and Vice-President of the Federation: elected by the Supreme committee from among its members. The President exercises, by virtue of the Constitution, important powers such as the presidency of the Supreme committee ; signature laws, decrees or resolutions ratified and dictated by the committee; appointment of the President of the committee of Ministers and of the Vice-President and Ministers; acceptance of their resignations or their suspension from office at the proposal of the President of the committee of Ministers. The Vice-President exercises all presidential powers in his absence.

By tradition, not recognized in the Emirati Constitution, the sheikh of Abu Dhabi is the president of the country, and the sheikh of Dubai is the vice-president and Prime Minister.

Thus, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, has been President of the United Arab Emirates since 2004, and Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Sheikh of Dubai, has been Prime Minister and Vice President since 2006.

committee of Ministers: composed of the Chairman of the committee of Ministers, the Vice-Chairman and the Ministers. It is the executive organ of the Federation. Supervised by the President and the Supreme committee , its mission statement is to manage the domestic and foreign affairs, which are of skill of the Federation by virtue of the Constitution and federal laws. It has certain prerogatives such as monitoring the implementation of the general policy of the Federal State at home and abroad; proposing draft federal laws and submitting them to the Supreme committee of the Federation; supervising the execution of federal laws and resolutions, and the implementation of international treaties and conventions signed by the UAE.

Federal National Assembly: what would resemble a congress, but is a consultative body only. It is composed of 40 members: twenty elected by the eligible citizens, by census suffrage, of the UAE through general election, and the other half by the rulers of each Emirate. In December 2018, the president, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, issued a decree providing for fifty percent of the Federal National Assembly (or FNC) to be filled by women, with the intention of "further empowering Emirati women and strengthening their contributions to the development of the country." It is distributed with seats: Abu Dhabi (8); Dubai (8); Sharjah (6); Ras Al Khaimah (6); Ajman (4); Umm Al Quwayn (4); and Fujairah (4). Federal and financial bills are referred to it before being submitted to the President of the Federation for submission to the Supreme committee for ratification. The Government is also responsible for notifying the Assembly of international covenants and treaties. The Assembly studies and makes recommendations on matters of a public nature.

The Federal Administration of Justice: The judicial system of the United Arab Emirates is based on Sharia or Islamic law. article 94 of the Constitution states that justice is the basis of government and reaffirms the independence of the judiciary, stipulating that there is no authority over judges except the law and their own conscience in the exercise of their duties. The federal justice system is composed of courts of first instance written request and courts of appeal (civil, criminal, commercial, contentious-administrative...).

There is also a Federal Supreme Court, consisting of a president and vocal judges, with powers such as reviewing the constitutionality of federal laws and unconstitutional acts.

In addition, the local Administration of Justice will hear all judicial cases that do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Administration. It has three levels: first written request, appeal and cassation.

The Constitution provides for the existence of an Attorney General, who presides over the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, in charge of filing position statements in crimes committed in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Criminal Code and procedure .

In order to promote understanding between federal and local administrations, a Judicial Coordination committee , chaired by the Minister of Justice and composed of presidents and directors of the State's judicial bodies, has been in place since 2007. [1]

It is important to know that the Constitution of the Federation has guarantees of reinforcement and protection of human rights in its Chapter III of freedoms, rights and public obligations, such as the principle of equality on the grounds of extraction, place of birth, religious belief or social position, although it does not mention gender, and social justice (art. 25); freedom of citizens (art. 26); freedom of opinion and guarantee of the means to express it (art. 30); freedom of movement and residency program (art. 29); religious freedom (art.32); right to privacy (arts. 31 and 36); family rights (art. 15); right to social welfare and social security (art. 16); right to Education (art. 17); right to health care (art. 19); right to work (art. 20); right to association and to form associations (art. 33); right to property (art. 21); and right to complain and right to litigate before the courts (art. 41).[2].

At first glance, it seems that these rights and guarantees contained in the 1971 Emirati Constitution are similar to those that would be found in a normal European and Western Constitution. However, they can be nuanced and are not as effective in the internship. On the one hand, because most of them include references to the specific and applicable law, saying"...within the limits set by law; in accordance with the provisions set by law; or in cases where so provided by law". In this way, the legislator will ensure that these rights are consistent and compatible with Sharia or Islamic law, or with political interests, as the case may be.

On the other hand, these rights and guarantees fully protect Emirati nationals. Considering that 80-85% of the population is foreign, 15% of the total population of the State would be protected in a fully constitutional manner. By Federal Law No. 28/2005 concerning the status of staff, the law applies to all citizens of the State of the United Arab Emirates provided that there are no special provisions for non-Muslims among them, specific to their confession or religion. Likewise, its provisions apply to non-nationals when they are not bound by the laws of their own country.

Legal safeguards include the Federal Penal Code (Act No. 3/1987); the Code of Criminal procedure (Act No. 35/1992); Federal Act on the Regulation of Prison Reform Institutions (No. 43/1992); Federal Act on the Regulation of Labor Relations (No. 8/1980); Federal Act on Combating Trafficking in Persons (No. 51/2006); Federal Act on staff Status (No. 28/2005); Federal Act on Juvenile Offenders and Homeless Persons (No. 9/1976); Federal Act on Publications and Publishing (No. 15/1980); Federal Act on the Regulation of Human Organs (No. 15/1993); Federal Act on Associations Declared to be in the Public Interest (No. 2/2008); Federal Act on Social Welfare (No. 2/2001); Federal Act on Pensions and Social Insurance (No. 7/1999); Federal Act on Environmental Protection and development (No. 24/1999); and Federal Act on the Rights of Persons with Special Needs (No. 29/2006).

Military service of 9 months is compulsory for university men between 18 and 30 years of age, and of two years for those who do not have higher programs of study . For women, it is optional and subject to the agreement of their tutor. Although the country is not a member of NATO, the Emirates has decided to join the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) coalition, and to provide arms assistance in the war against the Islamic State.

In terms of international treaty guarantees and international cooperation, the UAE has made a great effort to include in its Constitution laws and principles protected by the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, being a member of the UN and adhering to its treaties: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1974), Convention on the Rights of the Child (1997), UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2007), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (2004); UN Convention against Corruption (2006), among others.

It has also ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Arab Charter on Human Rights, and conventions on the organization of work. It is a member of WHO, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, UNICEF, WIPO, World Bank and IMF. It is also bound by cooperation agreements with more than 28 international organizations of the United Nations carrying out advisory, technical and ministerial tasks.

They are members of the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic lecture , reinforcing and promoting Arab work in their regional activities and programs.

The Emirati police maintain public order and state security. The Ministry of Interior places human rights at the forefront of its priorities, focusing on justice, equality, fairness and protection. Members of the police force must commit to 33 standards of conduct before taking up their post. The Ministry of the Interior provides administrative units for citizens to monitor police activity and take the necessary measures. However, there is a certain distrust of foreigners towards the police. Most complaints come from Emirati nationals.

The Ministry of the Interior should provide diplomatic and consular missions with lists including data on their nationals held in penitentiary institutions.

III. SOCIAL SYSTEM

The Emirati government has promoted civil societies and national institutions such as the Emirates association for Human Rights (under Federal Law No. 6/1974), the General Women's Federation, association of Jurists, association of Sociologists, association of Journalists, General Administration for the Protection of Human Rights attached to the General Headquarters of the Dubai Police, Dubai Charitable Foundation for the Care of Women and Children, National Commission to Combat Human Trafficking, Social Support Center of the General Administration of Abu Dhabi Police, Zayed Charities Institution, Emirates Red average , Family development Institution, and the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation for Charitable and Humanitarian Works, and the Marriage Fund, among many others.

It is important to note that the development of political participation is following a progressive process. To date, there is a full and general election to appoint half of the members of the Federal National Assembly, by census suffrage, for Emirati citizens and by publication of lists.

Also, the importance of women in Emirati society is growing thanks to legislative and legal measures taken by the government to empower women, through membership of the Social development committee of the Economic and Social committee , to provide opportunities for women to actively participate in sustainable development , and the integration of women in government and private-business sectors (women make up 22.5% of the Assembly, 2006; expected to be 50% as of 2019 by decree)[3], and promoting female literacy to equalize it with male literacy. However, despite being signatories to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, in the internship they suffer discrimination in marriage and divorce proceedings. Fortunately, the Emirati legislation providing for the mistreatment of women and minor children by the husband or father was abolished as long as the aggression did not exceed the limits allowed by Islamic law. Also, once married, women must obey their husbands and be authorized by them to take up employment. Likewise, cohabitation between unmarried men and women and sexual relations outside marriage are forbidden under penalty of imprisonment. Polygamy is present even in the royal family.

As in the rest of the Arab countries, homosexuality is considered a serious crime and punishable by fines, imprisonment and deportation in the case of foreigners, although enforcement is very weak.

The media play an important role in Emirati society. They are supervised by the National Media committee , which acts largely as a censor. They have reached a high technical and professional level in the journalistic sector, with more than 1,000 specialized companies in the Dubai average City. However, journalism is controlled by the Federal Law on Press and Publications of 1980, and the Charter of Honor and Morals of the Journalistic Profession, which the heads of essay have signed. For example, some news that may be unfavorable to Islam or the government would never be published in domestic newspapers, but would be published in foreign newspapers (case of Jordan's Haya). Since 2007, by a decree of the committee of Ministers, the imprisonment of journalists in case they made mistakes during the exercise of their professional duties was prohibited. However, it ceased to apply with the entrance into force of the Law against cybercrime adopted in 2012.

The government is striving to improve work conditions, as the UAE is convinced that human beings have the right to enjoy adequate living conditions (housing, working hours, means, labor courts, health insurance, protective guarantees in labor disputes at the international cooperative level...). However, the "Sponsor" or "Kafala" system , whereby an employer exercises sponsorship of its employees, is still in force . Thus, there are cases in which the sponsor retains the passports of its employees during the term of the contract, which is illegal, but has never been investigated and punished by the government (case of the Saadiyat Island construction project ), despite being a signatory to UN conventions on work .

The latest Human development report for 2018 ranks the United Arab Emirates 34th out of 189 countries. Spain is ranked 26th. The State has ensured free and quality Education up to the university stage for all Emirati citizens, and the integration of disabled people. University and higher Education centers have been positively encouraged by the government, such as the United Arab Emirates University, Zayed University, or New York University in Abu Dhabi. Healthcare has improved considerably with the construction of hospitals and clinics, lowering mortality fees and increasing life expectancy to 77.6 years (2016). The state allocates money from the public coffers to social care for the most disadvantaged sectors of the Emirati population and for the elderly, widows, orphans or the disabled. It has also ensured that citizens have decent housing through government agencies such as the Ministry of Public Works, the Zayed Housing Program that offers interest-free mortgage loans, the Abu Dhabi Mortgage loan Agency, the Mohammed bin Rashid Institution for Housing that provides loans, and the Sharjah Public Works Agency.

In terms of religion, approximately 75% of the population is Muslim. Islam is the official religion of the United Arab Emirates. The government follows a tolerant policy towards other religions, and prohibits non-Muslims from interfering in Islamic Education . The evangelization of other religions is prohibited, and the internship of these religions must be carried out in authorized places.

On February 3, 2019, at the beginning of the Year of Tolerance, Pope Francis was received with the highest honors in Abu Dhabi by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Vice President and Emir of Dubai Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum, and Ahmed al Tayyeb, Grand Imam of Al-Azhar University and main Islamic theological reference, being the first time that the head of the Catholic Church set foot on the Arabian Peninsula. Likewise, the Pope officiated a mass in Zayed Sport City in front of 150,000 people, saying in his homily: "let us be an oasis of peace". The event was described by Mike Pompeo, US Secretary of State, as "a historic moment for religious freedom".

There are projects for the development of remote regions, which seek to modernize the infrastructure and services in those areas of the State that are farther away from population centers. Also, by virtue of Federal Law No. 47/1992, the Marriage Fund was created, whose goal is to encourage marriage between citizens and promote the family, which according to the government is the basic unit and fundamental pillar of society, offering financial subsidies to those citizens with limited resources in order to help them meet wedding expenses and contribute to achieving family stability in society.

IV. ECONOMICS

Since 1973, the UAE has undergone a huge transformation and modernization thanks to oil exploitation, which accounted for 80% of GDP at the time. In recent years, with the knowledge that oil will run out in less than 40 years, the government has diversified its Economics into financial services, tourism, trade, transport and infrastructure, with oil and gas making up only 20% of national GDP.

Abu Dhabi has 90% of the oil and gas reserves, followed by Dubai, and in small quantities in Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah. The country's oil policy is carried out through the Supreme Petroleum committee and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The main foreign oil companies operating in the country are BP, Shell, ExxonMobil, Total, Petrofac or Partex, and the Spanish company CEPSA, of which the Emirati sovereign wealth fund Mubadala owns 80% of the business.

The borrowing capacity of financial companies was strongly negatively affected during the economic crisis of 2008. The entrance of large foreign private capital came to a standstill, as did investment in the property and construction sectors. The fall in property values forced liquidity to be restricted. In 2009, local companies were seeking moratorium agreements with their creditors on $26 billion in debt. The Abu Dhabi government provided a $5 billion bailout to reassure international investors.

Tourism and infrastructure is a success story for the country, especially in Dubai. 4] The construction of luxury tourist attractions such as the Palm Islands and the Burj al-Arab, and the good weather most of the year, has attracted Westerners and people from all over the world. According to the Emirati government, the tourism industry generates more money than oil does today. Major investments are being made in renewable energy, notably through Masdar, the government business , which has initiated theMasdar City project , the creation of a city powered solely by renewable energy.

V. DYNASTIES AND ROYAL FAMILIES. THE AL NAHYAN DYNASTY

The United Arab Emirates consists of seven Emirates and is ruled by six families:

Abu Dhabi: by the Al Nahyan family (Al Falahi House)

Dubai: by the Al Maktum family (Al Falasi House)

Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah: by the Al Qassimi Family

Ajman: by the Al Nuaimi family

Umm Al Quwain: by the Al Mualla family

Fujairah: by the Al Sharqi family

It is important to know the terminology used in the family tree of the Emirati royal families: "Sheikh" means sheikh, and an emir is a nobiliary degree scroll attributed to sheikhs. In the composition of the names, the proper name of the descendant is placed first, followed by the infix "bin" meaning "of", plus the proper name of his father, and the surname of the family. The infix is "bint" for females.

For example: Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan is the father of Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan.

It is frequent that marriages are celebrated between the ruling families of the different Emirates, intertwining dynasties, but the husband's surname will always prevail over the wife's in the name of the children. Contrary to the great European monarchies in which the reign is transmitted from father to son, in the Emirate families the power is transmitted first between brothers, by appointment, and as a second resource, to the sons. These positions of power must be ratified by the Supreme committee .

The Al Nahyan family of Abu Dhabi is a branch of the Al Falahi House. This is a royal house belonging to Bani Yas and is related to the Al Falasi House to which the Al Maktoum family of Dubai belongs. Bani Yas is known to be a very old tribal confederation of the Liwa Oasis region. There is little historical data on its exact origin. The Al Nahyan royal family is incredibly large, as each of the brothers has had several children and with different wives. The most important and recent governors of Abu Dhabi would be those who have been in power since 1971, when the United Arab Emirates consolidated as a country, ceasing to be a Truce State and British protectorate. They are:

Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (1918-2004): was governor of Abu Dhabi from 1966 until his death. He collaborated closely with the British Empire to maintain the integrity of the territory in the face of Saudi Arabia's expansionist pretensions. He is considered the Father of the Nation and founder of the United Arab Emirates, along with his counterpart Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum of Dubai. Both pledged to form a Federation together with other rulers after the British military withdrawal. He was the first president of the United Arab Emirates, and was re-elected four times: 1976, 1981, 1986 and 1991. Zayed was characterized as sympathetic, peaceful and united with neighboring emirates, charitable in terms of donations, relatively liberal and permissive of private means. He was considered one of the richest men in the world by Forbes magazine, with a net worth of twenty billion dollars.

He died at the age of 86 and was buried at the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque in Abu Dhabi. He was succeeded in the position by his first-born son Khalifa as governor and ratified president of the UAE by the Supreme committee .

He had six wives: Hassa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, Sheikha bint Madhad Al Mashghouni, Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi, Mouza bint Suhail bin Awaidah Al Khaili, Ayesha bint Ali Al Darmaki, Amna bint Salah bin Buduwa Al Darmaki, and Shamsa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Nahyan; and thirty children, of whom some are as follows:

Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1948-present): eldest son of the above, whose mother is Hassa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, is the current governor of Abu Dhabi and president of the United Arab Emirates. His wife is Shamsa bint Suhail Al Mazrouei, with whom he has eight children. He also holds other positions: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, chairman of the Supreme Petroleum committee , and chairman of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. He was educated at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in the UK. Previously, he was appointed Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi; Head of the Abu Dhabi Defense department , which would become the Emirates Armed Forces; Prime Minister, Abu Dhabi Chief of Staff, Minister of Defense and Finance; Second Deputy Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates and Chairman of the Abu Dhabi Executive committee . Dubai's Burj Khalifa is named after him, as he paid the money needed to complete its construction. He intervened militarily in Libya by sending the Air Force along with NATO, and pledged support for the democratic uprising in Bahrain in 2011.

According to a WikiLeaks leak, the U.S. ambassador describes him as "distant and uncharismatic character". He has been criticized for his spendthrift character (purchase of the Azzam yacht, scandal of the construction of the palace and purchase of territories in the Seychelles, the Panama Papers and the revelation of properties in London and front companies...).

In 2014, according to the official version, Khalifa suffered a stroke and underwent surgery. According to the government, he is stable, but has virtually disappeared from the public eye.

Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1961-present): brother of Khalifa, but whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, deputy supreme commander of the Armed Forces, and entrusted with the execution of presidential affairs, receptions of foreign dignitaries and political decisions due to the President's poor health. Also, like Khalifa, he was educated at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. He has been an Officer in the Presidential Guard and a pilot in the Air Force. He is married to Salama bint Hamdan Al Nahyan, and has nine children.

He has been characterized by his activist foreign policy against Islamist extremism, and charitable characterpartnership with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for vaccines in Afghanistan and Pakistan). International governments such as France, Singapore and the United States have invited Mohammed to various events and bilateral dialogues. He has even met Pope Francis twice (Rome, 2016; Abu Dhabi, 2019), promoting the Year of Tolerance.

In economic subject , he is the chairman of the sovereign wealth fund Mubadala and head of the Abu Dhabi committee for Economic development . He has been involved in billion-dollar economic stimulus C for the modernization of the country in the energy and infrastructure sectors.

She has also promoted women's empowerment by welcoming a delegation of women officers from the Arab Women's Military and Peacekeeping Program, who are preparing for United Nations peace operations. She has encouraged the presence of women in public services, and has pledged to meet regularly with female representatives of the country's institutions.

Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1955-present): Zayed's second son. He has six children. He is the son of Shamsa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa Al Nahyan. He was educated at Millfield School and Sandhurst Military Academy like his two previous brothers. He is the third deputy prime minister of the United Arab Emirates, a member of the Supreme Petroleum committee and a member of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority.

Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1963-present): fifth son of Zayed, whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is married to Shamsa bint Hamdan bin Mohammed Al Nahyan. He was educated at the Sandhurst Military Academy. He held the position of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs until 2009. He is currently the emir's representative in the western region of Abu Dhabi. He holds a graduate in Political Science and Business Administration from the United Arab Emirates University.

Nahyan bin Mubarak al Nahyan (1951-present): son of Mubarak bin Mohammed Al Nahyan. He is the current head of the UAE Ministry of Tolerance since 2017. From 2016 to 2017, he was minister of culture and development of knowledge. He also dedicated years of his life to the establishment of higher Education centers such as the United Arab Emirates University (1983-2013), technical school of Technology (1988-2013), and Zayed University (1998-2013). He is also the chairman of Warid Telecom International, a telecommunications business , and the chairman of Abu Dhabi banking group , Union National Bank and United Bank Limited, among other companies.

Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1972-present): Ninth son of Zayed, whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is married to Al Jazia bint Saif bin Mohammed Al Nahyan, with whom he has five children. He has held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates since 2006. He holds a graduate in Political Science from the United Arab Emirates University. During his tenure, the UAE has experienced a great expansion in its diplomatic relations with countries in South America, South Pacific, Africa and Asia, and a consolidation with Western countries. He is a member of the country's National Security committee , Vice Chairman of the Permanent Border committee , Chairman of the National Media committee , Chairman of the board of Directors of the Emirates Youth development Foundation, Vice Chairman of the board of Directors of the Abu Dhabi Fund for development and Member of the board the National Defense high school He was Minister of Information and Culture from 1997 to 2006, and Chairman of Emirates average Incorporated.

Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1970-present): eighth son of Zayed, whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is married to two wives, Alia bint Mohammed bin Butti Al Hamed, and Manal bint Mohammed Al Maktoum, with whom he has six children in total. He has held the positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Presidential Affairs of the UAE since 2009. He is chairman of the Ministerial committee for Services, the Emirates Investment Authority and the Emirates Racing Authority. He is a member of the Supreme Petroleum committee and the Abu Dhabi Investment committee . He was educated at Santa Barbara Community College in the United States, and holds a B.A. in International Affairs from the United Arab Emirates University. He chairs the National Documentation and research Center and the Abu Dhabi Fund for development. He was chairman of First Gulf Bank until 2006.

He has a developed business vision. He is the owner of the English soccer team Manchester City, and co-owner of New York City of the MLS, an American professional soccer league. He is a member of the board of directors of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, has a 32% stake in Virgin Galactic, a 9.1% stake in Daimler, and owns the Abu Dhabi average Investment Corporation, through which he owns the English newspaper The National.

Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan(1968-present): twelfth son of Zayed, whose mother is Mouza bint Suhail Al Khaili. He has been Deputy Prime Minister since 2009 and Minister of Interior since 2004. His role is to ensure the internal protection and national security of the United Arab Emirates. He holds a graduate in Political Science from the United Arab Emirates University. He was Director General of the Abu Dhabi Police in 1995, and Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior in 1997, until his appointment as Minister.

Hazza bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1965-present): fifth son of Zayed, whose mother is Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He is married to Mozah bint Mohammed bin Butti Al Hamed, with whom he has five children. He is the Minister of National Security of the United Arab Emirates, Vice Chairman of the Executive committee of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and Chairman of the Emirates Identity Authority.

Nasser bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1967-2008): son of Zayed, whose mother is Amna bint Salah Al Badi. He was chairman of the department Planning and Economics of Abu Dhabi, and was an officer of the royal security. According to the official version, he died at the age of 41 when the helicopter in which he was traveling with his friends crashed off the coast of Abu Dhabi. He was buried at the Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Mosque, and three days of mourning were declared throughout the UAE.

Issa bin Zayed Al Nahyan (1970-present): son of Zayed, whose mother is Amna bint Salah Al Badi. He is a prestigious real estate developer in the city of Dubai, but does not hold any political position in the government of the Emirates. He starred in a case in which, allegedly, in a leaked video, he himself tortured two Palestinians who were his business partners. The Emirati court declared in a final judgment that Issa was innocent because he was the victim of a conspiracy and sentenced the Palestinians to five years' imprisonment for drug use, recording, publication and blackmail. International observers sharply criticized the Emirati judicial system and called for an overhaul of the country's penal code.

From my point of view, and with the experience of having lived in the country, the United Arab Emirates is a very unknown country for the Spanish youth and has incredible professional opportunities due to the demand for foreign work , a very high quality of life at an affordable price, as salaries are quite high, and a strong and modernized administration and institutions. The culture shock is not very big, as the State makes sure to avoid discriminatory situations, unlike other Arab countries. I can say with full conviction that cultural tolerance is real. However, foreigners should keep in mind that it is not a western country, and it is recommended to respect the customs of the nation regarding dress, sacred places and public performances, and to know the basic Emirati law.

ESSAY / Jairo Císcar Ruiz[Spanish version].

In recent months, the open commercial hostilities between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China have taken over the main generalist headlines and specialized economic publications of the entire world. The so-called "commercial war" between these two superpowers is nothing but the successive escalation of the imposition of tariffs and special taxes on products and original manufacturing of the countries in conflict. This, in economic numbers, assumes that the US imposed in 2018 special tariffs on US $ 250 billion of imported Chinese products (of a total of US $ 539 billion), while China for its part imposed tariffs on 110 of the US $ 120 billion of North American import products. [1] These tariffs supposed for the American consumer and companies an increase of US $ 3 billion in additional taxes. This analysis wants, therefore, to explain and show the position and future of the European Union in this commercial war in a general way.

This small reminder of numbers illustrates the magnitude of the challenge to the world economy posed by this clash between the two economic locomotives of the world. It is not China who is paying the tariffs, as Trump said literally on May 9 during a meeting with journalists, [2] but the reality is much more complex, and obviously, as in the case of the inclusion of Huawei in the commercial blacklist ( and therefore the prohibition to acquire any item on American soil, neither hardware nor software, without prior agreement with the Administration), which may affect more than 1,200 North American companies and hundreds of millions of customers globally, according to BBC, [3] the economic war may soon begin to be a great drag on the global economy. On June 2, Pierre Moscovici, European Commissioner for Economic Affairs, predicted that if the confrontation continues, both China and the US could lose between 5 and 6 tenths of GDP, underlining in a special way that "protectionism is the main threat to growth worldwide." [4]

As can be inferred from the words of Moscovici, the commercial war does not concern only the countries directly involved in it, but is closely followed by other actors in international politics, especially the European Union. The European Union is the largest single market in the world, this being one of the fundamental premises and pillars of the very existence of the EU. But it is not already focused on domestic trade, but is one of the major commercial powers of export and import, being one of the main voices that advocate healthy trade relations that are mutually beneficial for the different economic actors at a global and regional level. This opening to business means that 30% of EU GDP comes from foreign trade and makes it the main actor when doing import and export business. To illustrate briefly, according to the data of the European Commission [5] in the last year (May 2018-April 2019), the EU made imports worth € 2,022 billion (a growth of 7%) and exported 4% more, with a total of € 1,987 billion. The balance of trade is, therefore, in a negative balance of € 35 billion, which, due to the large volume of imports and exports and the nominal GDP of the EU (taking 18'8 trillion euros as data) is only 0.18% of the total GDP of the EU. The USA was the main place of export from the EU, while China was the first place of import. These data are revealing and interesting: an important part of the EU economy depends on the business with these two countries and a bad performance of its economy could weigh on the own of the member countries of the EU. Another fact that illustrates the importance of the EU in commercial matters is that of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 2018, 52% of global FDI came from countries within the European Union and this received 38.5% of the total investment worldwide, being a leader in both indicators. Therefore, it can be said that the current trade war can pose a serious problem for the future European economy, but, as we will see later, the Union can emerge strengthened and even benefit from this situation if it manages to thrive between the difficulties, businesses and strategies. of the two countries. But let's see, first, the EU's relations with both the US and China.

The US-EU relationship has traditionally been (though with ups and downs) the strongest in the international sphere. The United States is the main ally in defense, politics, economy and diplomacy of the European Union and vice versa. The economic, political, cultural model is shared; as well as the main collective defense organization at world level, NATO. However, in the so-called transatlantic relationship, there have always been clashes, accentuated in recent times by the Obama Administration and habitual with Trump. With the current administration, not only have the EU been reproached within NATO (regarding the failure of member countries to invest the required budget, shared the criticism with the United Kingdom), but an outbreak of tariff warfare has started in all rule.

In barely two years it has gone from the negotiations of the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), the announced 21st century trading base that finally failed in the last few bars of Obama in the White House, to the current situation of extreme protectionism in USA and EU response. Especially illustrative is the succession of events that have taken place in the last year: at the stroke of Twitter, in March 2018 the US unilaterally imposed global tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) to protect American industry. [6] These tariffs not only affected China, they also inflicted great damage on companies in European countries such as Germany. It was also in the air to apply tariffs of 25% to vehicles of European origin. After a harsh climate of mutual reproach, on July 25, Jean Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, announced with Trump an agreement to lower tariffs on agricultural products and services, and committing the US to review the imposition of metallurgical tariffs to the EU, as well as to support within the World Trade Organization the European proclamations for a reform of Intellectual Property laws, which China does not respect. [7] However, after the reiteration of the transatlantic friendship and Trump's announcement of "we are going towards zero tariffs", [8] Europe was slapped with a dose of reality. On April 9 of this current year, Trump announced on Twitter the imposition of tariffs on the EU worth US $ 11,000 million for the support of the EU to Airbus (competition from the North American Boeing, Lockheed Martin ... ), completely burning the beginning of agreement stablished July of last year. The EU for its part threatened to impose tariffs of € 19 billion for US state support for Boeing. As can be seen, the EU, despite its traditional conciliatory role and many times subjugated to the US, has decided to counterattack and not allow more menaces by the American side. The last threat, in mid-July, goes against French wine (and due to the European mechanism, against all stocks of European origin, including Spanish). This threat has been described as "ridiculous", [9] since the US consumes more wine than it produces (it is the world's largest consumer) and therefore, the available supply could be quite diminished.

It is still early to see the real impact that the commercial war is having in the US, beyond the 7.4% drop in exports from the US to China [10] and the damage that consumers are suffering, but the Nobel Prize in Economics Robert Schiller, in an interview for CNBC [11] and the President of the World Trade Organization, Roberto Azevedo, for the BBC; They have already expressed their fears that if the situation and protectionist policies continue that way, we could face the biggest economic crisis since the end of the Second World War. It is difficult to elucidate what the future relationship between Europe and its main exporting partner, the United States, will be like. Everything indicates that the friction and elevation of the tone will continue if the American Administration does not decide to lower its rhetoric and acts against free trade with Europe. Finally, it must be clear (and with the intention of reducing the sometimes overly alarmist tone of the news) that between the threats (either by Twitter or spokespersons) on both sides and the effective imposition of tariffs (in the US after the announcement) of the Office of the US Trade Representative, in the EU through the approval of the 28) is a long way off, and do not confuse potential acts and facts. It is evident that despite the hardness of the tone, the negotiating teams from both sides of the Atlantic are still in contact and try to avoid as much as possible damaging actions for both.

On the other hand, the relationship between China and Europe is frankly different from the relationship with the US. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (to which Italy has formally adhered) is the confirmation of China's commitment to be the next leader in the world economy. Through this initiative, President Xi Jinping aims to redistribute and streamline trade flows to and from China by land and sea. For this, the stability of South Asian countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan is vital, as well as being able to control vital points of maritime traffic such as the Strait of Malacca or the South China Sea. The Asian "dragon" has an internal situation that favors its growth (6.6% of its GDP in 2018, being the worst data for 30 years is an overwhelming figure), since the relative efficiency of its authoritarian system and , especially, the great support of the State to companies boost their growth, as well as also having the largest reserves of foreign currency, especially dollars and euros, which allow great stability of the country's economy. The Chinese currency, the Renminbi, has been declared by the IMF as a world reserve currency, which is another indicator of the good health that is predicted for the Chinese economy in the future.

For the EU, China is a competitor, but also a strategic partner and a negotiating partner. [12] China is for the EU its main importing partner, totaling 20.2% of imports (€ 395 billion), and 10.5% of exports (€ 210 billion). The volume of imports is such that, although the vast majority arrive at the European continent by sea, there is a railway connection that, covered by the BRI, unites the entire Eurasian continent, from the manufacturing capital of China, Yiwu , and the last stop at the southern tip of Europe, Madrid. Despite the fact that part of what is imported continues to be "low- end" goods, that is, products of basic manufacture and cheap unit price, since the entry of China into the WTO, in December 2001, the concept of material produced in China has changed radically: the great abundance of rare earths in Chinese territory, together with the advance in its industrialization and investment in new technologies (in which China is a leader) have meant that we no longer think of China only as a producer of bazaars in China. dough; On the contrary, the majority of imports into the EU from China were high-end machinery and products, of high technology (especially telecommunications equipment and data processing).

In the aforementioned press release from the European Commission, China is warned to face the commitments made in the Kyoto Protocols and Paris Agreements regarding greenhouse gas emissions; and urges the Asian country to respect the dictates of the WTO, especially in terms of technology transfer, state subsidies and illicit practices such as dumping.

These aspects are vital for economic relations with China. At a time when most of the countries in the world signed or are part of the Paris Agreements for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, while the EU is making efforts to reduce its pollution (closing coal plants and mines; putting special taxes on energy obtained from non-renewable sources ...), China, which accounts for 30% of global emissions, increased its emissions by 3% in 2018. This, beyond the harmful effects for the climate, has industrial and economic benefits: while in Europe the industries are narrowing their profit margins due to the increase in energy prices; China, which feeds on coal, provides cheaper energy to its companies, which, without active restrictions, can produce more at a cheaper price. An example of how the climate affects economic relations with China is the recent announcement [13] of AcerlorMittal to reduce its total steel production in Europe by 3 million tons (over 44 million usual production) due to the high costs of electricity and to the increase in the import of countries from outside the EU (especially China) that with excess production are lowering prices worldwide. This practice, named dumping, which is especially used in China, is to flood the market with an overproduction of a certain product (overproduction is paid with government subsidies) to lower prices. Until December 2018, in the last 3 years, the EU has had to impose more than 116 sanctions and anti-dumping measures against Chinese products. [14] This shows that, despite the attempts of the EU to negotiate in terms satisfactory to both, China does not comply with the stipulations of the agreements with the EU and the WTO. Especially thorny is the problem with the companies controlled by the government (the ban of 5G networks in Europe, controlled by Chinese suppliers, for security reasons), which have practically monopoly in the interior of the country, is being studied; and above all, the distorted reading of legality by the Chinese authorities, which try to use all possible mechanisms in their favor, making difficult or impeding the direct investment of foreign capital in their country, as well as imposing requirements (need to have Chinese partners, etc.) that hinder the international expansion of small and medium enterprises.

The greatest friction with the EU, however, is the forced transfer of technology to the Government, especially by strategic product companies such as hydrocarbons, pharmaceuticals and the automotive industry, [15] imposed by laws and as a conditio sine qua non companies cannot land in the country. This creates a climate of unfair competition and direct attack on international trade laws. The direct investment of Chinese capital in critical industries and producers in the EU has provoked voices calling for greater control and even vetoes on these investments in certain areas for Defense and Security issues within the EU. The lack of protection of intellectual rights or patents are also important points of complaint by the EU, which aims to create through diplomacy and international organizations a favorable climate for the promotion of equal commercial relations between the two countries, as it is reflected in the various European guidelines and plans on the subject.

As we have seen, the commercial war is not limited only to the US and China, but third parties are suffering and even actively participating in it. Here the question arises. Can the EU benefit in any way and avoid a new crisis? Despite the pessimistic environment, the EU can obtain multiple benefits from this trade war if it manages to adequately maneuver and avoid as far as possible more tariff impositions against its products and keeps the market open. If the trade war continues and the positions of the US and China harden, the EU, as the main partner of both, could receive benefits thanks to a redistribution of the flow of trade. So, to avoid the loss due to tariffs, both China and the US could sell products with heavy taxes in the other country to the European market, but, especially, import products from Europe, as they have not imposed huge tariffs against EU products. If an agreement is reached with the US to eliminate or minimize tariffs, the EU would be faced with a huge niche market left by Chinese products banned or taxed in the US. The same in China, especially in the automotive sector, from which the EU could benefit by selling to the Chinese market. Alicia García-Herrero, of the Belgian think tank Bruegel), affirms that the benefit for Europe will only be possible if it does not lean towards any of the contenders and remains neutral on the economic level. [16] It also highlights, like the European Commission, that China must adopt measures to guarantee its reciprocity and market access, since the European Union continues to have greater volume of business and investments with the US, so the Chinese offer should be highly attractive to European producers as considering directing products to China instead of the US. The UN itself figures in US $ 70 billion the benefits that the EU could absorb thanks to the trade war. [17] Definitely, if the right measures are taken and the 28 draw an appropriate road map, the EU could benefit from this war, without forgetting that, as the EU itself advocates, coercive measures are not the solution to the trade problem, and hopes that, due to its ineffectiveness and damage to both consumers and producers, the tariff war will come to an end and, if differences persist, they will be elucidated in the WTO Appellate Body, or in the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the United Nations.

This commercial war is a highly complex and with different views issue. This analysis has tried to address a large part of the aspects, data and problems that the European Union faces in this commercial war. It has been analyzed generally in what the commercial war consists, as well as the relations between the EU, China and the USA. We are facing a gray future, with the possibility of multiple and rapid turns (especially from the US, as could be seen after Osaka's G20 summit, when Trump accept to sell some key components to Huawei, but not to remove the company from their blacklist) and from which, if the requirements and conditions set out above are met, the EU will definitely benefit, not only in the economic plan, but by staying together and making a common front, it will be an example of negotiation and economic freedom for the whole world.

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17. European Union, the big beneficiary of the trade war between China and the U.S.(4-2-2019) UN News . Retrieved from

essay / Jairo Císcar Ruiz [English version].

In recent months, the open trade hostilities between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China have dominated the main general headlines and specialized economic publications around the world. The so-called "trade war" between these two superpowers is nothing more than the successive escalation of the imposition of tariffs and special levies on original products and manufactured goods from the countries in confrontation. This, in economic figures, means that the US imposed in 2018 special tariffs on US$250 billion of imported Chinese products (out of a total of US$539 billion), while China for its part imposed tariffs on 110 out of US$120 billion of US import products [1]. These tariffs meant an increase of US$3 billion in additional taxes for American consumers and businesses. This analysis is therefore intended to explain and show the position and future of the European Union in this trade war in a general way.

This small reminder of the figures illustrates the magnitude of the challenge to global Economics posed by this clash between the world's two economic locomotives. It is not China that is paying the tariffs, as Trump literally said on May 9 during a meeting with journalists [2], but the reality is much more complex, and, evidently, as in the case of the inclusion of Huawei in the trade blacklist (and therefore the prohibition to purchase any item on US soil, whether hardware or software, without a prior agreement with the Administration), which may affect more than 1.200 American companies and hundreds of millions of customers globally, according to the BBC [3], the economic war may soon start to be a great burden for Economics globally. On June 2, Pierre Moscovici, European Commissioner for Economic Affairs, predicted that if the confrontation continues, both China and the USA could lose between 5 and 6 tenths of GDP, stressing in particular that "protectionism is the main threat to world growth" [4].

As can be inferred from Moscovici's words, the trade war is not only of concern to the countries directly involved in it, but is closely followed by other actors in international politics, especially the European Union.The European Union is the largest Single Market in the world, this being one of the premises and fundamental pillars of the EU's very existence. But it is no longer focused on internal trade, but is one of the major trading powers for exports and imports, being one of the main voices advocating healthy trade relations that are of mutual benefit to the different economic actors at global and regional level. This openness to business means that 30% of the EU's GDP comes from foreign trade and makes it the main player when it comes to doing import and export business. To illustrate briefly, agreement to data from the European Commission [5] in the last year (May 2018-April 2019), the EU made imports worth €2,022 billion (a growth of 7%) and exported 4% more, with a total of €1,987 billion. The trade balance is therefore a negative balance of €35 billion, which, due to the large import/export Issue and the nominal GDP of the EU (taking the figure of 18.8 trillion euros) is only 0.18% of the EU's total GDP. The USA was the main place of export from the EU, while China was the first place of import. These data are revealing and interesting: an important part of EU Economics depends on business with these two countries and a bad performance of their Economics could weigh down the EU member countries' own.

Another figure that illustrates the importance of the EU in subject of trade is that of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 2018, 52% of global FDI came from countries within the European Union and the EU received 38.5% of total investment worldwide, leading in both indicators. Therefore, it can be said that the current trade war can pose a serious problem for the future European Economics , but, as we will see below, the Union can emerge strengthened and even benefit from this status if it manages to mediate well between the difficulties, businesses and strategies of the two countries. But let us first look at the EU's relations with both the US and China.

The US-EU relationship has traditionally been (albeit with ups and downs) the strongest in the international sphere. The United States is the European Union's main ally in defense, politics, Economics and diplomacy, and vice versa. They share the economic, political and cultural model , as well as the main world collective defense organization, NATO. However, in the so-called transatlantic relationship, there have always been clashes, accentuated in the recent times of the Obama Administration and usual with Trump. With the current Administration, not only have there been reproaches to the EU within NATO (regarding the failure of member countries to invest the required budget ; shared criticism with the United Kingdom), but a full-fledged tariff war has begun.

In barely two years we have gone from the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) negotiations, the announced basis for trade in the 21st century that finally failed in the final stages of Obama's term in the White House, to the current status extreme protectionism of the USA and the EU's response. Particularly illustrative is the succession of events that have taken place in the last year: at the stroke of Twitter, in March 2018 the US unilaterally imposed global tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) to protect American industry [6]. These tariffs did not only affect China, they also inflicted great damage on companies in European countries such as Germany. Tariffs of 25% on European vehicles were also in the air. After a harsh climate of mutual reproaches, on July 25, Jean Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, announced with Trump an agreement to lower tariffs on agricultural products and services, and the US committed itself to review the imposition of metallurgical tariffs on the EU, as well as to support within the World Trade Organization the European calls for a reform of Intellectual Property laws, which China does not respect [7]. However, after the reiteration of the transatlantic friendship and Trump's advertisement of "we are moving towards zero tariffs" [8], soon the clattering of the cash registers began again. In April of this year, on April 9, Trump announced on Twitter the imposition of tariffs on the EU worth US$11 billion for the EU's support to Airbusskill of the American companies Boeing, Lockheed Martin...), blowing up the principle of agreement of July last year. The EU, for its part, threatened to impose tariffs of €19 billion for US state support to Boeing. As can be seen, the EU, despite its traditional conciliatory role and often subjugated to the US, has decided to fight back and not to allow any more outbursts of tone from the American side. The latest threat, in mid-July, is against French wine (and due to the European mechanism, against all wines of European origin, including Spanish wines). This threat has been described as "ridiculous" [9], since the USA consumes more wine than it produces (it is the world's largest consumer) and therefore the available supply could be considerably reduced.

It is still too early to see the real impact that the trade war is having on the US, beyond the 7.4% drop in US exports to China [10] and the damage that consumers are suffering, but the Nobel Prize winner in Economics Robert Schiller, in an interview for CNBC [11] and the president of the World Trade Organization, Roberto Azevedo, for the BBC, have already expressed their fears that if the status and protectionist policies continue as they are, we could be facing the biggest economic crisis since the end of World War II. It is difficult to elucidate what the future relationship between Europe and its main export partner , the US, will be like. All indications are that friction and escalation will continue if the US Administration does not decide to tone down its rhetoric and actions against free trade with Europe. Finally, it must be clear (and with the intention of lowering the sometimes excessively alarmist tone of the news) that between the threats (either by Twitter or spokespersons) from both sides and the actual imposition of tariffs (in the US after the relevant advertisement from the Office of the US Trade Representative; in the EU through the approval of the 28) there is a long way to go, and we must not confuse potential acts and facts. It is clear that despite the harsh tone, the negotiating teams on both sides of the Atlantic are still in contact and are trying to avoid as far as possible actions detrimental to both sides.

On the other hand, the relationship between China and Europe is frankly different from the one with the US. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (which Italy has formally joined) confirms China's bid to be the next leader in global Economics . Through this initiative, President Xi Jinping aims to redistribute and speed up trade flows to and from China by land and sea. To this end, the stability of South Asian countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan is vital, as is the ability to control vital maritime traffic points such as the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. The Asian "dragon" has an internal status that favors its growth (6.6% of its GDP in 2018 which, being the worst figure for 30 years, is still an overwhelming figure), as the relative efficiency of its authoritarian system and, especially, the great support of the State to companies boost its growth, as well as possessing the largest foreign currency reserves, especially dollars and euros, which allow a great stability of the country's Economics . The Chinese currency, the Renminbi, has been declared a world reservation currency by the IMF, which is another indicator of the good health that the Chinese Economics is expected to enjoy in the future.

For the EU, China is a competitor, but also a strategic partner and a negotiating partner [12]. China is the EU's main import partner , accounting for 20.2% of imports (€395 billion) and 10.5% of exports (€210 billion). The Issue of imports is such that, although the vast majority reach the European continent by sea, there is a railway connection that, under the BRI, links the entire Eurasian continent, from China's manufacturing capital, Yiwu, and the last stop at the southern tip of Europe, Madrid. Although some of the imports are still so-called "low-end" goods, i.e. products of basic manufacture and cheap unit price, since China's entrance the WTO in December 2001, the concept of material produced in China has changed radically: the great abundance of rare earths in Chinese territory, together with the progress in its industrialization and investment in new technologies (in which China is a leader) have meant that China is no longer thought of only as a mass producer of bazaars; on the contrary, the majority of EU imports from China were machinery and high-end, high-tech products (especially telecommunications and data processing equipment).

In the aforementioned press statement of the European Commission, China is warned to comply with the commitments made in the Kyoto Protocols and Paris Agreements regarding greenhouse gas emissions; and urges the Asian country to respect the dictates of the WTO, especially with subject to technology transfer, state subsidies and illegal practices such as dumping.

These aspects are vital for economic relations with China. At a time when most countries in the world signed or are part of the Paris Agreements for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, while the EU is making efforts to reduce its pollution (closing coal plants and mines; putting special taxes on energy obtained from non-renewable sources...), China, which totals 30% of global emissions, increased in 2018 by 3% its emissions. This, beyond the harmful effects for the climate, has industrial and economic benefits: while in Europe industries are narrowing their profit margins due to the rise in energy prices; China, which is fueled by coal, provides cheaper energy to its companies, which, without active restrictions, can produce more. An example of how the climate affects economic relations with China is the recent advertisement [13] by AcerlorMittal to reduce its total steel production in Europe by 3 million tons (out of 44 million tons of usual production) due to high electricity costs and increased imports from countries outside the EU (especially China) which, with overproduction, are lowering world prices. This internship, which is especially used in China, consists of flooding the market with an overproduction of a certain product (this overproduction is paid for with government subsidies) to lower prices. As of December 2018, in the last 3 years, the EU has had to impose more than 116 sanctions and anti-dumping measures against Chinese products [14]. Which sample that, despite the EU's attempts to negotiate on mutually satisfactory terms, China does not comply with the stipulations of the agreements with the EU and the WTO. Particularly thorny is the problem with government-controlled companies (a ban on 5G networks in Europe, controlled by Chinese providers, is being considered for security reasons), which have a virtual monopoly inside the country; and above all, the distorted reading of legality by the Chinese authorities, who try to use all possible mechanisms in their favor, making it difficult or hindering direct investment of foreign capital in their country, as well as imposing requirements (the need to have Chinese partners, etc.) that hinder the international expansion of small and medium-sized companies. However,

The biggest friction with the EU, however, is the forced transfer of technology to the government, especially by companies of strategic products such as hydrocarbons, pharmaceuticals and the automotive industry [15], imposed by laws and conditio sine qua non companies cannot land in the country. This creates a climate of unfair skill and direct attack on international trade laws. The direct investment of Chinese capital in critical industries and producers in the EU has caused voices to be raised calling for greater control and even vetoes on these investments in certain areas for Defense and Security issues. The lack of protection of intellectual rights or patents are also important points of complaint by the EU, which aims to create through diplomacy and international organizations a favorable climate for the promotion of equal trade relations between the two countries, as reflected in the various European guidelines and plans on topic.

As we have seen, the trade war is not only limited to the US and China, but third parties are suffering from it and even actively participating in it. The question arises here: can the EU benefit in any way and avoid a new crisis? Despite the pessimistic mood, the EU can derive multiple benefits from this trade war if it manages to maneuver properly and avoid as far as possible further tariffs against its products and keeps the market open. If the trade war continues and the positions of the US and China harden, the EU, as a major partner of both, could benefit from a redistribution of trade flows. Thus, to avoid the loss due to tariffs, both China and the US could sell heavily taxed products to the European market, but especially import products from Europe. If an agreement is reached with the US to lift or minimize tariffs, the EU would find itself facing a huge market niche left by Chinese products vetoed or taxed in the US. The same in China, especially in the automotive sector, from which the EU could benefit by selling to the Chinese market. Alicia Garcia-Herrero, of the Belgian think tank Bruegel, states that the benefit for Europe will only be possible if it does not lean towards any of the contenders and remains economically neutral [16]. It also stresses, like the European Commission, that China must adopt measures to guarantee its reciprocity and market access, since the European Union still has a greater business and investment Issue with the USA, so that the Chinese offer should be highly attractive for European producers to consider directing products to China instead of the USA. The UN itself estimates at US$70 billion the benefits that could be absorbed by the EU thanks to the trade war [17]. Definitely, if the right measures are taken and the 28 draw up an adequate road map, the EU could benefit from this war, without forgetting that, as the EU itself advocates, coercive measures are not the solution to the trade problem, and hopes that, due to their ineffectiveness and damage caused to both consumers and producers, the tariff war will come to an end and, if differences persist, they will be resolved in the WTO Appellate Body or in the Permanent Court of Arbitration of the United Nations.

This trade war is a highly complex and nuanced topic ; this analysis has attempted to address many of the aspects, data and problems faced by the European Union in this trade war. It has been generally analyzed what the trade war consists of, as well as the relations between the EU, China and the USA. We are facing a gray future, with the possibility of multiple and quick turns (especially on the part of the US, as seen after the G20 summit in Osaka, after which it has allowed the sale of components to Huawei, but has not removed the company from its blacklist) and from which, if the requirements and conditions set out above are met, the EU will definitely benefit, not only economically, but if it remains united and making a common front, it will be an example of negotiation and economic freedom for the whole world.

REFERENCES

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Blake, A. (9-5-2019) Trump's rambling, disappointing Q&A with reporters, annotated. The Washington Post. Retrieved from.

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5. European Union Trade Statistics. (18-6-2019) European Commission.Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/eu-position-in-world-trade/statistics/

6. Pozzi, S. (2-3-2018) Trump reaffirms protectionism by raising tariffs on imported steel and aluminum. El País (New York correspondent)Retrieved from.

7. Inchaurraga, I. G. (2013). China and GATT (1986-1994): Causes and consequences of the failure of a negotiation. Cizur Menor, Navarra: Aranzadi. pp. 204-230.

8. Tejero, M. (25-7-2018) EU-USagreement : "zero tariffs" on industrial goods; more soybeans and liquefied gas. El Confidencial. Retrieved from

9. Pardo,P. & Villaécija, R. (17-6-2019) Trump threatens Spanish wine. El Mundo. Retrieved from.

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11. Rosenfeld, E. & Soong, M. (25-3-2018) Nobel-winner Robert Shiller warns of an 'economic crisis' from trade war threats. CNBC. Retrieved from.

12. EU reviews relations with China and proposes 10 actions(12-3-2019) European Commission- Press statement .

13. Asturias takes 23% of Arcelor's new EU production cut(6-5-2019) 5 Días Retrieved from.

14. Morales, R. (26-12-2018) EU increased 28.3% its antidumping measures in 3 years: WTO. El Economista Mexico. Retrieved from

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[Bruno Maçães, Belt and Road. A Chinese World Order. Penguin. Gurgaon (India), 2019. 227p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Having covered the moment of literature devoted to present the novelty of the Chinese New Silk Road project , Bruno Maçães leaves aside many of the specific concretions of the Chinese initiative to deal with its more geopolitical aspects. This is why Maçães uses the name Belt and Road throughout the book, instead of its acronyms - OBOR (One Belt, One Road) or the more recently used BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) - because he is not so much referring to the layout of the transport connections as to the new world order that Beijing wants to shape.

Through this economic integration, according to Maçães, China could project power over two thirds of the world, including Central and Eastern Europe, in a process of geographic cohesion of Eurasia to which this Portuguese politician and researcher has already dedicated his previous work.

Compared to other essays on the New Silk Road, this one focuses a lot on India (this is the case in its general content, but also in this review we have used a special edition dedicated to that country, with a particular introduction).

Maçães grants India the role of core topic in the Eurasia integration project . If India decides not to participate at all and, instead, to go for the alternative promoted by the United States, together with Japan and Australia, then the Chinese design will not reach the dimension desired by Beijing. "If India decides that life in the Western order will be better than under alternative arrangements, the Belt and Road will have difficulty achieving its original ambition," the author says.

Maçães believes, however, that the West is not all that attractive to the subcontinent. In that Western order, India can only aspire to a secondary role, while the rise of China "offers it the exciting possibility of a genuinely multipolar, rather than merely multilateral, world in which India can legitimately hope to become an autonomous center of geopolitical power," at least on a par with a declining Russia.

Despite these apparent advantages, India will not go all the way to either side, Maçães predicts. "It will never join the Belt and Road because it could only agree to join China in a project that was new. And it will never join a US initiative to rival the Belt and Road unless the US makes it less confrontational." So, "India will keep everyone waiting, but it will never make a decision on the Belt and Road".

Without Delhi's participation, or even more, with resistance from the Indian leadership, neither the US nor China's vision can be fully realized internship, Maçães continues to argue. Without India, Washington may be able to preserve its current model of alliances in Asia, but its ability to compete on the scale that the Belt and Road does would collapse; for its part, Beijing is realizing that it alone cannot provide the financial resources needed for the ambitious project.

Maçães warns that China has "ignored and disdained" India's positions and interests, which may end up being "a major miscalculation". He believes that China's impatience to start building infrastructure, because of the need to demonstrate that its initiative is a success, "may become the worst enemy".

He ventures that the Chinese may correct the shot. "It is likely - perhaps even inevitable - that the Belt and Road will grow increasingly decentralized, less China-centric," he says, commenting that in the end such a new Chinese order would not be so different from the structure of the existing Washington-led world order, where "the US insists on being recognized as the state at the apex of the hierarchy of international power" and leaves some autonomy to each regional power.

While Maçães places India in a non-aligned status plenary session of the Executive Council, he does foresee an unequivocal partnership between India and Japan. In his view it is a "symbiotic" relationship, in which India sees Japan as its first source of technology, while Japan sees the Indian navy as "an indispensable partner in its efforts to contain Chinese expansion and safeguard freedom of navigation" in the region's seas.

As for Europe, Maçães sees it in the difficult position "of not being able to oppose an international economic integration project , while being equally incapable of joining as a mere participant" in the Chinese initiative, in addition to the germ of division that the project has already introduced into the European Union.

From Bangladesh to Pakistan and Djibouti

Despite the differences indicated above, Maçães believes that the relationship between China and India can develop positively, even if there is some element of latent conflict, encouraged by a certain mutual distrust. The commercial linkage of two such immense markets and production centers will generate economic ties "called to dominate" world Economics by the middle of this century.

This movement of goods between the two countries will make Bangladesh and Myanmar the center of a major trade corridor.

For its part, Pakistan, in addition to being a corridor for the exit to the Indian Ocean from western China, will be increasingly integrated into the Chinese production chain. In particular, it can supply raw materials and basic manufactures to the textile industry that China is developing in Xinjiang, its export gateway to Europe for goods that can optimize rail transport. The capital of that province, Urumqi, will become the fashion capital of Central Asia in the next decade, agreement to Maçães' forecast.

Another interesting observation is that the shrinking of Eurasia and the development of internal transport routes between the two extremes of the supercontinent may lead to the North Sea container ports (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hamburg) losing weight in the trade between Europe and China at the expense of a greater transit of those in the Mediterranean (Piraeus, in particular).

The author also ventures that Chinese infrastructure works in Cameroon and Nigeria can help facilitate connections between these countries and Doralé, the port that China manages in Djibouti, which, through these trans-African routes, could become "a serious rival" to the Suez Canal.

If in Djibouti China has its first, and for the moment only, military base outside its territory, it should be kept in mind that Beijing can give a possible military use to other ports whose management it has assumed. As Maçães reminds, China approved in 2016 a legal framework that obliges civilian companies to support military logistics operations requested by the Chinese Navy.

All these are aspects of a suggestive book that does not allow itself to be carried away by the determinism of China's rise, nor by an antagonistic vision that denies the possibility of a new world order. The work of a European who, although he served in the Portuguese Foreign Ministry as director General for Europe, is realistic about the weight of the EU in the design the world.