Spain and Trump: Unmet Defense expediture goals

On May 2017, then recently elected US President Donald Trump made a speech which, at the time, was considered as weakening NATO. On that occasion, Trump voiced a long standing US concern over the low defense spending by more than half of the members of the alliance. In 2024, Trump was re-elected. In the four years leading up to his reelection, Europe faced the grim realization that many of Trump's warnings about vulnerabilities to Russia and NATO expenditure had been ignored, with the 2022 Invasion of Ukraine, combined with Biden's mismanagement in the Kabul evacuation of 2021, alongside Obama and the West's inaction in the annexation of Crimea, as evidence of NATO's deficiencies. Without openly admitting that Trump had been right, US pressure led many NATO members to increase their defense spending.

The leadup to Trump's return to the White House triggered massive concerns in Europe and especially in Ukraine over the possibility of Trump stopping weapon shipments to Kiev, pressuring Zelenski into ending the war, and increasing pressure on NATO nations to pay a fairer share of the cost of their own defense, whose shortcomings had been laid bare for the world to see.

Concerns like these were not unique to the Trump Administration: in 2014, during the NATO summit in Wales, then president Obama pressured the European allies to commit to increase their defense spending.

The fear that the president of the United States could seek to initiate a peace process in Ukraine has materialized as on February 12th, when Trump and Putin agreed in a phone call to begin negotiations to put an end to the war in Ukraine. The move has caused panic both in NATO capitals and in Ukraine over the possible outcome of said peace process. The Trump administration followed this decision with renewed pressure to the Alliance.

This document seeks to analyze Spain's current contributions to NATO, the measures Spain has taken to increase its defense expenditue and reach NATO goals, and what can be expected from US-Spanish relationship in coming years.

Background: The issue of the 2%

In 2014, in response to the annexation of Crimea, all NATO allies reached an agreement to increase their defense expenditure to reach at least 2% of their respective GDP within a decade. The 2% was meant to be a guideline, not dissimilar to the minimum agreed in 2006 for NATO Member States (MS) to contribute to the alliance. Yet, even as the situation in the eastern flank of the Alliance deteriorated further, by the time of Trump's first arrival to the White House, all NATO nations but the US, United Kingdom, Poland, Greece, and Estonia, had failed to meet this benchmark.

By 2021, the situation remained the same, with no major changes despite Trump's warnings. It was not until 2024, under Trump's successor Joe Biden, that some changes took place, especially as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine; when NATO Heads of State and Government met in Washington in 2024 to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Alliance, 23 of the MS had already reached the minimum.

In 2025, during the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, newly elected US President Donald Trump insisted on the urgency of NATO's allies increasing their national defense budgets; this time the demand rose to 5% of their GDP, justified under the argument that the US had for far too long covered what other members were failing to pay. In response, NATO proposed a compromise increase of up to 3%, as many MS saw the increase as far to costly, even if they were the most benefited from said security. In addition to these direct calls, during a press conference in the Oval Office in which he, probably on purpose, confused it as a member of the BRICs, Trump singled out Spain as the most conspicuous laggard among NATO allies.

Spain's Defense expenditure and NATO missions

Since its entry into NATO in 1982, Spain has actively engaged in NATO, contributing to multiple missions, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Today, the country contributes troops to Operation 'Inherent Resolve' deployed in Iraq to train the nation's army; to the NATO Standing Naval Maritime Groups (NSMG) in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic; to the Eastern Flank deployment with units in Latvia, Solvakia, and Romania; to the Baltic Air Police mission, and to Operation "Sea Guardian" in the Mediterranean. In addition to these contributions, Spain hosts the headquarters of the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Torrejón de Ardoz, responsible for protecting NATO's southern airspace, and the NATO Rapid Deployment Corps Spain Headquarters (NRDC-ESP HQ) in Valencia.

Yet, despite these contributions, at a meager 1.28% of its GDP in September 2024, Spain's defense spending is the lowest in the entire alliance. This was conspicuously clear at the critical time when the US elections neared, and the countries in Eastern and Central Europe demanded an increase of the minimum contribution to NATO to 2.5% of the allied national GDPs. Bracing for Trump's possible return to the White House, 23 out of the 32 MS managed to surpass the minimum 2%, with Poland contributing the largest percentage, 4.12%. As mentioned before, Spain had the lowest, with only 1.28%.

When singled out, Spain has unsuccessfully shielded itself from criticism for failing to reach the 2% benchmark by highlighting its other contributions to the alliance, and pointing out to token increases in defense. However, both arguments fall short. Spain's token increases on defense pale in comparison to Denmark's 39% increase in 2024 and Greece's, which managed to continue maintaining its commitment to NATO even amid a crippling economic crisis. Even the other countries struggling to reach the 2% GDP such as Croatia (1.81) or Italy (1.49) are faring slightly better than Spain. 

Spain's troop and leadership contributions to NATO also fall short in comparison to those made by nations like the US and the UK, which have made up the bulk of NATO forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to official data from NATO, the bulk of Spain's shared contribution are in regards to maintaining its current operational strength in both personnel and equipment, rather than increasing its capabilities. This is in contrast to the rest of Europe, which has seen attempts by militaries which have attempted to acquire better equipment for their forces in light of the invasion of Ukraine, including MBTs.

The trend is not new: ever since the days of transition to democracy at the end of the Franco dictatorship, military spending has been steadily decreasing in Spain, even after joining NATO. Data from the World Bank on military expenditure show Spain's spending only slightly increasing right after joining the Atlantic Alliance for about two years before dropping exponentially. Many have pointed out to Spain's common perception of being under no direct threat to Spain's borders (that, despite its complicated relationship with Morocco), or to the as distant perceived issues like the Russian-Ukraine War or conflicts in Africa and the Middle East, as a reason for Spain's lack of emphasis in defense.

Spain, to be true, has somewhat increased its defense expenditure in the last years, although most of it has gone to the maintenance of current equipment and to purchases of ammunition, instead of it being invested in the procurement of new weapon systems.

Trump vs. Sánchez: Challenges and Difficulties

During his electoral campaign for the 2016 elections, candidate Trump repeatedly referred to NATO as an obsolete institution, and castigated the Europeans for taking advantage of the US security umbrella. There was some merit in the claim, because the US had, for several years, been the top contributor to the Alliance, and because less than half its members were reaching the commitment of 2% they had agreed on in 2014.

Throughout his first term as president, Trump pressured many NATO leaders to increase their defense spending, stirring controversy both among the Democrats and US average opposed to Trump and several European leaders. Amongst those who rushed to defend their commitment to NATO, by downplaying their shortcomings in financial contribution and focusing on their other contributions, including deployment of soldiers in NATO and EU missions, was Spain's Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez who, truth be told, followed with this argument in the wake of Mariano Rajoy, his conservative predecessor.

It has become a habit of Spain's central government to repeatedly put off the deadline when the country will reach the agreed level of defense expenditure; right after becoming prime minister in 2018, Sánchez announced Spain would reach the 2% in 2024. As of 2025, Spain now claims it will not be until 2029 that the benchmark will be met. Even this new deadline looks unrealistic, in view of Spain's current political landscape.

On February 13, 2025, newly appointed US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth confirmed Trump's position on the defense spending issue, by calling NATO countries to reach 5%, a move which NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte endorsed during a press conference following a meeting of the defense ministers of the alliance. This all comes at a critical time, as Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, reached an agreement for starting negotiations on a possible end of the war in Ukraine.

The timing was unfortunate as Sanchez's government faces both domestic and foreign pressure to increase defense spending to levels agreed in Wales. The pressure no longer includes just the US, but also the EU, as European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen has reiterated calls for Europe to increase defense spending. Furthermore, the EU has pressured its members, specifically Spain, to increase their defense contributions. The EU has offered its members a 1.5% GDP fiscal space to increase defense spending, which according to Von der Leyen, would translate to 25 billion euros yearly, at a cost of increasing public debt. The move has faced backlash from Spain, Italy and France, who prefer a spending based on grants instead of increasing their debt. Sánchez also stressed the need to establish a European Army, likely meaning that other European countries should pay for Spain's deficit.

When asked by US news average about Trump's criticism, Prime Minister Sánchez insisted in giving the sameresponse, ignoring the plain facts, and focusing instead on Spain's other contributions while once more pledging to reach the 2%, assuring the US that Spain is a reliable partner. Furthermore, Spain pledged to build the necessary capabilities for the Spanish military.

In a weak bid to show that it is indeed contributing to NATO while failing to meet its budgetary commitments, Spain increased the number of soldiers in the military exercise 'Steadfast Defender' 25 that took place in February. This fact hardly disguises the naked truth that Spain continues to show the poorest ratio in the Alliance between national GDP and defense spending.

Recently, in a desperate attempt to appear to be increasing the defense expenditure, Sánchez and Defense Minister Margarita Robles decided to increase the wages of the members of the armed forces. In addition to this, Sánchez is attempting for the EU to assume more responsibility in defense and other strategic areas, likely looking to replicate the EU's financial response during the Covid 19 pandemic.

The fragility of Sánchez's coalition government, supported by a myriad anti-NATO, extreme left and independentist parties, whose agreement he needs to forge a majority in Congress, makes very unlikely that, despite pledges from government officials, Spain reach the agreed threshold, as evidenced by the attempt made in 2024 to increase spending, which was met by the refusal of his coalition partners. Furthermore, Spain is heavily indebted due to massive social aid programs. Sánchez and his coalition partners are unwilling to cut back said social programs, which include pensions and financial aids because it would likely lead to a backlash from the far left elements in his coalition, which hold sway over Sánchez's government.

Adding complexity to the issue is Spain's regional administrative system of autonomous communities, which grants them some leeway to levy taxes and to incur in public debt. In February 2025, Sánchez announced his intention to yield to the demands of some members of his governmental coalition and condone Catalonia's debt in a move that, if implemented, would reduce the financial resources available for discretionary spending, especially in defense.

It must be noted that the problem with Catalonia's debt is hardly the only one for Prime Minister Sánchez; the particular constitutional status of regions like the Basque Country or Navarre, with its own foral system makes it hard for the state to levy taxes. On top of that, he has to face the opposition of Madrid, whose regionalpresident, the People's Party's conservative Isabel Díaz Ayuso is staunchly opposed to raising taxes and has frequently clashed with Sánchez on fiscal and political decisions.

The spat with the US over NATO contribution becomes more complex as Sánchez has taken a confrontational approach to Trump likely stemming from ideological differences; Trump is a conservative, nationalist politician, while Sánchez is a leftist politician, seeking to become the leader of the anti-Trump movement.

After Trump's meeting with Zelensky on February 28th of 2025, the Spanish government initiated debates without consulting Congress to once more increase the defense expenditure. The measure is not likely to progress, considering the strong opposition within his coalition partners to increase in anything related on defense, due in part to ideological reasons. On the 13th of February, the leader of ERC, a Catalan separatist party, which despite not being part of Sánchez's coalition government holds a key position in Congress, made it clear that his party would oppose any increase in defense spending. Unsurprisingly, on 20th January, Sánchez was unable to reach any agreement on the defense expenditure, and as a high note, his main coalition partner, the far left Sumar party's leader, Yolanda Díaz, made calls for Spain to withdraw from NATO.

Furthermore, Spain faces another challenge: a crisis in recruitment and manpower, stemming from the country's persistent low fertility rate, as well as from a severe deficit in security awareness among the population. Several Western countries have seen a major crisis in acquiring enough manpower for their militaries. In Spain, considerable sectors of the population, especially the younger cohorts, are opposed or unwilling to fight and defend their country in case of attacks. This, in addition to the lack of a strategic culture at the lowest and highest levels of society and government, provide a greater challenge to Spain's attempt to reach the minimum GDP defense requirements, and maintain a force that is up to standard of NATO requirements.

Furthermore, Europe, and the West in general, face another problem in regards to these issue: changes in mentality and values amongst the younger population make joining the armed forces a very unpopular, if not a taboo subject. While the trend is common across NATO and Western countries, the US has apparently managed to see increases in recruitment in 2025. To change this heavily ingrained ideas in society will take time, which seems unlikely in Europe's social landscape.

The demographic crisis will likely make it harder for Spain to reach the 2% GDP, as Spain may see a financial crisis due to inability to sustain its massive public spending, leading to slashing thereof spending. Sánchez has repeatedly tried to appeal to his critics by assuring them that an increase in defense will not lead to a slashing of the welfare state.

This problem is compounded in Spain because of its particular identitarian tensions; in communities like the Basque Country or Catalonia, governed by identitary parties, and where support for Spanish institutions, including those of security and defense is low, and sometimes outright hostile, Spain's Central government will face considerable challenges in reversing the social trends affecting recruitment, especially in regions where separatist parties and sentiments are strong.

In what is Spain spending the Defense budget?

To its credit, Spain has not been entirely inactive in the issue of defense. Since 2014, defense budget increased 107%. If the trend continues, the budget is expected to reach 21.5 bilion euros at some point in 2025. However, these seemingly considerable contributions are still well below the 2% GDP demanded by NATO MS leaders like Trump or Tusk.

Several projects are underway or are being proposed within the Spanish Ministry of Defense to improve the capabilities of Spain's armed forces. Some of these programs have already been greenlit, and are awaiting for financing, when and if the government increases the defense spending. Among them, the most important ones are those aimed at the replacement of older models of the 'Leopard' 2 main battle tank; the acquisition of new helicopters to supplement the 'Tigre' and MH90; the replacement, already on the works, with the Spanish Army already having defined the needed requirements, of the M109 self propelled artillery system; or the acquisition of the 'Dragon' 8x8 to replace the older BMRs and, probably, the famous but elderly M113s TOAs. A critical project, however, is that oriented to the fielding of a weapon system similar to the HIMARS missile launcher operated by the US military. The project's importance is highlighted by the weapon's success in Ukraine and the need to acquire a capability Spain has not possessed since the decommissioning of the 'Teruel' multiple rocket system in 2011.

The modernization of Spain's ground forces is in line within the broader Fuerza 35 modernization and reorganization program, which aims to prepare the Spanish military to rising security challenges by the year 2035. The project also envisions arming the brigades of the Spanish Army with new and improved capabilities, including information and electronic warfare.

The Spanish Air and Space Force has also launched multiple modernization programs. The most prominent one is the one to replace the vaunted but rapidly aging F/A-18 'Hornet' with newer versions of the Eurofighter. It also seeks to modernize its Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities with the acquisition of Airbus C295W, to improve its air refueling capability with the acquisition of three A330 AAR aircraft purchased in 2021, and to modernize its UAV capabilities. The most ambitious of these programs, however, is the FCAS or Future Combat Air System one. The FCAS is a joint program that involves multiple European countries, including France and Germany, to jointly develop a Sixth generation fighter.

Furthermore, the Spanish Navy is starting to seek a replacement for its vaunted AV8 Harriers, with the likely candidate being the F-35 Lighting, thought this remains ambiguous, as several NATO members have decided to boycott the purchase of American F-35s in response to Trump's clashes with European leaders. The Navy has also launched ambitious naval construction programs to build new frigates and submarines, the first of which, the S-81 'Isaac Peral', making its first vogage in 2025. The Navy has also initiated the procurement of the newer F-110 'Bonifaz' class frigates to replace its older F-80 'Santa Maria' class.

While sounding impressive on paper, only a handful of the proposed plans have been carried out or have just started to materialize; many more of the most ambitious prograns remain a "what if" under the current economic and political constraints.

Prime Minister Sanchez is playing a complex political game by trying to appeal to his allies, opposed to the idea, with grandiose speeches, promising to increase the defense spending and take a greater role in the security spectrum of Europe without reducing entitlements. Although, under certain circumstances, he would be able to arm a majority in parliament with the support of PP and Vox, the main opposition parties, he faces the dilemma of whether or not tapping on that support, because any deal with them would create friction with his main coalition partners. The problem is compounded by the fact that, at the time of the discussion, Spain faces a second consecutive year of Sánchez's legislature being unable to get Congress to approve the budget for 2025. This state of affairs, for its part, has led to pressure from the PP for Sánchez to call for early elections, which he has refused.

As mentioned before, Sánchez is attempting to reach the 2% GDP without damaging the welfare state, which would likely result in the loss of support of his own party and the far left Sumar, his primary partner, possibly leading to a collapse of government and new elections. As a result, he has pressed, unsuccessfully, for the EU to cover the defense spending in the same way as the EU covered the massive debts incurred by members of the EU during the pandemic.

It is unlikely that Spain is able to reach the 2%, much less the 3% GDP, without having to reduce the welfare state or take unpopular measures to improve Europe's military capabilities, such as increasing taxes. As mentioned before, the issue of increasing public debt is the greatest concern of the Mediterranean countries.

What can we expect?

In conclusion, we can affirm that Spain is juggling with the pressure, the lack of interest in significantly increasing the level of expenditure in defense to honor its commitments to NATO, and the objective difficulties, to achieve the goal of the 2%, let alone that the 5%, even assuming there is a will to do it.

We can also conclude that there is a pattern of behavior in Spanish Prime Ministers of avoiding the GDP issue while emphasizing deployment of Spanish soldiers in NATO, EU, and UN missions, together with a tendency among Spanish leaders to make speeches advocating for European unity and pledging to do more, while at home they face considerable challenges to make even the smallest inroads to reach the stated goals. It is likely that the said pattern of behavior will continue, and we will likely see in 2029 another excuse for not reaching the agreed minimum and a later date, which will likely lead to the same result, unless pressure increases to a point Sánchez, or whoever is head of government in Spain, is unable to evade the issue any further.

If Spain continues along this line, characterized by small increases in its defense budget, the row will likely exacerbate Trump and NATO's demands to increase the minimum over the initial 2%. The confrontational attitude Sánchez and his coalition partners have adopted vis-à-vis the new US Administration will do nothing but worsen an already icy relationship.

As mentioned before, the issue is not unique to Sánchez's government, as his predecessor also struggled to achieve the NATO commitments. The lack of support, even opposition to an increase in the defense budget from a considerable sector of the Spanish population will make politicians, even those who sympathize with the idea, cautious about increasing spending, lest they risk losing support from voters. We can therefore conclude that the situation will likely not change significantly even if Sánchez is replaced by a conservative leader, as he or she will have to face many of the challenges mentioned above, including lack of support from the society to enlist in the armed forces or to increase the defense spending.

The issue is also likely to be a major recurring theme in the relationship between Spain and the United States, as Trump and his successors will likely increase pressure on NATO, and especially Spain and Italy, who are the two members struggling the most to reach the agreed benchmark.

We can, therefore, conclude that regardless of the political leadership, Spain faces an uphill battle to reach its NATO commitments, with several challenges coming from its political system, social welfare system, society's perception of the issue, and a youth who is unwilling to defend or serve the country.