In the picture
Special Reaction Team during an operation against the Sinaloa Cartel in the western desert of Arizona [ICE].
In early January, during his first month back in the White House, US President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 14157, formally designating several Latin American cartels and organized crime groups, including the Sinaloa Cartel, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the Aragua Train, as Specially Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Global Terrorists. This measure was justified on the grounds that these groups "threaten the security of the American people, the security of the United States, and the stability of the international order in the Western Hemisphere".
The State department placed eight Latin American organized crime groups on the list of Designated Foreign Terrorists pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, including Venezuela's Tren de Aragua, El Salvador's Mara Salvatrucha, and Mexico's Sinaloa, Jalisco Nueva Generación, Cárteles Unidos, Northeast, Gulf, and Nueva Familia Michoacana cartels. The department State has the responsibility to make such a designation if an organization engages, or has the capability and intent to engage, in terrorist activities or terrorism that threatens the security of the United States or its citizens, both at home and abroad.
Secretary of State framework Rubio stated that in order to "stop the campaigns of violence and terror by these ruthless groups, both in the United States and internationally" the new designations "provide law enforcement with additional tools." While the Trump Administration claims that this will protect national security, regional stability and public safety, the decision appears to be influenced by broader political and ideological factors.
The use of terrorism designations against drug cartels reflects not only a legal categorization, but a strategic repositioning of criminal threats in the counterterrorism framework . This is not simply a reaction to violence, but a calculated implementation of the Trump Administration's "America First" diary , while a continuation of the global "war on terror" that has defined U.S. foreign policy for more than twenty years. The aftermath of 9/11 brought international terrorism to the forefront of the political diary of the United States and many Western countries[1].
Thus, this designation is not limited to ensuring national security. It has to do with border control, immigration and the expansion of executive power in almost every area of policy.
It should be noted that the current international legal framework does not provide a universally accepted definition of terrorism. This lack of consensus means that countries often define terrorism in ways that favor their own national interests, and this is precisely what the United States has done. By labeling drug trafficking organizations as 'terrorists', the United States has expanded the scope of anti-terrorism policy beyond its traditional boundaries.
The designation of Latin American drug gangs and cartels as terrorists is aimed at ending the "war on drugs," as U.S. federal law enforcement will now have greater powers to combat these organizations. While ending a war that dates back to the 1970s seems overly ambitious, it does address some of the drug trafficking into the United States.
From a political standpoint, the designation gives the government a legal and moral justification for intensified border security, military intervention and unilateral actions, often without congress approval.
Distinction between organized crime and terrorism
Transnational Organized Crime refers to criminal activity that crosses national borders, whether committed in several countries, planned in one and carried out in another, or with spillover effects in neighboring jurisdictions. These crimes are often perpetrated by criminals operating on an international scale. They actively seek the most lucrative markets for illegal goods and services such as cocaine, fentanyl, vehicle smuggling, prostitution and other forms of illicit trade. It is important to note that most of the Latin American cartels mentioned above cause harm to individuals and communities through the crimes they commit for profit[2]. The core topic here is that they are driven primarily by profit and not by ideology or ideologized religion, as in the case of terrorists.
Terrorism, on the other hand, includes premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually with the intention of influencing an audience. In the last two decades, a dangerous form of terrorism has emerged, which is a significant departure from its traditional secular predecessors, such as ETA or the IRA. Unlike previous forms, which were often politically motivated and targeted state representatives or institutions, this new wave of terrorism is characterized by religious ideology, indiscriminate violence and decentralized organization[3]. Rather than seeking specific political concessions, these groups seek targets rooted in extremist interpretations of religion. Their tactics involve mass casualty attacks against civilians, with little regard for discrimination, and they increasingly threaten the use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological agents.
What these two groups might have in common is known as the criminal-terrorist nexus, "which presupposes that criminals and terrorists share an interest in both generating money and destabilizing the state"[4]. 4] However, according to the US State department , criminals and terrorists share methods, but not motives, which could limit their cooperation.
At the same time, it is undeniable that these cartels engage in behavior that, even at first glance, appears terrorist per se. Cartels have employee mass executions, beheadings, bombings and intimidation tactics to control territories and populations throughout Latin America. Some groups, such as the Mara Salvatrucha, operate across borders with a level of coordination and brutality that mimics insurgent movements and terrorist nodes. In that sense, the terrorist designation can be seen as a reflection of the changing nature of transnational threats in the 21st century.
However, there is ample discussion about the root cause of the cartels' presence in the United States, such as U.S. demand for drugs, especially fentanyl in recent years. In addition, migration also plays a core topic considering the adverse conditions in some Central American countries, as well as in Venezuela. Some of these countries have become 'narco-democracies' and the cartels have become a kind of state within the state. Without addressing these underlying causes, the designation of 'terrorist' may do little to dismantle the power of the cartels in the long term.
Moreover, most counterterrorism laws and measures have been designed to combat threats that seek political or religious transformation through violence. By designating the eight Latin American cartels, traditionally considered transnational organized criminal groups, under the same category as fundamentalist terrorists such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda, the United States risks diluting the meaning of terrorism and undermining the credibility of its designations. While the cartels have engaged in activities typically associated with terrorism, they look like chicken thieves compared to other traditional groups on the Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization list.
In this way, the term 'terrorism' appears to be increasingly general, broadening to include groups that, while undoubtedly violent and destabilizing, have historically been addressed through criminal justice mechanisms rather than national security frameworks.
However, this designation is already in place and allows US law enforcement and intelligence agencies, such as the FBI, to apply the same aggressive counterterrorism measures used against jihadist networks. In internship, this creates a loophole that allows the United States to treat cartel violence not as a criminal justice issue, but as a national security issue.
This designation is also politically charged. It reinforces Trump's traditional narrative that the southern border is a magnet for chaos, drugs and violence. It also appeals to a domestic audience frustrated by the fentanyl epidemic, immigration issues and gang violence perpetrated on domestic soil. Many Americans now agreement the current Administration's efforts to combat the newly designated terrorists.
U.S.-Mexico Relations
This political maneuver has generated considerable diplomatic backlash, particularly from Mexico, whose President Claudia Sheinbaum declined Trump's offer to send US troops to Mexico to combat drug trafficking. Moreover, US military intervention in Mexico could jeopardize economic and cultural relations that have strengthened over the past three decades, while undermining the vital partnership between the US and Mexican militaries, including intelligence exchange , joint operations and coordinated border security efforts to combat illegal migration and drug trafficking.
Trump's idea to deploy US troops to Mexico unilaterally and without consent was not just tactless; it was a bold act disguised as a counter-narcotics policy. It ignored decades of diplomatic progress, trampled on Mexican sovereignty, and risked reigniting anti-American sentiment in Latin America, which has recently surged due to other political posturing such as the 'Gulf of America' proclamation.
Too much cost
Labeling cartels as terrorist organizations could give law enforcement some additional tools, but at the cost of transforming a complex criminal justice problem into an artificial national security crisis. The move trades nuance for noise, diplomacy for confrontation and politics for performance. Militarizing the fight against drug cartels is not a solution, but a dangerous distraction from the real problems: uncontrolled demand for drugs, ineffective immigration systems and decades of failed regional strategy.
* An English version was published on May 22, 2025.
[1] Andrew Moran, "Chapter 11: Terrorism ," essay, in International Security Studies Theory and Practice, 2nd ed (Routledge , 2021), 150-63.
[2] Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas , "Chapter 26: Transnational Crime ," essay, in Contemporary Security Studies , 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2016), 384-97.
[3] Ersun N. Kurtulus, Isabelle Duyvesteyn, and Leena Malkki, "Chapter 3: Is There a 'New Terrorism' in Existence Today?" essay, in Contemporary Debates on Terrorism, 2nd ed. (Routledge , 2018), 43-57.
[4] Giraldo and Trinkunas, Op. cit.