In the picture
Flag of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF), flying during the Orient Shield 17 military exercises [Markus Castaneda]
The long-standing coalition partnership between Japan’s leading party, the LDP, and the smaller Komeito came to an end in October 2025, after nearly three decades of collaboration. Without Komeito acting as a pacifist check on the LDP, there is a high likelihood that Japan will acquire “normal military powers,” and self-restraint will disappear.
On October 10, 2025, Japan’s 26-year-long ruling coalition between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito came to an end. Komeito,“the party of welfare and peace,” has its roots in a Nichiren Buddhist movement called Sokka Gakkai. Since its founding in 1964, this moderate conservative party has repeatedly sought to advocate for the interests of a segment of Japanese citizens who lacked representation. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the dominant, broad-based conservative LDP, which, under Sanae Takaichi, is championing anti-communism and assertive right-wing politics. Marking a major political shift following the collapse of the most stable coalition in modern Japanese politics, the question arises: What will Japanese foreign policy look like after Komeito is no longer represented in the Diet? This article examines the key role Komeito played before the coalition split, acting as a pacifist check on the LDP. It further narrows its focus to a specific aspect of the LDP’s policy diary, namely its support for the reinterpretation of Japan’s constitution to allow for an expanded military role.
Japan’s Pacifism and Culture of Anti-Militarism
Japan’s postwar pacifist stance is enshrined in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (1947): “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” After World War II, the Constitution was imposed on the Japanese people by the American occupying forces; Article 9 embodies MacArthur’s vision of an unarmed Japan. Japan’s devastating defeat in 1945 led many ordinary Japanese citizens to develop a deep aversion to militarization and war in general.
Japan’s reluctance to assume a more assertive military role is not primarily the result of material constraints but rather a deeply ingrained “culture of anti-militarism” that emerged in the aftermath of World War II. It is rooted in the collective memory of the Japanese people that the military is a dangerous entity that must be constantly restrained so that it does not undermine Japan’s postwar democratic order. Although collective guilt is present in postwar Japan, victimization is ultimately the dominant narrative. Many citizens viewed themselves as doubly victimized by the West—through economic coercion and wartime destruction—as well as by their own military leadership, which had recklessly plunged the nation into catastrophe. This perception of “double victimization” further fostered deep institutional distrust of the armed forces.
From a constructivist perspective, this combination of institutional constraints and societal norms has produced a national identity that characterizes Japan as a “peace state,” in which the use of military force is viewed as both politically and morally problematic. As Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink argue, norms and identities are socially constructed and shape how states define their interests and behavior.
Today, Komeito serves as a vital defender of this ethos in Japanese politics. However, its core values have gradually eroded under pressure to accommodate and mitigate the LDP’s more aggressive proposals since the two parties became coalition partners in 1999. Following the breakup of the coalition, the concern lingering among the Japanese—now that Takaichi and the LDP are in power—is whether militarization could eventually become the norm in Japan.
26-year-long governing coalition
The LDP-Komeito coalition was characterized by strategic pragmatism rather than ideology. The partnership would never have lasted 26 years without reciprocity. The biggest draw for the LDP was Komeito’s ability to mobilize 7–8 million Soka Gakkai voters, thereby delivering 20,000–30,000 additional votes per single-member district, which could have prevented the loss of nearly 100 lower house seats without this support. In return, Komeito secured 8–10 seats in single-member districts, 20–25 via proportional representation, plus cabinet positions and a seat at the policymaking table—outcomes that would have been unattainable on its own in the winner-take-all system.
Komeito, lacking the power to fully block LDP initiatives but retaining sufficient leverage to shape and moderate them, is precisely how it served as a pacifist check. This common feature of coalition politics—where junior partners must constantly balance influence against principle—perfectly mirrors the LDP-Komeito dynamic.
During Keizo Obuchi’s administration between 1998 and 2000, Komeito helped pass legislation establishing the hinomaru as the national flag and“Kimigayo”as the national anthem (even though the party had previously opposed it because the song and the anthem had military associations). The hardest pills for the Komeito party to swallow were the SDF deployments to Iraq under Koizumi following 9/11 and the compromise that led to the passage of the unpopular Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS), which took effect in late 2014. The Komeito of the 1960s and 1970s, rooted in a commitment to democracy, peace, and human rights, would never have tolerated supporting policies that so blatantly expanded the power of the state. Despite Komeito’s constant pushback against the LDP, the collaboration did result in the LDP passing fewer aggressive military initiatives.
Komeito could not stop the normalization process, but it slowed and limited it. One example is the role Komeito played in diplomatic negotiations within the coalition, rather than resorting to confrontation. In 1972, Komeito Secretary General Yoshikatsu Takeiri traveled to China and met with Premier Zhou Enlai to discuss the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. Upon his return to Tokyo, he conveyed Zhou’s views to Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of the LDP and reportedly helped persuade him that Beijing was serious about establishing diplomatic ties.
Constant opposition to the revision of Article 9 is of the utmost importance in Komeito’s work. Komeito party leader Natsuo Yamaguchi warned against unilateral reinterpretation lacking legitimacy. While the party ultimately accommodated reforms during Shinzo Abe’s tenure as prime minister, it ensured that measures such as collective self-defense were tightly circumscribed and legally bounded. In this sense, Komeito served as an internal check on the LDP, often curbing its bolder revisionist initiatives, effectively “saving the LDP from itself.”
Without Komeito's restraint
The end of the coalition between the LDP and Komeito marks the removal of the main representative of pacifist moderation within the Japanese government. For 26 years, Komeito has served as an internal check on the LDP—not always successfully, and not without compromises, but meaningfully and consistently. Without this check, the conditions for accelerated military normalization in Japan are more favorable than they have been since 1945. The LDP under Takaichi is leaning toward constitutional revision, increased defense spending, and a more aggressive foreign policy. The coalition constraints that previously forced moderation are now gone.