The deteriorating status of the small Mediterranean country benefits Hezbollah and its patron saint, Iran.

With four different prime ministers so far this year, it is difficult to escape the vicious circle in which Lebanon finds itself, so that the continuity of the current political system and the severe financial crisis seem inevitable. This perpetuation gives rise to a number of possibilities, almost all of them bleak, for the Lebanese future. Here are some of these scenarios.

▲ State of the port of Beirut after the explosion on August 4, 2020 [Mehr News Agency/Wikipedia].

article / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

To say that the Lebanese political system is dysfunctional is nothing new. Based on a sectarian balance of power established in 1989 after a long civil war, it perpetuates the existence of clientelistic networks, encourages corruption, hampers the country's economic development and hinders the creation of a cross-cutting Lebanese national identity that transcends religious denominations.

For some time now, Lebanon has been immersed in an economic and social crisis of such magnitude that it has led many analysts to wonder whether we are facing a new case of a failed state. In October 2019, the country was rocked by a wave of demonstrations that the government itself considered unprecedented, unleashed by the advertisement the Executive to address the severe economic crisis with several unpopular measures including taxing the use of the popular Whatsapp application. The protests, initially focused on this issue, soon incorporated complaints against rampant corruption, the uncontrolled increase in the cost of living, or the lack of employment and opportunities in the country.

This popular pressure forced the resignation of the unity government led by Saad Hariri at the end of the same month. The government was replaced in January 2020 by a more technical government led profile former Education Minister Hassan Diab. The new government had little room for maneuver to introduce reforms before the coronavirus pandemic was declared, and soon found itself beset by the same street pressure that had toppled the previous government, with demonstrations continuing despite the restrictions imposed by the pandemic.

The devastating explosion in early August 2020 in the port of Beirut only further plunged the country into the downward spiral into which it was already plunged. Despite the voices that tried to see the hand of Israel or Hezbollah behind the catastrophe that took the lives of 163 people, the Lebanese population soon sensed that this was but the logical consequence of years of corruption, bureaucratic sloppiness and withdrawal the national infrastructure. Again there was a crescendo of popular indignation; again the government was forced to resign at a plenary session of the Executive Council.

With the echoes of the explosion still alive, at the end of August, Mustafa Adib, former Lebanese ambassador to Germany, was entrusted by President Aoun with the task of forming a government. Unable to complete such an arduous task, among other reasons because of Hezbollah's insistence on controlling the Ministry of Finance, Adib resigned on September 26, leaving the country on the brink of the precipice in which it still finds itself.

It is difficult to make predictions about Lebanon's future, beyond predicting that it looks bleak, as a complex dynamic of internal and external forces is gripping the country. Despite the pressure, at least from the urbanized and cosmopolitan Beirut, to put an end to it, it is enormously complex to untangle the dense skein of clientelistic networks that have controlled the country since its independence, not only because of the benefits it has generated for a small group of privileged people, but also because many fear the alternatives to a model that, with all its flaws, has avoided a reproduction of the savage civil war that took place between 1975 and 1990.

Its geographical status makes it difficult for Lebanon to escape the general climate of instability prevailing in the Middle East and the influence exerted on the country by regional and international actors such as Israel, Iran, Syria and France, especially if one considers that the problems of the Levantine state are so deep and its national leadership so weak that it does not seem to be able to overcome them on its own.

The drama of Lebanon is that its own sectarian division makes it difficult for nations to emerge that are willing to donate with cross-cutting criteria to help bridge the gap that divides the country internally, and that the financial aid it may receive from actors such as Iran or Saudi Arabia only reinforces it. The efforts of French President Emmanuel Macron, self-appointed as the driving force behind Lebanese reconstruction, do not seem, for the moment, to be gaining momentum. At the donors' lecture he convened on July 9 with fifteen heads of state, he obtained contributions worth $250 million to revitalize the moribund Lebanese Economics . Meanwhile, the mayor of Beirut estimates the reconstruction costs of the August explosion in the capital's port at between 3 and 5 billion dollars.

As a mirror image of this difficulty, Lebanese communities, comfortably ensconced in the status quo, reject financial aid, no doubt necessary, if they feel it could be detrimental to their respective power instructions . Hezbollah, for example, does not accept IMF programs, complicating the achievement of the necessary national consensus that would facilitate IMF support. It is difficult to escape from this vicious circle, so that the continuation of the current political system, and with it the continuation of the serious Lebanese financial crisis, seems inevitable. From this perpetuation result some possibilities, almost all of them bleak, for the Lebanese future. The first is that Lebanon will continue to slide down the inclined plane that is turning it into a failed state, and that this condition will eventually lead to a civil war precipitated by events similar to those that occurred during the Arab Spring in other states in the region. This eventuality would resurrect the ghosts of the past, produce regional instability that would be difficult to measure but which would undoubtedly provoke the intervention of regional and international actors, and could end up dismembering the country, a result that would only sow the seeds of further instability throughout the region.

Without going to that extreme, the internal disorder could break the precarious balance of power on which Lebanese political life is based, to the benefit of one of its sectarian groups. Hezbollah, the undisputed leader of the country's Shiite faction, appears here as the most organized and strongest group within the country and, therefore, as the one that stands to gain the most from this breakdown. It should be noted that, in addition to the support of the entire 27 internship of Lebanese Shiites, the militia-organization is viewed favorably by many members of the divided Christian community - some 45 percent of the country's population - who put their desire for internal Security Service in the country before other considerations. Aware of this, the leader of Hezbollah, Hasan Nasrallah, sample moderate in his proposals, seeing in the Sunni community, supported by Saudi Arabia, his real rival, and trying to broaden his power base.

Iran would undoubtedly be the real winner in this scenario, since it does not seem realistic to think of a Hezbollah that, once it has come of age, would have a life of its own outside the regime of the ayatollahs. Tehran would complete, with this new piece, the Shiite arc that connects Iran with Iraq and, through Syria, with the Eastern Mediterranean. The destabilizing effects of such a status, however, cannot be underestimated if one takes into account that the mere possibility of the Islamic Republic of Iran gaining absolute control of Lebanon constitutes a casus belli for Israel.

On a positive grade , the serious crisis the country is going through and the strong popular pressure, at least in urban areas, may be, paradoxically, a spur to overcome the sectarian system that has contributed so much to generate this status. However, such a transition only has a chance of advancing - no matter how tenuous - with strong external wholesale support.

In this scenario, the role of the international community should not be limited to the contribution of economic resources to prevent the collapse of the country. Its involvement must favor the development and support of civic-political movements with an intersecting base that are capable of replacing those who perpetuate the current system. To this end, in turn, it is imperative that the contributing nations lend their financial aid in a high-minded manner, renouncing any attempt to shape a Lebanon to suit their respective national interests, and forcing the elites controlling the factions to abdicate the status quo in favor of a true Lebanese identity. The obvious question is: is there any real chance of this happening? The reality, unfortunately, does not allow for high hopes.