State of the Joint Task Force Bravo and U.S. Assistance to Honduras

For decades, Honduras and Latin America in general have been at the bottom of the U.S. security policy agenda. Compared to its counterparts in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) maintained only a minuscule force with which to address the few but formidable threats in the region. However, since Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the United States has increased its military presence in Latin America, primarily to combat drug cartels and counter Chinese influence in the region. One key area in the War on Drugs, however, has seen no increase in American forces: Honduras and the vital Soto Cano Air Base.

This article seeks to analyze the U.S. military assets and missions currently in Honduras and the U.S. approach to the security challenges facing this small but geographically vital Central American nation, concluding that the current level of U.S. forces at the Soto Cano base is insufficient. The article also offers recommendations for U.S. and Honduran policymakers on this matter. Additionally, the article identifies challenges faced by the U.S. in the region and possible contingencies.

Background

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States shifted its focus away from security issues in Latin America. The end of proxy conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua led to a significant reduction in U.S. military presence in the region following the 1989 invasion of Panama(Operation Just Cause) and the subsequent withdrawal of all U.S. instructions the Canal Zone by 2000.

In the case of Honduras, Soto Cano Air Base in the Comayagua Valley also saw a reduction in troop levels. The 1980s had seen the deployment of a significant number of U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force units to that facility to contain the “spread of communism” and provide assistance to Contra rebels attempting to overthrow Nicaragua’s revolutionary regime. The end of the Cold War saw the withdrawal of most of these forces, as the focus shifted to the Balkans and disarmament.

This situation has persisted ever since. In 2025, however, the Western Hemisphere witnessed a significant shift in U.S. policy, as Washington deployed a substantial number of assets to the Caribbean as part of a campaign against drug trafficking launched by the Trump administration. The campaign soon escalated into efforts to pressure the Venezuelan regime to collapse. These efforts were later consolidated into Operation “Southern Spear.”

American military efforts led to an increased U.S. military presence in the Caribbean and the reopening of decommissioned military instructions Puerto Rico. However, Soto Cano, the United States’ largest base in Central America, was not involved in the buildup that culminated in the US’s first military operation in a Latin American country since Panama, when US Special Forces, supported by aircraft and naval assets, captured Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026, during Operation “Absolute Resolve.”

Furthermore, U.S. efforts to combat drug cartels, organized crime, and human trafficking led to the launch of the “Shield of the Americas” initiative in Florida during a meeting between Trump and eleven Latin American leaders, with the stated goal of enhancing coordination to combat drug cartels and organized crime. The pact has faced severe criticism due to the absence of key countries involved in drug trafficking, such as Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela.

As of 2026, despite U.S. President Trump’s more aggressive push to combat drug cartels and restore American influence in the region, U.S. military assets in Honduras have not changed in any significant way, even though the situation in Honduras has begun to deteriorate in relation to the War on Drugs, with the production of illegal drugs gradually increasing and the country shifting from a transit country to a producer.

Furthermore, operations in Latin America have seen resources being redeployed to Europe and the Middle East following the launch of the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran (Operation “Epic Fury”). Of particular significance was the departure of the aircraft carrier USS “Gerald Ford,” which was redeployed to the Mediterranean to participate in the operation against Iran in February 2026.

Major security challenges

One of the major security challenges facing Honduras has been transnational crime involving traffickers linked to the drug trade in Mexico and Colombia. Honduras’ geographical location makes it a necessary stepping stone for cartels heading to the U.S. The influence of drug traffickers has been well documented, as seen in the major scandals that have affected presidents on both the left and the right, as well as their families. While the true extent of these figures’ involvement varies based on available evidence, the damage suffered by government and political institutions has been palpable, as has the damage to Honduras’ image on the international stage. This problem has been exacerbated by a weak judicial system.

Another challenge is posed by natural disasters. Honduras, like the rest of Central America, is particularly vulnerable to hurricanes, such as Hurricanes Eta and Iota in 2020, or the infamous Hurricane Mitch of 1998. Another major risk is forest fires, particularly during the dry summer months. Water shortages have hindered firefighting efforts to extinguish the flames in forested areas, which in turn leads to massive ecological damage. Furthermore, Honduras lacks helicopters capable of carrying large water buckets to combat the fires, hampering these efforts.

Organized crime and gangs are a common threat faced by the countries of the Northern Triangle, and one that has left its mark. While El Salvador, under President Bukele’s controversial but effective war on gangs, has seen major success, Guatemala and Honduras have continued to suffer from high crime rates. Alarmingly, members of gangs such as MS-13—which have been a thorn in the side of law enforcement in the Northern Triangle for decades—have been arrested and deported in several Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) operations in the U.S., demonstrating the gangs’ reach. Furthermore, in Central America, gangs have managed to control areas through extortion, as well as by freeing fellow gang members from prison or instigating deadly prison riots.

Poverty is the primary concern in Central American countries, and one that has been linked to other security issues affecting the region. Honduras has typically ranked among the poorest countries in the region, surpassed only by Haiti. The lack of opportunities and inequality has led to a significant number of people leaving the country in caravans. Complicating matters, a considerable portion of the labor force in Honduras is in the informal sector. This, combined with the fact that many low-income families depend entirely or partially on remittances sent by relatives in the U.S.—some of whom entered the country illegally—creates significant problems for Honduras’ stagnant economy, which is dependent on the willingness of U.S. officials to enforce immigration laws.

Without a doubt, however, drug trafficking is the most significant security challenge facing Honduras—one whose effects extend beyond the country’s borders to affect the entire Central American region and the United States as well.

The Area of Operations (AO) where the War on Drugs is being waged in Honduras is La Mosquitia, a vast jungle region spanning eastern Honduras and the border with Nicaragua, characterized by significant biodiversity and isolated settlements inhabited by indigenous Miskito communities. The area is also known as the Platano River Biosphere Reserve. Dense jungle and rivers dominate the area, making ground access difficult, which means operations will have to be conducted via helicopter or using small patrol boats to patrol the rivers, similar to the U.S. approach in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta. Drug traffickers have built small“narcopistas”: small, clandestine airstrips where Cessnas and smaller aircraft land to unload drugs. Operations to neutralize them involve using explosives to crater the airstrips.

However, recent operations by the Honduran Army in the 2020s have uncovered cocaine farms where coca cultivation has begun. This has expanded the area of operations from La Mosquitia to several major departments in Honduras, including the Caribbean Coast and the areas along the Nicaraguan border. These areas are mountainous and covered with either forest or jungle, making ground operations difficult on the treacherous dirt roads that crisscross the mountains and valleys.

Drug trafficking also occurs in the Caribbean and the Pacific, with small boats—known as “narcolanchas”—transporting significant quantities of drugs toward the United States. Taking all these factors into account, Honduras faces at least three fronts in the War on Drugs: the Caribbean, the Pacific, and eastern Honduras. Geographically located at the center of the continent and Central America, Honduras serves as the gateway for drug cartels to reach the United States, and for Washington, it is the chokepoint where the cartels can be slowed down.

Addressing these issues is of immediate importance, not only for Honduras but also for the United States, especially given that Trump’s focus on security has emphasized combating illegal migration and drug trafficking.

Joint Task Force Bravo

The main U.S. military force in the region is Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B). JTF-B is headquartered at the only U.S. base in Central America, Soto Cano Air Base, located on the outskirts of Comayagua, in the central part of the country. The force and base were established during the 1980s to assist U.S. Southern Command in countering Communist influence from Cuba and Nicaragua. After the end of the Cold War, JTF-B shifted its focus to humanitarian assistance missions, providing aid to poverty-stricken areas in Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and the rest of the Caribbean. JTF-B has also provided training for Honduran and partner nations in CENTAM exercises such as CENTAM Smoke and CENTAM Guardian.

JTF-Bravo currently consists of a small military force comprising three units: an Army Forces Battalion (ARFOR), responsible for commanding forces in the theater; the 1st Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment, equipped with UH-60 Blackhawks and CH-47 Chinook helicopters; and the 612th Air Base Squadron, responsible for logistical duties at the base and helicopter maintenance. As these forces are primarily deployed for humanitarian missions, such as those involving humanitarian assistance and natural disaster relief, as was the case during Hurricane Eta.

JTF-B’s assets, particularly its helicopters, have been invaluable in helping Honduras combat forest fires and evacuate civilians during hurricanes, such as those in 2020. The training provided by JTF-B—including first responder, firefighting, and military training —has been invaluable to Honduran emergency response services.

Proposals to improve security in Honduras

Based on the threats to Honduras identified above, which ultimately pose a threat to U.S. national security, the forces currently available to JTF-B are insufficient to combat drug trafficking and to conduct and/or support humanitarian operations in Central America—the two areas for which JTF-B was established. The United States would need additional forces to assist Honduran forces in counter-narcotics operations. Given the more militarized approach taken by the Trump Administration, it would be of the utmost importance to increase the number of assets in Honduras.

However, before deploying additional U.S. forces, the Honduran Armed Forces must be reinforced. Significant modernization efforts would need to be undertaken regarding the equipment of the Honduran Air Force (FAH) to enable it to play a more active role in the campaign and to prevent the U.S. from bearing the brunt of the challenge. To enhance these capabilities, the Honduran Armed Forces would need to be reinforced. Not only should the Embraer “Super Tucano”fleet be expanded ,but the possibility of an American or European alternative should also be explored to modernize the aircraft fleet.

Another challenge in combating traffickers is small boats, such as those targeted by SOUTHCOM assets in the Caribbean. Honduras’s small navy is capable of conducting some patrols and interdictions, but will need to expand its fleet and surveillance capabilities to effectively counter drug trafficking. With a small navy consisting of only two Damen Stan 4207 Patrol Vessels and a single Sa'ar 62-class offshore patrol vessel for coastal defense duties, the acquisition of additional vessels of this type may be necessary to increase the capacity to conduct patrols.

As mentioned earlier, the Honduran military would need to undergo modernization to ensure its ability to operate without placing a burden on U.S. resources. These modernization efforts could include the acquisition of additional Airbus H145 helicopters, as seen in the purchase from Germany in 2024. The acquisition of additional Bell helicopters could also be a solution to enhance the Honduran military’s insertion capabilities.

However, ground forces would be required to destroy the clandestine airstrips and laboratories, which would necessitate an increase in the number of ground forces in the area. Operations would involve Honduran forces, with U. S. advisors or small units of U.S. soldiers attached to them for search-and-destroy (S&D) missions against coca farms and clandestine airstrips in the region. This could involve the deployment of a small infantry force in the region, composed of either U.S. Army, Marine Corps, or Special Operations (SOF) units, as well as transport helicopters to conduct operations against drug traffickers.

The most suitable assets for the theater would be unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the MQ-9 Reaper. Surveillance aircraft would be needed to help track the planes and boats bringing drugs from South America. To intercept smuggler aircraft, the U.S. would need to deploy a small force of fighter aircraft to Soto Cano. These could be either F-16 ‘Fighting Falcon’s’ or units of older F-15 ‘Eagles’ deployed from Air National Guard (ANG) units on the U.S. mainland. These forces would assist the Embraer ‘Super Tucanos’ operated by Honduras, emulating actions seen in Brazil, where aircraft have been used to intercept smugglers.

For naval interdiction, U.S. Coast Guard cutters and a handful of U.S. Navy ships can provide assistance to cover the area under the command of the 4th Fleet. The permanent deployment of an aircraft carrier would not be required, but destroyers such as the Arleigh Burke-class or Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) would be . Ground forces deployed in the region would consist of Special Operations Forces (SOF) units specialized in jungle warfare to assist Honduran forces, though at least two battalions of the U.S. Army or Marines should be considered for permanent deployment at any given time to reinforce Honduran forces.

To address the economic problems in Honduras, greater investment in education and key industries would be required. The main industries identified are agricultural exports such as coffee and bananas. There is a significant textile industry in the northern part of the country, known as “maquilas,” which is responsible for clothing manufacturing. Shrimp aquaculture is also a significant component of Honduras’ exports, most of which are shipped to the United States. There is also a snack company, Yummies, which is popular in Honduras. The other main source of revenue is tourism, particularly beaches such as Tela and Roatan in the north, as well as the Mayan ruins in Copán in the western part of the country.

Given the issues mentioned, the first step would be to take measures to formalize the informal labor market, while making massive investments in existing industries and working to create new ones. Education is essential to solving these problems—an area where Honduras and other impoverished nations are struggling. The public education system in Honduras is in poor condition, understaffed, and rife with corruption; in contrast, the more expensive private education tends to be of higher quality and, as a result, produces better-prepared graduates.

With regard to tourism, the primary strategy would need to be an intensive public relations campaign to encourage people to visit those areas. This is not impossible, as Mexico—despite being one of the most dangerous countries in the region—has a well-established tourism industry in Cancún, even as violence in the country continues to escalate. This soft power campaign would need to be carried out by both private and public entities to ensure its impact extends far beyond Honduras’ borders.

However, for these measures to succeed, the necessary legal and security conditions must be established; Honduran law would have to be amended, and legal safeguards put in place to ensure that investments are protected from expropriation. For its part, Honduras will have to balance economic needs with environmental concerns. To ensure security for potential investors and to allow tourism to flourish, order must be restored on the streets, with more aggressive police action by the National Police and the Military Police of Public Order (PMOP) against gangs and the areas they control. In addition, Honduran security forces would likely have to be deployed to said area during times when tourism is expected to peak, such as Holy Week. With all their weaponry coming from the US and Israel, efforts to ramp up assistance and training for these initiatives should be undertaken.

Challenges to U.S. aid

However, U.S. assistance to Honduras or any other Latin American country would face significant political challenges from both the U.S. and local populations. On the one hand, there are the understandable concerns ofthe American public about being dragged into a Vietnam-style situation or an Iran-Contra fiasco. On the other hand, there is the fear among many in the region of an increased American role in its “backyard.” As such, Honduras would have to expand its role, including modernization programs and an increase in the size of its armed forces, although a draft may not be necessary.

The main obstacle to any U.S. action against cartels and traffickers may come from sectors of the Honduran population opposed to the U.S. presence, particularly from socialist groups such as the Libre Party. Libre, short for Libertad y Refundación, was formed as a splinter group of the traditional Liberal Party around President Manuel “Mel” Zelaya following the 2009 constitutional crisis, during which he was arrested and removed from power by the Honduran Armed Forces after Congress approved his removal. Among the party’s supporters, it is widely believed that the US orchestrated Zelaya’s downfall, a claim that hampered US-Honduran cooperation during the presidency of Zelaya’s wife, Xiomara Castro, from 2022 to 2026.

The killing of Honduran nationals or U.S. direct operations could lead to rising tensions if the U.S. military conducts operations in the same manner as those in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Honduras experienced major riots in 1988 afterthe U.S. abducted a Honduran drug trafficker linked to Pablo Escobar and following the killing of a DEA agent in Mexico in 1985. In 2025, after President Trump pardoned former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, who was imprisoned in the United States following his conviction for drug trafficking, protests broke out outside the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa. Protests erupted again in 2026 following the U.S. capture of Maduro. On both occasions, Libre organized the protests.

If the U.S. and Honduras are forced to carry out more aggressive strikes against drug traffickers, a massive public relations campaign will have to be launched, aimed at convincing people in the U.S. and Honduras of the necessity of these strikes and operations and the benefits—not only for the U.S. but also for Honduras—of taking a hardline approach to fighting cartels. Furthermore, a framework must be established to ensure that operations can continue despite the changes in government that will occur in Washington and Tegucigalpa, especially if a left-wing party comes to power.

Libre has, especially during tense moments—such as when politicians’ ties to drug traffickers were brought up or during Xiomara’s administration when her government was unpopular—raised the idea of closing Soto Cano, but has never followed through on the threat, likely due to fears of U.S. reprisals in the form of drug trafficking ties becoming public, reduced U.S. economic aid, or, more likely, direct indictments in U.S. courts, which could lead to extradition requests.

Furthermore, the killing of drug traffickers could spark controversy among human rights groups—and even among supporters of operations against cartels—who might question the legality of eliminating a threat. In 2012, there was a major backlash when a Honduran Army operation, with assistance from the DEA, attacked a suspected drug-smuggling boat, killing civilians inLa Mosquitia.

Another concern for the U.S. government has been the possibility that some of the weapons sent to Honduras might end up in the hands of organized crime groups. The Mexican experience with the Zetas Cartel, where Mexican Special Forces soldiers defected to form one of Mexico’s most violent and notorious cartels. This fear was amplified during the Obama Administration’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) “Gunwalking” scandal—commonly referred to by some as the “Fast and Furious” scandal—in which the ATF sold weapons to cartels in Mexico in a failed attempt to track those weapons, which led to the killing of a U.S. Border Patrol agent in 2010.

In economic terms, the main challenges posed by any changes to the legal and economic spheres would come from Libre and othersectors that might view the new actors in the economic system as a threat. These actors would likely oppose any legislation perceived as part of the neoliberal model or U.S. investment, which they might regard as an infringement of Honduran sovereignty. Much of this resentment stems from the complex history of the United States’ role in the region, particularly regarding the United Fruit Company and the Standard Fruit Company, which wielded considerable influence in the country in the early 20th century, making Honduras synonymous with the term “Banana Republic.” Another source of tension is the military interventions of the Banana Wars in the 1920s and the coups and military dictatorships supported by the U.S. during the Cold War. The U.S. would need to deploy significant soft power resources to attempt to limit the negative backlash from any U.S. investment or financial assistance in the region.

Conclusions

Based on this analysis, we can conclude that the precarious and complex economic and security situation in Honduras poses a threat to U.S. national security and the broader stability of the Western Hemisphere. The United States would be wise to increase its assistance to Honduras and expand the number of assets and resources deployed in the region to combat drug trafficking. Honduras will also need to make significant efforts to address the situation, primarily through economic reforms and military modernization. The main challenge in resolving these issues will be the willingness of politicians and public opinion in both countries to take the necessary steps to authorize deployments to a region that has a complex history with the United States.