June 15, 2021

WORKING PAPER / Jon Paris Oses, Jokin de Carlos Sola and Túlio Dias de Assis

ABSTRACT

South Korea finds itself in the middle of the geopolitical ambitions of regional giants, while at the same time addressing their own conflictive relationship with their northern counterpart. Because of that, a global and also a peninsular overview of their characteristics from an international relations perspective has been analysed, with the objective in mind of identifying the main dynamics and driving factors that strategically influence South Korea in the present times with an eye into the future. Pursuing that analysis, a global perspective and an inter-Korean perspective were suitable to better address the main issues, with special attention to the influence of the two big powers in relation with Seoul, the US and China, as well as the constant uncertainty North Korea generates in the relations between both Koreas. Findings regarding key aspects such as the US military presence in South Korean soil, or the possibility of a Korean reunification suggest the primacy of continuity and controlled stability for the next ten years, as the stakes are too high for the actors involved to take high-risk high-benefit decisions. The main conclusions follow the same direction, with stagnation as present condition South Korea will have to find its way, always with the inter-Korean relations in mind, if it wants to survive and develop its own path under the shadow of two giants.

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POLITICAL RISK REPORT / Andrea Izco, Elena López-Doriga and Lucía Sáez

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this political risk report is to analyze how stable the political, economic, and social conditions of South Korea are to determine the best approach to invest in this country. 

Firstly, regarding the Economic Outlook, the GDP is expected to increase 3.6% in 2021 and 2.8% in 2022 and the government has devoted to get out of the crisis through the Korean-New Deal. Concerning heavy industry, manufacturing, and AI and technology, South Korea is taking action to become a potential leader. In terms of energy, the country's high dependence on energy imports because of its scarcity of natural resources motivates them to move towards renewable energies as well as to maintain its energy security.

Secondly, in relation to South Korea's Social Outlook, the country has shown great social cohesion after the COVID-19 crisis with responsible action by the population. The birth rate is expected to remain very low, but still, the need for immigrants has not been an easy response as nationals feel a certain threat. Regarding religion, the notion of democracy is what brings South Korea closer to the Western World, not too much the notion of Christianity, but even having a democratic system, many Confucian values still remain. It is safe to say that even though Koreans are likely to become less institutionally committed, the decline on religion will be minimal and regarding social stability, there will not be social confrontations between the different groups.

Thirdly, in the Political Outlook we see how South Korea's democracy faces issues concerning the powerful executive connected to a crony capitalism system in which Chaebols have been related to political scandals in the last administrations. However, in the short-term, the government will focus on resolving partner-economic issues rather than taking system reforms, as a new form of populism is emerging claiming for solutions for inequalities and damage caused by modernity. Despite of the little economic progress carried out by the current administration under President Moon, it is likely that his party will win again the next presidential elections in 2022 thanks to the well management of the COVID-19 crisis.

Finally, the Inter-Korean question can be concluded by saying North Korea is not willing to open up and instead takes minimal reforms. Despite of the struggles caused by the crisis and the commitment to dialogue from South Korea under the so-called Sunshine Policy, little progress has been achieved.

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS REPORT / Marina Díaz, Lucía Montón and Paula Mostajo

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

South Korea is considered to have a middle power status, not only in the North-East Asian region but internationally. In this sense, this paper aimed to provide a comprehensive understanding of the stance South Korea might take regarding key international, regional, peninsular and domestic issues in ten years time.

In the international sphere, this paper has focused on the US-ROK stating the plausibility of a further enhancement, in view of the new Biden's Administration's need to reduce the breach created by former President Trump.

Regarding the regional sphere, the present report addresses South Korea's relations with China, in economic matters; Japan, alliance-wise, and Russia, in relation with energy. These bilateral engagements are clearly impacted by South Korea's proximity to the United States, the country's historical memory and North Korea's willingness to be part of a trilateral understanding, respectively.

Second to last, the peninsular approach of the script assesses the development of inter-Korean relations in views of the two incompatible ideologies and approaches coming from the North and the South of the peninsula and presents the maintenance of the current status has the most plausible scenario.

To end up, there is an allusion to domestic concerns as they play an important role in South Korea's development capabilities. In this section the paper discusses the country's SARS-CoV-2 disease successful management and assess why export possibilities might not be taken for granted, the big South Korean concerns on the ever-worsening demographic situation and, lastly, the country's satisfactorily progression towards renewable energy sources.

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS REPORT / Corey J. Hubbard and Paula Mora Brito

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Intense military pressures on South Korea have been present for half a century, with the country being at the centre of numerous regional conflicts. The government's technique for addressing external security threats differs depending on its nature, varying from assuming the position of great foreign powers to implementing its independent policy. The Republic of Korea's reliance on foreign assistance for defence and protection shows no signs of ending, especially concerning North Korea. The incitement of Kim Jong Un's government risks hostility in the region.

The country is under growing domestic pressures to find solutions for a rapidly ageing population and record low birthrates, one of the world's weakest. Failure to do so compromises South Korea's status as a growing power in East Asia, one of the four Asian Tigers, and risks leading the country to economic stagnation. Suppose the South Korean government does not find a way to make immigration more palatable to the Korean people. In that case, it is unlikely that South Korea will avoid a significant population decline.

Well-established antagonism with Japan could worsen as Japanese nationalist policies conflict with the South Korean government's goals. However, the recent signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership opens up several possible developments in Korean-Japanese relations, extending from an unlikely reset in their bilateral ties to an equally unlikely economic confrontation. The Liancourt Rocks dispute also stands to be influenced by recent events, which may incline South Korea to turn to foreign mediation on the issue.

South Korean relations with the United States are evolving, with the Biden Administration recently inking a new cost-sharing deal with the South Korean Government to cover the expenses of American troops stationed on the Peninsula. Nevertheless, China's growing influence threatens to overturn the established order in the region, and a rapprochement of South Korea to China may take place over the coming decades.

The future security of South Korea is directly tied to developments on the Korean Peninsula. Suppose relations with the North Korean Regime significantly improve, which most expect to be unlikely in the near future. In that case, reunification may result, but North Korea's nuclear weapons development could destabilise the region too. Scenarios relating to these events vary from an unlikely reunification to an equally unlikely nuclear war.

South Korea's attempts at navigating the growingly tense feud between the United States and China may force the country to choose a side in the conflict, which will have severe ramifications for its security architecture.

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS REPORT / María G. Fajardo, Marcelina Kropiwnicka and Matilde Romito

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Korean Peninsula is central to the political, economic and military policies of several actors in the East Asia region. Due to its geographical location, the peninsula has seen the involvement of major powers throughout history, like the United States, China, Russia and Japan. Currently, the peninsula is a contested territory between the U.S. and China. The latter is the only country capable of challenging American interests and uses its economic power to increase its sphere of influence in the region.

The DPRK has built and maintained capabilities to target areas as far as U.S. soil. The North has always represented one of the biggest challenges for South Korea and its security guarantor, the U.S. President Biden will nevertheless sway for establishing a network line for Kim to potentially cross and instead, new sanctions could be expected despite their lack of effectiveness.

For the U.S. to maintain its dominant role in the East Asia region, deter North Korea, and keep China in check, it must reaffirm its military and economic alliances which entered into a period of uncertainty during the Trump administration. Currently, China is South Korea's principal trading partner and is openly evading international sanctions imposed on North Korea being its principal trading partner as well.

The prosperous South Korea will remain neutral in many aspects related to China, yet if put in a situation where it has to choose between the U.S. and China, it will incline towards the former, which remains its security guarantor. When it comes to Russia, its role in the Korean conflict is now secondary but over the years, Russia has used the U.S.-China battle to increase relations with the latter. In the case of Japan, a close U.S. ally, a shift in relations with the ROK is unlikely to happen any time soon since their political issues have evolved into legal ones. This will remain detrimental to the U.S' New East China Sea policy which requires cooperation between U.S. allies.

Diplomacy, openness and potential reunification in the peninsula depend on external actors. Neither reunification nor openness are likely to take place in the short term due to Kim's personality and the preference of external actors to maintain the status quo. A reunification led under peaceful terms would be most desirable and would ultimately lead to an even larger economic powerhouse in the region. For the U.S, this pathway would be most beneficial if a reunified Korea would align with the U.S. This would be detrimental, however, to China's geopolitical interests in the region. Russia could come out as being the greatest benefactor from a peaceful reunification. Lastly, Japan could continue to feel threatened by a reunified Korea, which is united by hatred over a colonial past under Japanese savage rule.

First high-level US-China meeting of the Biden era, to be held in Alaska on 18 March 2021 [State Department].

essay / Ramón Barba

President Joe Biden is cautiously building his Indo-Pacific policy, seeking to build an alliance with India on which to build an order to counter the rise of China. Following his entrance in the White House, Biden has kept the focus on this region, albeit with a different approach than the Trump Administration. While it is true that the main goal is still about containing China and defending free trade, Washington is opting for a multilateral approach that gives greater prominence to QUAD[1] and takes special care over relations with India. As a standard-bearer for the free world and democracy, the Biden Administration seeks to renew US leadership in the world and particularly in this critical region. However, although the relationship with India is at a good moment, especially given the signature of agreement scholarship[2] reached at the end of the Trump Administration, the interaction between the two countries is far from consolidating an alliance.

The new US presidency is faced with a very complicated puzzle to solve in the Indo-Pacific, with China and India as the main players. Generally speaking, of the three powers, only Beijing has successfully managed the post-pandemic status [3], while Delhi and Washington continue to face both a health and economic crisis. All of this may affect the India-US relationship, especially on trade[4], but although Biden has yet to demonstrate his strategy in the region, the relationship between the two powers looks set to go from strength to strength[5]. However, although the US wants to pursue a policy of multilateral alliances and deepen its relationship with India, the Biden administration will have to take into account a number of difficulties before it can talk about an alliance as such.

Biden began to move in this direction from the outset. First up was February's meeting of QUAD[6], which some see as a mini-NATO[7] for Asia, where issues of vaccine distribution in Asia (aiming to distribute one trillion doses by 2022), freedom of navigation in the region's seas, North Korea's denuclearisation and democracy in Myanmar were discussed. In addition, the UK seems to be taking a greater interest in the region and in this dialogue group . On the other hand, in mid-March there was a meeting in Alaska[8] between Chinese and US diplomats (led respectively by Yang Jiechi, director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and Antony Blinken, Secretary of State), in which both countries harshly reproached each other's policies. Washington remains firm in its interests, although open to a certain partnership with Beijing, while China insists on rejecting any interference in what it considers to be its internal affairs. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Biden seems to be willing to organise a summit of democracies[9] in his first year in office.

Following contacts also in Alaska between the Chinese and US defence chiefs, Pentagon chief Austin Lloyd[10] visited India to stress the importance of Indo-US cooperation. In addition, early April saw France's participation in the La Pérouse[11] naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal, raising the possibility of a QUAD-plus involving not only the four original powers but also other countries.

The Indo-Pacific, remember, is the present and the future of the International Office due to its economic importance (its main actors, India, China and the USA, represent 45% of the world's GDP), demographic importance (it is home to 65% of the world's population) and, as we will see throughout this article, geopolitical importance[12].

US-China-India relations

The Biden administration seems to be continuing along the same lines as the Trump administration, as the objectives have not changed. What has changed is the approach to the subject matter, which in this case is none other than the containment of China and freedom of navigation in the region, albeit on the basis of a strong commitment to multilateralism. As George Washington's new successor said at his inauguration[13], the United States wants to resume its leadership, but in a different way from the previous Administration; that is, through a strong policy of alliances, moral leadership and a strong defence of values such as dignity, human rights and the rule of law.

The new presidency sees China as a rival to be reckoned with[14], as does the Trump Administration, but it does not see this as a zero-sum game, since, although it openly declares itself to be against Xi's actions, it opens the door to dialogue[15] on issues such as climate change or healthcare. Generally speaking, in line with what has been seen in New tensions in the Asia-Pacific[16], the United States is committed to a multilateralism that seeks to reduce tension. It should be remembered that the United States advocates the defence of free navigation and the rule of law, as well as democracy in a region in which its influence is being eroded by the growing weight of China.

A good understanding of the state of US-China-India relations goes back to 2005[17], when everything seemed to be going well. As far as the Sino-Indian relationship was concerned, the two nations had resolved their disputes over the 1998 nuclear tests, their presence in regional fora was growing, and it seemed that the issue of cross-border disputes was beginning to be settled. For its part, the United States enjoyed good trade relations with both countries. However, shifting patterns in the global Economics , driven by the rise of China, the 2008 financial crisis in the US, and India's inability to maintain its growth rate upset this balance. Donald Trump's tightening stance contributed to this. However, some argue that the breakdown of the post-Cold War order in the Asia-Pacific began with the Obama administration's 'pivot to Asia'[18]. To this must be added the minor frictions China has had with both nations.

Briefly, it is worth mentioning that there are border problems between India and China[19] that have been flaring up again since 2013. India, in turn, is opposed to Chinese hegemony; it does not want to be subjugated by Beijing and is clearly committed to multilateralism. Finally, there are problems regarding maritime dominance because the Strait of Malacca is at capacity. Moreover, Delhi claims the Adaman and Nicobar Islands, on the Malacca access route, as its own. Moreover, as India is now well below China's military and economic power[20] - the balance that existed between the two powers in 1980 is broken - it is trying to hinder Beijing in order to contain it.

The United States has ideological subject friction with China, due to the authoritarian nature of Xi Jinping's regime[21], and commercial friction, in a dispute[22] that Beijing is trying to take advantage of to reduce US influence in the region. In the middle of this conflict is India, which supports the United States because, although it does not seem to want to be completely against China[23], it rejects a Chinese regional hegemony[24].

According to the CEBR's latest report [25], China will overtake the United States as a global power in 2028, earlier than previous projections, in part because of its handling of the coronavirus emergency: it was the only major country to avoid a crisis after the first wave. On the other hand, the US has lost the battle against the pandemic; economic growth between 2022-2024 is expected to be 1.9% of GDP and to slow to 1.6% in the following years[26], while China, according to report , is expected to grow at 5.7% between 2021-2025[27].

For China the pandemic has been a way of signalling its place in the world[28], a way of warning the United States that it is ready to take over as leader of the international community. This has been compounded by China's belligerent attitude in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as its hegemonic growth in the region and trade projects with Africa and Europe. All of this has led to imbalances in the region that implicate Washington's QUAD moves. Recall that, despite its declining role as a power, the US is interested in freedom of navigation for both commercial and military reasons[29].

China's economic rise has thus led to a worsening of the relationship between Washington and Beijing[30]. Moreover, while Biden is committed to cooperation on the pandemic and climate change, there is talk in some quarters of American politics of inevitable competition between the two countries[31].

The Degree of the US-India alliance

In line with the above, we can see that we are in a delicate situation after the change in the White House. January and February have been months of small moves by the US and India, which have not left China indifferent. Although the Sino-US relationship has benefited both sides since its inception (1979)[32], with trade between the two countries growing by 252% since then, the reality is that trust levels are now at rock bottom, with more than 100 dialogue mechanisms suspended between them. Therefore, although conflict is not foreseeable, tension is predicted to rise as, far from being able to cooperate in broad areas, only light and limited cooperation seems feasible at the moment. At the same time, it should be remembered that China is very much affected by the Malacca Dilemma[33], which is why it is seeking other access to the Indian Ocean, giving rise to territorial disputes with India, with whom it already has the territorial problem of Ladakh[34]. In the midst of this Thucydides Trap[35], in which China seems to threaten to overtake the United States, Washington has been moving closer to New Delhi.

Consequently, both countries have been developing a strategic partnership [36], based essentially on security and defence, but which the United States seeks to extend to other areas. It is true that Delhi's problems are in the Indian Ocean and Washington's in the Pacific; however, both have China[37] as a common denominator. Their relationship, moreover, is strongly marked by the aforementioned "tripartite crisis"[38 ] (health, economic and geopolitical).

Despite the intense cooperation between Washington and New Delhi, there are two different views on thispartnership. While the US claims that India is a very important ally, sharing the same political system and an intense trade relationship[39], India prefers a less strict alliance. Traditionally, Delhi has conveyed a policy of non-alignment[40] in international affairs. Indeed, while India does not want Chinese supremacy in the Indo-Pacific, neither does it want to align itself directly against Beijing, with whom it shares more than 3,000 km of border. Nonetheless, Delhi sees a great need for cooperation with Washington on subject security and defence. Indeed, some argue that India needs the US more than ever.

Although Washington began to review the US Global Posture Strategy last February, everything suggests that the Biden Administration will continue Trump's line on partnership with India as a way of containing China. However, while Washington speaks of India as its ally, Delhi is somewhat reticent, speaking of an alignment[41] rather than an alliance. Although the reality we live in is far from that of the Cold War[42], this new containment[43] in which Delhi is sought as a base, support and banner, is materialised in the following:

(i) Intensive cooperation on subject Security and Defence

There are different forums and agreements here. First, the aforementioned QUAD[44]. This new multilateral cooperation alliance that began to take shape in 2006[45] agreed at its March meeting on the development of its vaccine diplomacy, with India at the centre, in order to counteract Beijing's successful international campaign in this field. In fact, there was a commitment to spend 600 million to deliver 1 billion vaccines[46] by 2022. The idea is that Japan and the US will finance the operation[47], while Australia will provide the logistics. India, however, is committed to greater multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific, giving entrance to countries such as the UK and France[48], which already participated in the last Raisina Dialogues together with QUAD. Other issues such as the denuclearisation of Korea, the restoration of democracy in Myanmar and climate change were also discussed at meeting [49].

India seeks to contain China, but without provoking a direct confrontation with China[50]. In fact, Beijing has intimated that if things go further, it is not only India that knows how to play Realpolitik. Let us recall that New Delhi will chair this year's meeting with the BRICS. Moreover, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation will host joint military exercises between China and Pakistan, a country with a complex relationship with India.

On the other hand, during his March trip to India, the Pentagon chief[51] discussed with his counterpart Rajnath Singh increased military cooperation, as well as issues related to logistics, exchange information, possible opportunities for mutual attendance and the defence of free navigation. Lloyd said he did not object to Australia and Korea participating as permanent members in the Malabar exercises. Since 2008, military subject trade between Delhi and Washington has totalled $21 billion[52]. In addition, $3,000 has recently been spent on drones and other aerial equipment for reconnaissance and surveillance missions.

A week later this meeting, two Indian and one US ship conducted a maritime exercise of subject PASSEX[53] as a way of consolidating the synergies and interoperability achieved in last November's Malabar exercise.

accredited specialization subject In this context, a special mention should be made of the 2+2 dialogue platform and the aforementioned scholarship (agreement ) ( exchange and Basic and Cooperation for Geospatial Cooperation). The first is a subject of meeting in which the foreign and defence ministers of both countries meet every two years to discuss issues of interest to them. The most recent meeting took place in October 2020[54]. Not only was the scholarship agreed, but the US reaffirmed its support for India on its territorial issues with China. Other memoranda of understanding were also signed on nuclear energy and climate issues.

The scholarship, signed in October 2020 during the final months of the Trump administration, makes it easier for India to better track enemies, terrorists and other subject threats from land or sea. This agreement is intended to consolidate the friendship between the two countries, as well as help India outpace China technologically. This agreement concludes the "troika of foundational pacts" for deep security and defence cooperation between the two countries[55].

Prior to this agreement, the LEMOA (Memorandum of agreement for exchange Logistics) was signed in 2016, and in 2018 the COMCASA (agreement Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) was signed. The former allows both countries access to each other's instructions for supply and replenishment; the latter allows India to receive systems, information and encrypted communication to communicate with the United States. Both agreements affect land, sea and air forces[56].

(ii) United for Democracy

Washington emphasises that the two powers are very similar, since they share the same political system, and it is emphasised with a certain grandiloquence that they are the oldest and the largest democracy (per issue inhabitants)[57]. Because this presupposes a shared set of values, Washington likes to speak of "likeminded partners"[58].

Tanvi Mandan of the Brookings Institution think tank Tanvi Mandan defends this idea of ideological bonding. The same system of government means that the two countries see each other as natural allies, who think alike and also believe in the value of the rule of law. In fact, in all matters relating to the spread of democracy around the globe, there is strong cooperation between the two nations: for example, supporting democracy in Afghanistan or the Maldives, launching the US-India Global Democracy Initiative, and providing legal and technical assistance on democratic issues to other countries at attendance . Finally, it is worth noting that democracy and its associated values have facilitated the exchange and flow of people from one country to another. As for the economic relationship between the two countries, it has become more viable, given that they are both open economies, share a common language and their legal system has Anglo-Saxon roots.

iii) Growing economic cooperation

partner The United States is India's main trading partner, with which it has a significant surplus[59]. Trade between the two has grown by 10% annually over the last decade, and in 2019 was $115 billion[60]. Around 2,000 US companies are based in India, and some 200 Indian companies are based in the US[61]. There is a Mini-Trade Deal between the two, believed to be signed soon, which aims to deepen this economic relationship. In the context of the pandemic, everything related to the health sector plays an important role[62]. 62] In fact, despite the fact that both countries have recently adopted a protectionist attitude, the idea is to achieve $500 billion in trade.

Divergences, challenges and opportunities for India and the US in the region

Briefly, between the leaders of the two countries there are minor frictions, opportunities and challenges to be nuanced in order to make this relationship a strong alliance. Among the sticking points is India's purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia, which is against CAATSA(Countering America's Adversaries trhough Sanctions Act) [64], for which India may receive a sanction, although in the meeting between Sigh and Lloyd, Lloyd seemed to overlook topic [65]. However, it remains to be seen what happens once the missiles arrive in Delhi. There are also minor divergences on freedom of expression, security and civil rights, and how to engage with non-democratic countries[66]. Among the challenges that both countries must take into account is the possible loss of support in some quarters of US policy for the relationship with India. This is due to India's actions in Kashmir in August 2019, the protection of religious freedom and attention to dissent. On the other hand, there has been no shortage of weakening of democratic norms, immigration restrictions and violence against Indians[67].

Lastly, let us remember that both are facing a profound health and therefore economic crisis, the resolution of which will be decisive in relation to competition with Beijing[68]. The crisis has affected the bilateral relationship since, although trade in services has remained stable (around 50 billion), trade in goods declined from 92 to 78 billion between 2019 and 2020, increasing India's trade deficit[69].

Finally, it is worth mentioning the opportunities. First, both countries can develop democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific as well as in a rules-based international order[70]. In security and defence, there are also opportunities such as the UK and France's entrance as allies in the region, for example by seeking both countries' entry into the Malabar exercise or France's chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposiumin 2022[71]. Although the medium-term trend deadline is for cooperation between the US and India, skill with Russia will be a growing threat[72], so cooperation between the US, India and Europe is very important.

It also opens up the possibility of cooperation in MDA (Maritime Warning Environment) and ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) mechanisms, as the Indian Ocean is of general importance to several countries due to the value of its energy transport routes. The possibility of cooperation through the use of the US P-8 "Poseidon" aircraft is opened up. Despite disputes over the Chagos archipelago, India and the US should take advantage of the agreements they have over islands such as the Andaman and Diego Garcia to carry out these activities[73]. Therefore, India should use the regional bodies and groups of work to cooperate with European countries and the US[74].

Europe seems to be gaining increasing importance because of the possibility of entering the Indo-Pacific game through QUAD Plus. European countries are very much in favour of multilateralism, defending freedom of navigation and the role of rules in regulating it. While it is true that the EU has recently signed a trade agreement with China - the IAC - increasing the European presence in the region takes on greater importance, as Xi's authoritarianism and his actions in Tibet, Xinjiang, or central China are not to the liking of European countries[75].

Lastly, it is worth remembering that there are some voices that speak of a decline or weakening of globalisation[76], especially after the coronavirus epidemic[77], so reviving multilateral exchanges through joint action becomes a challenge and an opportunity for both countries. In fact, it is believed that protectionist tendencies, at least in the Sino-Indian relationship, will continue in the short term deadline , despite intense economic cooperation[78].

Conclusion

The geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific is complex to say the least. Chinese expansionism clashes with the interests of the other major regional power, India, which, while avoiding confrontation with Beijing, takes a dim view of its neighbour's actions. In a bid for multilateralism, and with its sights set on its regional waters, threatened by the Malacca Dilemma, India seems to be cooperating with the United States, but sticking to regional forums and groups to make its position clear, while seeming to open the door to European countries, whose interest in the region is growing, despite the recent trade agreement signed with China.

On the other hand, the United States is also threatened by Chinese expansionism and sees the moment of its rival's economic overtaking approaching, which the coronavirus crisis may even have brought forward to 2028. In order to avoid this status, the Biden Administration has opted for multilateralism at the regional level and is deepening its relationship with India, beyond the military aspect. Washington seems to have understood that US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific is far from being real, at least in the medium term deadline, so that only a cooperative and integrating attitude can be adopted. On the other hand, in the midst of this supposed retreat from globalisation, we see how Washington, together with India, and probably halfway through deadline with Europe, are defending the Western values that govern the international sphere, i.e. the defence of human rights, the rule of law and the value of democracy.

There are two factors at play here. On the one hand, India does not want to see an order imposed by any subject, either American or Chinese, hence its reluctance to confront Beijing directly and its preference to expand the QUAD. On the other hand, the United States seems to perceive that it is at a delicate moment, as its competition with China goes beyond the mere substitution of one power for another. Washington is still a traditional power that, for its presence in the Indo-Pacific, has relied primarily on military power, while China has based the extension of its influence on the establishment of strong trade relations that go beyond the belligerent logic of the Cold War. Hence, the United States is seeking to form a front with India and its European allies that goes beyond military cooperation.

REFERENCES 

[1] The QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) is a dialogue group formed by the United States, India, Japan and Australia. Its members share a common vision of Indo-Pacific security that runs counter to China's; they advocate multilateralism and freedom of navigation in the region.

[2] scholarship (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement). Treaty signed by India and the United States in October 2019 to improve security in the Indo-Pacific region. Its goal is the exchange of tracking, tracing and intelligence systems.

[3]Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective". Chinawatch. Connecting Thinkers... http://www. chinawatch.cn/a/202102/05/WS60349146a310acc46eb43e2d.html,(accessed 5 February 2021),

[4] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating and Rebalancing Ties," in Tanvi Madan, "India And The Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties",. German Marshal Found of the United States. https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/02/11/india-and-biden-administration-consolidating-and-rebalancing-ties,(accessed 11 February 2021).

[5]DarshanaBaruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "diary 2021: A Blueprint For U.S.-Europe-India Cooperation", US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security. GMF India Trilateral Forum. Pg:1. https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/02/16/us-india-cooperation-indo-pacific-security, (accessed 16 February 2021).

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[7] Mereyem Hafidi, "Biden Renews 'QUAD' Alliance Despite Pressure From Beijing". Atalayar. https://atalayar.com/content/biden-renueva-la-alianza-de-%E2%80%98QUAD%E2%80%99-pesar-de-las-presiones-de-pek%C3%ADn.(accessed February 2021).

[8] "`Grandstanding`: US, China trade rebukes in testy talks". Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/19/us-china-top-diplomats-trade-rebukes-in-testy-first-talks (accessed March 2021).

[9] Joseph R. Biden, "Why America Must Lead Again". Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again (accessed February, 2021).

[10] Maria Siow. "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind". South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3126091/india-receives-us-defence-secretary-lloyd-austin-china-its-mind.(accessed 19 March 2021).

[11] Seeram Chaulia, "France and sailing toward the 'QUAD-plus'". The New Indian Express. https://www. newindianexpress.com/opinions/2021/apr/06/france-and-sailing-toward-the-QUAD-plus-2286408.html (accessed April 4, 2021).

[12] Juan Luis López Aranguren. "Indo-Pacific: The new order without China at the centre. The Indo-Pacific as a new global geopolitical axis. Global Affairs Journal. P.:2. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/indo-pacifico-el-nuevo-orden-sin-china-en-el-centro?_33_redirect=%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fglobal-affairs%2Fpublicaciones%2Finformes.(accessed April 2021).

[13] Biden, "Remarks By President Biden On America's Place In The World | The White House...".

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/

[14] Ibid.

[15] Derek Grossman, 'Biden's China Reset Is Already On The Ropes'. Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Biden-s-China-reset-is-already-on-the-ropes.(accessed 14 March 2021).

[16] Ramón Barba Castro, 'New tensions in the Asia-Pacific in a scenario of electoral change'. Global Affairs and Strategic Studies. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/nuevas-tensiones-en-asia-pacifico-en-un-escenario-de-cambio-electoral-en-eeuu.(accessed, April 2021).

[17] Sankaran Kalyanaraman, "Changing Pattern Of The China-India-US Triangle". Manohar Parrikar Institute For Defence Studies And Analyses. https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/changing-pattern-china-india-us-triangle-skalyanaram (accessed March 2021).

[18] Pang Zhongying, 'Indo-Pacific Era Needs US-China Cooperation, Not Great Power Conflict'. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3125926/indo-pacific-needs-us-china-cooperation-not-conflict-QUAD (accessed 19 March 2021).

[19] Sankaran Kalayanamaran, "Changing Pattern of the China-India-US Triangle".

[20] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective".

[21] Joseph R. Biden, "Remarks By President Biden On America's Place In The World

[22]Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective".

[23] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind".

[24]Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties".

[25] CEBR (Centre for Economics and Business Research) is an organisation dedicated to the economic analysis and forecasting of companies and organisations. linkhttps://cebr.com/about-cebr/. Every year, this organisation produces an annual report graduate World Economic League Table¸which analyses the position of each country in the world in terms of the state of its Economics. The latest edition(World Economic League Table 2021), published on 26 December 2020, presents a prediction of the state of the world's Economics in 2035, in order to know who will be the world's leading economic powers. (CEBR, "World Economic League Table 2021". Centre for Economics and Business Research (12th edition), https://cebr.com/reports/world-economic-league-table-2021/ (accessed March 2021).

[26] Ibid., 231.

[27] Ibid., 71.

[28] Vijay Gokhale, "China Doesn't Want a New World Order. It Wants This One". The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/opinion/china-america-united-nations.html(accessed April 2021).

[29] Mereyem Hafidi, "Biden renews 'QUAD' alliance despite pressure from Beijing.

[30] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective".

[31] Ibid.

[32] Wang Huiyao, "More cooperation, less competition". Chinawatch. Connecting Thinkers. http://www.chinawatch.cn/a/202102/05/WS6034913ba310acc46eb43e28.html(accessed March 2021).

[33] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective".

[34] DarshanaBaruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security". Page 5.

[35] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective".

[36] Ibid.

[37] DarshanaBaruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security". Page 5.

[38] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties".

[39] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship". Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/democracy-and-the-us-india-relationship/ (accessed March 2021)

[40] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind".

[41] Bilal Kuchay, "India, US sign key military deal, symbolizing closer ties". Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/2/india-us-military-deal(accessed March 2021)

[42] Wang Huiyao, "More cooperation, less competition".

[43] Alex Lo, "India-the democratic economic giant that disappoints". South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3126342/india-democratic-economic-giant-disappoints(accessed 21 March 2021).

[44] Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific". South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3125344/QUAD-summit-us-india-australia-and-japan-counter-chinas.(accessed 13 March 2021).

[45] MereyemHafidi, "Biden renews 'QUAD' alliance despite pressure from Beijing.

[46] Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific".

[47] Aljazeera, "'QUAD' leaders pledge new cooperation on China, COVID-19, climate".

[48]DarshanaBaruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security". Page 2.

[49]Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific".

[50] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind".

[51] "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner". Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/us-defense-secretary-lloyd-austin-says-us-considers-india-to-be-a-great-partner-101616317189411.html.(accessed 21 March 2021).

[52] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind".

[53] The term PASSEX is an abbreviation of the English military jargon, which stands for Passing Exercise. It consists of taking advantage of the fact that a Marine unit is passing through a given area to deepen military cooperation with the army of the area through which it is passing. An example of this is the news item cited in this article article: "India, US begin two-day naval exercise in eastern Indian Ocean region". The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-us-begin-two-day-naval-exercise-in-eastern-indian-ocean-region/articleshow/81735782.cms (accessed 28 March 2021).

[54] Annath Krishnan, Dinakar Peri, Kallol Bhattacherjee; India-U.S. 2+2 dialogue: U.S. to support India's defence of territory. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-us-22-dialogue-rajnath-singh-raises-chinas-action-in-ladakh/article32955117.ece.(accessed, March 2021)

[55] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind".

[56] Ibid.

[57] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship".

[58] Hindustan Times, "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner".

[59] "Committed to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/committed-to-achieving-goal-of-500-bn-in-bilateral-trade-with-us-ambassador-sandhu/articleshow/80878316.cms.(accessed March 2021).

[60] Joe C. Mathew, "India-US mini trade deal: Low duty on medical devices; pact in final stages". Business Today. https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/india-us-mini-trade-deal-low-duty-on-medical-devices-pact-in-final-stages/story/413669.html.(Accessed March 2021).

[61] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[62] Joe C. Mathew, "India-US mini trade deal: Low duty on medical devices; pact in final stages".

[63] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[64] Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security". Page 2.

[65] "Hindustan Times "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner".

[66] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship".

[67] Ibid.

[68] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating and Rebalancing Ties".

[69] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[70] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship".

[71] Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security". Page3.

[72] IBIDEM p.3

[73] IBIDEM. Page 6

[74] IBIDEM. Page 7

[75] Seeram Chaulia, "France and sailing toward the 'QUAD-plus'". The New Indian Express

[76] Elisabeth Mearns, Gary Parkinson; "With a pandemic, populism and protectionism, have we passed peak globalization?". China Global Television Network. https://newseu.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-28/With-a-pandemic-populism-and-protectionism-has-globalization-peaked--QOQMPg3ABO/index.html.(accessed April 2021).

[77] Abraham Newman, Henry Farrel; "The New Age of Protectionism". Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2021-04-05/new-age-protectionism.(accessed 5 April 2021).

[78] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

Detainee in a Xinjiang re-education camp located in Lop County listening to "de-radicalization" talks [Baidu baijiahao].

ESSAY / Rut Noboa

Over the last few years, reports of human rights violations against Uyghur Muslims, such as extrajudicial detentions, torture, and forced labor, have been increasingly reported in the Xinjiang province's so-called "re-education" camps. However, the implications of the Chinese undertakings on the province's ethnic minority are not only humanitarian, having direct links to China's ongoing economic projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and natural resource extraction in the region. Asides from China's economic diary, ongoing projects in Xinjiang appear to prototype future Chinese initiatives in terms of expanding the surveillance state, particularly within the scope of technology. When it comes to other international actors, the Xinjiang dispute has evidenced a growing diplomatic split between countries against it, mostly western liberal democracies, and countries willing to at least defend it, mostly countries with important ties to China and dubious human rights records. The issue also has important repercussions for multinational companies, with supply chains of well-known international companies such as Nike and Apple benefitting from forced Uyghur labour. The situation in Xinjiang is critically worrisome when it comes to the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly considering recent outbreaks in Kashgar, how highly congested these "reeducation" camps, and potential censorship from the government. Finally, Uyghur communities continue to be an important factor within this conversation, not only as victims of China's policies but also as dissidents shaping international opinion around the matter.

The Belt and Road Initiative

Firstly, understanding Xinjiang's role in China's ongoing projects requires a strong geographical perspective. The northwestern province borders Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, giving it important contact with other regional players.

This also places it at the very heart of the BRI. With it setting up the twenty-first century "Silk Road" and connecting all of Eurasia, both politically and economically, with China, it is no surprise that it has managed to establish itself as China's biggest infrastructural project and quite possibly the most important undertaking in Chinese policy today. Through more and more ambitious efforts, China has established novel and expansive connections throughout its newfound spheres of influence. From negotiations with Pakistan and the establishment of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) securing one of the most important routes in the initiative to Sri Lanka defaulting on its loan and giving China control over the Hambantota Port, the Chinese government has managed to establish consistent access to major trade routes.

However, one important issue remains: controlling its access to Central Asia. One of the BRI's initiative's key logistical hubs is Xinjiang, where the Uyghurs pose an important challenge to the Chinese government. The Uyghur community's attachment to its traditional lands and culture is an important risk to the effective implementation of the BRI in Xinjiang. This perception is exacerbated by existing insurrectionist groups such as the East Turkestan independence movement and previous events in Chinese history, including the existence of an independent Uyghur state in the early 20th century[1]. Chinese infrastructure projects that cross through the Xinjiang province, such as the Central Asian High-speed Rail are a priority that cannot be threatened by instability in the region, inspiring the recent "reeducation" and "de-extremification" policies.

Natural resource exploitation

Another factor for China's growing control over the region is the fact that Xinjiang is its most important energy-producing region, even reaching the point where key pipeline projects connect the northwestern province with China's key coastal cities and approximately 60% of the province's gross regional production comes from oil and natural gas extraction and related industries[2]. With China's energy consumption being on a constant rise[3] as a result of its growing economy, control over Xinjiang is key to Chinese.

Additionally, even though oil and natural gas are the region's main industries, the Chinese government has also heavily promoted the industrial-scale production of cotton, serving as an important connection with multinational textile-based corporations seeking cheap labour for their products.

This issue not only serves as an important reason for China to control the Uyghurs but also promotes instability in the region. The increased immigration from a largely Han Chinese workforce, perceived unequal distribution of revenue to Han-dominated firms, and increased environmental costs of resource exploitation have exacerbated the pre-existing ethnic conflict.

A growing diplomatic split

The situation in Xinjiang also has important implications for international perceptions of Chinese propaganda. China's actions have received noticeable backlash from several states, with 22 states issuing a joint statement to the Human Rights Council on the treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang on July 8, 2019. These states called upon China "to uphold its national laws and international obligations and to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms".

Meanwhile, on July 12, 2019, 50 (originally 37) other states issued a competing letter to the same institution, commending "China's remarkable achievements in the field of human rights", stating that people in Xinjiang "enjoy a stronger sense of happiness, fulfillment and security".

This diplomatic split represents an important and growing division in world politics. When we look at the signatories of the initial letter, it is clear to see that all are developed democracies and most (except for Japan) are Western. Meanwhile, those countries that chose to align themselves with China represent a much more heterogeneous group with states from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa[4]. Many of these have questionable human rights records and/or receive important funding and investment from the Chinese government, reflecting both the creation of an alternative bloc distanced from Western political influence as well as an erosion of preexisting human rights standards.

China's Muslim-majority allies: A Pakistani case study

The diplomatic consequences of the Xinjiang controversy are not only limited to this growing split, also affecting the political rhetoric of individual countries. In the last years, Pakistan has grown to become one of China's most important allies, particularly within the context of CPEC being quite possibly one of the most important components of the BRI.

As a Muslim-majority country, Pakistan has traditionally placed pan-Islamic causes, such as the situations in Palestine and Kashmir, at the centre of its foreign policy. However, Pakistan's position on Xinjiang appears not just subdued but even complicit, never openly criticising the situation and even being part of the mentioned letter in support of the Chinese government (alongside other Muslim-majority states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE). With Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan addressing the General Assembly in September 2019 on Islamophobia in post-9/11 Western countries as well as in Kashmir but conveniently omitting Uyghurs in Xinjiang[5], Pakistani international rhetoric weakens itself constantly. Due to relying on China for political and economic support, it appears that Pakistan will have to censor itself on these issues, something that also rings true for many other Muslim-majority countries.

Central Asia: complacent and supportive

Another interesting case study within this diplomatic split is the position of different countries in the Central Asian region. These states - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan - have the closest cultural ties to the Uyghur population. However, their foreign policy hasn't been particularly supportive of this ethnic group with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan avoiding the spotlight and not participating in the UNHRC dispute and Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan being signatories of the second letter, explicitly supporting China. These two postures can be analyzed through the examples of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Kazakhstan has taken a mostly ambiguous position to the situation. Having the largest Uyghur population outside China and considering Kazakhs also face important persecution from Chinese policies that discriminate against minority ethnic groups in favour of Han Chinese citizens, Kazakhstan is quite possibly one of the states most affected by the situation in Xinjiang. However, in the last decades, Kazakhstan has become increasingly economically and, thus, politically dependent on China. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan implemented what some would refer to as a "multi-vector" approach, seeking to balance its economic engagements with different actors such as Russia, the United States, European countries, and China. However, with American and European interests in Kazakhstan decreasing over time and China developing more and more ambitious foreign policy within the framework of strategies such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Central Asian state has become intimately tied to China, leading to its deafening silence on Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

A different argument could be made for Uzbekistan. Even though there is no official statistical data on the Uyghur population living in Uzbekistan and former president Islam Karimov openly stated that no Uyghurs were living there, this is highly questionable due to the existing government censorship in the country. Also, the role of Uyghurs in Uzbekistan is difficult to determine due to a strong process of cultural and political assimilation, particularly in the post-Soviet Uzbekistan. By signing the letter to the UNHCR in favour of China's practices, the country has chosen a more robust support of its policies.

All in all, the countries in Central Asia appear to have chosen to tolerate and even support Chinese policies, sacrificing cultural values for political and economic stability.

Forced labour, the role of companies, and growing backlash

In what appears to be a second stage in China's "de-extremification" policies, government officials have claimed that the "trainees "in its facilities have "graduated", being transferred to factories outside of the province. China claims these labor transfers (which it refers to as vocational training) to be part of its "Xinjiang Aid" central policy[6]. Nevertheless, human rights groups and researchers have become growingly concerned over their labor standards, particularly considering statements from Uyghur workers who have left China describing the close surveillance from personnel and constant fear of being sent back to detention camps.

Within this context, numerous companies (both Chinese and foreign) with supply chain connections with factories linked to forced Uyghur labour have become entangled in growing international controversies, ranging from sportswear producers like Nike, Adidas, Puma, and Fila to fashion brands like H&M, Zara, and Tommy Hilfiger to even tech players such as Apple, Sony, Samsung, and Xiaomi[7]. Choosing whether to terminate relationships with these factories is a complex choice for these companies, having to either lose important components of their intricate supply chains or face growing backlash on an increasingly controversial issue.

The allegations have been taken seriously by these groups with organizations such as the Human Rights Watch calling upon concerned governments to take action within the international stage, specifically through the United Nations Human Rights Council and by imposing targeted sanctions at responsible senior officials. Another important voice is the Coalition to End Forced Labour in the Uyghur Region, a coalition of civil society organizations and trade unions such as the Human Rights Watch, the Investor Alliance for Human Rights, the World Uyghur Congress, and the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, pressuring the brands and retailers involved to exclude Xinjiang from all components of the supply chain, especially when it comes to textiles, yarn or cotton as well as calling upon governments to adopt legislation that requires human rights due diligence in supply chains. Additionally, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, the same organisation that carried out the initial report on forced Uyghur labor and surveillance beyond Xinjiang and within the context of these labor transfers, recently created the Xinjiang Data Project. This initiative documents ongoing Chinese policies on the Uyghur community with open-source data such as satellite imaging and official statistics and could be decidedly useful for human rights defenders and researchers focused on the topic.

One important issue when it comes to the labour conditions faced by Uyghurs in China comes from the failures of the auditing and certification industry. To respond to the concerns faced by having Xinjiang-based suppliers, many companies have turned to auditors. However, with at least five international auditors publicly stating that they would not carry out labor-audit or inspection services in the province due to the difficulty of working with the high levels of government censorship and monitoring, multinational companies have found it difficult to address these issues[8]. Additionally, we must consider that auditing firms could be inspecting factories that in other contexts are their clients, adding to the industry's criticism. These complaints have led human rights groups to argue that overarching reform will be crucial for the social auditing industry to effectively address issues such as excessive working hours, unsafe labor conditions, physical abuse, and more[9].

Xinjiang: a prototype for the surveillance state

From QR codes to the collection of biometric data, Xinjiang has rapidly become the lab rat for China's surveillance state, especially when it comes to technology's role in the issue.

One interesting area being massively affected by this is travel. As of September 2016, passport applicants in Xinjiang are required to submit a DNA sample, a voice recording, a 3D image of themselves, and their fingerprints, much harsher requirements than citizens in other regions. Later in 2016, Public Security Bureaus across Xinjiang issued a massive recall of passports for an "annual review" followed by police "safekeeping"[10].

Another example of how a technologically aided surveillance state is developing in Xinjiang is the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), a big data program for policing that selects individuals for possible detention based on specific criteria. According to the Human Rights Watch, which analyzed two leaked lists of detainees and first reported on the policing program in early 2018, the majority of people identified by the program are being persecuted because of lawful activities, such as reciting the Quran and travelling to "sensitive" countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Additionally, some criteria for detention appear to be intentionally vague, including "being generally untrustworthy" and "having complex social ties"[11].

Xinjiang's case is particularly relevant when it comes to other Chinese initiatives, such as the Social Credit System, with initial measures in Xinjiang potentially aiding to finetune the details of an evolving surveillance state in the rest of China.

Uyghur internment camps and COVID-19

The implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for Uyghurs in Xinjiang are pressing issues, particularly due to the virus's rapid spread in highly congested areas such as these "reeducation" camps.

Currently, Kashgar, one of Xinjiang's prefectures is facing China's most recent coronavirus outbreak[12]. Information from the Chinese government points towards a limited outbreak that is being efficiently controlled by state authorities. However, the authenticity of this data is highly controversial within the context of China's early handling of the pandemic and reliance on government censorship.

Additionally, the pandemic has more consequences for Uyghurs than the virus itself. As the pandemic gives governments further leeway to limit rights such as the right to assembly, right to protest, and freedom of movement, the Chinese government gains increased lines of action in Xinjiang.

Uyghur communities abroad

The situation for Uyghurs living abroad is far from simple. Police harassment of Uyghur immigrants is quite common, particularly through the manipulation and coercion of their family members still living in China. These threatening messages requesting staff information or pressuring dissidents abroad to remain silent. The officials rarely identify themselves and in some cases these calls or messages don't necessarily even come from government authorities, instead coming from coerced family members and friends[13]. One interesting case was reported in August 2018 by US news publication The Daily Beast in which an unidentified Uyghur American woman was asked by her mother to send over pictures of her US license plate number, her phone number, her bank account number, and her ID card under the excuse that China was creating a new ID system for all Chinese citizens, even those living abroad[14]. A similar situation was reported by Foreign Policy when it came to Uyghurs in France who have been asked to send over home, school, and work addresses, French or Chinese IDs, and marriage certificates if they were married in France[15].

Regardless of Chinese efforts to censor Uyghur dissidents abroad, their nonconformity has only grown with the strengthening of Uyghur repression in mainland China. Important international human rights groups such as Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch have been constantly addressing the crisis while autonomous Uyghur human rights groups, such as the Uyghur Human Rights Project, the Uyghur American Association, and the Uyghur World Congress, have developed from communities overseas. Asides from heavily protesting policies such as the internment camps and increasing surveillance in Xinjiang, these groups have had an important role when it comes to documenting the experiences of Uyghur immigrants. However, reports from both human rights group and average agencies when it comes to the crisis have been met with staunch rejection from China. One such case is the BBC being banned in China after recently reporting on Xinjiang internment camps, leading it to be accused of not being "factual and fair" by the China National Radio and Television Administration. The UK's Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab referred to the actions taken by the state authorities as "an unacceptable curtailing of average freedom" and stated that they would only continue to damage China's international reputation[16].  

One should also think prospectively when it comes to Uyghur communities abroad. As seen in the diplomatic split between countries against China's policies in Xinjiang and those who support them (or, at the very least, are willing to tolerate them for their political interest), a growing number of countries can excuse China's treatment of Uyghur communities. This could eventually lead to countries permitting or perhaps even facilitating China's attempts at coercing Uyghur immigrants, an important prospect when it comes to countries within the BRI and especially those with an important Uyghur population, such as the previously mentioned example of Kazakhstan.

REFERENCES

[1] Qian, Jingyuan. 2019. "Ethnic Conflicts and the Rise of Anti-Muslim Sentiment in Modern China." Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3450176.

[2] Cao, Xun, Haiyan Duan, Chuyu Liu, James A. Piazza, and Yingjie Wei. 2018. "Digging the "Ethnic Violence in China" Database: The Effects of Inter-Ethnic Inequality and Natural Resources Exploitation in Xinjiang." The China Review (The Chinese University of Hong Kong) 18 (No. 2 SPECIAL THEMED SECTION: Frontiers and Ethnic Groups in China): 121-154. Accessed November 15, 2020. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26435650

[3] International Energy Agency. 2020. Data & Statistics - IEA. Accessed November 14, 2020. https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics?country=CHINA&fuel=Energy%20consumption&indicator=TotElecCons.

[4] Yellinek, Roie, and Elizabeth Chen. 2019. "The "22 vs. 50" Diplomatic Split Between the West and China." China Brief (The Jamestown Foundation) 19 (No. 22): 20-25. Accessed November 14, 2020. https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Read-the-12-31-2019-CB-Issue-in-PDF.pdf?x91188.

[5] United Nations General Assembly. 2019. "General Assembly official records, 74th session : 9th plenary meeting." New York. Accessed October 18, 2020.

[6] Xu, Vicky Xiuzhong, Danielle Cave, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Nathan Ruser. 2020. "Uyghurs for sale: 'Re-education', forced labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang." Policy Brief, International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian Strategic Policy Paper. Accessed November 14, 2020. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale

[7] Ibid.

[8] Xiao, Eva. 2020. Auditors to Stop Inspecting Factories in China's Xinjiang Despite Forced-Labor Concerns. 21 September. Accessed December 2020, 16. https://www.wsj.com/articles/auditors-say-they-no-longer-will-inspect-labor-conditions-at-xinjiang-factories-11600697706.

[9] Kashyap, Aruna. 2020. Social Audit Reforms and the Labor Rights Ruse. 7 October. Accessed December 16, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/07/social-audit-reforms-and-labor-rights-ruse.

[10] Human Rights Watch. 2016. China: Passports Arbitrarily Recalled in Xinjiang. 21 November. Accessed November 15, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/22/china-passports-arbitrarily-recalled-xinjiang

[11] Human Rights Watch. 2020. China: Big Data Program Targets Xinjiang's Muslims. 9 December. Accessed December 17, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/09/china-big-data-program-targets-xinjiangs-muslims.

[12] National Health Commission of the People's Republic of China. 2020. How China's Xinjiang is tackling new COVID-19 outbreak. 29 October. Accessed November 14, 2020. http://en.nhc.gov.cn/2020-10/29/c_81994.htm.

[13] Uyghur Human Rights Project. 2019. "Repression Across Borders: The CCP's Illegal Harassment and Coercion of Uyghur Americans."

[14] Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. 2018. Chinese Cops Now Spying on American Soil. 14 August. Accessed December 7, 2020. https://www.thedailybeast.com/chinese-police-are-spying-on-uighurson-american-soil.

[15] Allen-Ebrahimian. 2018. Chinese Police Are Demanding staff Information From Uighurs in France. 2 March. Accessed December 7, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/02/chinese-police-are-secretly-demanding-staff-information-from-french-citizens-uighurs-xinjiang/.

[16] Reuters Staff. 2021. BBC World News barred in mainland China, radio dropped by HK public broadcaster. 11 February. Accessed February 16, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-britain-bbc/bbc-world-news-barred-from-airing-in-china-idUSKBN2AB214.

[Michael J. Seth, A Concise History of Modern Korea. From the Late Nineteenth Century to the Present (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), Volume 2, 356 pages]

REVIEW / Jimena Villacorta

Normally, when thinking about the Korean Peninsula, we emphasize on the divided region it is now, and how the Korean War (1950-1053) had a great impact on the two independent territories we have today, North and South Korea. We forget that it once was a culturally and ethnically homogenous nation, that because of its law, couldn't even trade with outsiders until the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876 which marked a turning point in Korean history as it ended isolation and allowed the Japanese insertion in the territory which had great effects on its economic and political order.

Michael J. Seth narrates the fascinating history of Korea from the end of the 19th century to the present. In this edition he updates his previous work, originally published ten years before, and he presents it as a "volume 2", because his latest years of research have produced a "volume 1", entitled A Concise History of Premodern Korea, which follows Korea's history from Antiquity through the nineteenth century.

From falling under Japanese imperialism and expansionism to its division after the Second World War, this book explores the economic, political and social issues that modern Korea has faced in the last decades. The author provides its readers a great resource for those seeking a general, yet detailed, history of this currently divided nation in eight chapters. The first two chapters focus on what happened before the Korean War and on how neighbors and other actors. Russia had great influence in the region until its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Consequently, Korea became a colony of Japan until the Allied Forces victory during the Second World War. Japanese rule is described as harsh and detrimental for Koreans as they intended to force their own culture and system in the territory. Although, in despite of its aggressiveness, the Japanese contributed to Korea's industrialization. Countries like China and the United States were also major players. From 1885 to 1894, China had a strong presence in the peninsula as the Chinese didn't want other powers to take over the territory.

The rest of the book emphasizes on the war and the consequences it had, tracing the different course both countries took becoming contrasting societies with different political and economic systems. The reason for the great differences between the two Koreas is the difference in governments and influences they had after the war, a war that stopped because of a ceasefire, as to date they haven't signed a peace treaty. Even if South Korea was under Syngman Rhee's authoritarian and corrupt regime tight after the Korean War, it soon became democratized and the country began to quickly advance in matter of technology and human development leaving North Korea out in the open under a totalitarian dictatorship lead by Kim Jong-un. However, after the separation of the two zones, Kim II-sung was the founder of the North in 1948 and his family dynasty has ruled the country since then. During this period, South Korea has had six republics, one revolution, two coups d'état, the transition to democratic elections and nineteen presidencies. In terms of economics, they went from having a very similar GDP at the beginning of the 1970s to very different outcomes. While South Korea has progressed rapidly, becoming one of the world's leading industrial producers, North Korea became stagnant due to its rigid state system. South Korea also has a high level of technological infrastructure. Moreover, North Korea became a nuclear power, which has been in its diary since the division. But as he explores the technical differences of both states, the author fails to elaborate in historical debates and controversies regarding both regions, but he emphasizes on the fact that after sixty years of division, there are still no signs or reunification. 

Without a doubt, it is interesting to learn about Korea's past colonial occupation and its division, but what I believe is the most captivating is to understand how North Korea and South Korea have evolved as two independent very different states because of the uniqueness and complexity of its history, while still sharing a strong sense of nationalism. As the author says, "No modern nation ever developed a more isolated and totalitarian society than North Korea, nor such an all-embracing family cult. No society moved more swiftly from extreme poverty to prosperity and from authoritarianism to democracy than South Korea".

Ships of the US, India and Japan in the Bay of Bengal during exercise Malabar 2017 [US Navy].

JOURNAL / Shahana Thankachan

[Document of 6 pages. Download PDF] [Document of 6 pages. Download PDF].

INTRODUCTION

There can be no objective and singular definition of the Indo-Pacific, one can only provide an Indian definition, a Japanese definition, a US definition, an ASEAN definition, etc. This is not to say that there are no common grounds in these definitions, there are as many commonalities as there are differences, and this is what makes this topic so hot and dynamic. The geopolitical reality of the Indo-Pacific perfectly represents a great power rivalry at the systemic level and also a perfect regional security complex. In this complex matrix, this paper will seek to focus on the Indo-Pacific from the perspective of India. While the term "Indo" in the Indo-Pacific does not mean India, it does refer to the Indian Ocean and India is the most important power in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, it is very important to fully understand the Indian perspective. The paper will begin by outlining the origin of the concept and thereafter the challenges in the Indian approach to the Indo-Pacific and the future prospects.

Chinese fortification on disputed small islands [CSIS satellite imagery].

JOURNAL / Fernando Delage

[8-page document. download in PDF].

INTRODUCTION

The idea of the "Indo-Pacific" has burst into the discussion on International Office in Asia. For a little over a decade now, different governments have used the term as the framework of reference letter in which they formulate their foreign policy towards the region. If the then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe began to popularise the expression in 2007, Australia formally adopted it in its 2013 Defence White Paper, a year in which the Indian government also resorted to the concept to define the regional environment. As US Secretary of State administrative assistant , Hillary Clinton similarly used the term in 2010, although it was not until late 2017, under the Trump administration, that it became Washington's official name for the region.

Although related, "Indo-Pacific" has two different connotations. It represents, on the one hand, a geographical reconceptualisation of Asia; a re-mapping of the continent as a consequence of the growing interaction between the two oceans and the simultaneous rise of China and India. The idea is also linked to a strategy designed in response to China's rise, the most visible instrument of which is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), an informal group comprising the United States, Japan, India and Australia. This is why Beijing is wary of the term and prefers to continue to use "Asia-Pacific" to describe its neighbourhood, even if its actions also respond to this new perspective: as Australian analyst Rory Medcalf has pointed out, the Maritime Silk Road is nothing more than "the Indo-Pacific with Chinese characteristics".

The prominence of the major powers in the origin and use of the term seems to have relegated the role of ASEAN and its member states. Despite their lesser economic and military weight, they are not without relevance. In addition to being located at the intersection of the two oceans - Southeast Asia is, in fact, the centre of the Indo-Pacific - disputes over the South China Sea place the sub-region in the midst of the rivalry between China and the United States. While the former extends its influence through economic diplomacy while unsettling neighbouring states over their maritime claims, the Trump administration has chosen to directly oppose China's increased economic and military power. ASEAN does not want to be caught up in the confrontation between Washington and Beijing, nor does it want to be marginalised in the ongoing reconfiguration of the regional structure. Its member states want to benefit from the opportunities that China provides for their development but also want external support to act as a strategic counterweight to the People's Republic. Although these circumstances explain its reservations about a concept that puts its cohesion and identity as an organisation at risk, ASEAN ended up adopting its own 'Indo-Pacific Perspective' in 2019, an official document that reveals its efforts to maintain its independence.