Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

The clear coordination between Iran and its proxies in the Middle East, as well as the recent erosion of this proxy model, poses a threat of nuclear terrorism should the Iranian regime acquire and consolidate its targeted nuclear capabilities. The United States and Israel are committed to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb because it would exacerbate regional security challenges, encourage other countries to pursue nuclear weapons as well, and—which is the focus of this article—increase the risk of nuclear terrorism if the weapon falls into the hands of non-state militias.

President Trump launched the February 2026 strikes on Iran with the stated purpose of preventing the country from building a nuclear weapon. But as the conflict unfolded, the alleged aim seemed to shift almost entirely toward the far-reaching military, geopolitical, and economic consequences. average shifted from the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to retaliatory missile barrages, the spread of hostilities to neighboring countries, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which choked off global oil supplies. The lack of a clear strategy by the U.S. administration, coupled with the media coverage of the conflict, caused the central issue of the controversy to fade into the background of the very war it supposedly started.

However, it would be inaccurate to assume that the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program is anything new in the geopolitics of the Middle East. In fact, the nuclear program represents the turning point that has led Iran into conflict, either with its neighbors or with Western countries, such as the United States and Israel. And while the Iranian regime argues that uranium enrichment is used for civilian and legitimate purposes, the U.S. and Israeli reaction has been nothing but skepticism, based on well-founded suspicions.

The Threat of a Nuclear Iran

Iran’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities poses a multitude of major threats to international security and world politics as a whole. Scholars argue that nuclear proliferation in the Middle East will have significant consequences. First, a shift in the region’s power structure, which some argue may contribute to the balance of power by creating a bipolar nuclear system between Israel and Iran, in line with Kenneth Waltz’s structuralism; while others contend that the Middle East does not follow a bipolar structure: other middle powers, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, may seek to acquire nuclear capabilities to deter a potentially nuclear Iran.

However, this article focuses on a second threat, one that is likely even more concerning: the threat of nuclear-powered international terrorism. Iran’s use of proxies —such as Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen—to respond to Israeli and U.S. attacks is neither new nor unprecedented. But with the rise of the Iranian nuclear program, marginal groups are moving one step closer to acquiring nuclear weapons, thereby changing the paradigm of traditional nuclear conflict, deterrence, and nonproliferation.

History of the Nuclear Program and 2026

The Iranian nuclear program is not a new aspiration of the Iranian government; it originated before the 1979 Revolution and the confrontation with the United States and Israel. Iran’s first nuclear program initiative was launched in the 1950s under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as part of the U.S. “Atoms for Peace” program under the Eisenhower administration. In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established to “ensure that nuclear technology is used only for peaceful purposes and to help Member States use this remarkable technology to improve the well-being and prosperity of their people.” In 1967, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center was established and equipped with a 5-megawatt research reactor supplied by the United States.

Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and ratified it in 1970, thereby placing its program under IAEA oversight. In the 1970s, the Shah set a goal of building 23 nuclear power plants by the year 2000 and envisioned nuclear energy as central to Iran’s future, stating that “petroleum is a noble material, far too valuable to burn (...) Nuclear energy could theoretically reduce some of Iran’s dependence and free up more oil and natural gas for export.” Construction of reactors at Bushehr began with German assistance, and U.S. and European companies scrambled for contracts. However, following the collapse of Western-led nuclear Programs the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the military capabilities gained during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Iran’s aspirations changed.

Outside the IAEA’s purview during the 1990s, Iran rebuilt its nuclear infrastructure with the goal of establishing a nuclear fuel cycle: uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment. The illegal transfer of nuclear materials and technologies from Pakistan’s uranium enrichment facilities, along with a complex international network of experts, suppliers, and front companies—including those in Libya and North Korea—aided Iran in rebuilding its capabilities.

Despite diplomatic crises and U.S. sanctions during the 2000s and early 2010s, Iran continued its uranium enrichment. By the summer of 2013, Iran had installed more than 18,000 of its first-generation IR-1 centrifuges and 1,300 more advanced centrifuges across its enrichment sites. According to the IAEA, it had also accumulated a stockpile of about 9,700 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% and 370 kg enriched up to 20%. These figures led to the 2015 nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

The JCPOA and UNSC Resolution 2231 aimed to cap enrichment at 3.67%, production at 300 kilograms, and the operation of reactors for periods of 10 and 15 years, in exchange for the lifting of sanctions by the U.S., the Security Council, and the EU. However, after President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, enrichment resumed and accelerated to 20%, the installation and operation of more advanced centrifuges resumed as well, and the production of uranium metal began. President Biden’s attempts to revive the deal were unsuccessful.

Nuclear Terrorism and the Iranian Proxy Model

The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups has been viewed as one of the most serious threats to international security. In this regard, nuclear terrorism is categorized into three distinct types of scenarios, each posing unique security threats:

1) The first scenario involves acquired weapons or improvised nuclear devices (INDs), in which terrorist groups might build a device using stolen special nuclear materials—such as highly enriched uranium—to obtain a functional weapon with the complicity of a state.

2) The second category includes radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) and radiological exposure devices (REDs). Unlike a nuclear explosion, these devices use conventional explosives or proximity to spread contamination, and a terrorist’s success may simply consist of creating widespread social and psychological panic rather than causing mass casualties.

3) And the third is the sabotage of major nuclear facilities. A successful attack on a nuclear facility, such as a power plant, could result in the release of radioactive material comparable in severity to a megaton explosion.

The risk of nuclear terrorism stems from the clear coordination between Iran and its proxies in the region, but also from the deterioration of the proxy model in 2026. Formerly known as the“Axis of Resistance,”groups such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias have served as tools for projecting power while avoiding direct confrontation. By 2026, however, this network had entered a phase of fragmentation and erosion.

Hezbollah, once the regional vanguard, suffered massive military attrition, the loss of its leadership, and the collapse of its Syrian logistical backbone with the fall of Bashar al-Assad in 2024. The Houthis faced international strikes and financial strangulation that forced them into a state of strategic retrenchment and organizational survival. And Iraqi militias have fragmented into competing factions that increasingly prioritize local political survival over coordinated service to Tehran.

The weakening of these groups undermines Iranian-led stability, creates security vacuums and unmanaged power gaps where fragmented militia cells or remnants may be inclined to seek out radiological or nuclear materials as a desperate means of maintaining their relevance. The increased reliance on nuclear capabilities raises the stakes for state-level conflict, which can lead to unauthorized or misinformed use of nuclear weapons if command structures fail.

Additionally, weakened non-state actors may no longer seek victory on the battlefield but rather aim to create social and psychological panic. Sabotage of nuclear facilities can result in severe radioactive contamination, offering a high-impact alternative for groups that can no longer sustain conventional warfare. And as the Middle East enters a“new era for nuclear energy,” more facilities are becoming potential targets, and the sale of weapons on the black market increases the risk of complicity by insiders as a primary method for successfully sabotaging a nuclear facility.

Beyond the Enrichment Line

The significance of Iran’s nuclear program extends far beyond the immediate military confrontation of 2026. While the conflict has been defined by the elimination of leadership, regional escalation, and economic disruption, these developments should not obscure the deeper strategic challenge posed by the continued erosion of nuclear nonproliferation norms in the Middle East. The international community will need to confront a security environment shaped not only by state rivalries, but also by the fragmentation of traditional proxy networks, the expansion of civilian nuclear infrastructure across the region, and the growing risk that non-state actors will exploit vulnerabilities in nuclear governance.

Looking ahead, the focus of international security is not on whether Iran’s nuclear ambitions will continue to influence regional politics, but on how it will adapt its institutions, deterrence strategies, and nonproliferation mechanisms to prevent a future in which nuclear risks become increasingly decentralized and difficult to contain.