COMMENTARY / Jairo Císcar

Since the end of the Second World War, collective security on the European continent and with it, peace, has been a priority. The founding fathers of the European Union themselves, aware of the tensions that resulted from the First and Second World Wars, devised and created security structures to prevent future conflicts and strengthen relations between former enemies. The first structure, although not purely military, obeys this logic: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), essential for the creation and maintenance of industry and armies, was created by the Treaty of Paris in 1951, introducing a concept as widely used today as "energy security". This was arguably the first major step towards effective integration of European countries.

However, for the issue at hand, the path has been much more complicated. In the same period in which the ECSC was born, French Prime Minister René Pleven, with the encouragement of Robert Schuman and Jean Monet, wanted to promote the European Defence Community. This ambitious plan aimed to merge the armed forces of the six founding countries (including the Federal Republic of Germany) into a European Armed Forces that would keep the continent together and prevent the possibility of a new conflict between states. Ambitious as it was, the project failed in 1954, when the deeply nationalist Gaullist deputies of the French National Assembly refused to ratify the agreement. European integration at the military level thus suffered a setback from which it would not begin to recover until the present century, although it continues to face many of the reluctances it once did.

Why did the European Defence Community fail, and what makes the European Armed Forces still a difficult discussion today? This is a question that needs to be analysed and understood, for while political and economic integration has advanced with a large consensus, the military problem, which should go hand in hand with the two previous issues, has always been the Achilles' tendon of the common European project.

There are basically two factors to take into account. The first is the existence of a larger defense community, NATO. Since 1948, NATO has been the principal military alliance of Western countries. Born to counter Soviet expansionism, the Alliance has evolved in size and objectives to its current configuration of 30 member states and a multitude of other states in the form of strategic alliances. Although NATO's primary purpose was diluted after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it has evolved with the times, remaining alert and operational all around the globe. The existence of this common, powerful and ambitious project under U.S. leadership largely obscured efforts and intentions to create a common European defense project. Why create one, overlapping, structure if the objectives were practically the same and NATO guaranteed greater logistical, military superiority and a nuclear arsenal? For decades, this has been the major argument against further European integration in the field of defense - as protection was secured but delegated.

Another issue was the nationalism still prevalent among European states, especially in the aforementioned Gaullist France. Even today, with an ongoing and deep political, economic and, at a certain level, judicial integration, military affairs are still often seen as the last bastion of national sovereignty. In Schengen Europe, they remain for many the guarantee of those borders that fell long ago. 

Other issues to take into account are the progressive detachment of the population from the armed forces (a Europe that has not seen war on its own territory in 70 years, except for the Balkans, has tended to settle into peace, nearly oblivious to wars) and its progressive ageing, with a future with fewer people of military age, and who, as we have mentioned, often have an ideological and motivational gap with previous generations with respect to the concept and utility of the military.

It was not until relatively recently, with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, that the embryonic mechanisms of the current Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), supervised by the European Defence Agency, began to be implemented. In the 2010s, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, these mechanisms were established. The Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS) is one of them. It constitutes the EU's first permanent strategic headquarters. The final impetus came in 2015, with the European Union Global Strategy. This led to the creation of various far-reaching initiatives, most notably the Permanent Structured Cooperation(PESCO), which since 2017 has been pursuing the structural integration of the Armed Forces of all EU countries except Denmark and Malta. It is not only limited to proper integration, but also leads capability development projects such as the EU Collaborative Warfare Capabilities (ECOWAR) or the Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA), as well as defense industry endeavors such as the MUSAS project, or the CYBER-C4ISR capabilities level.

Although it is too early to say for sure, Europe may be as close as it can get to René Pleven's distant dream. The EU's geopolitical situation is changing, and so is its own language and motivation. If we used to talk about Europe delegating its protection for years, now Emmanuel Macron advocates 'strategic autonomy" for the EU. It should be recalled that just over a year ago he claimed that "NATO is brain-dead". Some voices in the EU's political arena claim and have realised that it can no longer delegate the European protection and defense of its interests, and they are starting to take steps towards doing so. Despite these advances, it is true that it is not a shared interest, at least, as a whole. France and other Mediterranean member states are pushing towards it, but those in the East, as Poland or Latvia, are far more concerned about the rise of Russia, and are comfortable enough for U.S. troops to be established in their terrain. 

Having said that, I truly believe that the advantages of the European Armed Forces project outweigh its negative aspects. First of all, a Europe united in defense policies would not imply the disappearance of NATO, or the breaking of agreements with third countries. In fact, these alliances could even be strengthened and fully adapted to the 21st century and to the war of the future. As an example, in 2018 the EU and NATO signed collaboration agreements on issues such as cybersecurity, defense industry and military mobility.        

While NATO works, Europe is now facing a dissociation between U.S. interests and those of the other Allies, especially the European ones. In particular, countries such as France, Spain and Italy are shifting their defense policies from the Middle East, or the current peace process in Afghanistan (which, despite 20 years of war, sounds like a long way off), to sub-Saharan Africa (Operation "Barkhane" or EUTM Mali), a much closer region with a greater impact on the lives of the European citizens. This does not detract from the fact that NATO faces global terrorism in a new era that is set to surpass asymmetric warfare and other 4th generation wars: the era of hybrid warfare. Russia's military build-up on the EU's eastern flank and China's penetration into Africa do not invite a loosening of ties with the United States, but European countries need to prioritize their own threats over those of the U.S., although it is true that the needs of countries to the west of the EU are not the same as those to the east. This could be the main stumbling block for a joint European Army, as weighting the different strategic priorities could be really arduous.

It is true that this idea of differing policies is not shared in the EU as a whole. Countries such as Poland, those in the Balkans or the Baltic have different approaches and necessities when talking about a European Union common security strategy. The EU is a 27 country-wide body that often is extremely difficult to navigate within. Consensus is only reached after very long discussions (see the soap opera on the COVID relief package negotiations), and being defence as important as it is, and in need of fast, executive decision making, the intricate bureaucracy of the EU could not help with it. But if well managed, it could be an opportunity to develop new strategies for decision-making and reforming the European system as a whole, fostering a new, more effective Europe.

Another discussion, probably outdated, is the one who claims that the EU is not capable of planning, organizing and conducting operations outside the NATO umbrella. In this case, apart from the aforementioned guidelines and policies, one simply has to look at the facts: the EU today leads six active (and 18 completed) military missions with close to 5,000 troops deployed. The "Althea" (Bosnia & Herzegovina) and "Atalanta" (in the Indian Ocean) missions are particularly noteworthy. It is true that these examples are of low-intensity conflicts but, given the combat experience of EU nations under NATO or in other missions (French and Portuguese in Africa, etc.) combat-pace could be quickly achieved. The NATO certification system under which most European armed forces operate guarantees standardisation in tactics, logistics and procedures, so that standardisation at the European level would be extremely simple if existing models are taken into account.

Another issue is the question of whether the EU could politically and economically engage in a long, high-intensity operation without getting drowned by the public opinion, financial administration, and, obviously, with the planning and carrying out of a whole campaign. This is one of the other main problems with future European armed forces because, as mentioned earlier, Europeans are not prepared in any way to be confronted with the reality of a situation of war. What rules of engagement will be used? How to cope with casualties? And even more, how to create an effective chain of command and control among 27 countries? And what will happen if one does not agree with a particular intervention or action? How could it be argued that the EU, world's leading beacon of human rights, democracy and peace, gets engaged in a war? Undoubtedly, these questions have rational and objective answers, but in an era of social average, populism, empty discourses, and fake news, it would be difficult to engage with the public (and voters) to support the idea.

Having said that, there is room for optimism. Another reason pointing towards Europe's armed forces is the collaboration that exists at the military industrial level. PESCO and the European Defence Fund encourage this, and projects such as the FCAS and EURODRONE lay the foundations for the future of European armed forces capabilities. It should not be forgotten that the European defense industry is the world leader behind that of the United States and is an increasingly tough competitor for the latter.

In addition, the use of military forces in European countries during the current coronavirus pandemic has served to reinforce the message of their utility and need for collaboration beyond the purely military. While the militarisation of emergencies must be avoided and the soldier must not be reduced to a mere "Swiss army knife" at disposition of the government trying to make up their own lack of planning or capacity to deal with the situation, it has brought the military closer to the streets, and to some extent may have helped to counteract the disaffection with the armed forces that exists in many European countries (due to the factors mentioned above). 

Finally, I believe that European-level integration of the armed forces will not merely be beneficial, but necessary for Europe. If the EU wants to maintain its diplomacy, its economic power, it needs its own strategic project, an "area of control" over its interests and, above all, military independence. This does not preclude maintaining and promoting the alliances already created, but this is a unique and necessary opportunity to fully establish the common European project. The political and economic framework cannot be completed without the military one; and the military one cannot function without the former. All that remains is to look at the direction the EU is taking and hope that it will be realized. It is more than possible and doable, and the reality is that work is being done towards it.

COMMENTARY / Marina G. Reina

After weeks of rockets being fired from Gaza and the West Bank to Israel and Israeli air strikes, Israel and Hamas have agreed to a ceasefire in a no less heated environment. The conflict of the last days between Israel and Palestine has spread like powder in a spiral of violence whose origin and direct reasons are difficult to draw. As a result, hundreds have been killed or injured on both sides.

What at first sight seemed like a Palestinian protest against the eviction of Palestinian families in the Jerusalem's neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah, is connected to the pro-Hamas demonstrations held days before at Damascus Gate in Jerusalem. And even before that, at the beginning of Ramadan, Lehava, a Jewish far-right extremist organization, carried out inflammatory anti-Arab protests at the same Damascus Gate. Additionally, the upcoming Palestinian legislative elections that Palestinian PM Mahmoud Abbas indefinitely postponed must be added to this cocktail of factors. To add fuel to the flames, social average have played a significant role in catapulting the conflict to the international arena-especially due to the attack in Al-Aqsa mosque that shocked Muslims worldwide-, and Hamas' campaign encouraging Palestinian youth to throw into the streets at point of rocks and makeshift bombs. 

Sheikh Jarrah was just the last straw

At this point in the story, it has become clear that the evictions in Sheikh Jarrah have been just another drop of water in a glass that has been overflowing for decades. The Palestinian side attributes this to an Israeli state strategy to expand Jewish control over East Jerusalem and includes claims of ethnic cleansing. However, the issue is actually a private matter between Jews who have property documents over those lands dating the 1800s, substantiated in a 1970 law that enables Jews to reclaim Jewish-owned property in East Jerusalem from before 1948, and a group of Palestinians, not favored by that same law.

The sentence ruled in favor of the right-wing Jewish Israeli association that was claiming the property. This is not new, as such nationalist Jews have been working for years to expand Jewish presence in East Jerusalem's Palestinian neighborhoods. Far from being individuals acting for purely private purposes, they are radical Zionist Jews who see their ambitions protected by the law. This is clearly portrayed by the presence of the leader of the Jewish supremacist Lehava group-also defined as opposed to the Christian presence in Israel-during the evictions in Sheikh Jarrah. This same group marched through Jerusalem's downtown to the cry of "Death to Arabs" and looking for attacking Palestinians. The fact is that Israel does not condemn or repress the movements of the extreme Jewish right as it does the Islamic extremist movements. Sheikh Jarrah is one, among other examples, of how, rather, he gives them legal space. 

Clashes in the streets of Israel between Jews and Palestinians

Real pitched battles were fought in the streets of different cities of Israel between Jewish and Palestinians youth. This is the case in places such as Jerusalem, Acre, Lod and Ashkelon -where the sky was filled with the missiles coming from Gaza, that were blocked by the Israeli anti-missile "Iron Dome" system. Palestinian neighbors were harassed and even killed, synagogues were attacked, and endless fights between Palestinians and Israeli Jews happened in every moment on the streets, armored by ethnic and religious hatred. This is shifting dramatically the narrative of the conflict, as it is taking place in two planes: one militarized, starring Hamas and the Israeli military; and the other one held in the streets by the youth of both factions. Nonetheless, it cannot be omitted the fact that all Israeli Jews receive military training and are conscripted from the age of 18, a reality that sets the distance in such street fights between Palestinians and Israelis.

Tiktok, Instagram and Telegram groups have served as political loudspeakers of the conflict, bombarding images and videos and minute-by-minute updates of the situation. On many occasions accused of being fake news, the truth is that they have achieved an unprecedented mobilization, both within Israel and Palestine, and throughout the world. So much so that pro-Palestinian demonstrations have already been held and will continue in the coming days in different European and US cities. Here, then, there is another factor, which, while informative and necessary, also stokes the flames of fire by promoting even more hatred. Something that has also been denounced in social networks is the removal by the service of review of the videos in favor of the Palestinian cause which, far from serving anything, increases the majority argument that they want to silence the voice of the Palestinians and hide what is happening.

Hamas propaganda, with videos circulating on social average about the launch of the missiles and the bloodthirsty speeches of its leader, added to the Friday's sermons in mosques encouraging young Muslims to fight, and to sacrifice their lives as martyrs protecting the land stolen from them, do nothing but promote hatred and radicalization. In fact, 

It may be rash to say that this is a lost war for the Palestinians, but the facts suggest that it is. The only militarized Palestinian faction is Hamas, the only possible opposition to Israel, and Israel has already hinted to Qatari and Egyptian mediators that it will not stop military deployment and attacks until the military wing of Hamas surrenders its weapons. The US President denied the idea of Israel being overreacting. 

Hamas' political upside in violence and Israel's catastrophic counter-offensive 

Experts declare that it seems like Hamas was seeking to overload or saturate Israel's interception system, which can only stand a certain number of attacks at once. Indeed, the group has significantly increased the rate of fire, meaning that it has not only replenished its arsenal in spite of the blockade imposed by Israel, but that it has also improved its capabilities. Iran has played a major role in this, supplying technology in order to boost Palestinian self-production of weapons, extend the range of rockets and improve their accuracy. A reality that has been recognized by both Hamas and Iran, as Hamas attributes to the Persian country its success. 

This translates into the bloodshed of unarmed civilians to be continued. If we start from the basis that Israeli action is defensive, it must also be said that air strikes do not discriminate against targets. Although the IDF has declared that the targets are instructions of Hamas, it has been documented how buildings of civilians have been destroyed in Gaza, as already counted by 243 the numbers of dead and those of injured are more than 1,700 then the ceasefire entered into effect. On the Israeli side, the wounded reported were 200 and the dead were counted as 12. In an attempt to wipe out senior Hamas officials, the Israeli army was taking over residential buildings, shops and the lives of Palestinian civilians. In the last movement, Israel was focusing on destroying Hamas' tunnels and entering Gaza with a large military deployment of tanks and military to do so.

Blood has been shed from whatever ethnical and religious background, because Hamas has seen a political upside in violence, and because Israel has failed to punish extremist Jewish movements as it does with Islamist terrorism and uses disproportionate defensive action against any Palestinian uprising. A sea of factors that converge in hatred and violence because both sides obstinately and collectively refuse to recognize and legitimate the existence of the other.

Cartoon depicting Belgian King Leopold II (in the middle) at the Berlin Conference of 1884, by engraver F. Maréchal

COMMENTARY / Cameron Buckingham

The highwaters of the controversy about Belgium's colonial past in Africa, that dominated news at some point in 2020, have receded without Belgian grand institutions taking significant steps to redress the bad reputation. Belgian King Leopold II ordered horrible atrocities throughout the African continent but with the heaviest effect on the Democratic Republic of Congo. The genocide of over six million and slave labour of the Congolese people led by the late Belgian king resulted in immense wealth and can be directly linked to the success of Belgium in the modern-day. In the same way, it can be directly linked to the underdevelopment and continued struggle of the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

Currently, there has been an international movement to address the racial problems that plague the modern world. Regardless of the organization or political ideology, it is imperative to acknowledge these problems which stem directly from the unjust colonization, occupation, abuse, and slave trade throughout history. By actively not making any acknowledgment towards this issue, Belgium takes an ignorant stance which not only greatly affects its relations with central African countries, but an international stage speaks to its passive stance on Racism.

In 2019, a working group of experts from the United Nations issued a statement, composed of 74 key points of improvement the country should undertake, to the average with their conclusions of the effects of the colonial past within the country. The Working Group specifically condemned the Belgian government for their lack of engagement with the African minority in their population, as well as their lack of representation in federal institutions and average. The Working Group called on Belgian to improve their education resources so that they accurately portray what truly happened in Africa during colonial and Imperial times. Most importantly they urged Belgium to work on the recognition and social invisibility of people of African Descent, to make a clear and public apology to the African States and adopt a plan of action to confront racism within their country.

Domestic decolonization

Within the country, the biggest reforms and measures to confront racism are taking place in the capital city of Brussels. One of the biggest changes is the Royal Museum for Central Africa: the museum has taken strides to remove elements of colonialism on display. However, the overall paternalistic attitude of the museum strains the relationship between Belgium and central African countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. In light of recent events, A statue of Leopold II has been removed by the Antwerp museum after it was set on fire by protestors. There have been many statues defaced by protestors all over Belgium, all calling for his image to be removed from public space as seen in this article Statue of Leopold II, Belgian King Who Brutalized Congo, Is Removed in Antwerp. Simultaneously the government of Brussels has also made attempts to change the names of public spaces or infrastructure that have ties to colonization Most notably seen in a road tunnel, Belgium seeks new name for road tunnel as it takes on colonial past. Brussels has also launched a project to decolonize public space within the city, this was in direct reaction to the BLM movement. This is the most significant action the Belgian state has taken in an attempt to reshape its public history. From road tunnels to parks, the city is making an effort to change. All of these are very pertinent changes as Brussels is the capital city and hopefully, the rest of the nation follows suit. It is equally important to note the work being carried out by the government institution, Inter-Federal Centre of Equal Opportunities (UNIA), which is a public institution that fights discrimination and works to promote equal opportunities for African descendants in Belgium, has acted tremendously to improve the life of African descendants in Belgium.

Despite these advancements, many flaws must be addressed. The Royal Museum of Central Africa chooses certain displays to take down but maintains that history must be preserved. The problem with this is not the artifacts themselves, rather the information and context that turns their public history into a glorification of colonialism. The same can be said for the textbooks and educational resources propagated by the state. The history told in these state resources surrounding the Congolese genocide and the colonisation of Africa do not accurately portray the events and continues a passive ignorant mindset towards this part of their history. It furthers a paternalistic take on history that paints the Belgian leaders as people who were benevolent and brought civilization; when in reality they were brutal oppressors to native populations who exploited and abused central Africa in the name of wealth. While progress is being made, it is not nearly enough considering the global progress and the scale of impact Belgium's colonisation continues to have domestically and internationally.

African reparations

Countries such as Congo and Burundi still have effects today of the violence and loss from the Congolese genocide over a century ago. Their overall underdevelopment and indicators such as HDI, CPI, and GDP can be directly linked to the causes of Belgian colonization. Burundi has asked for $43 billion in reparations, while the Belgian government has yet to offer anything. Other African countries have sought reparations but Belgium has yet to pay any. This is significant because the lack of response and acknowledgment shown by the Belgian government especially during this racially charged period in time points to a blind spot of ignorance of the state. The farthest they have gone to show any sort of repatriation is by returning the tooth of an important political figure in Congo, this information can be accessed here: Belgium to return tooth of assassinated Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba to family | DW | 10.09.2020. This is dismal because it fails to acknowledge the ongoing effects of their colonists' period which paints horribly for their public history in the diplomatic sphere. The Belgian government has an opportunity to better utilize public history for the good of their image, as well as their growth as a country and relations with others however by not taking actions they are hurting themselves. Not only have the economies of these post-colony countries not been able to fully develop, the success of the Belgium economy that is rooted in colonisation creates a twisted paradox for these countries; Their resources and suffering were exploited by an Imperial power who continues to reap the benefits while they are left impoverished and impacted. In this sense, the exploitation of central Africa by Belgium continues today.

Conclusions and recommendations.

Belgium is missing the opportunity to take advantage of such a racially charged time to condemn their past behaviour, acknowledge their impact on Africa, and offer their support to countries they devastated. Belgium should uplift itself by creating a new public history, one that condemns their past. After 11 weeks of social average observation, the Belgium Ministry of Foreign affairs has not posted any content related to racial awareness or their former African colonies. One of the greatest tools today is social average, instead of only posting the glories of their country they should bring awareness to their past, on the biggest platform possible. However, it is not enough to bring light to this issue on social average. It is important to work with other governments, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, to amend and take necessary actions. Belgium needs to consider economic treaties with central Africa that would not only benefit both countries but make reparations for the African states. The goal of Belgian actions should be not only to acknowledge their colonial past but to actively make reparations and accurately acknowledge their atrocities and the impact they have had on central Africa, as well as the impact it's had on Belgian success as a country.

While Belgium ignores their colonial past, surrounding countries such as the Netherlands condemn and continue to actively work against racial cleavages in society. France, in a similar manner, continues to denounce the actions taken by Napoleon Bonaparte and even uses their history to emphasize their strengths not only in times of racial equality but also during coronavirus. With this in mind, it is time for Belgium to step up and meet or exceed the awareness of their neighbors and take actions to address their history and use it as a tool to improve.

Satellite image of the Canary Islands [NASA].

COMMENTARY / Natalia Reyna Sarmiento

The global pandemic caused by Covid-19 has forced the application of quarantines and other restrictions in all parts of the world and this has greatly limited the movement of people from one country to another. Nevertheless, the migratory phenomenon has continued its course, also in the case of Europe, where the closure of borders during part of 2020 has not prevented illegal immigration, such as from sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, in this time of pandemic, the health misery of poor countries has added another reason for flight from the countries of origin.

The increase in migration in recent decades has been a consequence of various humanitarian challenges. Lack of security, fear of persecution, violence, conflicts and poverty, among other reasons, generate a status of vulnerability that in many cases pushes those who suffer from these circumstances to leave their country in search of better conditions. The emergence of Covid-19 has been another element of vulnerability in societies with scarce medical resources in the last year as well, while the arrival of migrants without knowing whether or not they were carriers of the virus has aggravated social resistance to immigration in developed economies. Both issues went hand in hand especially in the migratory crisis experienced by the Canary Islands throughout 2020, especially in the last few months.

Fourteen years after the "cayuco crisis", the archipelago experienced another B boom in the arrival of immigrants (this time the term that has become generalized for their boats is pateras). In 2020, more than 23,000 immigrants arrived in the Canary Islands, in crossings that at least claimed the lives of nearly 600 people. If in 2019 about a hundred boats with illegal immigrants arrived to the islands, in 2020 there were more than 550, which speaks of a migratory phenomenon multiplied by five.

Why did this increase occur, redirecting to the Canary Islands a flow that at other times has sought the Mediterranean route? On the one hand, the sea crossing to reach Europe still prevails, because in addition to the cost of airfare -prohibitive for many-, flights require documentation that often is not possessed or that facilitates a control by the authorities -departure and arrival- that you want to avoid. On the other hand, the difficulties in points of the Mediterranean route, such as stricter policies in the admission of refugees rescued from the sea imposed by Italy or the war status that Libya lives, where itineraries arrive from Sudan, Nigeria and Chad, for example, derived part of the pressure of the migratory mafias towards the Canary Islands. Morocco's attitude may also have played a role in this.

Spain has an interest in maintaining a good relationship with Morocco for obvious reasons. Its border with Ceuta and Melilla and its proximity to the Canary Islands make it a neighbor that can contribute both to security and to intensifying migratory pressure on Spanish territory. Precisely at a critical moment of the Canary Islands crisis, the Spanish Minister of the Interior, Fernando Grande-Marlaska, went to the neighboring country on November 20 to meet with his Moroccan counterpart, Abdelouafi Laftit, with the intention of requesting financial aid from the Alaouite monarchy to put a stop to the migratory crisis. However, although in the following days a decrease of arrivals of small boats to the Canary Islands was registered, soon the arrivals were increasing again, leaving effectiveness of the visit made by Marlaska.

On the other hand, in those weeks, Pablo Iglesias, vice-president of the Spanish government and University Secretary of Podemos, called on Morocco to hold a referendum on the future of Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony and under Moroccan tutelage admitted by the UN until the holding of enquiry to the Saharawi people. The admission in the same days of Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara by the Trump Administration (in exchange for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Israel) led Rabat to expect a revision of the Spanish position, which is aligned with the UN approach. The ratification of this by Iglesias and above all his tone of demand made the Moroccan monarch, Mohamed VI, decide not to receive the President of the Spanish Government, Pedro Sanchez, on a trip to the neighboring country. Other issues, such as the delimitation of territorial waters made by Morocco in January, expanding its exclusive economic zone, have increased the disagreements between the two countries.

In addition to the normal tension in the Canary Islands due to the arrival of thousands of immigrants in a short period of time, there were also health risks due to the pandemic. Beyond the fears spread by some about the possible entrance of people actually infected with coronavirus, the established protocols required to keep isolated those arriving in small boats, which caused a problem of overcrowding in facilities that were not initially adequate.

The Spanish Red Cross created areas reserved for the isolation of people who tested positive for Covid-19. In addition, temporary macro-camps were set up to rehouse thousands of migrants who were first housed in different hotels. The transfer of groups of them by plane to points of the Peninsula created controversies that the Government had to deal with. The entrance of 2021 has lowered, at least momentarily, the pressure.

▲ Joe Biden and Barack Obama in February 2009, one month after arriving at the White House [Pete Souza].

COMMENTARY / Emili J. Blasco

This article was previously published, in a somewhat abbreviated form, in the newspaper 'Expansión'.

One of the great mistakes revealed by the U.S. presidential elections is to have underestimated the figure of Donald Trump, believing him to be a mere anecdote, and to have disregarded, as whimsical, a large part of his policies. In reality, the Trump phenomenon is a manifestation, if not a consequence, of the current American moment and some of his major decisions, especially in the international arena, have more to do with national imperatives than with fickle occurrences. The latter suggests that there are aspects of foreign policy, manners aside, in which Joe Biden as president may be closer to Trump than to Barack Obama, simply because the world of 2021 is already somewhat different from that of the first half of the previous decade.

First, Biden will have to confront Beijing. Obama started to do so, but the more assertive character of Xi Jinping's China has been accelerating in recent years. In the superpower struggle, especially for dominance in the new technological era, the United States has everything at stake vis-à-vis China. It is true that Biden has referred to the Chinese not as enemies but as competitors, but the trade war was already started by the Administration of which he was Vice-President and now the objective rivalry is greater.

Nor is the withdrawal of the United States the result of Trump's madness. Basically, it has to do, to simplify somewhat, with the energy independence achieved by the Americans: they no longer need oil from the Middle East and they no longer have to be in all the oceans to ensure the free navigation of tankers. The 'America First' was somehow already started by Obama and Biden will not go in the opposite direction. So, for example, no major involvement in European Union affairs and no firm negotiations for a free trade agreement between the two Atlantic markets can be expected.

In the two main achievements of the Obama era -the nuclear agreement with Iran sealed by the United States, the EU and Russia, and the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana- Biden will find it difficult to follow the path then defined. There may be attempts at a new rapprochement with Tehran, but there would be greater coordination against it on the part of Israel and the Sunni world, instances that now converge more. Biden may find that less pressure on the ayatollahs pushes Saudi Arabia toward the atomic bomb.

As for Cuba, the return to dissent will be more in the hands of the Cuban government than in those of Biden himself, who in the electoral loss in Florida has been able to read a rejection of any condescension with Castroism. Some of the new restrictions imposed by Trump on Cuba may be dismantled, but if Havana continues to show no real willingness to change and open up, the White House will no longer have to continue betting on political concessions to credit .

In the case of Venezuela, Biden will probably withdraw a good part of the sanctions, but there is no longer room for a policy of inaction like that of Obama. That Administration did not confront Chavismo for two reasons: because it did not want to bother Cuba given the secret negotiations it was holding with that country to reopen its embassies and because the level of lethality of the regime had not yet become unbearable. Today, international reports on human rights are unanimous on the repression and torture of the Maduro government, and also the arrival of millions of Venezuelan refugees in the different countries of the region make it necessary to take action on the matter. Here it is to be hoped that Biden can act in a less unilateral manner and, without ceasing to exert pressure, seek coordination with the European Union.

It often happens that whoever arrives at the White House takes care of domestic affairs in his first years and later, especially in a second term, focuses on leaving an international bequest . Because of age and health, it is possible that the new tenant will only be in office for a quadrennium. Without Obama's idealism of wanting to "bend the arc of history" -Biden is a pragmatist, a product of the American political establishment- nor Trump's businessman's rush for immediate gain, it is hard to imagine that his Administration will take serious risks on the international scene.

Biden has confirmed his commitment to begin his presidency in January by reversing some of Trump's decisions, notably on climate change and the Paris agreement ; on some tariff fronts, such as the outgoing Administration's unnecessary punishment of European countries; and on various immigration issues, especially concerning Central America.

In any case, even if the Democratic left wants to push Biden to certain margins, believing that they have an ally in Vice President Kamala Harris, the president-elect can assert his staff moderation: the fact that in the elections he obtained better result than the party itself gives him, for the moment, enough internal authority. Otherwise, the Republicans have held their own quite well in the Senate and the House of Representatives, so that Biden arrives at the White House with less support on Capitol Hill than his predecessors. That, in any case, may help to reinforce one of the traits most valued today in the Delaware politician: predictability, something that the economies and foreign ministries of a good part of the world's countries are eagerly awaiting.

COMMENTARY / Rafael Calduch Torres*.

As tradition dictates since 1845, on the first Tuesday of November, the 3rd, the voting inhabitants of the fifty states that make up the United States will take part in the fifty-ninth Election Day, the day on which the high school Electoral, which will have to choose between keeping the forty-fifth President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, or choosing the forty-sixth, Joe Biden.

But the real problem facing not only the inhabitants of the United States, but the rest of the world's population is that both Trump and Biden are proposing their international strategy at core topic domestically, following in the wake of the change that took place in the country after the 9/11 attacks and whose fundamental result has been the absence of effective leadership of the American superpower in the last twenty years. Because if there is one thing that must be clear to us, it is the fact that none of the candidates, as their predecessors did not, has a plan that would allow them to resume the international leadership that the United States enjoyed until the end of the 1990s; On the contrary, what urges them is to solve domestic problems and subordinate international issues, which a superpower of the stature of the United States must face, to the solutions adopted internally, which is one of the serious strategic errors of our era, since strong international leaderships that are coherent with the management of domestic problems have historically allowed the creation of points of meeting in American society that cushion divisions and bring cohesion to the country.

However, despite these general similarities there is a clear difference between the two candidates when it comes to addressing international issues that will affect the results of the choice Americans will make on Tuesday.

"The Power of America's example". With this slogan, Biden's general proposal , much clearer and more accessible than Trump's, develops a plan to lead the democratic world in the 21st century based on using the way in which American domestic problems will be solved as an example, binding and sustaining its international leadership; it goes without saying that the mere assumption that the internal problems of the United States are not exactly extrapolable to the rest of the international actors is not even taken into account.

Thus, the Democratic candidate , using a rather traditional rhetoric on the dignity of leadership, uses the connection between domestic and international reality to propose a program of national regeneration without specifying how this will restore the lost international leadership. This approach will be based on two main pillars: the democratic regeneration of the country and the reconstruction of the US class average which, in turn, will make it possible to underpin other international projects.

Democratic regeneration will be based on the reinforcement of the educational and judicial systems, transparency, the fight against corruption or the end of attacks on the media, and is proposed as an instrument for the reestablishment of the country's moral leadership which, in addition to inspiring others, would serve for the US to transfer these US national policies to the international arena, so that others may follow and imitate them through a sort of global league for democracy that seems very nebulous.

Meanwhile, the reconstruction of the class average , the same to which Trump appealed four years ago, would pass through greater investment in technological innovation and supposedly greater global equity with respect to international trade, from which the United States would benefit above all.

Finally, all of the above would be complemented by a new era in international arms control through a new START treaty between the US and Russia, US leadership in the fight against climate change, an end to interventions on foreign soil, particularly in Afghanistan, and the reestablishment of diplomacy as the backbone of US foreign policy.

"Promises Made, Promises Kept!What is Trump's alternative? The current President does not reveal what his projects are, but he does propose a review of his "achievements" which, we understand, will give us an idea of what his foreign policy will be, which will revolve around the continuity of the US trade rebalancing based, as up to now, on shielding US companies from foreign investment, the imposition of new tariffs, the fight against fraudulent trade practices, especially by China, and the restoration of US relations with its allies in Asia/Pacific, the Middle East and Europe, but without specific proposals.

With regard to the area of security, treated in a differentiated manner by Trump, the recipe is the increase in defense spending, the shielding of US territory against terrorism and opposition to North Korea, Venezuela and Iran, which will be joined by the maintenance and expansion of the recent campaign of actions directed specifically against Russia, with the goal declared to contain it in Ukraine and to prevent cyber-attacks.

But the reality is that both candidates will have to face global challenges that they have not considered in their programs and that will condition them decisively in their mandates, starting with the management of the pandemic and its economic effects on a global scale and including the growing competition from the European Union, especially as its common military and defense capabilities develop.

As we have just seen, none of the candidates will offer new solutions and therefore the situation is not likely to improve, at least in the short term.

* PhD in Contemporary History. graduate in Political Science and Administration. Professor at UNAV and UCJC.

COMMENTARY / Juan Luis López Aranguren

If traditional diplomacy is understood as the relations exercised between official representatives of States, in recent years a new concept of diplomacy has gained popularity and has become increasingly important in relations between nations: cultural diplomacy. Assuming that culture is the vehicle through which nations communicate with each other, cultural diplomacy is the exchange of culture, ideas and information that nations around the world engage in to achieve mutual understanding that will advance the construction of a more just and stable world. In this area, the celebration of the Olympic Games is one of the most important cultural diplomacy events that a nation can achieve to project and share its culture and identity with the rest of the world. In this regard, Japan reaffirmed its position as a global benchmark for this diplomacy with its public appearance at the closing ceremony of the 2016 Rio Olympics. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appeared in the guise of the world-famous character Mario to pick up the baton for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. Japan thus used an icon of Japanese pop culture to project its cultural identity to the entire planet. 

In this dimension of soft power or cultural diplomacy, the Olympic Games are the greatest exponent of it. Already in its origin, in the year 776 B.C., the Olympic Games were revealed as a diplomatic tool of extraordinary strength by forcing a sacred truce between the different city-states that participated in them. Therefore, from its very origin it was possible to achieve international political objectives by employing this cultural tool . This measure was observed to the point that if any city-state violated this truce, its athletes were expelled from the competition.

This same demonstration has been repeated in more recent times, demonstrating that the Olympics have been a diplomatic battleground throughout history. In 1980 the USA and 65 other countries boycotted the Moscow Olympics in protest against the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan. In retaliation, the USSR and 13 other states boycotted the next Olympics in 1984 in Los Angeles.

The upcoming Tokyo 2021 Olympic Games (delayed one year due to the pandemic) do not carry any controversy from this subject. Instead they have been conceived as a historic opportunity to reinvent the country domestically and globally in the wake of the Fukushima (or Great East Japan Earthquake) catastrophe. C To this end, an official project graduate Tokyo 2020 Action & Legacy Plan 2016 has been launched, which aims to achieve three objectives: first, to maximize the connection of Japanese citizens and groups with the Tokyo Olympics. Secondly, to maximize cultural projection both nationally and globally. Thirdly and finally, to ensure a valuable bequest to future generations, as it was on the occasion of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics.

These three objectives set by the Japanese government will be expressed in five dimensional pillars on which action will be taken. These five pillars are articulated like Olympic rings, intertwining with each other and strengthening the domestic and international impact of the Olympic Games. These dimensions are, starting with the most immediate to the purely sporting aspect itself, the promotion of sport and health. The second, connecting with culture and Education. The third, also of great importance for its potential to reform Tokyo in particular and Japan in general, is urban planning and sustainability. Not surprisingly, the Japanese government and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government have made great efforts to build ambitious infrastructures to accommodate these Olympics, to the point of relocating the famous and iconic Tsukiji fish market that has been a symbol of the city since 1935. Fourth, the Olympics will be used to revive Economics and technological innovation, just as the 1964 Tokyo Olympics did when it showcased the first Shinkansen or bullet trains that have become one of Japan's technological icons. Finally, fifthly, Japan saw the Olympic Games as an opportunity to overcome the crisis and trauma caused by the Fukushima disaster (a catastrophe that in Japan is referred to as the Great East Japan Earthquake).

In addition to these five objectives, ranging from the more specific to the more general, a sixth goal or unofficial dimension will be added in 2020: to project Japan's recovery from the COVID pandemic domestically and internationally. In this sense, the Olympic Games will not only be a symbol of overcoming a particular Japanese disaster, but may allow the Japanese country to position itself as a model in the management against the pandemic and in the promotion of economic recovery.

▲ VCR 8x8 Program [framework Romero/MDE].

COMMENTARY / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

After a gap of eight years since the publication of the last one in 2012, last June 11, the President of the Government signed a new National Defense Directive (DDN), marking with it the beginning of a new Defense Planning cycle which, of agreement with what is established by Defense Order 60/2015, must be valid for six years.

The essay of the DDN 20 is a praiseworthy effort to bring National Defense up to date in order to adapt to the challenges of a complex strategic environment in continuous transformation. Its essay also offers an excellent opportunity to build along the way an intellectual community on such a relevant issue, which will be fundamental throughout the whole cycle.

This article addresses a preliminary analysis of DDN 20 focusing on its most relevant aspects. In a first approximation, the official document follows the line, already enshrined in other Directives, of subsuming the essentially military concept of Defense within the broader concept of Security, which affects all the capabilities of the State. In this sense, the first difficulty that the DDN 20 has had to overcome is precisely the lack of a statutory document similar to the DDN, drafted at the level of National Security, to illuminate and guide it. To tell the truth, the void has not been total, since as stated by the DDN 20 in its introduction there is a National Security Strategy (ESN) which, although published in 2017, has served as reference letter in its elaboration, despite the evident lack of consistency seen between the strategic scenarios described in both documents.

In this regard, it is worth noting the lack of specificity with which the new DDN defines the strategic scenario, in comparison with the somewhat greater specificity of the ESN. The DDN 20 draws a vague, almost generic scenario, applicable almost unchanged to any nation in the world, without reference to specific geographical areas; an accumulation of threats and risks to security with an impact on defense, none of which appears to be more likely or more dangerous, and to which is added the recognition of changes in the international order that once again bring the possibility of major armed conflicts closer.

Such an approach makes it difficult to subsequently define defense objectives and guidelines for action and, perhaps for this reason, certain inconsistencies can be observed among the three parts of the document. It is striking that, although the document raises certificate, somewhat hastily, the possibility of the emergence of COVID-19, the possibility of a pandemic not being triggered is not considered in the description of the strategic scenario, something that, on the other hand, is included in ESN 17.

Along with the description of this scenario, the DDN 20 is interspersed with a set of considerations of a programmatic nature, in themselves positive and relevant, but which have little to do with what is to be expected in a document of this nature, designed to guide the planning of National Defense. In some cases, such as the promotion of the gender perspective, or the improvement of the quality of life of staff in its dimensions of improving living facilities, reconciliation of professional and family life, and reintegration into civilian life once the link with the Armed Forces has ended, the considerations are more typical of the Policy of staff of department than of a DDN. In others, such as the obligation to respect local cultures in military operations, they seem more subject typical of the Royal Ordinances or another subject code of ethics.

Undoubtedly motivated by the COVID-19 emergency, and in view of the role that the Armed Forces have assumed during it, the DDN emphasizes the importance of partnership missions with and support to civilian authorities, something, moreover, consubstantial to the Armed Forces, and establishes the specific goal of acquiring capabilities that allow the partnership and support to such authorities in crisis and emergency situations.

The management of the pandemic may have highlighted gaps in response capabilities, shortcomings in coordination tools, etc., thus opening a window of opportunity to make progress in this area and produce a more effective response in the future. However, it is advisable to guard against the possibility, open in this DDN, of losing sight of the central tasks of the Armed Forces, to prevent an excessive focus on missions in support of the civilian population from ending up distorting their organization, manning and training, thereby impairing the deterrence capacity of the armies and their combat operability.

The DDN also contains the usual reference letter, which is obligatory and necessary, to promote a true Defense Culture among Spaniards. The accredited specialization is justified by the role that the Ministry of Defense should play in this effort. However, it is not the sphere of Defense that should be reminded of the importance of this issue. The impact of any effort to promote the Culture of Defense will be limited if it is not assumed as its own by other ministerial Departments , as well as by all the administrations of the State, being also aware that it is not possible to generate a Culture of Defense without a prior consensus at national level on such essential issues as the objectives or values shared by all. It is, perhaps, on this aspect that the emphasis should be placed.

Perhaps the most controversial point of the DDN 20 is that of financing. Achieving the objectives set out in the document requires a sustained financial investment over time that breaks the current ceiling of expense in defense. Maintain the Armed Forces in the technological elite, substantially improve the quality of life of the professional staff -which starts by providing them with the equipment that best guarantees their survival and superiority on the battlefield-, strengthen the capacity to support civilian authorities in emergency situations, strengthening intelligence and cyberspace action capabilities, or meeting with guarantees the operational obligations derived from our active participation in international organizations, for which, moreover, a commitment has been made to strengthen them by up to 50% for a period of one year, is as necessary as it is costly.

The final paragraph of DDN 20 recognizes this when it states that the development of the document's guidelines will require the necessary funding. This statement, however, is little more than a recognition of the obvious, and is not accompanied by any commitment or guarantee of funding. Taking into account the important commitments already subscribed by the Ministry with the pending Special Armament Programs, and in view of the economic-financial panorama that is on the horizon due to the effects of COVID-19, which has led the JEME to announce to the Army the arrival of a period of austerity, and which would deserve to be included among the main threats to national security, it seems difficult that the objectives of the DDN 20 can be covered in the terms that it proposes. This is the real Achilles' heel of the document, which may turn it into little more than a dead letter.

In conclusion, the issuance of a new DDN is to be welcomed as an effort to update the National Defense policy, even in the absence of a similar instrument that periodically articulates the level of the Security Policy, in which the Defense Policy should be subsumed.

The emergence of COVID-19 seems to have overtaken the document, causing it to lose some of its validity and calling into question not only the will, but also the real capacity to achieve the ambitious objectives it proposes. At least there is a chance that the document may act, even in a limited way, as a sort of shield to protect the defense sector against the scenario of scarce resources that Spain will undoubtedly experience in the coming years.

▲ Rice field terraces in Vietnam [Pixabay].

COMMENT / Eduardo Arbizu

The combination of a market Economics and an authoritarian regime dominated by the Communist Party of Vietnam (VCP) has led Vietnam, a country of more than 90 million people, to become a key player in the future of Southeast Asia.

The current Vietnam is the consequence of a confusing and contradictory process of change that has transformed not only the country's Economics , but has also had a profound impact on social life, urban configuration, environment, domestic and foreign policies and whose final effects will be seen in the long term.

An impressive economic turnaround

The transformation of the economic model in Vietnam derives formally from the decision adopted at the sixth VCP congress in December 1986 to open the country to the market Economics , but its roots are to be found earlier, in the economic crisis that followed the war, in the collapse of agricultural production that the radical implementation of a communist model provoked in 1979. This debacle forced to allow private trade of any surplus production that exceeded the targets set by the State for public enterprises or public lands. This sort of state capitalism paved the way for the liberalization that followed the death of the Stalinist leader, Le Duan, in 1986. The approval of the do-moi or renovation policy meant the withdrawal of planning and the option for the free market. It was not an ideological decision but an instrumental one. work If the CP wanted to maintain control of the country it needed to generate one million jobs per year, guarantee food for 90 million inhabitants and reduce poverty.

It has been an economic and social success: per capita income has increased dramatically and the population below the poverty line has been reduced from 60% to 20%. The US embargo ended in 1993 and in 1997 the two countries signed a new trade agreement . In 2007, Vietnam was admitted to the WTO. In this context of openness, more than 150,000 new enterprises were created under the new enterprise law and large international companies such as Clarks, Canon, Samsung and Intel set up production sites in Vietnam.

The achievements of the process, however, should not hide its weaknesses: a state-controlled Economics through joint ventures and state-owned companies, a fragile rule of law, massive corruption, a network of families loyal to the PCV that accumulate wealth and own most of the private businesses, growing inequality and a profound ecological deterioration.

Agriculture has evolved from the sudden drop in production that followed communist collectivization to the current status where Vietnam is the second largest exporter of rice in the world, a crop that accounts for 20% of its exports. The industrialization of the Economics has meant that agriculture, which was 40% of GDP, is now only 20%. Life continues to depend on rice cultivation, still the main source of income for rural households, where half of the population lives. source . Rice exports are managed by a combination of free market and corrupt officialdom, with the negative consequences experienced in the speculative crisis of 2008. There has been an intense migration from the countryside to the big cities where wages are five times higher. The pressure in search of wealth is converting agricultural land into residential or industrial plots. Every year, 10,000 new hectares are requalified. The transformation of the rural world is pushing away the old Structures that provided security, meaning and purpose and it remains to be seen how it affects future stability.

Social and environmental change

The construction of proletarian cities after the war, under the communist housing program, has not prevented overpopulation or the continuation of communal life. Migrants continue to arrive in search of work, money and protection. Tons of industrial waste remains untreated; the rivers around Ho Chi Min City are biologically dead and pollution in Hanoi is well above internationally accepted levels. Problems such as prostitution, with more than 1% of women working in illicit sex trafficking, or abandoned children on the streets are a reality. However, while doubling or tripling its urban population, Vietnam has managed these problems better than its neighboring countries, avoiding to a greater extent the ghost cities and their problems of crime, extreme poverty and drug addiction so common in the rest of Asia.

Commercial and urban dynamism is reflected in thousands of illegal street food businesses and small enterprises, pioneers of small-scale capitalism, which today constitute a tourist symbol of Vietnam. In cities full of young people who identify freedom with a polluting motorcycle, youth rebels against years of communist austerity but not against family traditions.

Vietnam is a country where a natural wonder like Ha Long Bay, one of the country's iconic images, is simultaneously a tourist attraction and an environmental disaster. It is also one of the areas most exposed to the effects of climate change, due to its low altitude and reliance on agricultural production in the Mekong Delta and tourism. Respect for wildlife and the environment are issues of high priority leave for the authorities.

PCV remains in control

There are issues that have not changed with the same intensity. Vietnam still lives under a "natural system of control", the deep surveillance system put in place by the communist regime to control the values and behavior of its people. A system in which one out of six Vietnamese ended up working in the security forces and which resulted in a control of the "cultivated families", those who behave in accordance with the values set by the party, agreement . Although it has proven its effectiveness in crises such as the avian flu and now partly in the Covid-19 crisis, the system is now controversial due to the spread of the Internet and social networks and radical social changes that demand more freedom. Despite this control, corruption is widespread and is damaging the country's future.

The VCP is still in power. Maintaining its Leninist roots, it is now an elitist and intelligent organization in search of its own survival. A new mandarinate that has evolved from a centralized power present in all aspects of public and social life to a fragile and partial control; from a "negligible legal system", where decisions were taken directly by the VCP and their compliance with the law was irrelevant, to a "State based on the Law", where the rules are the tool to supervise entrepreneurs and investors, allowing them to create wealth and employment but simultaneously comply with the expectations of the VCP. Similarly the party controls the legislature, the courts and indirectly the press, media and news coverage, which prevents Vietnam from being considered a truly free country.

Life has been difficult and lonely for those few who tried to oppose the regime and promote a real democracy. The name of the Catholic priest Father Ly and his followers, brutally repressed, tried and convicted in March 2007, once the country was admitted to the WTO, overshadows the hope for a transition to effective political freedom.

Foreign policy and future

Vietnamese foreign policy seeks to strike a balance in its relations with two major players: the United States and China, counterbalanced by a set of alliances with third countries. Overcoming war wounds and establishing trusting cooperation on subject security is the goal of the policy of rapprochement with the United States, which is already a significant investor in the country. The special relationship with China, the largest importer of Vietnamese products, an industrial giant and the largest army in Asia, is the other axis of its policy despite old territorial conflicts.

The overexploited environment, inequality, the entrenchment of the elites and, above all, uncertainty about the evolution of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the political system are aspects that are weighing on the outlook. However, a young and well-educated population, as well as the inflow of foreign investment, are reasons for optimism about further liberalization of the country, including political liberalization.

▲ Minneapolis street crossing where George Floyd was stopped by local police [Fibonacci Blue].

COMMENTARY / Salvador Sánchez Tapia [Brigadier General (Res.)].

In a controversial public statement made on June 2, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to deploy Armed Forces units to contain the riots sparked by the death of African-American George Floyd at the hands of a police officer in Minnesota, and to maintain public order if they escalate in the level of violence.

Regardless of the seriousness of the event, and beyond the fact that the incident has been politicized and is being employee as a platform of expression of rejection of Trump's presidency, the possibility pointed out by the president poses an almost unprecedented challenge to civil-military relations in the United States.

For reasons rooted in its pre-independence past, the United States maintains a certain caution against the possibility that the Armed Forces can be employed domestically against citizens by whoever holds power. For this reason, when the Founding Fathers wrote the Constitution, while authorizing the congress to organize and maintain armies, they explicitly limited their funding to a maximum of two years.

Against this background, and against the backdrop of the tension between the Federation and the states, U.S. legislation has tried to limit the employment of the Armed Forces in domestic tasks. Thus, since 1878, the Posse Comitatus limits the possibility of employing them in the fulfillment of missions for the maintenance of public order, which it is the responsibility of the states to carry out with their means, including the National Guard.

One of the exceptions to this rule is the Insurrection Act of 1807, invoked precisely by President Trump as an argument in favor of the legality of an eventual decision of employment. This, despite the fact that this law has a restrictive spirit, since it requires the cooperation of the states in its application, and because it is designed for extreme cases in which the states are unable or unwilling to maintain order, circumstances that do not seem applicable to the case at hand.

The controversial nature of advertisement is attested to by the fact that voices as authoritative and so little inclined to publicly break its neutrality as that of Lieutenant General (ret.) James Mattis, Secretary of Defense of the Trump Administration until his premature relief in December 2018, or that of Lieutenant General (ret.) Ma rtin Dempsey, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 2011 and 2015, have spoken out against this , joining in this way the statements made by former presidents as disparate as those of former presidents as disparate as the former President of the United States. ) Martin Dempsey, head of the board of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 2011 and 2015, have spoken out against this employment, thus joining the statements made by former presidents as disparate as George W. Bush or Barak Obama, or those of the Secretary of Defense himself, Mark Esper, whose position against the possibility of using the Armed Forces in this status has recently become clear.

The presidential advertisement has opened a crisis in the usually stable American civil-military relations (CMR). Transcending the scope of the United States, the deep-rooted question, which affects the core of CMR in a democratic state, is none other than the convenience or not of using the Armed Forces in public order or, in a broader sense, domestic tasks, and the risks associated with such a decision.

In the 1990s, Michael C. Desch, one of the leading authorities in the field of CMR, identified the correlation between the missions entrusted to the Armed Forces by a state and the quality of its civil-military relations, concluding that externally oriented military missions are the most conducive to healthy CMRs, while internal missions that are not purely military are likely to generate various pathologies in such relations.

In general, the existence of the Armed Forces in any state is primarily due to the need to protect it against any threat from outside. In order to carry out such a high task with guarantees, armies are equipped and trained for the lethal employment use of force, unlike police forces, which are equipped for a minimal and gradual use of force, which only becomes lethal in the most extreme, exceptional cases. In the first case, it is a matter of confronting an armed enemy that is trying to destroy one's own forces. In the second, force is used to confront citizens who may, in some cases, use violence, but who remain, after all, compatriots.

When military forces are employed in tasks of this nature, there is always a risk that they will produce a response in accordance with their training, which may be excessive in a law and order scenario. The consequences, in such a case, can be very negative. In the worst case, and above all other considerations, the employment may result in a perhaps avoidable loss of life. Moreover, from the point of view of the CMR, the soldiers that the nation submission for its external defense could become, in the eyes of the citizenry, the enemies of those they are supposed to defend.

The damage this can produce for civil-military relations, for national defense and for the quality of a state's democracy is difficult to measure, but it can be intuited if one considers that, in a democratic system, the Armed Forces cannot live without the support of their fellow citizens, who see them as a beneficial force for the nation and to whose members they extend their recognition as its loyal and disinterested servants.

The abuse of employment of the Armed Forces in domestic tasks may, in addition, deteriorate their already complex preparation, weakening them for the execution of the missions for which they were conceived. It may also end up conditioning their organization and equipment to the detriment, once again, of their essential tasks.

On the other hand, and although today we are far away and safe from such a scenario, this employment may gradually lead to a progressive expansion of the Armed Forces' tasks, which would extend their control over purely civilian activities, and which would see their range of tasks increasingly broadened, displacing other agencies in their execution, which could, undesirably, atrophy.

In such a scenario, the military institution could cease to be perceived as a disinterested actor and come to be seen as another competitor with particular interests, and with a control capacity that it could use for its own benefit, even if this were opposed to the nation's interest. Such a status, in time, would lead hand in hand to the politicization of the Armed Forces, from which would follow another damage to the CMR that would be difficult to quantify.

Decisions such as the one targeted by President Trump may ultimately place members of the Armed Forces in the grave moral dilemma of using force against their fellow citizens, or disobeying the President's orders. Because of its gravity, therefore, the decision to commit the Armed Forces to such tasks should be made on an exceptional basis and after careful consideration.

It is difficult to determine whether the advertisement made by President Trump was just a product of his temperament or whether, on the contrary, it contained a real intention to use the Armed Forces in the disturbances that dot the country, in a decision that has not occurred since 1992. In any case, the president, and those advising him, must assess the damage that can be inferred from it for civil-military relations and, therefore, for the American democratic system. This without forgetting, moreover, the responsibility that falls on America's shoulders in the face of the reality that a part of humanity looks at the country as a reference letter and model to imitate.