Do the US Marines have the strength to help defend Europe?

Do the U.S. Marines have the strength to help defend Europe?

DEFENSE

October 27, 2026

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Analyzing the forces under the command of the Marine Corps Europe and Africa and their ability to fulfill their defense commitments

In the image

Demonstration of capabilities by the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe & Africa [US MARFOR]

On August 24, the United States deployed U.S. Marines to the island of Jan Mayen in Norway to conduct Operation Atlantic City, as part of NATO’s Exercise Nordic Response. The exercise, which has also seen British Royal Marines deployed to Norway alongside their American counterparts, is part of efforts to deter Russian military actions in Northern Europe. The U.S. Marine Corps forces involved in Nordic Response operate under the command of the United States Marine Forces Europe and Africa (MARFOREUR/AF), one of the multiple command elements of U.S. forces in Europe.

Compared to other branches of the U.S. military in Europe, the Marine Corps is rarely associated with operations on the continent, with its most celebrated action there being the 1918 Battle of Belleau Wood during World War I, which earned the Marines the nickname “Devil Dogs.” Today, the Marine Corps is frequently overshadowed in Europe by other U.S. military branches, particularly the U. S. Air Force, which operates several combat units such as the 48th Fighter Wing at RAF Lakenheath and the 31st Fighter Wing in Aviano.

This article aims to analyze the current strength of U.S. Marine Corps forces deployed in Europe, the security challenges facing NATO in Europe and Africa, and what the Marine Corps may need to address emerging security challenges. The article will conclude with recommendations for NATO and U.S. political and military leaders on this matter.

MARFOREUR/AF

The United States Marine Forces Europe and Africa (MARFOREUR/AF) is the command element responsible for all United States Marine Corps (USMC) units operating in the areas of responsibility of U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Headquartered at the Panzer Kaserne barracks in Stuttgart, Germany, the current organization was established in 1980 following the decision that U.S. Navy and Marine Corps units in Europe and Africa would share responsibilities for the two regions.

The current strength of MARFOREUR/AF is approximately 1,500 active-duty troops in Germany, who perform administrative and command duties, while U.S. Marine Corps combat units undertake temporary deployments throughout Europe rather than remaining permanently stationed there, unlike the U.S. Army or Air Force, which maintain combat units permanently deployed in Europe, such as the 173rd Airborne Brigade based in Italy.

U.S. Marine units stationed in Europe and Africa carry out a variety of missions, ranging from providing training and assistance to their counterparts in Africa to joint exercises with NATO and African partners, such as Exercise African Lion. Marines are also engaged in deterrence missions, particularly in Europe.

The Marine units rotating through the region fall under the command of one of the three Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) assigned to the U.S. East Coast, which reports to the II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). These are the 22nd, 24th, and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units. The average strength of an MEU consists of a battalion of U.S. Marine infantrymen and a helicopter unit comprising attack and transport helicopter squadrons equipped with the Bell AH-1Z “Viper” and the Bell-Boeing V-22 “Osprey,” respectively. If necessary, MEUs can also carry fixed-wing aircraft from a Marine Fighter Squadron (VMFA) operating the F-35 “Lightning” II.

Rather than being permanent combat units, MEUs are composed of standing Marine battalions that are rotated from their “parent” Marine regiments for a period of six to nine months before returning to their parent unit, at which point another MEU—and thus another Marine battalion—takes their place. The entire cycle —from preparation, training, and certification to deployment—can take months, as battalions undergo training for the duties they will perform as part of an MEU.

The few Marines permanently deployed in Europe serve as the headquarters element for MARFOREU/AF, which includes the Marine Rotational Force-Europe (MRF-E), responsible for overseeing U.S. Marine winter and mountain warfaretraining with NATO allies. The MRF-E is forward-deployed to carry out the duties mentioned above. The MRF-E is organized as a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SP-MAGTF), which serves as the U.S.’s emergency response force, ready to deploy on short notice in times of crisis. Its duties include the evacuation of non-combatants and reinforcing U.S. embassies. MAGTFs consist of infantry, armored vehicles, artillery, and an air component, as well as logistical and command elements. Like the MEUs, the SP-MAGTF does not have any permanent units deployed to Europe; instead, MEUs deployed to Europe are assigned to it and operate under the same rotation system. The SP-MAGTF does have logistical personnel deployed in Europe, operating out of Morón Air Base in Spain, with additional facilities at Naval Air Station Sigonella in Italy.

If the need arises—such as in the event of war—MARFOREU/AR can call upon the aforementioned II Marine Expeditionary Force, located on the East Coast of the United States. Among the units under the II MEF’s command is the 2nd Marine Division, located at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, which serves as the main ground and amphibious combat element. Also under the command of the II MEF is the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (2nd MAW), which serves as the Corps’ air combat element. The MAW includes multiple Marine Aircraft Groups, which operate a variety of aircraft , including the V-22 “Osprey, ” Bell AH-1Z “Viper, ” CH-53E “Super Stallion,”Lockheed F-35 “Lightning” II , and Lockheed KC-130J “Super Hercules.”

Threats and Challenges

The U.S. forces deployed to Europe not only support EUCOM operations and missions, but also those of CENTCOM and AFRICOM; therefore, we will analyze security challenges in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East accordingly. As of August 2026, the United States and NATO face challenges in three areas that directly affect the U.S. forces deployed in Europe.

The first challenge is Russia. Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, tensions between NATO and Moscow have escalated, with analysts and Western leaders fearing that Russian forces could launch an attack on the Baltic states or Poland to test NATO’s resolve. Threats of hybrid warfare from Russia and Belarus have increased—ranging from cyberattacks to the weaponization of migration and disinformation campaigns—and Moscow has stepped up its efforts to sow discord within the Alliance.

The second challenge is Africa, which is grappling with Islamist insurgencies in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. In addition to this, there are also health emergencies such as the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On top of these threats, there is also the issue of failed states in Africa, such as Somalia. Furthermore, migration flows from Africa have become a security challenge for Europe, as evidenced by the August 2026 surge of migrants into the Spanish autonomous city of Ceuta. Adding to this is the presence of Russia, which has deployed mercenaries from its Africa Corps (formerly known as the Wagner Group) to Mali to assist the country’s military regime in dealing with the insurgency following the French withdrawal in 2022.

The third challenge is the Middle East. The wave of violence that erupted in 2023 following the October 7 attacks by Hamas against Israel rapidly escalated into conflict in Yemen with the Houthi blockade of the network Sea, which in turn led to U.S. airstrikes in the region as part of the U.S. Navy’s Operation Poseidon Archer and Operation Prosperity Guardian. The conflict escalated further with Iranian missile strikes on Israel and Israeli airstrikes against Iran, culminating in the 2025 “Operation Midnight Hammer” strikes by the U.S. against Iranian nuclear facilities in Natanz and Fardow. Conflict also escalated in southern Lebanon between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah. In February 2026, the U.S. went to war with Iran once more, leading to naval blockades in the Strait of Hormuz and an economic crisis that has affected Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Furthermore, terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and others remain active in the Middle East.

Assessment

Given the multiple threats faced by U.S. forces in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, the current U.S. Marine force deployed in Europe is not suited for a scenario in which the U.S. needs to respond to more than one crisis simultaneously across multiple theaters. While it may be argued that the U.S. could deploy the II Marine Expeditionary Force if necessary, deploying such a large unit can take weeks, if not months—as demonstrated by the deployment of the 1st Marine Division to the Middle East for the 1991 Gulf War. Added to this is the logistical buildup required to sustain combat operations. Furthermore, U.S. commanders fear that the U.S. Marines are stretched too thin to handle current threats as they prepare for future conflicts, given the U.S. pivot to the Indo-Pacific to counter China.

Another issue is the movement of these troops. The deployment of U.S. Marines to Europe will take the form of a naval deployment aboard amphibious assault ships such as the “America” and “Wasp” classes and the “San Antonio” class amphibious transport dock. Such a move would also require a U.S. naval escort of aircraft carriers from the Atlantic Fleet, which, as of September 2026, includes the USS “Gerald Ford”(CVN-78), the most advanced carrier in the U.S. Navy.“Arleigh Burke” class destroyers will also be deployed to escort the force, alongside U.S. Navy supply ships. Such a substantial escort would likely be deployed in the event of a war with Russia.

Such a movement would likely take place via the vitally strategic Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom (GIUK) naval chokepoint in the North Atlantic, through which NATO could block a Russian naval advance into the Atlantic. There would be a considerable risk that U.S. naval convoys heading to Europe could come under air and naval attack by Russian forces if conflict breaks out— a scenario that renowned American author Tom Clancy envisioned in his 1986 novel*network : Storm Rising*.

In this context, an attack against U.S. naval forces supporting such a deployment should be expected, as seen in the 1945 battles for Iwo Jima and Okinawa. During those battles, U.S. Navy ships supporting the invasion of the islands came under heavy air attack by Japanese kamikaze pilots, which resulted in the sinking of the last U.S. aircraft carrier lost to enemy action, the USS “Bismarck Sea.” Naval forces would also likely come under attack by other ships and submarines, as seen in the brutal battles—mostly between U.S. and Japanese cruisers and destroyers—in the waters around Guadalcanal from 1942 to 1943, or in the ambush of U.S. destroyers at Vella Gulf in August 1943.

U.S. forces heading for the Middle East would have to cross the Mediterranean, which would offer the protection of Southern Europe as they reach their destination, with the main obstacle being the network Sea, which is largely controlled by the Houthis in Yemen. Such a scenario is a possibility, especially following the September 2026 Houthi offensive that captured several strategic islands in the network Sea. While this obstacle could be bypassed by deploying forces via the Pacific—which would avoid the network Sea—it would take more time.

Challenges to an Increased U.S. Marine Presence in Europe

However, deploying additional forces to Europe poses considerable political challenges. For one thing, opposition by European countries to the U.S. use of its “ instructions ” on their territories for military operations is not unique to the 2026 Iran War. Italy and Spain refused to allow the U.S. access to their air instructions s during Operation El Dorado Canyon, when USAF F-111 “Aardvarks” had to fly over the Bay of Biscay to strike Libya in 1986.

This sentiment has also surfaced when the U.S. has conducted operations in Latin America, as evidenced by the response of some Spanish politicians to the capture of Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro. Shortly after the successful mission, far-left parties in Spain demanded that Spain withdraw from NATO. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. and Europe have faced tensions over the 2026 Iran War, and as such, the U.S. may not be willing to deploy such a large force to Europe if it cannot be utilized.

Furthermore, the U.S. public has gradually become more assertive on the issue of U.S. defense spending with regard to Europe, and specifically NATO. One factor has been that European opposition to U.S. operations in the Middle East has led some Americans to believe that Europe would not come to the U.S.’s aid if it were attacked. The main issue has been the sharing of the burden of European defense. It is worth noting that Donald Trump was not the first U.S. president to raise this issue, but he has received much more attention from the average than any of his predecessors.

Another issue is geopolitics. Since the U.S. “Pivot to Asia” in November 2011 under President Barack Obama, Europe began to lose its priority for the U.S. as China emerged as the main economic and geopolitical rival. Under Donald Trump’s first administration, the U.S. increased its focus on China, which raised concerns in Europe about the possibility of the U.S. abandoning the region. However, during his second term, Trump has shifted his focus back to the Middle East.

Recommendation

The recommended approach for the U.S., to effectively deter Moscow and respond to threats in Africa and the Middle East, would be to deploy a permanent force of Marines to Europe to enable a faster response. This force would be brigade-sized, comparable to an understrength division, with two regiments rather than the three regiments typically found in U.S. divisions. The brigade would also include a Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion equipped with LAV-25 vehicles or a Reconnaissance Battalion, with the possibility of an artillery regiment. This force would consist of approximately 5,000 Marines.

The U.S. should also consider deploying permanent air assets to Europe, such as U.S. Marine Corps F-35 squadrons and support units like the KC-130J and V-22 “Osprey,” to enable the rapid deployment of Marines and to provide air support. Such a force would consist of approximately 1,500 personnel.

It should be noted that the organizational structure of the Marine Corps' divisions varies; for example, the 1st Marine Division has four regiments, one of which is an artillery unit, while the 2nd Marine Division has three regiments, one of which is an artillery unit.

Such a move would mean the reactivation of deactivated U.S. Marine Corps units, with the brigade likely being designated a division in order to uphold the traditions of older units, such as the deactivated 5th Marine Division, which earned fame at Iwo Jima in 1945, where the division’s 28th Marines raised the American flag on Mount Suribachi. Deactivated Marine aircraft squadrons would likely be reactivated as well.

To address U.S. concerns that European countries are free-riding on aid, defense commitments must be secured from Europe, whereby the deployment of these forces will be contingent on European countries increasing their defense spending and expanding their existing capabilities. Furthermore, specific defense commitments may be secured from the countries where the Marines will be deployed, with Italy and Spain being the likely candidates, as they already have existing U.S. instructions. Such a commitment should take the form of Spain establishing another unit similar to the Marine Corps Brigade-Tercio de Armada (BRIMAR-TEAR) or Italy establishing another unit similar to the San framework Marine Brigade.

Conclusion

We can conclude that, in order to effectively address the growing number of security challenges, the U.S. Marine Corps needs to increase its forces in Europe to counter existing threats in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Furthermore, European political concerns regarding U.S. military operations and U.S. pressure on Europe to assume greater defense responsibilities must be taken into account when discussing an increase in U.S. troops in Europe. Striking a balance between these concerns will be key to maintaining transatlantic cooperation.