How would a U.S. ground operation on Kharg Island take place?

On February 28, 2026, the United States launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran, marking the start of the 2026 Iran War. The operation saw U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft strike several targets across Iran in conjunction with the Israeli Air Force’s Operation Roaring Lion. In the opening salvos, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed, and several Iranian military installations were destroyed. Furthermore, the Strait of Hormuz saw reciprocal blockades by the U.S. Navy and Iran, as well as Iranian missile and drone attacks against U.S. and allied installations in the region. A total of eighteen U.S. service members have lost their lives in the ongoing conflict, and hundreds more have been wounded.

As of August 2026, the war has continued with Iran launching missile strikes against U.S. instructions , while U.S. airstrikes have targeted Iranian installations near the Strait of Hormuz, which has become a battle zone between U.S. and Iranian blockades. Meanwhile, rounds of negotiations between the belligerents continue.

On several occasions, President Trump has threatened to strike Kharg Island and other vital Iranian installations if no agreement is reached regarding the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program, raising the possibility of a major escalation in the conflict. But what would be the outcome of a U.S. military operation against Kharg Island? The objective of this article is to analyze how U.S. military operations led by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) might be conducted against Kharg Island and how they could result in either a U.S. victory or another long, drawn-out ground war in the Middle East.

Kharg Island

Located in the Persian Gulf, just 25 kilometers or 15 miles off the coast of southern Iran, Kharg Island is a geographically small island, no larger than one-third the size of Manhattan. Despite this, the island is the lifeline of Iran’s economy, accounting for 90% of Iran’s crude oil exports. Furthermore, the island is home to an airfield andseveral liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities. These factors make Kharg Island a strategic asset for the Iranian regime and an important target for the U.S., as evidenced by the airstrikes carried out against the island’s military installations. For the U.S., neutralizing Iran’s oil economy will increase pressure on the regime to reach a deal by setting a time limit on Iran’s ability to sustain the war effort—and, as such, could represent the U.S.’s chance to win the war.

Air campaign and naval blockade

The first option for CENTCOM to neutralize Kharg Island would be to escalate the ongoing airstrikes againstIran by U.S. Navy aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf, combined with a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The objectives of these strikes—carried out by U.S. Navy F/A-18E/F “Super Hornets” and F-35 “Lightning II” aircraft operating from aircraft carriers in the Gulf, as well as by Tomahawk missiles launched from Arleigh Burke-class destroyers—would be to prevent Iran from exporting oil and limit its ability to wage war by targeting its oil facilities, fuel depots, and vital infrastructure. U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps air assets could also be used to strike Iranian targets on Kharg Island to ensure the U.S. strikes with overwhelming force. However, for the operation to be effective, U.S. forces would have to target Iran’s oil facilities—something Trump has threatened to do on multiple occasions but has not followed through on, fearing a larger escalation in the Gulf.

As of July 14, 2026, U.S. CENTCOM reportedly has twenty U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf in support of operations against Iran, with two aircraft carriers operating in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. These carriers are the USS “Abraham Lincoln” (CVN-62) and the USS “George H. W. Bush” (CVN-77). The United States would likely have to deploy additional forces to the region, including F-15E “Strike Eagles,” F-16 “Fighting Falcons,” A-10 “Thunderbolts,” and support aircraft such as KC-135 refueling aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to assist in the operation.

Amphibious landing

A more direct, though riskier, option for neutralizing Kharg Island would be an amphibious landing by U.S. forces. On multiple occasions, Trump has threatened that the U.S. might take control of Kharg Island if a deal were not reached. Such an operation on the island would have to be carried out by U.S. Marines to seize key installations there. The U.S. forces landing on the island would do so under cover of air and naval bombardment, similar to the landings conducted by the U.S. Marines during World War II. Several analysts, retired military commanders, and even Trump have stated that the option of seizing the islands remains on the table for the U.S.

The operation would involve U.S. Marines deploying via helicopters such as the V-22 “Osprey” or Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) from amphibious ships in the Gulf. The Marines would also likely deploy LAV-25s from their Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalions to provide armored support, as the Marine Corps no longer fields the M1 “Abrams” Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) or M2 “Bradley” Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) following the reorganizations in 2021 as part of the Force Design 2030 program, which led to the deactivation of all U.S. Marine Tank Battalions. If the U.S. decides to deploy such vehicles, they will have to come from U.S. Army units, such as the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Armored Division.

The airfield on the island is likely to be seized by U.S. airborne units such as the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division, or the 75th Ranger Regiment—units specifically trained to launch airborne assaults on airfields, as demonstrated by the 82nd Airborne’s combat jump in Panama against Torrijos-Tocumen Airport during Operation Just Cause in 1989.

A more limited ground incursion that the Trump Administration might consider would be a commando raid. Such an operation would be conducted by U.S. Special Forces against Kharg Island and would involve a smaller force. Rather than a full-scale invasion, the operation would involve U.S. forces raiding key targets on the island before withdrawing after achieving their objectives. Such operations would likely involve units of the Navy SEALs or the Marine Raider Regiment securing vital installations to prevent their destruction by Iranian forces, as well as capturing prisoners and gathering intelligence.

In addition to the commando force securing the target, other ground forces will be needed to secure the perimeter around the target, as seen in U.S. operations during the Global War on Terror, with the 75th Ranger Regiment likely to play a role. However, this duty could be entrusted to regular forces, as was the case during the 2003 operation in Iraq to capture Saddam Hussein’s sons, Uday and Qusay. During that operation, the 101st Airborne held the perimeter around the compound while Delta Force operators attempted to secure the target building in a firefight that ultimately led to the deaths of Saddam’s sons after they refused to surrender.

The Risks and Benefits

A successful U.S. occupation of the island or military campaign would cause Iran to lose its upper hand in the negotiations; with its economy crippled by sanctions, airstrikes, and the loss of access to oil revenues, Tehran would have to negotiate and potentially agree to most of the U.S. demands. However, the operation carries several risks, both military and political.

If CENTCOM launches airstrikes against oil infrastructure in Kharg, it could lead to an escalation of the conflict. Iran would likely retaliate against oil infrastructure in other Gulf countries. Since the start of the conflict, Iran has launched strikes against U. S. installations across the region, including the U.S. CENTCOM base at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar—strikes that have demonstrated that the U.S. cannot prevent the Iranians from damaging its assets. Iran has also targeted several Gulf countries using missiles and drones, and Iranian proxies have threatened to get involved in the conflict. However, such Iranian strikes risk triggering retaliatory strikes from U.S. allies in the Gulf, as evidenced by reports that Kuwait and Bahrain bombed Iran in retaliation for Iranian strikes on their territory.

Such an escalation of the conflict would cause economic hardship in oil markets in the region and elsewhere, as was seen in the U.S., Europe, and Latin America after Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz and a new round of U.S. airstrikes in July 2026.

From a military perspective, the operation carries considerable risks. First, an air campaign against the island would expose U.S. strike aircraft to the risk of being shot down by Iranian anti-aircraft weapons, potentially resulting in losses ina scenario not unlike the U.S. air campaign over North Vietnam, Operation Rolling Thunder.

Such an event is a possibility, as evidenced by the shootdown of an F-15E “Strike Eagle” pilot and his Weapons System Officer (W.S.O.) from the 494th Fighter Squadron over southern Iran in April 2026, and the subsequent rescue operation by U.S. Air Force Pararescuemen and U.S. Navy SEALs. A repeat of such a situation would be more difficult to resolve. The rescue mission in April demonstrates that such an operation is risky, as evidenced by the number of American aircraft lost during the operation—either damaged by the Iranians or destroyed by U.S. forces to prevent their capture.

Furthermore, the shootdown of an American aircraft would undermine U.S. morale, and the capture of an American airman could cause the U.S. to escalate the conflict or negotiate with Iran, as was feared during the F-15E shootdown. On the other hand, a successful rescue mission would boost morale among U.S. forces and the public.

For a ground operation, there are several challenges that must be overcome before launching an attack. First, the U.S. would have to deploy additional forces to the theater to reinforce the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in the region. An MEU consists roughly of a Marine battalion, along with a helicopter unit for transport and amphibious vehicles. Additional U.S. Marine units would have to be sent to the theater to ensure there are sufficient forces to capture and hold the island. In addition, the U.S. would need to bring in additional U.S. Navy assets to support the operation.

However, the deployment of such forces and assets—including armored vehicles, tanks, landing craft, or ground units such as the 101st Airborne Division or the Rangers—is likely to attract attention and alert both allies and adversaries that a ground operation is being prepared in the region, with Kharg Island as a likely target, making it a considerable challenge to maintain the element of surprise. U.S. intelligence would also have to conduct reconnaissance of the island prior to an operation and gather intelligence, with the risk that Iran might detect these attempts and reinforce its troops in preparation for the invasion.

Another problem would be the capture of the airfield on the island. Airfield seizure operations are risky because troops would have to jump directly onto enemy positions to ensure the element of surprise. These operations tend to result in a considerable number of injuries from the combat jump and casualties from enemy defenders, as seen in the U.S. Rangers’ airborne assault in Grenada during Operation Urgent Fury or the U.S. Navy SEALs’ assault on Punta Paitilla Airport during Operation Nifty Package, part of the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama.

Furthermore, Iranian forces stationed in command centers and military barracks are likely to put up stiff resistance against the invading U.S. forces, as evidenced by the heavy fighting that took place at La Comandancia between U.S. forces and the Panamanian Defense Forces in 1989.

Amphibious landings, as demonstrated by the operations conducted by the U. S. Marines in Tarawa, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa during World War II, show that such missions will result in considerable losses for the attacker, despite massive air and naval bombardment before and after the initial landings. The U.S. may face heavy resistance from die-hard Iranian forces such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The U.S. experience during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, where Saddam’s Fedayeen militia proved to be a greater threat than the Iraqi Army or the Republican Guard, shows that such a force must not be underestimated.

Furthermore, the U.S. Navy can be expected to suffer heavy losses and face constant attacks from Iranian drones. The British experience in the Falklands, where Argentine A-4 “Skyhawks” attacked British ships at low altitude in San Carlos Bay (Bomb Alley), shows that the landing force may face challenges in maintaining a stable supply line for the troops. The U.S. Navy is likely to face attacks by kamikaze drones, much like the onslaught the Navy faced in Okinawa at the hands of the Japanese in 1945.

An occupation of the island would mean that the U.S. would have to deal with sporadic attacks by remnants of the regime and militias opposed to the U.S., similar to Noriega’s Dignity Battalions in Panama or the insurgency thatthe U.S. and the Coalition were forced to contend with in Iraq from 2003 to 2011.

The U.S. would suffer losses during the landing operation and in its aftermath, and U.S. forces would be at risk of Iranian missile and drone attacks—two scenarios the American public is wary of, as evidenced by its reluctance to send troops to military operations overseas, especially in the Middle East following Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

Furthermore, the U.S. may be forced to remain on Kharg Island for an extended period of time in order to pressure Iran into negotiating, with the risk that China or Russia may begin to make economic inroads once the U.S. leaves the islands.

Conclusions

Based on the available information, we can conclude that Kharg Island may be the key for the U.S. to secure a deal with Iran, although any move to seize the island would greatly escalate the conflict in the region and risk dragging the United States into a full-scale war there. Furthermore, any operation in the region carries considerable military risks, particularly regarding U.S. military casualties, enemy resistance, and the challenges the U.S. would face in making effective preparations to strike the island. Although a U.S. ground operation to capture the island remains a possibility, we can conclude that any operations against Kharg Island by the United States would occur only as a last resort, with an air campaign and a naval blockade being the most likely scenarios and, to a slightly lesser extent, the possibility of limited raids on the island.