In the image
Satellite image [Gov. of Germany].
For the first time, Germany has drawn up a national security strategy document. The change of era ('Zeitenwende') that the Russian aggression in Ukraine represents in Europe and the world has forced the first European power to take an unusual step forward in military terms. However, the strategy presented is limited to ratifying the commitments already announced on expense to make the Bundeswehr a true instrument of defense, both its own and that of its allies. The novelty, for a text of this nature, lies in the emphasis placed on energy security and the diversification of suppliers of raw materials and other supplies for German industry. Dependence on Russian gas and certain Chinese investments has alarmed Berlin, which is seeking a complete transformation of some of its economic dynamics. This is what it calls "integrated security".
Germany reiterates in its national security strategy, entitled "An integrated security for Germany", the commitment to raise its defense expense to 2% of GDP "as average over a multi-year period" and to create a special fund of 100 billion euros for this purpose. The fact that the document has not gone further in its concreteness with respect to the advertisement made in the same terms by Chancellor Olaf Scholz days after Russia invaded Ukraine, a year and a half ago, has been seen with certain discouragement by those who consider that the German government is not facing the war in Ukraine in a proactive, but reactive way. In fact, despite the fact that it is advancing proposals in other areas, beyond the military one, the document specifies that none of this will be accompanied by new budgetary allocations. Perhaps because the three government partners disagree on important aspects, German action in the Ukrainian crisis suffers from a certain arrhythmia.
All in all, the strategy presented represents a conceptual breakthrough that will normally take some time to be assimilated by the various levels of the German administration. It is a complete turnaround. To assume with all its consequences that, with its "brutal war of aggression", Russia is "the most significant threat to Germany's peace and security" is not easy for a country that during the governments of Schröder (SPD) and Merkel (CDU) cultivated an intense partnership with Moscow. Not only has there been a complete change in the relationship with Russia, precipitously cutting off the major import of Russian hydrocarbons, but the new international order is also forcing Germany to review its relationship with China, an important destination for German manufactured goods. The document continues to regard China as a partner, but also calls that country a "systemic competitor and rival." "We have observed that rivalry and skill have increased in recent years," the text says of China, and that it acts "again and again against our interests and values."
Economic security
It is precisely adapting the machinery of German industry to this new international order that is the great task facing Berlin and which makes this strategy document unique. Normally, in the military sphere, almost everything is subject to decisions taken by NATO or the European Union. But the search for stable energy alternatives to replace the previous dependence on Russia and to open up new markets that would make it possible not to be so dependent on Chinese purchases is the direct task of the Berlin authorities and especially, as the same document indicates, of German companies. This is the "integrated security" of the new strategy, which "means putting together all the issues and instruments that are relevant for protecting ourselves against external threats".
Germany's power is based on an industry whose production far exceeds the needs of its own market, which is why exports are essential for maintaining jobs at work and thus ensuring social peace. It is also essential to guarantee the inputs that industry needs for its activity and which it must import to a large extent. The weight of exports (around 40% of GDP) in general has been forcing Germany not to tighten the rope too much in its relations with potential buyers; even though its exports are mostly to the rest of Europe, China is a market that Germany has so far not wanted to risk but which may be on the way to being lost.
"In the future we will focus more on security when it comes to decisions on economic policy," warns Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock in the preamble to the document. "Also when it comes to deciding which players are allowed to invest in critical infrastructure," she adds, at reference letter very directly to China, which has been investing in Germany in sensitive strategic sectors.
The document insists on these ideas: "We will reduce current unilateral dependencies in the supply of raw materials and energy, as well as in other strategically relevant areas, by diversifying our supply relationships"; "our goal is to ensure that economic ties do not have a negative impact on our security".
Other aspects
Alongside this economic emphasis, the 76-page document logically addresses various defense aspects, such as the "unwavering commitment" to NATO's article 5 on mutual military assistance in the event of war (and similar stipulations in the EU Treaty and the existing treaty with France); the intention to expand the German military presence in allied territories and make it more permanent, as well as to make the Bundeswehr in the coming years "one of the most effective conventional armed forces"; and the purpose to develop deep strike precision weapons. Attention is also focused on capabilities to combat cyberattacks and the terrorist threat. Linked to energy security and security of access to raw materials, the importance of maritime security, both on the surface and underwater, is noted.
Germany is also in favor of an enlargement of the EU to include the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova and, in the long term deadline, also Georgia. To this end, it argues that institutional reforms should be carried out in the EU to ensure its operability in a horizon that exceeds thirty members. He announces his purpose to opt for a non-permanent seat of the UN Security committee for 2027-28.
At presentation of the strategy document, the German government specified that it had ruled out the creation of a National Security committee . It justified the decision by stating that such a body subject is more appropriate for a country with a presidential system such as the United States.