In the image
On the flight deck as the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) while transiting the Taiwan Strait in 2020 during routine operations [Samuel Hardgrove, US Navy].
The 2020s have seen the situation in Taiwan become more tense, from China's aggressive military exercises in response to Nancy Pelosi's visit to the island, the shift of traditional allies to mainland China, to new elections held in 2024. China has become increasingly more aggressive against its neighbor, and the traditional ally of Taiwan, the United States. Several countries have gradually shifted their loyalties towards China leaving Taiwan diplomatically isolated in the world stage.
This analysis has the objective of comparing both Taiwan and China's air and naval power, which since the end of the civil war in 1949 have become the key military assets of the two players, both as a tool of pressurein the case of China and one of deterrence in the case of Taiwan. The analysis uses historical precedents in Asia as clues of what to expect of the two nations and examines the role the US and Japan would play in an open conflict.
Background
Both air and naval forces have played critical roles in the management of the crisis. Aircraft in particular became critical in the defense of Taiwan, particularly in 1949, 1954-55, and 1958, when some of the most serious actions since the 1949 Civil War took place. Control of the air and the sea of the Strait is critical for both nations, as it is the only thing keeping Taiwan safe from invasion and would be of great importance for China in the case of attempting military action.
The first attempt by China to invade Taiwan took place in 1949, with its failed attempt to capture Kinmen. Further naval and air clashes took place around the area during the crisis that occurred during the 1950s. However, no engagements between the two have occurred since the 1958 crisis. At that time, both China and Taiwan heavily depended on Soviet, and US and Western weapons sales respectively to build up their arsenals. They gradually began to produce their own weapons and equipment as they built up their industrial capabilities and found their suppliers unwilling to sell certain types of equipment.
Naval Power
This is (probably) the most important, and recognizable aspect of conflict and power projection in the Pacific and modern warfare. Both China and Taiwan have expanded their navies in recent years. China, to confront its greatest adversary, the US Navy, and Taiwan to maintain its survival and protect the Strait.
Taiwan, in particular, has seen major changes in this field. While its mainland counterpart has rapidly expanded in size and capabilities, going from depending on purchases of ships from other countries to building its own ships, Taiwan also continues to field ships that previously saw service with the United States Navy in previous wars. The change to building self-sufficiency has been gradual, but is picking up speed, with the nation starting construction in early 2024 of a new frigate. In addition to this, Taiwan has started expansion of its submarine force, with 2023 seeing the small nation expand its military industry in regard to naval power with the launch of its first domestically produced submarine. Currently the ROC Navy fields 5 submarines, 4 destroyers, 22 frigates, 2 corvettes, 10 mine warfare vessels, more than 40 offshore patrol vessels, and 7 amphibious assault ships. Despite gradually beginning construction of its own ships, they still bear similarities to ships used by the US Navy and those of
The PLAN on the other hand, has expanded its fleet to a much larger degree and speed than Taiwan, since its objective is to act as a deterrence and, if necessary, confront the US Navy in the Pacific. Within a short period of time, the PLAN has become one of the largest navies in the world. In recent years, China has taken interestinthe construction of aircraft carriers, already possessing two that were purchased from the Russians and one more, domestically produced, is fitting out before beginning trials. In addition, China has quickly build up the industrial power to build its own ships. Most of China's equipment has influence from those of the Russian Navy. China has also greatly expanded its fleet of submarines, with almost 80 submarines from a variety of classes and types, though there are some exceptions. Currently China possesses 3 aircraft carriers, 72 submarines, 49 destroyers, 44 frigates, 71 corvettes, 49 mine warfare vessels, 127 offshore patrol vessels, and 11 amphibious assault vessels. According to some reports, China has already surpassed the US the largest navy in the world.
Both nations field destroyers and frigates, which are the backbone of blue water fleets. In the case of Taiwan, it operates 4 destroyers and 6 frigates, all of which are of the Kidd Class and Knox Class of the US Navy. All the ships in these two classes were sold to Taiwan after the US decommissioned them. In addition to these, Taiwan operates 6 ships of French built La Fayette Class and 10 of the licensed produced Oliver Hazard PerryClassfrigates, all of them are licensed built except for two which were transferred from the US Navy after decommissioning.
The PLAN for its part, operates a large destroyer force ranging from different classes, with the first of them being based on the Soviet Sovremenny Class. The rest of the ships are a mixture of a variety of modified models of the Type 51 and Type 52 Classes of destroyers. China also operates the Type 55 Class destroyer. Regarding frigates, it operates configurations of the Type 54 and Type 53 frigates.
However, if war came to Taiwan, the main ship used would be the landing craft, which would take the troops from ships to shore. China has since the 2000s increased acquisition and construction of LCACs (Landing Craft Air Cushion). LCACs are capable of transporting vehicles, including tanks, making them a valuable asset for any amphibious operation. LCACs are not ships in a conventional sense, while they can sail like ships they can also 'float' above the water via the inflatable cushion beneath it. Based on historical records, China's approach to increase capabilities to conduct amphibious operations are recent. However, in these regard, China is still limited in their capabilities, as some reports indicate China may need to requisition civilian ferries and ships to transport troops in a hypothetical war, which will be more vulnerable than military ships.
In the case of corvettes, the ROC Navy operates 3 ships of the domestically produced Tuo Chiang Class, with at least twelve more planned. The ROC Navy also operates a sizeable force of mine warfare, missile boats, and patrol vessels, which, while lacking the size and capabilities of their larger and more famous counterparts, have played critical roles in modern war. China for its part operates a sizeable force of corvettes, centered around the Type 56. In addition to this, it also operates a large force of smaller vessels, including the Type 22, Type 37, and Type 62, alongside a variety of smaller vessels.
Taiwan also has a limited force of amphibious transports, some of which are leased from the US Navy or built by Taiwan. Of those ships that were leased, 4 are World War Two era LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank).The ROC also operates 2 ships of the Newport Class. However, in 2023, Taiwan commissioned the first ship of the Yushan Class. China for its part, operates a large amphibious transport form in the form of the Type 27, Type 71, Type 72, Type 73, Type 74, and Type 75.
Regarding aircraft carriers and submarines, China is the only one who possesses the former, with 3 of them built, all of them influenced by Soviet models. For its part, Taiwan has started expansion of its submarine force, possessing 5 of them, though only 3 can be considered modern. China for its part, operates a massive force of submarines, from multiple classes and types.