COMMENTARY / Jairo Císcar

Since the end of the Second World War, collective security on the European continent and with it, peace, has been a priority. The founding fathers of the European Union themselves, aware of the tensions that resulted from the First and Second World Wars, devised and created security structures to prevent future conflicts and strengthen relations between former enemies. The first structure, although not purely military, obeys this logic: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), essential for the creation and maintenance of industry and armies, was created by the Treaty of Paris in 1951, introducing a concept as widely used today as "energy security". This was arguably the first major step towards effective integration of European countries.

However, for the issue at hand, the path has been much more complicated. In the same period in which the ECSC was born, French Prime Minister René Pleven, with the encouragement of Robert Schuman and Jean Monet, wanted to promote the European Defence Community. This ambitious plan aimed to merge the armed forces of the six founding countries (including the Federal Republic of Germany) into a European Armed Forces that would keep the continent together and prevent the possibility of a new conflict between states. Ambitious as it was, the project failed in 1954, when the deeply nationalist Gaullist deputies of the French National Assembly refused to ratify the agreement. European integration at the military level thus suffered a setback from which it would not begin to recover until the present century, although it continues to face many of the reluctances it once did.

Why did the European Defence Community fail, and what makes the European Armed Forces still a difficult discussion today? This is a question that needs to be analysed and understood, for while political and economic integration has advanced with a large consensus, the military problem, which should go hand in hand with the two previous issues, has always been the Achilles' tendon of the common European project.

There are basically two factors to take into account. The first is the existence of a larger defense community, NATO. Since 1948, NATO has been the principal military alliance of Western countries. Born to counter Soviet expansionism, the Alliance has evolved in size and objectives to its current configuration of 30 member states and a multitude of other states in the form of strategic alliances. Although NATO's primary purpose was diluted after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it has evolved with the times, remaining alert and operational all around the globe. The existence of this common, powerful and ambitious project under U.S. leadership largely obscured efforts and intentions to create a common European defense project. Why create one, overlapping, structure if the objectives were practically the same and NATO guaranteed greater logistical, military superiority and a nuclear arsenal? For decades, this has been the major argument against further European integration in the field of defense - as protection was secured but delegated.

Another issue was the nationalism still prevalent among European states, especially in the aforementioned Gaullist France. Even today, with an ongoing and deep political, economic and, at a certain level, judicial integration, military affairs are still often seen as the last bastion of national sovereignty. In Schengen Europe, they remain for many the guarantee of those borders that fell long ago. 

Other issues to take into account are the progressive detachment of the population from the armed forces (a Europe that has not seen war on its own territory in 70 years, except for the Balkans, has tended to settle into peace, nearly oblivious to wars) and its progressive ageing, with a future with fewer people of military age, and who, as we have mentioned, often have an ideological and motivational gap with previous generations with respect to the concept and utility of the military.

It was not until relatively recently, with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, that the embryonic mechanisms of the current Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), supervised by the European Defence Agency, began to be implemented. In the 2010s, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, these mechanisms were established. The Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS) is one of them. It constitutes the EU's first permanent strategic headquarters. The final impetus came in 2015, with the European Union Global Strategy. This led to the creation of various far-reaching initiatives, most notably the Permanent Structured Cooperation(PESCO), which since 2017 has been pursuing the structural integration of the Armed Forces of all EU countries except Denmark and Malta. It is not only limited to proper integration, but also leads capability development projects such as the EU Collaborative Warfare Capabilities (ECOWAR) or the Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA), as well as defense industry endeavors such as the MUSAS project, or the CYBER-C4ISR capabilities level.

Although it is too early to say for sure, Europe may be as close as it can get to René Pleven's distant dream. The EU's geopolitical situation is changing, and so is its own language and motivation. If we used to talk about Europe delegating its protection for years, now Emmanuel Macron advocates 'strategic autonomy" for the EU. It should be recalled that just over a year ago he claimed that "NATO is brain-dead". Some voices in the EU's political arena claim and have realised that it can no longer delegate the European protection and defense of its interests, and they are starting to take steps towards doing so. Despite these advances, it is true that it is not a shared interest, at least, as a whole. France and other Mediterranean member states are pushing towards it, but those in the East, as Poland or Latvia, are far more concerned about the rise of Russia, and are comfortable enough for U.S. troops to be established in their terrain. 

Having said that, I truly believe that the advantages of the European Armed Forces project outweigh its negative aspects. First of all, a Europe united in defense policies would not imply the disappearance of NATO, or the breaking of agreements with third countries. In fact, these alliances could even be strengthened and fully adapted to the 21st century and to the war of the future. As an example, in 2018 the EU and NATO signed collaboration agreements on issues such as cybersecurity, defense industry and military mobility.        

While NATO works, Europe is now facing a dissociation between U.S. interests and those of the other Allies, especially the European ones. In particular, countries such as France, Spain and Italy are shifting their defense policies from the Middle East, or the current peace process in Afghanistan (which, despite 20 years of war, sounds like a long way off), to sub-Saharan Africa (Operation "Barkhane" or EUTM Mali), a much closer region with a greater impact on the lives of the European citizens. This does not detract from the fact that NATO faces global terrorism in a new era that is set to surpass asymmetric warfare and other 4th generation wars: the era of hybrid warfare. Russia's military build-up on the EU's eastern flank and China's penetration into Africa do not invite a loosening of ties with the United States, but European countries need to prioritize their own threats over those of the U.S., although it is true that the needs of countries to the west of the EU are not the same as those to the east. This could be the main stumbling block for a joint European Army, as weighting the different strategic priorities could be really arduous.

It is true that this idea of differing policies is not shared in the EU as a whole. Countries such as Poland, those in the Balkans or the Baltic have different approaches and necessities when talking about a European Union common security strategy. The EU is a 27 country-wide body that often is extremely difficult to navigate within. Consensus is only reached after very long discussions (see the soap opera on the COVID relief package negotiations), and being defence as important as it is, and in need of fast, executive decision making, the intricate bureaucracy of the EU could not help with it. But if well managed, it could be an opportunity to develop new strategies for decision-making and reforming the European system as a whole, fostering a new, more effective Europe.

Another discussion, probably outdated, is the one who claims that the EU is not capable of planning, organizing and conducting operations outside the NATO umbrella. In this case, apart from the aforementioned guidelines and policies, one simply has to look at the facts: the EU today leads six active (and 18 completed) military missions with close to 5,000 troops deployed. The "Althea" (Bosnia & Herzegovina) and "Atalanta" (in the Indian Ocean) missions are particularly noteworthy. It is true that these examples are of low-intensity conflicts but, given the combat experience of EU nations under NATO or in other missions (French and Portuguese in Africa, etc.) combat-pace could be quickly achieved. The NATO certification system under which most European armed forces operate guarantees standardisation in tactics, logistics and procedures, so that standardisation at the European level would be extremely simple if existing models are taken into account.

Another issue is the question of whether the EU could politically and economically engage in a long, high-intensity operation without getting drowned by the public opinion, financial administration, and, obviously, with the planning and carrying out of a whole campaign. This is one of the other main problems with future European armed forces because, as mentioned earlier, Europeans are not prepared in any way to be confronted with the reality of a situation of war. What rules of engagement will be used? How to cope with casualties? And even more, how to create an effective chain of command and control among 27 countries? And what will happen if one does not agree with a particular intervention or action? How could it be argued that the EU, world's leading beacon of human rights, democracy and peace, gets engaged in a war? Undoubtedly, these questions have rational and objective answers, but in an era of social average, populism, empty discourses, and fake news, it would be difficult to engage with the public (and voters) to support the idea.

Having said that, there is room for optimism. Another reason pointing towards Europe's armed forces is the collaboration that exists at the military industrial level. PESCO and the European Defence Fund encourage this, and projects such as the FCAS and EURODRONE lay the foundations for the future of European armed forces capabilities. It should not be forgotten that the European defense industry is the world leader behind that of the United States and is an increasingly tough competitor for the latter.

In addition, the use of military forces in European countries during the current coronavirus pandemic has served to reinforce the message of their utility and need for collaboration beyond the purely military. While the militarisation of emergencies must be avoided and the soldier must not be reduced to a mere "Swiss army knife" at disposition of the government trying to make up their own lack of planning or capacity to deal with the situation, it has brought the military closer to the streets, and to some extent may have helped to counteract the disaffection with the armed forces that exists in many European countries (due to the factors mentioned above). 

Finally, I believe that European-level integration of the armed forces will not merely be beneficial, but necessary for Europe. If the EU wants to maintain its diplomacy, its economic power, it needs its own strategic project, an "area of control" over its interests and, above all, military independence. This does not preclude maintaining and promoting the alliances already created, but this is a unique and necessary opportunity to fully establish the common European project. The political and economic framework cannot be completed without the military one; and the military one cannot function without the former. All that remains is to look at the direction the EU is taking and hope that it will be realized. It is more than possible and doable, and the reality is that work is being done towards it.

[Pablo Pérez López, Charles de Gaulle, el estadista rebelde (Ciudadela: Madrid, 2020), 218 pp.]

review / Jairo Císcar

Coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the death of Charles de Gaulle and the 75th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II, Professor Pablo Pérez López publishes this new biography of "the most illustrious of the French", as he is sometimes referred to. When one undertakes the writing of a biography, and even more so when it is about a character about whom an infinite number of books and articles have been written, one runs the risk of becoming diluted in what has gone before and not contributing anything new. However, this volume presents the character from a different perspective: his rebelliousness. Rebelliousness understood as a struggle for what is believed to be just, as an active nonconformism that pushes to overcome mediocrity, as love and service to France in its darkest moments. Precisely, I believe that this is one of the greatest achievements of the book: to present, in barely 200 pages and with a kind and direct style, a new portrait of the French general, who is praised -beyond the excusable chiaroscuros of every person- as a model to follow and an example of bravery that counts with full actuality.

The book presents De Gaulle's life chronologically, from his childhood to his death. It is essential, in order to understand the great man he would later become, to analyze his early life. We are presented with a restless and dreamy young man, a devout Christian from a very early age. A young man who, at the age of 14, discovered a vocation, that of military life, which would mark his whole life and the lives of millions of his compatriots, and who would apply himself to it to the point of becoming a leader A . Also noteworthy in the book is the extensive use of passages from his memoirs or handwritten texts of the protagonist, which reveal the most unknown facet of the character: his psyche, his love, his devotion, his rebelliousness. Because it must be emphasized that sample is a self-conscious (but not overbearing) De Gaulle who is clear that he has a mission statement.

We soon move on to introduce the then captain, who stood out during the Great War for his wise analysis and foresight, whose love for France never clouded his judgment when it came to pointing out his own and others' failures. A young man who, despite the humiliation of being taken prisoner (despite his heroic efforts that earned him the Legion of Honor), never ceased to learn and examine the enemy, taking advantage of every moment of his 32 months of captivity.

His evolution is followed after the Great War, already as a promising member of Petáin's entourage. But not everything is success. De Gaulle's life is traced in the greatness of men who know how to overcome difficulties. Perhaps the most special, and where his true character is appreciated, is in the life of his daughter Anne, who suffered from Down syndrome, and with whom De Gaulle developed an extraordinary bond and closeness. It was with her that the thoughtful general dressed as an affable and affectionate father.

This training of his character seems to me essential to understand the rest of the book, and therefore the rest of his life. Without wanting to end up making a complete summary of the volume (which, as mentioned above, covers his entire life, with special and necessary emphasis on his "political life"), I felt it necessary to reflect the singular proposal and goal of this book, which is none other than to show that more unknown side of the French general, that rebelliousness and nonconformism that pushed him to have a very important weight in the creation of the current form of the French Republic and whose imprint, 50 years after his death, is still alive in Europe and in French politics.

Personally, I was very attracted to the style and organization of the writing. It makes the proposal enjoyable and easy to read, while at the same time a very serious and profound work , which invites constant reflection. sample the intimacy and loneliness of a man faced with the incomprehension of his contemporaries, with respect to whom he was always ahead. A man who, in final, always put the greater good, his beloved France, before his own good. An expert tankman who knew how to lead his country in such different moments: the Free French government in London, the parade on the Champs Elysées, the revolt of Algiers, the birth of the Fifth French Republic, May '68 and his last resignation, as a man of honor, after losing the referendum on the Senate and the regions that he called, in one of his last acts of rebellion, against all his advisors.

Finally, De Gaulle was a rebel until death, refusing any state funeral and resting, together with his beloved daughter, in a small French village. His tombstone - which simply reads: Charles de Gaulle, 1890-1970 - merely shows his final rebellion. The man died, but the myth was born.

WORKING PAPER / Jokin de Carlos Sola

ABSTRACT

During and after the fall of the Soviet Block the three countries of Germany, Denmark and Sweden saw an opportunity to increase their influence on the region that centuries before they had possessed. They did this through diplomatic support of the opposition and communication strategies and once the new countries were either independent or liberal democracies, they used their economic and political power to attract them. This was done by buying and investing in the new privatized assets of these countries, soft power and in some cases diplomatic pressure. By this way Germany, Sweden and Denmark did not only got new investment hubs and markets for their products but also support in the Governance of the European Union.

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A brief outline of the European defense system, integrated into the European External Action Service and its importance to the Union

The European Union will launch the Conference on the Future of Europe on May 9th, marking the beginning of the event that will feature debates between institutions, politicians and civil society on several topics that concern the community, including security and defense. It is clear that the majority of the European Union favors a common defense effort, and the Union has taken steps to ensure a solid structure to lay the framework for a possible integration of forces. Following the efforts to unify foreign policy objectives, a unified defense is the next logical step for European integration.

Course for the Somali National Armed Forces, led by a Spanish Colonel with instructors from Italy, Sweden, Finland and Spain [EUTM-Somalia].

ARTICLE / José Antonio Latorre    

According to the last standard Eurobarometer, around 77% of Europeans support a common defense and security policy among European Union member states. The support for this cause is irregular, with the backing spanning from 58% (Sweden) to 93% (Luxembourg). Therefore, it is expected that security and defense will definitely take a prominent role in the future of the Union.

In 2017, the European Commission launched the "White Paper on the Future of Europe," a document that outlines the challenges and consequently the possible scenarios on how the Union could evolve by 2025. In the field of security, the document considers three different scenarios: Security and Defense Cooperation, Shared Security and Defense, and Common Defense and Security. In the first scenario, the member states would cooperate on a voluntary basis, similarly to an ad-hoc system. The second scenario details one where the tendency would be to project a stronger security, sharing military and economic capabilities to enhance efficiency. The final scenario would be one where members expand mutual assistance and take part in the integration of defense forces; this includes a united defense spending and distribution of military assets to reduce costs and boost capabilities.

Although these are three different predictions, what is clear is that the enhancement of European security is of greatest importance. As former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said in the 2016 State of the Union address: "Europe can no longer afford to piggyback on the military might of others. We have to take responsibility for protecting our interests and the European way of life. It is only by working together that Europe will be able to defend itself at home and abroad." He was referring to the paramountcy of a strategic autonomy that will permit the union to become stronger and have more weight in international relations, while depending less on the United States.

The existing framework on security

The European Union does not have to start from scratch to achieve these goals, since it currently has a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) branch. The bureau is situated within the EU Military Staff, part of the European External Action Service in Brussels. This operational headquarters was established on June 8th, 2017, with the aim of boosting defense capabilities for the European Union outside its borders. It was created in order to strengthen civil/military cooperation through the Joint Support Coordination Cell and the Civil Planning and Conduct Capability, avoiding unnecessary overlap with NATO. Its main responsibilities include operational planning and conduct of the current non-executive missions; namely the European Union Training Missions (EUTM) in Mali, Somalia and Central African Republic.

A non-executive mission is an operation conducted to support a host nation with an advisory role only. For example, EUTM Somalia was established in 2010 to strengthen the Somali federal defense institutions through its three-pillar approach: training, mentoring and advising. The mission is supporting the development of the Somali Army General Staff and the Ministry of Defense through advice and tactical training. The mission has no combat mandate, but it works closely with the EU Naval Force - Operation ATALANTA (prevention and deterrence of privacy and protection of shipping), EUCAP Somalia (regional civilian mission), and AMISOM (African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia), in close cooperation with the European Union. The mission, which is located in Mogadishu, has a strength of over 200 personnel, with seven troop contributing states, primarily from Italy and Spain. Non-executive missions have a clear mandate of advising, but they can be considered as a prototype of European defense cooperation for the future.

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is the framework for cooperation between EU member states in order to conduct missions to maintain security and establish ties with third countries through the use of military and civilian assets. It was launched in 1999 and it has become a bedrock for EU foreign policy. It gives the Union the possibility to intervene outside its borders and cooperate with other organizations, such as NATO and the African Union, in peacekeeping and conflict prevention. The CSDP is the umbrella for many branches that are involved with security and defense, but there is still a need for an enhancement and concentration of forces that will expand its potential.

Steppingstones for a larger, unified project

Like all the European Union, the CSDP is still a project that needs construction, and a European Union military should be a priority. In recent years, there have been efforts to implement measures to advance towards this goal. Firstly, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched in 2017 to reinforce defense capabilities and increase military coordination at an interoperable level. Participation is voluntary, but once decided, the country must abide by legally binding commitments. So far, 25 member states have joined the integrated structure, which depends on the European External Action Service, EU Military Staff and the European Defense Agency. Presently, there are 46 projects being developed, including a Joint EU Intelligence School, the upgrade of Maritime Surveillance, a European Medical Command and a Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Center, among the many others. Although critics have suggested that the structure will overlap with NATO competences, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that he believed "that PESCO can strengthen European defense, which is good for Europe but also good for NATO". It is important to add that its alliance with NATO was strengthened through common participation in the cybersecurity sector, joint exercises, and counterterrorism. Secondly, the launch of the European Defense Fund in 2017 permits co-funded defense cooperation, and it will be part of the 2021-2027 long-term EU budget. Finally, the mentioned Military Planning and Conduct Capability branch was established in 2017 to improve crisis management and operational surveillance.

Therefore, it is a clear intention of the majority of the European Union to increase capabilities and unify efforts to have a common defense. Another aspect is that a common military will make spending more efficient, which will permit the Union to compete against powers like China or the United States. Again, the United States is mentioned because although it is an essential ally, Europeans cannot continue to depend on their transatlantic partner for security and defense.

A European Union military?

With a common army, the European Union will be a significant player in the international field. The integration of forces, technology and equipment reduces spending and boosts efficiency, which would be a historical achievement for the Union. European integration is a project based on peace, democracy, human dignity, equality, freedom and the protection and promotion of human rights. If the Union wants to continue to be the bearer of these values and protect those that are most vulnerable against the injustices of this century, then efforts must be concentrated to reach this objective.

The Union is facing tough challenges, from nationalisms and internal divides to economic and sanitary obstacles. However, it is not the first time that unity has been put at risk. Brexit has shown that the European project is not invulnerable, that it is still not fully constructed. The European way of life is a model for freedom and security, but this must be fought for and protected; it can never be taken for granted.

Europe has lived an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity due to past endeavors at its foundation. It is evident that there will always be challenges and critics, but the only way to continue to be a leader is through unification; and it starts with a European Army. There are already mechanisms in place to ensure cooperation, such as those explored with non-executive missions. These are the stepping-stones for defense coordination and partnerships in the future. Although it is a complex task, it seems more necessary than ever before. For the protection of Western values and culture, for the promotion of human rights and dignity, and for the defense of freedom and democracy, European integration at the defense level is the next step in the future of the European Union.

The former ECB president takes the helm of Italy with a diary of reforms and a return to Atlanticism.

After a few years of political instability, in mid-February Italy inaugurated a government that is stronger in principle, headed by Mario Draghi, former President of the European Central Bank. His technical profile , his prestige after eight years in European governance and the formation of a government with a certain national unity character are an opportunity for Italy to overcome the current health and economic crisis and to undertake the reforms that the country needs.

Mario Draghi, accepting the assignment to form a government in February 2021 [Presidency of the Republic].

article / Matilde Romito, Jokin de Carlos Sola

For more than a year, the government of Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte had been strongly contested from within, especially due to the disagreements of Italia Viva, the party led by Matteo Renzi, at subject economic. The straw that broke the camel's back was Renzi's civil service examination to Conte's proposed plan for the use of aid from the Recovery Fund launched by the European Union to deal with the crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Conte lost his majority on January 13 following the resignation of three ministers belonging to Italia Viva and on January 26 he presented his Withdrawal. On February 3, the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, entrusted the training of the new government to Mario Draghi, former President of the European Central Bank (ECB).

At the start of his mandate, Mario Draghi set out his objectives. He stressed the importance of the country maintaining a certain unity in such a difficult historical moment and indicated that his priority will be to offer more opportunities and fight against the status quo that prevents the implementation of reforms.

On February 17, Mario Draghi obtained the confidence of Parliament, recording one of the largest majorities since the Second World War. management Draghi then formed a government made up of different political forces, with the purpose to face the consequences of the pandemic in a framework of national unity: in addition to various technical ministers (8), the 5 Star Movement (4), the Democratic Party (3), the Lega (3), Forza Italia (3), Liberi e Uguali (1) and Italia Viva (1) are represented in the Cabinet. This internal diversity, which on some issues manifests itself in opposing positions, could lead to some governmental instability.

National policy: recovery and reforms

The Draghi Government has proposed as a priority the vaccination campaign and the economic reactivation, as well as reforms in the tax system and in the public administration and Justice system. The former President of the ECB has shown a certain capacity both for innovation in the organizational Structures and for delegating tasks, all of which will be tackled quickly, according to his maxim that "we will do it soon, we will do it very soon".

Accelerating vaccination

As for the vaccination campaign, Draghi is applying maximization and firmness. First of all, he reformed the administrative summits in charge of the vaccination plan and appointed General Francesco Paolo Figliuolo, a military expert in logistics, as the new extraordinary commissioner for the Covid-19 emergency. By then the daily doses supplied reached 170,000, but Figliuolo, together with the director of the Civil Protection, Fabrizio Curcio, and the Minister of Health, Roberto Speranza, have set as goal to triple that issue. To this end, new vaccination sites have been set up, such as companies, gyms or empty parking lots, and a mobilization of staff has been promoted for vaccination work.

The Draghi government has also adopted greater firmness at the international level, as was the decision to block the export to Australia of 250,000 doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine. Although supported by the EU, the measure took many countries by surprise and made Italy the first EU member to apply such a legal mechanism. On March 12, the Government announced the possibility of future production in Italy of some of the vaccines already approved internationally.

Economicsstructural reforms

The new Government's economic diary will be characterized by structural reforms to promote productivity, as well as by the application of economic aid aimed at those most affected by the crisis, with the goal aim of relaunching the country and fighting against new social inequalities. The Government is finalizing the Recovery Plan to be submitted to Brussels in order to obtain the funds provided by the EU.

During his term as ECB President Draghi promoted structural reforms in several European countries; therefore, his leadership will be core topic for the promotion of reforms aimed at increasing productivity, reducing bureaucracy and improving the quality of Education. The Government promises more expense at Education and the promotion of a more sustainable and digitized Economics , as called for by the EU Green Deal.

Through the "Sostegni" legislative decree, the Government is implementing an aid plan. Some of them are aimed at defraying the modification of the framework layoffs implemented by Conte, but this requires a more consensual negotiation.

Streamlining of public administration and Justice

The reform of public administration has been entrusted to framework D'Alberti, lawyer and professor of Administrative Law at La Sapienza in Rome. The reform will follow two paths: greater connectivity and an update of the competencies of public officials.

In relation to Justice, the purpose is to implement several of the recommendations moved by the EU in 2019 and 2020. Among other measures, the EU calls for a greater efficiency of the Italian civil judicial system, through a faster work of the courts, a better distribution of the burden of work, the adoption of simpler procedural rules and an active crackdown on corruption.

Foreign Policy: Atlanticism and less enthusiasm for China

One of the first consequences of Draghi's election as Prime Minister has been the new image of stability and willingness to cooperate that Italy has come to project not only in Brussels but also in Washington, both politically and economically. Nevertheless, many aspects of Conte's foreign policy will be maintained, given the continuity of Luigi di Maio as Foreign Minister.

Beyond Europe, Draghi's priorities will be mainly two: the new rapprochement with Washington - in the framework of a convinced Atlanticism, within multilateralism - and the reinforcement of Italian policy in the Mediterranean. Draghi's arrival also has the potential to break with the rapprochement with China effected by Conte, such as the inclusion of Italian ports in the New Silk Road. While this may secure Italy as a major U.S. ally, any decision will have to take into account the Chinese investment that may be committed.

Contribution to European governance

Italy is the third Economics in the EU and the eighth in the world, so its economic performance has some international repercussions. Draghi has assured his commitment to the recovery and his contacts with European elites may help to ease the tension in discussions with other EU members on the distribution of funds, especially the so-called Next Generation EU. During the Euro Crisis Draghi was one of the main advocates of structural reforms and now these are again vital to avoid an increase in expense that could cause debt to grow too high or cuts from budget that would hurt growth.

Draghi has stated that "without Italy there is no Europe, but without Europe there is less Italy" and he intends to make Italy a more active and engaged subject in Europe, while trying to balance the interests of France, Germany and the Netherlands. Merkel's departure at the end of 2021 opens the possibility of a power vacuum in the European committee ; with France and Italy being the second and third Economics her partnership could bring stability and ensure the persistence of the Recovery Fund. This in turn may end up causing governance problems with Germany and the Netherlands should there be disagreements over the use of the funds. However, Draghi has been reticent about France's geopolitical proposals to establish Europe as an independent actor from the United States. This may end up poisoning the potential new special relationship between Rome and Paris.

The advertisement of willingness for dialogue and concord with both Turkey and Russia may end up causing problems in Brussels with other countries. In the Turkish case it may compromise relations with Greece in the Mediterranean. However, the strong criticism of Erdogan, whom he called a dictator, for having diplomatically humiliated Ursula von der Leyen in his visit to AnKara, seems to rule out counterproductive approaches. On the other hand, his desire for dialogue also with Moscow may end up sitting badly in the Baltic capitals, as well as in Washington. 

The Mediterranean: immigration, Libya and Turkey

Draghi also referred to strategic areas outside the EU close to Italy: the Maghreb, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Regarding the latter, Italy's priorities do not seem to change: the goal is to control immigration. To this end, Draghi hopes to establish cooperation with Spain, Greece and Cyprus.

In this area the stability of Libya is important, and the Italian support to the Government of agreement National (GNA) established in Tripoli, one of whose main advocates in the EU has been Luigi Di Maio, who remains at the head of Foreign Affairs, will follow. Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah has declared to be ready to collaborate on Immigration issues with Draghi, but the latter seems to be skeptical towards bilateral deals and will prefer it to be done in a European framework .

This goes against the policy of Greece and France, who support the Libyan National Army, based in Tubruk, because of the GNA's Islamist connections and Turkey's support for them. These differences in relation to Libya have already caused problems and made it difficult to establish sanctions against Ankara.

Seizing the opportunity

The new Draghi Government represents an opportunity for Italy to achieve a certain political stability after years of ups and downs. The integration in the same government of people from different ideological backgrounds can contribute to the national unity required by the present status. The emergency and exceptional nature of the Covid-19 crisis gives Italy an opportunity to implement not only anti-pandemic measures but also radical structural changes to transform Economics and public administration, something that would otherwise be too much of a hindrance.

On the other hand, although within a certain continuity, Draghi's government represents a change in the international strategic chessboard, not only for Brussels, Berlin and Paris but also for Washington and Beijing, given that the more Atlanticist tendencies will distance it from both Russia and China.

Italian governments are not known for their duration and neither does this one offer any guarantee of permanence, bearing in mind that the effort of unity made is due to the temporary nature of the crisis. Nevertheless, Draghi's own profile projects an image of seriousness and responsibility.

Spain, although affected, is not as badly affected as other European partners

The United Kingdom's exit from the European Union finally materialized on the last day of 2020. The compromise on fisheries was the last point of the arduous negotiations and the differences were only overcome some conference before the unpostponable deadline. The fisheries agreement reached provides that for five and a half years EU vessels will continue to have access to fish in British waters. Although affected, Spain is not as adversely affected as other European partners.

Fishing fleet in the Galician town of Ribeira [Luis Miguel Bugallo].

article / Ane Gil

The agreement Withdrawal that culminated the Brexit ran aground in its final stretch on the fisheries issue, despite the fact that the UK's fishing activity in its waters contributes only 0.12% of British GDP.

That discussion, which nearly derailed the negotiations, centered on the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the area beyond territorial waters - at a maximum distance from the coast of 200 nautical miles (about 370 kilometers) - in which a coastal country has sovereign rights to explore and exploit, conserve and manage natural resources, whether living or non-living. The UK EEZ contains fish-rich fishing grounds, accounting for, with a average of 1,285 million tonnes of fish per year, according to a 2019 study by the European Parliament's Fisheries Committee, 15% of total EU fisheries. Of these catches, only 43% was taken by British fishermen, while the remaining 57% was taken by the other EU countries. The European countries that had access to fishing in British waters were Spain, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Ireland and Sweden.

Therefore, the entrance in force of the Brexit would mark the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Common Fisheries Policy, which defines the access of European vessels to the Exclusive Economic Zone.

Initial perspectives

During its membership of the EU, the UK was part of the Common Fisheries Policy, whereby all EU member states' fishing fleets have equal access to European waters. In the EU, fishing rights are negotiated annually by the ministers of each member state and national quotas (amount of fish of each species that each country's fleet can catch) are set using data historical as reference letter.

The Spanish fishing fleet followed the negotiations closely, as it had a lot to lose with a bad agreement. On the one hand, a Brexit without agreement could mean a reduction in income of 27 million euros related to fishing in British waters; it would also entail a drastic reduction in catches of hake, roosterfish and mackerel for Spanish fishing vessels specialized in these species. On the other hand, the employment would also be affected if the agreement established a drastic reduction in catches. There are eighty Spanish vessels that have licence to fish in British waters, which means almost 10,000 work jobs related to this activity.

Negotiations

Until Brexit, British waters and their exploitation were negotiated jointly with the rest of the maritime areas of the European Union. Brussels tried to maintain this relationship even if the UK left the EU, so the position of the European negotiators focused on preserving the fishing quota system that had been in place, for a term of fifteen years. However, the British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, always ruled out any trade agreement that would grant European vessels access to British waters, in exchange for better conditions for British financial services in the single market as offered by Brussels. London wanted to implement a regime similar to the Norwegian one, which negotiates year by year the catches of EU fleets in its waters, with the difference that in the Norwegian case the pact refers to average dozen species, compared to almost a hundred in British waters.

We should bear in mind that the service sector accounts for 80% of the UK's GDP, while fishing activities are only 0.12%. Therefore, it is quite evident that London's positions in the fisheries section were more political than economic. And the fact is that, although fishing activities have little impact on the British Economics , the fishing sector does have political importance for the Eurosceptic cause, since regaining control of the waters was one of the promises in the Brexit referendum. Thus, this issue became a symbol of national sovereignty.

The starting point of the negotiations was the British government's demand to repatriate up to 80% of the catch in its waters of control, while the EU offered refund to the UK between 15% and 18%. Johnson wanted to maintain the management of the exploitation of its waters and negotiate with the European Union as partner preferential. He expressed his initial intention to establish, from January 2021, more frequent negotiations on how to fish in his EEZ. This resulted in a finalagreement which implies that European vessels will continue to be able to fish in British waters for five and a half years, in exchange for refund 25% of the quotas that EU vessels fish there, a volume estimated to be worth some 161 million euros. In exchange, fishery products will continue to enter the European market at zero tariff. After this transitional stage, the EU and the UK will have to renegotiate year after year. If the agreement is violated, there are mechanisms that guarantee compensation, such as the establishment of tariffs.

Consequences for Spain and its European neighbors

The agreement provoked discontent in the UK fishing industry, which accused Johnson of caving in on this agreement. The National Federation of Fishermen's Organizations expressed disappointment that only marginal changes had been made to quotas and that EU fleets would continue to have access to UK waters up to the six-mile limit. The prime minister responded that the UK could now catch "prodigious amounts of extra fish".

At the moment, the UK has already encountered some problems. The new customs agreement has been causing delays and trucks have to be checked at the borders. With a sudden glut of production, there will not be enough veterinarians to make the necessary export health certificates. Therefore, the new bureaucratic requirements has led to several cases of seafood rotting on the docks before it can be exported to the EU. It is estimated that the fishing industry is losing 1 million pounds per day due to these new requirements, which has caused many fishermen to reduce their daily catches.

But EU fishermen will also be affected, as until now they obtained catches in British waters with a total annual value of 650 million euros, according to the European Parliament, especially at position from Danish, Dutch and French vessels. In addition, Belgium is one of the countries most affected, as 43% of its catches are taken in British waters; it will now have to reduce its catches by 25% over the next 5 years. In addition, Belgian fishermen used to land their fish in British ports and then truck it to Belgium. However, this will no longer be possible. Along with Belgium, other countries that will suffer the most from the loss of fishing rights due to Brexit are Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands.

As for Spain, the fishing sector has acknowledged its unease about the annual negotiation that will take place after the initial five-year period, as well as the consequences on the future distribution of the rest of the fishing quotas, on the Common Fisheries Policy itself, on the exchange of quotas between countries and on the sustainable management of marine stocks. However, in the short term the Spanish fleet does not seem to be so affected in comparison with other European countries.

In fact, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Luis Planas, valued positively this agreement, considering it a "good agreement, which provides stability and legal certainty". Planas argued that the 25% reduction in the average value of the catches of the eight European countries fishing in British waters has limited effects on Spanish fishing activity and, by way of example, he stated that hake catches will only be reduced by 1%. That is, the current quota of 29.5% would drop to 28.5% in 2026. In addition, other species of greater interest to Spain (such as mackerel, horse mackerel and blue whiting) have not been included in the agreement and there are no reductions in deep-water species in high demand (such as black scabbardfish or grenadiers). In conclusion, Planas stated that Spain has only conceded on 17 of the 32 fishing resources that the country has been allocated. However, it is up to Brussels to go into details and decide on fishing quotas during the transition period opened on January 1, in which the eight countries fishing in British waters will have lower quotas.

In conclusion, Britain now has the ability to dictate its own rules at subject on fishing. By 2026, the UK can decide to completely withdraw access for EU vessels to British waters. But the EU could then respond by suspending access to its waters or imposing tariffs on UK fish exports.

A last-minute minimum agreement avoids the chaos of a no-deal Brexit agreement, but further negotiations will have to take place over the next few years.

Fragment of Brexit mural [Pixabay].

ANALYSIS / Pablo Gurbindo

After the United Kingdom officially left the European Union on January 31, 2020 at midnight, with the agreement Withdrawal entrance in force, it seemed that the issue that has practically monopolized the discussion in Brussels in recent years was settled. But nothing could be further from the truth. The "political Brexit" had been resolved, but the "economic Brexit" still remained to be resolved.

In order to avoid chaos, this agreement provided for a transition period of 11 months, until December 31, 2020. During this period the United Kingdom, despite being already out of the EU, had to continue to be subject to European legislation and the Court of Justice of the EU as before, but without having a Community voice and vote. The goal of this transition was to give both parties time to reach a agreement to define the future relationship. All parties knew that 11 months would not be enough time. Only a new trade agreement takes years to negotiate, the agreement with Canada took 7 years, for example. For this, the transition period included a possible extension before June 30, but Johnson did not want to ask for it, and promised his citizens to have a trade agreement by January 1, 2021.

With the fear of a possible no-deal Brexit agreement, and the serious consequences it would have for the economies and citizens on both sides, a agreement was finally reached on December 24, just one week before the end of the transition period.

This agreement came into force on January 1, 2021 provisional, since there was not enough time for it to be C in one week. The question now is: What does this agreement consist of? What have been the sticking points? And what have been the first tangible consequences during these first months?

The agreement for Trade and Cooperation (ACC)

What needs to be made clear from the outset is that this is a agreement minimum. It is a hard Brexit. Brexit has been avoided without agreement which would have been catastrophic, but it is still a hard Brexit.

The PCA between the United Kingdom and the European Union comprises a free trade agreement , a close association on subject citizen security and a general governance framework .

The highlights of agreement are as follows:

Trade in goods

The PCA is very ambitious in this sense, as it establishes free trade between the two parties without any subject tariffs or quotas on any product. If there had been no agreement in this sense, their trade relationship would have been governed by the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), with its corresponding quotas and tariffs. However, this free trade has a catch. This absence of any subject tariff or quota is only for "British originating" products, and this is where the complexity lies.

The rules of origin are detailed in the PCA, and although as a general rule the agreement is generous in qualifying a product as "British", there are certain sectors where this certification will be more demanding. For example, for an electric vehicle produced in the UK and exported to the EU to avoid tariffs, at least 45% of its added value must be British or European and its battery must be entirely British or European. From now on proving the origin of each shipment in certain sectors is going to become a bureaucratic hell that did not exist before December 31. And the re-export of unprocessed foreign products from British soil to Europe will now have to suffer a double tariff: one from entrance to the United Kingdom and another from entrance to the Union.

However, even if there is no subject tariff or quota on products, the usual trade flow will not be maintained. For example, in the area of trade in agri-food products, the absence of agreement in the sanitary and phytosanitary regime of the United Kingdom means that from now on sanitary certificates will be required for the trade of these products, which were not required before. This increase in "red tape" may have important consequences for products that are more easily substitutable, as importers of these products will prefer to avoid this extra bureaucracy by switching from British suppliers to other European ones.

Financial Services

At subject services the agreement is quite poor, but the lack of agreement for financial services, a very important sector for the UK, which alone generates 21% of UK services exports, stands out.

While the United Kingdom was part of the Union, its financial institutions could operate freely throughout the EU thanks to the "financial passport", since all Member States have agreed on similar regulatory and supervisory rules for the markets. But this no longer applies to the UK.

The British government unilaterally decided to maintain easy access to its markets for EU entities, but the EU has not reciprocated.

In the absence of agreements at subject financial, the European rules and regulations referring to third country entities, as a general rule, simply makes it easier for these entities to establish themselves in the Union in order to operate in its markets.

One of the EU's objectives with this lack of reciprocity may have been the desire to wrest part of its capital from the City of London, the leading European financial place .

Citizens

Most of this section was resolved with the agreement Withdrawal, which guaranteed for life the maintenance of acquired rights (residency program, work...) for European citizens already on British soil, or British citizens on European soil.

The PCA has agreed to abolish the need for apply for visa bilaterally for tourist stays not exceeding 3 months. For these cases it will now be necessary to carry a passport, not just a national identity card. But for longer stays, visas will be required from residency program or work.

As for the recognition of professional and university degrees and qualifications, despite the UK's interest in maintaining them automatically as they are now, the EU has not allowed it. This could mean, for example, that qualified professionals such as lawyers or nurses will find it more difficult to have their degree scroll recognized and be able to work.

data protection and security cooperation

The agreement will allow police and legal cooperation to continue, but not with the same intensity as before. The United Kingdom will no longer be part of the instructions of data community on these matters. Exchanges of information will only be made at written request either by requesting information or by sending information on its own initiative.

British relations with Europol (European Police Office) or Eurojust (European Agency for Judicial Cooperation) will be maintained, but as an external partnership .

Participation in Union programs

The UK will continue to be part of some EU programs such as: Horizon, the main European scientific cooperation program; Euratom, through a cooperationagreement external to the ACC; ITER, an international program for the study of fusion energy; Copernicus, a program led by the European Space Agency for the development of autonomous and continuous Earth observation capability; and SST (Space Surveillance and Tracking) a European program for tracking space objects to avoid their collision.

But on the other hand the UK will not continue in other programs, most notably the important Erasmus student exchange program. Johnson has already announced the creation of a national student exchange program named after British mathematician Alan Turing, who cracked the Enigma code during World War II.

Friction points in the negotiation

There have been certain points which, due to their complexity or symbolism, have been the main points of friction between the Union and the United Kingdom. They have even jeopardized the success of the negotiations. The three main sticking points for the negotiations have been: fisheries, the level-playing field and governance.

Fishing

The disproportionate importance that fishing has had on the negotiation is surprising, considering that it only represents 0.1% of the British GDP, and is not an essential sector for the EU either. Its importance lies in its symbolic value, and the importance given to it by Brexit supporters as an example of recovering lost sovereignty. It should also be borne in mind that it is one of the points on which the UK had the upper hand in the negotiations. British waters are home to some of Europe's main fishing grounds, which have been accounting for 15% of total European fisheries. Of these fishing grounds, 57% were taken by the EU-27 and the remaining 43% by British fishermen. This percentage greatly infuriated the British fishing sector, which has been one of the main sectors supporting Brexit.

The British intention was to negotiate annual access quotas to its waters, following Norway's example with the EU. But finally a 25% cut in catches has been agreed on a progressive basis, but maintaining access to British waters. This agreement will be in force for the next five and a half years, after which new negotiations will be necessary, which will then be on an annual basis. In exchange, the EU has kept the possibility of commercial retaliation in the event that European fishermen are denied access to British waters.

"Level-playing field"

The topic of the unfair skill was one of the most worrying issues in Brussels. Since from now on the British do not have to follow European legislation, there was concern that, just a few kilometers from the Union, a country of the size and weight of the United Kingdom would considerably reduce its labor, environmental, tax or public aid standards. This could result in many European companies deciding to relocate to the UK because of this reduction in standards.

The agreement establishes a monitoring and retaliation mechanism in cases of discrepancies if one of the parties feels aggrieved. If there is a dispute, depending on the case, it will be submitted to a panel of experts, or it will be submitted to arbitration. For the EU a system where tariff offsets would have been automatic and if not interpreted by the CJEU would have been preferable. But for the UK one of its main objectives in the negotiation was not to be under the jurisdiction of the CJEU in any form.

Governance

The design governance of agreement is complex. It is chaired by the committee of association Joint which will ensure that the PCA is correctly implemented and interpreted, and where all issues that may arise will be discussed. This committee will be assisted by more than thirty specialized committees and technical groups.

If a dispute arises, it will be referred to this committee of association Joint. If a solution is not reached by mutual agreement agreement , an external arbitration will then be used, the resolution of which is binding. In the event of non-compliance, the aggrieved party is entitled to retaliate.

This instrument allows the EU to cover its back against the risk of the UK breaching part of the agreement. This risk gained a lot of traction during the negotiations, when Johnson presented to the British Parliament the Internal Market Act, which was intended to prevent any subject internal customs in the UK. This bill would go against the "Irish safeguard" agreed by Johnson himself and the EU in the Withdrawalagreement , and would go against international law as a clear contravention of the principle of "pacta sunt servanda". In the end this law was not passed, but it created great tension between the EU and the UK, in the British civil service examination to Johnson and even among its own ranks by putting the country's international credibility in question.

Consequences

During the first few months of entrance the ACC has been in force, several important consequences have already been observed.

The controversial withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Erasmus program has already been felt. According to British universities, applications for programs of study from European citizens have dropped by 40%. The pandemic has played a role in this significant reduction, but it should also be noted that fees university applications in the UK after the exit of the program have increased fourfold.

In terms of financial services, the City of London has already lost degree scroll as Europe's leading financial center to Amsterdam in the first few months of the year. Daily equity trading in Amsterdam in January totaled 9.2 billion euros, higher than the 8.6 billion euros managed by the City. The London average last year was €17.5 billion, far higher than the second European place which was Frankfurt, with a average of €5.9 billion. Last year, the figure average for Amsterdam exchanges was 2.6 billion euros, making it the sixth largest European financial place . The EU's lack of reciprocity with regard to financial services has been able to fulfill its goal for now.

One of the most curious anecdotes demonstrating the changes brought about by Brexit during these first months was the viral video of the Dutch customs authorities confiscating ham sandwiches from transporters arriving by ferry from the United Kingdom to the Netherlands. With the entrance in force the PCA does not allow the export of animal products without the corresponding health certificates.

Despite the absence of tariffs and quotas, the increased bureaucracy was expected to affect the exchange trade and it has. According to data from the UK Road Transport association , UK exports to the EU through the ports fell by 68% in January compared to the same month last year.

It seemed that the British fishing sectors could be among the main beneficiaries of agreement, but after these first few months British fishermen are not satisfied. New bureaucratic requirements are slowing down deliveries and some fishermen are complaining that their catches are going to waste because they cannot be delivered on time to certain European markets. According to Scottish fishing representatives, delays due to bureaucracy are causing a loss of one million pounds a day to the sector. It should be borne in mind that UK fish exports to the EU accounted for 67% of the total in 2019. Faced with complaints from the sector, the British Government has already announced a financial aid of 23 million pounds.

Conclusion

The agreement reached is undoubtedly a better result than the no agreement, but it is an incomplete agreement , and further negotiations will be necessary. The future of the PCA will depend on the change of position of the United Kingdom, which during the negotiation has prioritized having regulatory autonomy and recovering its "lost sovereignty". The agreement is also fragile as it allows either party to terminate the negotiated relationship if 12 months' notice is given.

The European Union and the United Kingdom are doomed to understand each other. The Union will have to learn to live with a neighbor with a lot of power and influence, and the United Kingdom will have to learn to live in the sphere of influence of the 27.

But, when the time comes, the United Kingdom will always have the option of article 49 of the EU Treaty, which regulates the accession of new countries to the Union.

The nascent English kingdom was consolidated on civil service examination to power on the other side of the English Channel, giving rise to a particularism that is particularly vivid today.

With no turning back now, once Brexit has been consummated, England is seeking to establish a new relationship with its European neighbors. Its departure has not been seconded by any other country, which means that London has to come to terms with a European Union that remains a bloc. Despite the drama with which many Europeans have welcomed Britain's farewell, this is yet another chapter in the complex relationship that a large island has with the continent to which it is close. Island and continent continue where geography has placed them -at a distance of particular value- and will possibly reproduce vicissitudes already seen throughout their mutual history.

Fragment of the Bayeux tapestry, illustrating the battle of Hastings in 1066.

article / María José Beltramo

The result of the 2016 referendum on Brexit may have come as a surprise, as the abrupt manner in which the United Kingdom finally effectively left the European Union on December 31, 2020 has undoubtedly come as a surprise. However, what we have seen is not so alien to the history of the British relationship with the rest of Europe. If we go back centuries we can see a geopolitical patron saint that has been repeated on other occasions, and also today, without having to speak of determinism.

Although it is worth mentioning some previous moments in the relationship of insular Britain with the continent next to which it is located, such as the period of Romanization, the gestation of patron saint that at the same time combines linkage and distancing, or even rejection, we can perhaps place it at the beginning of the second millennium, when from Norman invasions that cross the English Channel the nascent kingdom of England is consolidated precisely against the power of the other shore.

England in Norman times

Normandy became a political entity in the north of France when in 911, after Viking invasions, the Norman chief Rolon reached an agreement with the Frankish king agreement that guaranteed him the territory in exchange for its defense[1]. Normandy became a duchy and gradually adopted the Frankish feudal system, facilitating the gradual integration of both peoples. This intense relationship would eventually lead to the full incorporation of Normandy into the kingdom of France in 1204.

Before the progressive Norman dissolution, however, the Scandinavian people settled in that part of northern France carried their particular character and organizational capacity, which ensured their independence for several centuries, across the English Channel.

The Norman-English relationship began in 1066 with the Battle of Hastings, in an invasion that led to the Duke of Normandy, William the Conqueror, being crowned king of England in London. The arrival of the Normans had several consequences. Politically, they introduced the islands into the European relations of the time and brought English feudalism into line with Norman feudalism, a mixture that would lay the instructions groundwork for future English parliamentarianism. As for the Economics, the Normans demonstrated their Scandinavian organizational capacity in the reorganization of productive activities. In their different conquests, the Normans knew how to take advantage of the best of each system and adapt it to their culture and needs, and so it happened in England, where they developed a particular idiosyncrasy.

From this contact takeover of the continent, England began to consolidate as a monarchy without leaving its link with the Duchy of Normandy. However, with its strengthening after the fall of the Plantagenets in France, England gained the momentum it lacked to finally become an independent kingdom, completely separate from the continent, detached from a Normandy with a weak and critical lineage. In fact, the absorption of the Norman duchy by the kingdom of France facilitated the development and consolidation of the English monarchy as an independent and strong entity[2].

The separation with respect to the European continent refers us to Ortega y Gasset's analysis of European decadence and the moral crisis it is going through[3]. The continental powers, being in a status of geographical continuity, and therefore in greater contact, are more likely to spread their status among themselves and to be dominated by another major power. England, once the bridge of feudal ties that connected it with the rest of Europe was broken, finds no difficulty in taking distance when it deems it appropriate, always in the benefit of its interests, something we see repeated several times throughout its history. This is especially evident in the vicissitudes that punctuate the United Kingdom's relationship with the continent throughout the final decades of the second millennium.

The English status since 1945

The Second World War greatly weakened the United Kingdom, not only economically, but also as an empire. In the subsequent process of decolonization, London lost possessions in Asia and Africa; moreover, the Suez Canal conflict confirmed its decline as a key player, precisely at the hands of the United States, which had replaced it as the world's leading power. The post-war confrontation with the Soviet Union and the American presence in Europe meant that the transatlantic relationship was no longer based on the preferential link that Washington had with England, so the role of the British also diminished[4].

In 1957, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg created the European Economic Community (EEC). Conservative Harold MacMillan, British Prime Minister from 1957 to 1963, refused to include the United Kingdom in the initiative, but aware of the need to revitalize the British Economics and "the difficulty of maintaining a policy that was alien to European interests", he promoted the creation in 1959 of the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) together with Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal.

The Common Market proved to be a success and in 1963 the United Kingdom considered joining, but was blocked by de Gaulle's France. In 1966, the British again presented their proposal application, but it was again rejected by De Gaulle. The French general's conception of Europe did not include the Atlantic bloc; he continued to think of building Europe on a Franco-German axis.

In the 1970s there was a directional shift in European politics. The British Conservatives won the 1970 elections and in 1973 their country joined the EEC. The international economic crisis, which was particularly difficult in the United Kingdom, prompted the Labour Party, back in power, to propose a review of the conditions of membership and Premier Harold Wilson called a referendum in 1975: 17 million Britons wanted to remain (67% of voters) compared with only 8 million who called for a first Brexit.

However, when the European Monetary System (EMS) was launched in 1979 to equalize currencies and achieve "economic convergence", the United Kingdom decided not to join this voluntary agreement . Europe was experiencing a gradual economic boom, but the UK's Economics was not keeping pace, which partly led to the early elections of 1979. These were won by the Conservatives with Margaret Thatcher, who remained in Downing Street until 1990. The Thatcher revolution "marked the way out of the crisis of the 1970s". In 1984, London reduced its contribution to EU funds and Thatcher, who was very reluctant to accept EU budgets and other procedures that reduced national sovereignty, again asked for a review of the agreements.

In 1985 the Schengen Agreements were signed (the opening of borders between certain countries generating a kind of much wider second border), which came into force ten years later. Again, the UK stayed out of it. As was also the case in relation to the euro, when the single currency came into effect in 2002, maintaining the pound sterling to this day.

Immigration from Central and Eastern European countries, following the 2004 EU enlargement, admitted by Labour's Tony Blair, and the acceleration of financial harmonization mechanisms following the 2008-2011 crisis, faced with displeasure by the Conservative David Cameron, provided arguments for the anti-EU speech in the United Kingdom. This led to the rise of the anti-European UKIP and the assumption of its postulates by broad Tory sectors, finally amalgamated by the controversial personality of Boris Johnson.

In an interview with the BBC Johnson referred in 2016 to many of the arguments used in favor of Brexit, such as the dialectical vision that the United Kingdom has of its relationship with the continent or the fear of losing sovereignty and the dissolution of profile own in the European magma. The premier returned to these ideas in his message to the British people as the country prepared to begin its final year in the EU. His words were in some ways an echo of a centuries-old tug-of-war.

Repeating patterns

As we have seen, England has always maintained its own rhythm. Its geographical separation from the continent - far enough away to be able to preserve a particular dynamic, but also close enough to fear a threat, which sometimes proved to be effective - determined the distinctly insular identity of the British and their attitude towards the rest of Europe.

We are dealing with a power that throughout history has always sought to maintain its national sovereignty at all costs and whose geopolitical imperative has been to prevent the continent from being dominated by a rival great power (the perception, during the 2008 crisis management , that Germany was once again exercising a certain hegemony in Europe may have fueled the Brexit).

Perhaps in the medieval period we cannot link this to a meditated political strategy, but in an involuntary and circumstantial way we can see how from the very beginning there are certain conditions that favor the distancing of the island from the continent, although without losing the contact in a radical way. In more recent history we observe this same distant attitude, this time premeditated, with the pursuit of interests focused on the search for economic prosperity and the maintenance of both its global influence and its national sovereignty.

[1] Charles Haskins, The Normans in European History (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915).

[2] Yves Lacoste, Géopolitique : La longue histoire d'aujourd'hui (Paris: Larousse, 2006).

[3] José Ortega y Gasset, La rebelión de las masas (Madrid: Alianza publishing house, 1983). 

[4] José Ramón Díez Espinosa et al., Historia del mundo actual (desde 1945 hasta nuestros días), (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1996).

Attempt by both to reposition France at the geostrategic center of Europe, with civil service examination of Germany.

The nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte and the current president of the French Republic are not completely parallel lives, but there are some really suggestive similarities between the two. It is often said that French presidents revive some of the longed-for packaging of the decapitated monarchy; in Macron's case there is probably a lot of that, but also the assumption of geopolitical imperatives already evident in the Second Empire.

Napoleon III in uniform in an 1850 portrait, and Macron in his 2019 New Year's Eve televised message.

article / José Manuel Fábregas

Emmanuel Macron's decision to hold the G7 summit in the French Basque town of Biarritz in August 2019 brought about a symbolic rapprochement with the figure of Napoleon III. The emperor, and nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, transformed the former fishing village into a cosmopolitan holiday hub where European aristocrats and members of the highest political echelons met on an international scale. Macron, for his part, returned Biarritz to the stage of the world's major political discussions.

Thus, two personalities come together who, with the attraction of having been the youngest heads of state in the country, share two fundamental aspects in their understanding of French politics. First, the influence that their childhood has had on both of them in developing a personalist way of understanding the head of state. And, secondly, how both have tried to reposition France at the geostrategic center of Europe and have been hindered by Germany. 

What is the role of the head of state?

Born fifth in the order of succession to Napoleon I, the young Louis Napoleon Bonaparte never foresaw that he would become heir to the imperial house in 1832. According to his biographer Paul Guériot, his mother, Hortense de Beauharnais, instilled in him from an early age the idea that he was destined to rebuild the now-defunct Napoleonic Empire. His mother's insistence that he should have a perfect intellectual and military training transformed Louis Napoleon - who received Education from the Jacobin, and follower of the figure of Robespierre, Philippe Le Bas - into a solitary, shy and megalomaniacal person obsessed with restoring Napoleonic France[1].

The revolution of February 1848, according to Jacob Talmon, was inevitable "although it was, however, an accident"[2]. The Israeli historian explains that the uprisings in various parts of Europe were a direct reaction to the territorial reordering of the Vienna congress (1815). In this context of discontent or disillusionment with the Restoration system, the figure of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte may have benefited from the image of a romantic revolutionary assigned to him by the newspapers and opinion writings of the time. After failed coup attempts in Strasbourg (1836) and Bologna (1840), the future emperor spent a short period of time in prison. This was a decisive aspect in the construction of the romantic hero character that aroused so much admiration in a society that loved the novels of Alexandre Dumas[3]. The exploitation of this personality by means of a great propaganda apparatus allowed him to comfortably win the elections of December 1848. Thus, it could also be said that the establishment of the Second Empire - ratified by a popular plebiscite in November 1852 - was the next step in his main political project : the rebirth of Napoleonic France.

For his part, the current president of the French Republic also experienced an overprotective childhood that forged, like the last emperor of France, a solitary personality and an individualistic way of understanding politics. Anne Fulda underlines in her biography of Emmanuel Macron that, being born a year after the death of his older sister and after a complicated delivery, his birth was considered a miracle. This may have fostered, along with a competitive Education in which he excelled as a "child prodigy", his self-conviction that he was destined to rule the country[4]. However, his election as head of state was not the fruit of a long-term strategy, but rather, like that of Louis Napoleon, of a tactical move. The renovating image that Macron offered was cleverly exploited in elections in which he faced rivals who presented certain communicative weaknesses, such as those with a low profile like François Fillon (Republican) and Benoît Hamon (Socialist), or others with more extremist tones like Marine Le Pen (National Front) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon (Unsubmissive France).

In 2015, while still minister of Economics, Emmanuel Macron made an interesting reflection for the weekly Le 1 on what was the role of the president in France. He understood that French citizens felt a lack after the fall of the monarchy that they had tried to fill by strengthening the figure of the president. This excessive weight of personalism in Macron's understanding of politics has also been demonstrated recently in the replacement of Édouard Philippe as prime minister. Because his popularity had grown in the last year as he had shown himself to be more charismatic and calm in counterpoint with the overacting and abusive protagonism of the president, Macron chose as his replacement Jean Castex, with a more technocratic profile that does not overshadow the president in the face of his reelection.

What role France should play in Europe

This firm commitment of both leaders to give greater importance and visibility to the position head of state transcends the borders of the Gallic country. Napoleon III and Emmanuel Macron also share the desire to place France at the center of the European balance.

Having won the elections with a speech against the order inherited from the congress of Vienna, Napoleon III had his own European project based on the free integration or separation of the different national identities of the old continent. A clear example of this was the Crimean War (1854-1856). Fearing that the decadent Ottoman Empire would end up as a vassal of Russia, the emperor defended, together with the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Sardinia, its independence from the Ottomans in a conflict that would separate Russia from the other Western powers temporarily[5]. The Treaty of Paris (1856) would not only end the war, but also motivate Napoleon III to initiate an interventionist policy in Europe.

Napoleon III's imperial dream forced him to develop an active foreign policy focused on the expansion of French borders and the reordering of the continent, taking into account two main values: nationalism and liberalism. However, Henry Kissinger rightly comments that his diplomatic work was so confused that "France got nothing"[6]. By supporting the unification of Italy at the cost of the loss of territory of the Austrian Empire, Napoleon unintentionally favored the creation of Germany. These facts strongly weakened the geostrategic influence of France in the face of the new European order to which he aspired. On the other hand, it was Bismarck's clever diplomatic tactics that would really put an end to the Vienna system, hastening the fall of the Second French Empire at the Battle of Sedan (1870).

In addition, Emmanuel Macron is presenting himself as the savior of the European Union in a context marked by the rise of populist and Eurosceptic movements. However, his ambitious reform projects have met with Angela Merkel's reluctance.

In a recent interview for The Economist, Emmanuel Macron pointed out that NATO was "brain dead" and that Europe was "on the edge of the precipice" by depending on the United States and lacking independence in terms of defense. Macron opts for greater integration of the European Union at the strategic level, going so far as to propose a single pan-European army. In response, German Chancellor Angela Merkel objected to him that Europe does not currently have the capacity to defend itself on its own and is consequently dependent on the Atlantic Alliance. In addition, Macron has also challenged the apparent agreement among the countries of the Union regarding the addition of new members and the relationship with Russia. The French president's veto of a possible incorporation of Albania and North Macedonia, claiming that they did not comply with EU clauses on corruption, has come to be described as a "historic mistake" by leaving the future of the Balkan countries at the mercy of Russia and China. He does not share this position with regard to Russia, with which he is willing to relax diplomatic relations and even suggests a greater integration of the country into Europe.

On final, Emmanuel Macron and Napoleon III share an excessively egocentric vision. The overexposure of certain personal characteristics in matters of state and the inordinate pretension to leadership in Europe are two aspects common to these two young leaders. Despite the fact that historiography has already judged the mistakes that precipitated Louis Napoleon into exile, it remains to be seen whether or not Macron is doomed to repeat the history of his predecessor.

[1] Guériot, P. (1944). Napoleon III. Madrid: Ediciones Técnicas.

[2] Talmón, J.L. (1960). Political messianism. La etapa romántica. Mexico City: Ed. Aguilar.

[3] Guériot, P. (1944). Napoleon III. Madrid: Ediciones Técnicas.

[4] Fulda, A. (2017). Emmanuel Macron, the president who has surprised Europe. Madrid: Ediciones Península.

[5] Milza, P. (2004). Napoleon III. Paris: Éditions Perrin.

[6] Kissinger, Henry (1994). Diplomacy (First Edition). Barcelona: Ediciones B.

Cartoon depicting Belgian King Leopold II (in the middle) at the Berlin Conference of 1884, by engraver F. Maréchal

COMMENTARY / Cameron Buckingham

The highwaters of the controversy about Belgium's colonial past in Africa, that dominated news at some point in 2020, have receded without Belgian grand institutions taking significant steps to redress the bad reputation. Belgian King Leopold II ordered horrible atrocities throughout the African continent but with the heaviest effect on the Democratic Republic of Congo. The genocide of over six million and slave labour of the Congolese people led by the late Belgian king resulted in immense wealth and can be directly linked to the success of Belgium in the modern-day. In the same way, it can be directly linked to the underdevelopment and continued struggle of the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

Currently, there has been an international movement to address the racial problems that plague the modern world. Regardless of the organization or political ideology, it is imperative to acknowledge these problems which stem directly from the unjust colonization, occupation, abuse, and slave trade throughout history. By actively not making any acknowledgment towards this issue, Belgium takes an ignorant stance which not only greatly affects its relations with central African countries, but an international stage speaks to its passive stance on Racism.

In 2019, a working group of experts from the United Nations issued a statement, composed of 74 key points of improvement the country should undertake, to the average with their conclusions of the effects of the colonial past within the country. The Working Group specifically condemned the Belgian government for their lack of engagement with the African minority in their population, as well as their lack of representation in federal institutions and average. The Working Group called on Belgian to improve their education resources so that they accurately portray what truly happened in Africa during colonial and Imperial times. Most importantly they urged Belgium to work on the recognition and social invisibility of people of African Descent, to make a clear and public apology to the African States and adopt a plan of action to confront racism within their country.

Domestic decolonization

Within the country, the biggest reforms and measures to confront racism are taking place in the capital city of Brussels. One of the biggest changes is the Royal Museum for Central Africa: the museum has taken strides to remove elements of colonialism on display. However, the overall paternalistic attitude of the museum strains the relationship between Belgium and central African countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. In light of recent events, A statue of Leopold II has been removed by the Antwerp museum after it was set on fire by protestors. There have been many statues defaced by protestors all over Belgium, all calling for his image to be removed from public space as seen in this article Statue of Leopold II, Belgian King Who Brutalized Congo, Is Removed in Antwerp. Simultaneously the government of Brussels has also made attempts to change the names of public spaces or infrastructure that have ties to colonization Most notably seen in a road tunnel, Belgium seeks new name for road tunnel as it takes on colonial past. Brussels has also launched a project to decolonize public space within the city, this was in direct reaction to the BLM movement. This is the most significant action the Belgian state has taken in an attempt to reshape its public history. From road tunnels to parks, the city is making an effort to change. All of these are very pertinent changes as Brussels is the capital city and hopefully, the rest of the nation follows suit. It is equally important to note the work being carried out by the government institution, Inter-Federal Centre of Equal Opportunities (UNIA), which is a public institution that fights discrimination and works to promote equal opportunities for African descendants in Belgium, has acted tremendously to improve the life of African descendants in Belgium.

Despite these advancements, many flaws must be addressed. The Royal Museum of Central Africa chooses certain displays to take down but maintains that history must be preserved. The problem with this is not the artifacts themselves, rather the information and context that turns their public history into a glorification of colonialism. The same can be said for the textbooks and educational resources propagated by the state. The history told in these state resources surrounding the Congolese genocide and the colonisation of Africa do not accurately portray the events and continues a passive ignorant mindset towards this part of their history. It furthers a paternalistic take on history that paints the Belgian leaders as people who were benevolent and brought civilization; when in reality they were brutal oppressors to native populations who exploited and abused central Africa in the name of wealth. While progress is being made, it is not nearly enough considering the global progress and the scale of impact Belgium's colonisation continues to have domestically and internationally.

African reparations

Countries such as Congo and Burundi still have effects today of the violence and loss from the Congolese genocide over a century ago. Their overall underdevelopment and indicators such as HDI, CPI, and GDP can be directly linked to the causes of Belgian colonization. Burundi has asked for $43 billion in reparations, while the Belgian government has yet to offer anything. Other African countries have sought reparations but Belgium has yet to pay any. This is significant because the lack of response and acknowledgment shown by the Belgian government especially during this racially charged period in time points to a blind spot of ignorance of the state. The farthest they have gone to show any sort of repatriation is by returning the tooth of an important political figure in Congo, this information can be accessed here: Belgium to return tooth of assassinated Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba to family | DW | 10.09.2020. This is dismal because it fails to acknowledge the ongoing effects of their colonists' period which paints horribly for their public history in the diplomatic sphere. The Belgian government has an opportunity to better utilize public history for the good of their image, as well as their growth as a country and relations with others however by not taking actions they are hurting themselves. Not only have the economies of these post-colony countries not been able to fully develop, the success of the Belgium economy that is rooted in colonisation creates a twisted paradox for these countries; Their resources and suffering were exploited by an Imperial power who continues to reap the benefits while they are left impoverished and impacted. In this sense, the exploitation of central Africa by Belgium continues today.

Conclusions and recommendations.

Belgium is missing the opportunity to take advantage of such a racially charged time to condemn their past behaviour, acknowledge their impact on Africa, and offer their support to countries they devastated. Belgium should uplift itself by creating a new public history, one that condemns their past. After 11 weeks of social average observation, the Belgium Ministry of Foreign affairs has not posted any content related to racial awareness or their former African colonies. One of the greatest tools today is social average, instead of only posting the glories of their country they should bring awareness to their past, on the biggest platform possible. However, it is not enough to bring light to this issue on social average. It is important to work with other governments, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, to amend and take necessary actions. Belgium needs to consider economic treaties with central Africa that would not only benefit both countries but make reparations for the African states. The goal of Belgian actions should be not only to acknowledge their colonial past but to actively make reparations and accurately acknowledge their atrocities and the impact they have had on central Africa, as well as the impact it's had on Belgian success as a country.

While Belgium ignores their colonial past, surrounding countries such as the Netherlands condemn and continue to actively work against racial cleavages in society. France, in a similar manner, continues to denounce the actions taken by Napoleon Bonaparte and even uses their history to emphasize their strengths not only in times of racial equality but also during coronavirus. With this in mind, it is time for Belgium to step up and meet or exceed the awareness of their neighbors and take actions to address their history and use it as a tool to improve.