▲ Members of the Armed Forces setting up a pavilion at Ifema for the treatment of Covid-19 [Defense].

COMMENTARY / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

The Spanish Government's declaration of a state of alarm on March 15 as an instrument to fight the spread of COVID 19 has brought with it the not very usual image of soldiers of the Armed Forces (FAS) operating in the main cities and roads throughout Spain to cooperate in the fight against the virus.

For most Spaniards, the presence of military units carrying out their missions on public roads is a rarity to which they are not accustomed, with the exception of the relatively frequent activity of the Military Emergency Unit (UME) in support of civil society, which is well known to a public that, in general, values it very positively.

Apart from these actions, it can be said that the image of uniformed soldiers working directly in front of the public is not common. This subject of support is not, however, a novelty, and responds to a long tradition of social attendance provided by the military institution to its fellow citizens when it has been called upon.

Several elements in our recent history have contributed to produce what seems to be a certain estrangement between Spaniards and their Armed Forces. Among them are the shift in the missions of the Armed Forces abroad with the birth of the democratic regime in 1975; the long years of the fight against ETA terrorism, which led Spanish soldiers to hide their military status from the public to safeguard their security; the progressive reduction in the size of the Armed Forces, which eliminated many of the provincial garrisons maintained by the Armies; or the end of military service, which ended up making the Armed Forces unknown to its citizens.

This detachment, if it has existed or exists, has been one-way, for even at times when the military institution may have been most ignored, soldiers have remained close to their fellow citizens, from whom they come, and whom they serve, supporting them in the most difficult situations. Numerous examples testify to the army's long history of service to the citizenry. To corroborate this statement, it is enough to cite cases such as the military support in the floods suffered by Valencia in 1957; that of Operation "Alazán", carried out in 1981 in support of the State Security Forces and Corps in their fight against ETA terrorism, sealing the French-Spanish border; that of Operation "Sentinel", carried out in 1981 in support of the Spanish Army in its fight against ETA terrorism, sealing the French-Spanish border; Operation "Centinela Gallego", in which, for years, Army units have been monitoring the Galician mountains to prevent forest fires; the fight against the spread of camalote in the Guadiana River; or the construction of mobile bridges in many towns in Spain, such as Montblanc, to restore communications after violent meteorological phenomena had interrupted them.

On this occasion, it has been the declaration of the state of alarm that has brought the Armed Forces to the forefront of public attention. Due to the novelty of this intervention, it seems appropriate, at this point, to make a reference letter to the rationale behind the decision of employment of the military instrument, and to make known what can and cannot be expected from the actions of the Armed Forces in this subject of situations.

The coronavirus pandemic sample clearly shows the reality that the security challenges faced by modern societies require a cooperative response multidisciplinary, in which all the forces of society participate, contributing their particular capabilities to produce the synergy required to solve a crisis. The Armed Forces cannot remain outside this effort, and must act on an equal footing with other public and private actors. Sometimes, when the crisis is of a military nature, they will lead the effort; at other times, they will assume a supporting role to other agents, which they will carry out without seeking any subject of protagonism.

In the specific case of this crisis, the contribution of the Armed Forces to the effort by deploying resources responds, not merely to an intention to graphically capture this reality, but also to the recognition that the crisis will be long, that it will require the cooperation of all, and that the solution requires the contribution of resources beyond the ordinary ones.

The main mission of the Armed Forces is the military defense of Spain against external threats. From this mission derive their organization, their preparation, their dimensions, and the equipment and armament that equips them, optimized, within the possibilities of the human and material resources of the Nation, and of agreement with the will of the Spanish people, to respond to the demands of this mission, which constitutes their true raison d'être [1].

This does not preclude that the Armies can and should fulfill other missions, which they will execute within their capabilities. In fact, from a legal point of view, military participation in the coronavirus crisis is reasonable if one takes into account that, according to agreement with the Organic Law of National Defense, one of the missions of the Armed Forces is to "preserve, together with the institutions of the State and the Public Administrations, the security and welfare of citizens in cases of serious risk, catastrophe, calamity or other public needs, as established in the current legislation" [2].

The Royal Decree declaring the state of alarm leaves no doubt as to the legislator's intention to involve the Armed Forces in the resolution of the crisis, since Article 4 establishes the Minister of Defense as one of the competent authorities delegated by the President of the Government for the coordinated management of the crisis, and because it specifically and explicitly empowers these authorities to require the Armed Forces to act in tasks that guarantee the effective fulfillment of the measures included in the decree [3].

By virtue of the provisions of the Law of the Military degree program , when a state of alarm is declared, the members of the Armed Forces are invested as "agents of the authority" with regard to the tasks provided for in the decree of declaration, which brings them closer to the functions of the police subject . Specifically, and from agreement with Article 5.2. of the decree, this condition empowers them to "carry out checks on persons, goods, vehicles, premises and establishments that are necessary to verify and, where appropriate, prevent the services and activities suspended in this royal decree from being carried out, except for those expressly exempted". To this end, "they may issue the necessary orders and prohibitions and fail the activities or services that are being carried out".

Having defined the legal framework of action, it should also be considered that the employment of the Armed Forces requires a minimum familiarization with the military organization, as well as with its capabilities and limitations. While it is true that the Armed Forces offer a wide range of possibilities for action, it is necessary to be aware that there are tasks for which they are not qualified, and that the use of these capabilities must be in accordance with their specific possibilities and procedures employment.

This reality, together with the imperative need for the employment of military means to be done in a coordinated manner with all the actors involved in the resolution of the crisis, justifies the presence of the Chief of Defense Staff (JEMAD) -who is also the advisor of the President of the Government and of the Minister of Defense in subject operative- in the Situation Committee that the Royal Decree of declaration of the state of alarm has constituted in support of the Government.

The first and most important capacity with which the military institution contributes to the resolution of the crisis is that which resides in the people who serve in uniform. The Armed Forces put at the disposal of the Nation, not only the power given by the number of its members but, above all, the imponderable strength of its values, placed at the service of the common good: the generous submission , the spirit of sacrifice, the work as a team, the sense of duty, and so many others that are so necessary in times like these, and that make it possible to entrust to the Armed Forces those missions that entail more risk and fatigue, in the certainty that they will do their best to fulfill them.

In the realm of the unquantifiable, there is also the not inconsiderable capacity for planning operations that the Armed Forces have at all levels, from the strategic to the tactical, including the operational. The General Staffs of the three Armies, and those of their subordinate units, have an enormous potential for the organization, coordination and planning of complex operations which, if used, is extremely useful.

The diversity and versatility of a large part of the material means of the Armed Forces makes them particularly useful in circumstances such as the current one. Among the catalog of possibilities are some as varied as the transport, both of staff and equipment, supplies, merchandise, material, or any urgent or essential item, at any distance and by air, sea, or land, especially if it has to be done to remote or difficult to reach places; the support to the construction of shelters, hospitals, or any other facilities with the means of castramation of the Army Engineers, who can also carry out specialized works to improve communications, or to ensure the supply of water, electricity, or other services; the sanitary and epidemiological support to the civilian population with staff specialized -both doctors and nurses-; the attendance in the distribution and even the packaging of food for large groups; the execution of security and protection tasks for essential or particularly sensitive installations, such as energy production and distribution plants; the surveillance and control of compliance with the terms of the state of alarm by land, sea and air, either with staff, or with conventional or remotely manned means; support for disinfection operations in large areas; the production of medicines or means of health protection; communications support; the provision of essential services such as airspace control, or interurban public transport or within major cities; etc. The list could be extended almost ad infinitum.

The realization of the enormous amount of possible support, together with the magnitude of the pandemic itself, and the consideration of the fact that military capabilities are sized to meet the needs arising from the most likely operational scenarios, and not for a massive support scenario such as the one we now confront, suggest that, in this case, the needs far exceed the possibilities of the Armed Forces and that, without proper planning, the institution could be totally consumed in the development of these noble tasks.

The above would be very laudable, but it would anchor the entire National Defense capability in a task other than the military defense of Spain, rendering the Armed Forces incapable of dealing with the tasks which, it is reasonable to argue, constitute the raison d'être of the Armed Forces, and which must continue to be attended to, even in the midst of a pandemic. Beyond that, they would also be unable to sustain the operational efforts that the Government has decided that the Armed Forces should carry out abroad, some of which could be reconsidered.

The aforementioned limitations make it advisable to measure the effort required from the Armed Forces -also because they must sustain it over a long period of time-, which must be provided with a selective criterion, the Armed Forces acting in application of the principle of subsidiarity, when there are no civilian agencies, public or private, capable of providing support, or when the support is of a risky, dangerous or arduous nature that makes the use of military resources advisable, employment .

With the exception of the UME, the Armed Forces are not specifically equipped, organized, or trained for the subject tasks of an emergency such as the current one. In some cases, military capabilities are directly applicable in a situation such as the coronavirus. In others, however, the provision of support cannot be immediate and requires a minimum period of adaptation, reprogramming, and training to ensure that military capabilities are applied in a manner appropriate to the nature of an operational environment with which the soldier may be unfamiliar. For example, it is not appropriate to simply employ a unit trained for high-intensity combat in emergency or humanitarian support roles without first making the transition [4].

In this adaptation time, it is always necessary to include the response time that the units must have between missions to recover, reorganize, maintain the material in operational conditions. fill in the consumed resources, plan the new mission, move between scenarios of employment, etc. Even if they are in a high availability situation and their response time is reduced to a minimum, it will never be equal to zero if they have already been employed.

The employment of the Armed Forces in this subject of tasks must always be done with a criterion of strict temporality. If this does not happen and the Armed Forces perpetuate in their missions of support to the civilian population, it is possible that they will progressively expand their tasks, atrophying the development of civilian agencies that could and should preferably carry them out, and becoming their competitors; that they may, in the process, neglect their fundamental tasks -to the point of reorganizing, equipping and training themselves only for their civilian support dimension-; and that they may compromise the neutrality and the character of disinterested servants that the citizens demand from their Armed Forces and that they appreciate so much from them. As soon as the situation allows it, the Armed Forces, with the exception of the UME, it is understood, must return to their habitual framework of action.

That moment has not yet arrived. The end of the crisis is not yet in sight, and we Spaniards must be prepared for a long battle against COVID 19. In this struggle, citizens can be convinced that their Armed Forces, and all those who compose them, will be at their side, attending to their needs, sharing the same hardships, participating in their mourning. When the virus has been defeated, they will rejoice with them and, in silence, they will return naturally to their duties, without waiting for applause, with the intimate satisfaction of having fulfilled their duty in the service of their compatriots.

* Brigadier General (R)

[1] An exception to this is the EMU, a unit specially organized to carry out tasks in support of the civilian population.

[2] An issue outside this work, and which would be the subject of a more in-depth analysis, is that the aforementioned Organic Law 5/2005 introduces a change, extending them, of the constitutional missions that Article 8 of the Magna Carta imposes on the Armed Forces.

[3] Royal Decree 463/2020, of March 14.

[4] Consider, for example, the differences between providing a facility protection service in an area of operations, in an environment that may be hostile, and which is subject to certain Rules of Engagement (ROE), and providing it in a nuclear power plant on national territory in a circumstance such as the present one. As can be easily understood, the response cannot be the same, and employing in the latter an individual trained for the former requires a certain adaptation.