Realpolitik à la XXI Century Communism: Vietnam's Quest for Power in the Age of Multipolarity

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The twenty-first century poses unique challenges to Vietnam's domestic politics and geostrategic standing. The regime faces a series of domestic challenges to its legitimacy and political supremacy, both of which rely on the Party's deliverance of sustained economic growth. Regardless of this, popular sentiments contrary to the established one-party system continue to gain traction, and it will be difficult for Hanoi to strike a correct balance between maintaining sufficient economic growth so as not to endanger its own ruling legitimacy, but also prevent an ever-more westernized general population from publicly espousing ideals of political pluralism and democracy. For the medium-to-long term, the current political system would only appear sustainable if the Party adequately integrates both sensible political reform with successful economic policy, as well as ensuring external geopolitics do not compromise the integrity and sovereignty of the nation.

These external threats, in a general sense, are due in part to China's ever-more assertive stance in regional geopolitics-specifically when concerning both countries' clashing territorial claims in the South China Sea. Beijing has correctly identified Hanoi as a key obstacle to regional hegemony and is attempting to strategically encircle Vietnam via economic domination over Laos and Cambodia and the effective exercise of maritime power to constrain Vietnam's freedom of navigation and exploitation of its own natural resources-even within its own Exclusive Economic Zone. China's global ambitions, primarily reunification with Taiwan, threaten to expose Vietnam's strategic vulnerabilities, especially when regarding its own defense capabilities. This is the inevitable consequence of the hard-fought, principles-driven foreign policy Hanoi has conducted since the political and economic reforms of the 1980's: its strive to maintain its independence and sovereignty is an obstacle to China, who would much rather prefer a subdued and complacent Vietnam.

Vietnam would then see little alternative elsewhere; surrounded by a geopolitical panorama of political fracturing and polarization, Hanoi could find it difficult to find like-minded partners who are as willing to address the threat posed by China's global ambitions. To its south, ASEAN remains politically fractured and bogged down by complex conflicts, such as Myanmar's drawn-out civil war-a nuisance for several within the bloc, but also a valuable opportunity for Hanoi to increase its international reputation. To the northeast lies Washington's long-time chain of allies and Indo-Pacific partners, as well as internationally isolated North Korea, whom Vietnam should be wary of engaging in any official partnership. To the West, India is emerging as a regional power, but its capabilities remain untested, and its intentions unclear. This report will present a series of possible outcomes, each describing the different approaches Hanoi could take in the next ten years with regards to harmonizing its national strategy with its complex position in the Sinosphere. Particular attention will be paid to the possibility of Vietnam seeking an official security guarantee from its former enemy, the United States. The significant economic concessions Hanoi is capable of granting the United States, particularly in supporting (and no longer facilitating China's evasion of) Washington's protracted trade war with Beijing, will be a critical factor in this consideration.

This report will then come to a series of conclusions, including but not limited to, that:

• The Communist Party of Vietnam has tied its political legitimacy to the exercise of sustained economic growth, which might in turn endanger popular support for the one-party system.
• Vietnam's national security interests are incompatible with China's rise as a global power and its regional ambitions.
• Vietnam's economy is poised to enjoy significant growth for the next decade, likely at the expense of China's recent economic challenges.
• The Russian Federation, historically Vietnam's largest arms supplier and defense guarantor, is not a reliable security provider for the country.
• China has embarked on a strategy of encircling Vietnam with geopolitical allies, especially due to Beijing's influence in Laos and Cambodia.
• As ASEAN is not prepared to overcome its internal political fractures and does not yet offer the possibility of a true role of political leadership to any of its member states. Vietnamese prospects to bid for a leadership role are therefore limited.
• Vietnam would benefit significantly from further developing its partnership with like-minded regional actors, such as India, Japan, and South Korea, but avoid further cooperation with rogue states, like North Korea.
• Vietnam would see significant gains from strengthening relations with the United States, putting aside Cold War legacies.
• The United States is a reasonable and reliable choice for a security provider for Vietnam.