In the image
Gjader camp in Albania [Klodiana Millona]
The intended Italy-Albania Protocol, seeking to 'fast track' the asylum procedure for specific individuals through externalization, has shifted, rather than resolved, Italy's migration management difficulties due to legal, operational, and jurisdictional challenges. The protocol was originally praised by the European Commission as 'out-of-the-box' thinking; however, two years into its implementation, the protocol remains a high-cost, low-impact initiative. For it to function even a fraction as much as it intended to, it has—and must continue to—adapt moving forward.
Since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, migration management has been a key focus of European policymaking towardssouthern Mediterranean states. Data collected by the UN indicates that over 2.88 million migrants have crossed the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe since then, with 155,100 arrivals in 2025 alone. Such a multitude of arrivals heavily contrasted with the EU's very limited support mechanisms, and throughout this time, Italy was taking the hit as one of the most popular destinations by sea.
On the other hand, Albania has had longstanding aspirations of European integration. Its government, under Prime Minister Edi Rama, has repeatedly sought to demonstrate its readiness for EU accession by proving its ability to contribute to European stability. Therefore, Albania's collaboration with Italy is not just a deal with one of its closest neighbors, but by extension, a cry for attention to Brussels.
Thus, on November 6, 2023, a memorandum of understanding was established between Italy and Albania. Then, the prime ministers of both countries, Giorgia Meloni and Edi Rama, reached an agreement resulting in the opening of two Centers of Permanence and Repatriation (CPR) in Albania, at an Italian cost of 600 million euros over 5 years.
The agreement entails that adult male asylum seekers and migrants rescued from international waters by Italian vessels can be brought to the Albanian CPRs to carry out the asylum or return processes. The entire operation, including construction and management of the centers in Shengjin and Gjader (locations of CPRs), is to be placed under Italian responsibility and jurisdiction, and will take place according to the “Italian and European relevant legislation.” Under the protocol, asylum applications in Albania are to be examined through an accelerated border procedure, with decisions required in a maximum of 28 days, instead of the months that procedures usually take in Italy. Those whose claims are accepted will then be transferred to Italy, while rejected applicants will be quickly channeled into return procedures, hence the "fast track" nature of the scheme.
Legal and human rights challenges
From the very outset of the matter, the protocol faced significant legal and human rights challenges from Italian and European courts questioning its compatibility with established asylum and detention standards. First, Italy's idea of a 'fast-tracked' asylum process was dependent on the identification of migrants coming from 'safe' countries of origin (SCoO), with those migrating from the 19 determined 'safe' countries having their asylum claims dismissed more quickly, as mentioned in the contents of the protocol. However, in 2024, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that Italy's implementation of this list of safe countries did not comply withEU law, highlighting its inadequacy in accounting for the safety of all social/minority groups in the countries on the list (some of which face heavy injustice, e.g., female genital mutilation in Bangladesh).
Another major factor of legal pushback was the protocol’s reliance and use of automatic detention. Critics and human rights experts argued that the entire structure of the centers in Albania was designed to enforce systematic, mandatory detention for all the transferred asylum seekers, forcing more rigorous conditions over longer periods of time onto migrants. The practice is considered arbitrary, unlawful, and even "shameful" by Amnesty International. Additionally, legal experts warned that by placing asylum applicants' detention in remote, external centers (specifically the Gjader facility), Italy risked violating migrants' fundamental rights to staff guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights.
Operational and cost inefficiencies
In addition to the immediate legal challenges, at the protocol’s commencement, several operational and cost-related inefficiencies exposed its fiscal irresponsibility. As mentioned, the project was set to cost Italy a sum of 600 million euros, a figure that stood in great disproportion to the project’s estimated impact. Even for the operation's initial estimate of processing between 3,000 and 36,000 migrants annually, the 600 million euro price tag seemed a costly burden, especially considering there were over 157,000 sea arrivals in Italy in 2023. Additionally, due to the aforementioned legal resistance that the deal faced, arrivals in Albania were delayed, canceled, and halted for months. As of October 2025, only a few immigrants were in the Albanian centers.
As previously mentioned, the construction and management of the centers were to be placed under Italian responsibility. This meant that Italian personnel, including police and administrative workers, were deployed to Albania under costly arrangements that nevertheless left the centers underutilized. Most facilities remained nearly empty for extended periods of time, despite the presence of round-the-clock staffing and security. At the same time, these personnel lacked training and a coordinated plan for health, legal assistance, and translation services in the Albanian locations. This further slowed procedures and diminished the credibility of the protocol as a model for fast-tracked asylum processing.
Jurisdictional and accountability issues
A key aspect of the Italy-Albania protocol is that it “operates under Italian jurisdiction and applies Italian (and potentially EU) law.” This, however, was the root of another set of doubts for the deal, because given that the centers were located in Albanian territory, critics are unsure of Italy's ability to ensure that asylum processing and detention will meet EU legal standards.
Under international law, Albania retains full sovereignty and jurisdiction over matters relating to law enforcement, external security, and incidents outside the centers, regardless of Italy's authority over internal asylum procedures. Considering this, a jurisdictional "gray zone" emerges, in which Italy assumes formal responsibility for asylum and return procedures, while Albania retains control over policing, external security, and the broader legal environment surrounding the centers. When put into practice, such division risks migrants’ access to justice, since incidents such as ill-treatment by Albanian police or obstructions to legal assistance would primarily fall under Albanian jurisdiction rather than Italian. This creates serious gaps in rights protection, jurisdictional transparency, and the overall accountability of the protocol.
The protocol today
Two years after its commencement, the Italy-Albania Protocol has largely underachieved its initial intention of efficient, high-volume processing. The centers in Shengjin and Gjader remain dramatically underused, having processed a tiny fraction of sea arrivals onto Italian shores, all while continuously attracting intense legal and political scrutiny. Additionally, the financial and diplomatic costs for both countries are mounting at overwhelming volumes, hinting that it may indeed be time to pull the plug on the whole operation.
With this considered, the most defensible option for the future of the protocol would be a managed retrenchment rather than further attempts to expand or replicate it. This could take the form of a gradual decrease of the offshore aspect, allowing existing procedures to run their course but halting new transfers. Remaining funds can be redirected to existing asylum processing facilities in Italian territory and reparations if deemed necessary. As for Albania, although a B , political actions toward EU integration would likely be more effective in uncontroversial, low-risk ways. Stepping away from association with systematic detention, legal gray areas, and human rights concerns would ease reputational pressure, while ensuring openness to future coordination with EU nations on more realistic and constructive endeavors. In conclusion, scaling the protocol down is not just the least damaging option, but the only one that aligns with long-term stability and responsible governance.