The risk of military use of the facility, fuelled by confidentiality clauses, fuels discussion in Argentina and suspicion in Washington.

China's arrival on the far side of the moon has put the spotlight on Chinese space developments. For this new degree program, Beijing has a tracking and observation station in Patagonia, the first on its own territory. In Argentina, there has been an extensive discussion about possible unacknowledged purposes of these facilities and alleged secret clauses negotiated at the time by the Kirchner administration. The government of Mauricio Macri guarantees the peaceful uses of the station, but the controversy has not ceased.

Chinese space station in the Argentinean province of Neuquén [Casa Rosada] ▲ Chinese space station in the Argentinean province of Neuquén [Casa Rosada].

article / Naomi Moreno Cosgrove

After years of gradual economic penetration, which has led it to become the leading commercial partner in several South American countries and a major lender and investor throughout the region, China's incursion into Latin America is no longer silent. The influence it has achieved in various nations - for example, it acquires almost 90% of Ecuador's oil exports and its credits have been essential for the subsistence of Venezuela and certain Brazilian public companies - means that China's activities are attracting special attention and its expansion is becoming increasingly clear.

China's growing power in Latin America is especially noted by the United States, although its own neglect of the region, sometimes presented as a consequence of its pivot towards Asia, has contributed to national governments' attempts to meet its needs by seeking other partners from reference letter.

Already suspicious of China's growing presence in the Americas, any activity in strategic fields such as security arouses particular suspicion in Washington. This has also been the case with moves made by Moscow, such as the siting of a station for the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema or GLONASS) in Managua (Nicaragua). The secrecy surrounding the operation of the facility has caused mistrust among the population itself, raising suspicions as to whether its use is intended solely to provide a higher quality of the Russian navigation system or whether there is the possibility of strategic exploitation by Russian aerospace defence forces.

Negotiation

Suspicions about the so-called Far Space Station, the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA) station in Patagonia, in the province of Neuquén, stem from entrance from the fact that it was negotiated at a time of particular disadvantage for Argentina, due to the financial weakness of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's government and its need for urgent credit. When Argentina was out of the international credit markets for having defaulted on nearly 100 billion dollars in bonds, the Asian country was a blessing for the then president.

In 2009, in the midst of the financial crisis, China sent representatives to Latin America to discuss an issue that had little to do with currency fluctuations: Beijing's space interests. This was due to China's desire to have a centre in the other hemisphere of the globe that could support its space activity, such as the expedition to the far side of the moon.

After months of negotiation under great secrecy, the Chinese government and the government of the province of Neuquén signed a agreement in November 2012, giving China the right to use the land - rent-free - for fifty years. The technical agreement was signed by the Chinese state-owned business Launching Security and Control Satellite (CLTC) and the Argentinean National Commission for Space Activities (CONAE).

Enormous in size, the larger of the two circular antennas - it is twelve stories high, weighs 450 tons and has a large diameter - and visible from a great distance due to its location in the middle of a desert plain, the station soon became an ideal target for controversy and suspicion. Fears that, in addition to its declared civilian use, it might also have a military purpose and be used to gather information by intercepting communications in that part of South America, fuelled the controversy.

After becoming Argentine president in 2015, Mauricio Macri entrusted the then foreign minister Susana Malcorra and the Argentine ambassador in Beijing, Diego Guelar, with the task of negotiating that agreement should include the specification that the station would only be used for peaceful purposes, which the Chinese accepted.

In spite of everything, the discussion about the risks and benefits of the Chinese base is still alive in Argentine public opinion. Politicians from civil service examination in Neuquén consider that "it is shameful to renounce sovereignty in your own country", as Congresswoman Betty Kreitman said when provincial legislators heard about project.

Beyond Argentina's borders, White House officials have called project a 'Trojan Horse', reflecting US concerns about the initiative, according to sources quoted by The New York Times. Even apart from any strategic dispute with the United States, some Latin American leaders have doubts and regrets about established ties with China, worrying that previous governments have subjected their countries to excessive dependence on the Asian power.

Confidentiality

The main questioning of the Chinese base, then, has to do with its possible military use and the possible existence of secret clauses. The latter have been the main cause of international suspicion, as Macri himself came to validate the existence of these clauses when they became a weapon against the Kirchner government, and promised to reveal them when he became president, something he has not done. However, the Argentine space authorities themselves deny any section secrecy.

Perhaps the misunderstanding can be found in the fact that the contract signed between the Chinese CLTC and the Argentinean CONAE states that "both parties will maintain confidentiality regarding the technology, activities and monitoring, control and acquisition programmes of data". Although confidentiality regarding third parties in relation to technology is a common internship , in this case it contributes to public mistrust.

Given that the CLTC reports to the Chinese People's Army, it is difficult to deny that the data it obtains will come under the domain of the Defence hierarchy and may end up being put to military use, although not necessarily for military purposes. Experts also say that antennas and other equipment used to support space missions, similar to those the Chinese have in Patagonia, are likely to increase China's intelligence-gathering capabilities. "A giant antenna is like a huge hoover. It sucks up signals, information, all subject of things," Dean Cheng, an expert on China's national security policy, was quoted as saying in the NYT.

[Roberto Valencia, Letter from Zacatraz. Libros del K.O. Madrid, 2018. 384 pp.]

review / Jimena Villacorta

The story of El Directo – a young Salvadoran man who at the age of 17 was blamed for 17 murders, who was in and out of prison and was eventually sentenced by his fellow gang members – serves as a canvas for an even bigger picture: the serious social problem posed by violent gangs in Central America, particularly in El Salvador.

Roberto Valencia, a Spanish journalist who has lived in that Central American country for almost twenty years, has dedicated time and effort to addressing this problem in depth as a reporter for "El Faro". portal Salvadoran news outlet awarded for his research. Letter from Zacatraz (as the local media call the maximum security prison of Zacateoluca) is a journalistic story that through a concrete story exposes the broader panorama of a truly complex reality.

September 11, 2012 was the first time Valencia sat down to talk with Gustavo Adolfo Parada Morales, alias El Directo, someone who for years had garnered media attention, despite the existence of thousands of other young people involved in gangs. That contact staff encouraged the journalist to seek out other testimonies, including fill in a book that collects Parada's direct voice and that of people who knew him, based on interviews with those who loved him, such as his mother or his wife, and with those who confronted him, such as some judges.

As a result of an unwanted pregnancy, El Directo was born on January 25, 1982 in the city of San Miguel. Barely two decades later, he was already the most dangerous and feared man in El Salvador, or at least that's how the media projected him. A member of the Pana di Locos, a clique of the Mara Salvatrucha, he became the main public enemy. From the age of 17, accused of as many murders (of which he only admitted six) and various crimes, El Directo was in three juvenile detention centers and nine prisons. He had the opportunity to start a new life in Costa Rica, but it was ruined. He didn't make it to the United States. He was free for several months, but it wasn't long before the police recaptured him.

Through Parada's life, the author projects the phenomenon of the maras in El Salvador. It emphasizes how this phenomenon mainly affects the lower classes, while the rest of society does not realize the full magnitude of the problem and, therefore, is not interested in finding a solution. How is it possible, Valencia asks, that a society like El Salvador's, with 6.5 million inhabitants, tolerates an average of 10 homicides a day, not to mention the numerous other crimes, in a country where 1% of the population are gang members.

The repressive measures applied by the governments of the right (ARENA) and the left (FMLN) have not improved the gang problem. They have been growing, both inside and outside detention centres, many of which are in a deplorable state. It is precisely the condition of the prisons that aggravates the status: The infrastructure is damaged, there is a great deal of unsanitary conditions and overcrowding is extreme. In most prisons, gang leaders have a large share of control and dominate their respective organizations. "El Salvador's prison system is the most overcrowded in the hemisphere, according to the Organization of American States," Valencia said.

El Directo went through several prisons, where he was seriously wounded on multiple occasions, sometimes by order of the Mara Salvatrucha, which declared him a traitor and threatened to kill him, and other times by police and prison employees. After a few months in prison, he decided to reform himself and give up his activity in the MS. This brought him several opportunities, but he returned to prison. He was finally murdered in 2013, at the age of 31, by members of his new gang, La Mirada Locos, because he had been accused of ordering the killing of someone from the organization with whose wife he had had an affair.

It is interesting to note how in a country where a large number of crimes are recorded, for at least ten years the case of El Directo had an absolute priority in the media, which often exaggerated Parada's criminal record. "We live in a country where great murderers have been granted amnesty. The drugs circulate relatively freely and, despite the fact that police officials have said that there are important names in the business, of the state apparatus and the army involved in drug trafficking, we have not seen any arrests at that level," he told Valencia President of the Central American University, José María Tojeira. And he adds: "Income tax evasion is a fairly widespread vice among the wealthiest sectors. The police are still dealing with a Degree of significant corruption. Deputies are pardoned or investigated for acts in which the life or honor of other citizens has been severely threatened." For his part, Fernando Sáenz Lacalle, archbishop emeritus of San Salvador, regrets that journalists, commentators, analysts and politicians repeated over and over again, "like a church choir, the false refrain of the 17 years, 17 murders." In his opinion, "perhaps they went too far in terms of display and arrogance," according to Valencia.

Roberto Valencia concludes that the problem with the media is that at first they were benevolent towards the gangs, and then magnified the phenomenon, not to mention the repressive measures and the policies used to combat them.

Letter from Zacatraz is not a condescending book, but the criticism does not drown all hope. He warns that Salvadorans have become accustomed to living with this problem. Nowadays it is more common to avoid certain places that are known to be dangerous, than to try to fight for the betterment of the country. But it fosters confidence that shattered lives like El Directo's will serve to make new generations want something better for themselves.

Washington warns of the increase in violent transnational gangs, estimates that MS-13 has as many as 10,000 members

The Trump administration has drawn attention to an increase in violent transnational gangs in the United States, particularly the Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13, which maintains links to gang members in Central America's Northern Triangle. Although Trump has invoked this issue in a demagogic way, criminalizing immigration and forgetting that the Central American gangs were born in Los Angeles, the FBI notes that these organizations are recruiting more young people than ever before and demanding greater violence from their members. U.S. authorities believe that these gangs are governed to some extent from El Salvador, but that hierarchy is less clear.

▲ Mara Salvatrucha graffiti [Wikimedia Commons]

article / Lisa Cubías

Never before has the word "animal" caused so much controversy in the United States as when it was uttered by President Donald Trump in reference to the members of the Marasalvatrucha or MS 13, on May 16. It initially appeared to refer to all undocumented immigrants, prompting widespread pushback; He went on to say that the label he had wanted to apply it to gang members who come to the United States illegally to commit acts of violence. Trump placed his war on gangs in the framework of its zero-tolerance migration policy and the reinforcement of national agencies such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in order to reduce migratory flows from Latin America to the United States.

The description of the phenomenon of Latino youth gangs as a migration problem had already surfaced in the United States. speech of the State of the Union that Trump delivered on Jan. 28. In the face of the congress Trump told the story of two teenagers, Kayla Cuevas and Nisa Mickens, who had been brutally murdered by six MS-13 members on their way home. He said that criminals had taken advantage of loopholes in immigration legislation to live in the United States and reiterated that the congress It had to act to close them down and prevent gang members from using them to enter the country.

Despite Trump's demagogic simplification, the truth is that Latino gangs are a product of the United States. They are, as The Washington Post has put it, "as made in America as Google." They were born in Los Angeles, first to children of Mexican immigration and then fueled by the arrival of emigrants and refugees fleeing armed conflicts in Central America. Thus, El Salvador saw the emergence of a twelve-year civil war between the government and leftist guerrillas during the 1980s. The duration and brutality of the conflict, along with the political and economic instability that the country was experiencing, drove the exodus of Salvadorans to the United States. The influx of young people from El Salvador, as well as Honduras and Guatemala, led to the emergence of the Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 gangs, both of which were linked to the pre-existing Mexican Mafia (La M).

When peace came to Central America in the 1990s, many of these young people returned to their countries, following their families or being expelled by U.S. authorities because of their criminal activities. In this way, the maras began to operate in the Northern Triangle, where they constitute a serious social problem.

Transnationality

According to the department According to the U.S., there are about 33,000 violent street gangs, with a total of 1.4 million members. MS-13, with about 10,000 young people enrolled, accounts for only 1% of that total and in 2017 only 17 of its members were prosecuted, and yet it deserves the full attention of the White House. Apart from the possible political interests of the Trump Administration, the truth is that the US authorities have been highlighting its increase and its danger, in addition to warning that certain orders are issued from El Salvador. This transnationality is viewed with concern.

The United States does not recognize MS-13 as a terrorist organization, and therefore has not included it in its National Counterterrorism Strategy released in October 2018. It is, on the other hand, classified as a transnational criminal organization, as described by adocument of the department April 2017. According to the report, several of the gang leaders are incarcerated in El Salvador and are sending representatives to cross illegally into the United States in order to unify the gangs operating in the United States, while forcing the U.S. MS-13 organization to send its illegal profits to the leaders of the United States. group in El Salvador and to exert more control and violence over their territories.

The FBI says MS-13 and Barrio 18 "continue to expand their influence in the United States." These transnational gangs "are present in almost every state and continue to grow in the United States." issue of members, now targeting recruits younger than ever before." As indicated by the grade of the department of Justice, the Attorney General warned that "in the last five years alone" the issue "has gone up significantly." "Transnational criminal organizations like MS-13 pose one of the most serious threats to U.S. security," he said.

Stephen Richardson, director attachment of the Division of research FBI criminal,told the congressIn January 2018, the mass arrests and imprisonment of MS-13 members and mid-level leaders over the past year in the United States have caused frustration for MS-13 leaders in El Salvador. "They're very interested in sending younger, more violent offenders through their channels into this country to be gang thugs," he told the committee House of Representatives.

The transnational nature of MS-13 is questioned by expert Roberto Valencia, author of articles and books on the maras. She works as a journalist at El Faro, one of El Salvador's leading digital media outlets; his latest book, graduate Letter from Zacatraz, was published a few months ago.

"In the beginning, Los Angeles gangs served as moral guides for those who immigrated to El Salvador during the 1990s. Some of the veteran leaders now living in El Salvador grew up in Los Angeles and have maintained personal and emotional ties with the Structures of the gangs they belonged to," Valencia tells Global Affairs. "However," he adds, "that doesn't imply an international connection: everyone, no matter where they live, believes they are the essence of the gang and are not subordinate to another country's organization." "Some leaders in El Salvador share a very close relationship. staff with the organization in which they started in the United States, and that doesn't dissolve so easily, but the link as a single organization was broken a long time ago," he says.

Valencia firmly rejects any interference by the U.S. MS-13 in El Salvador. He admits, instead, that there may be some subject Salvadoran gang members in the United States "can be deported to El Salvador and end up in Salvadoran prisons, where they can be punished by prison mafias."

Migrants: Cause or Consequence?

Roberto Valencia also speaks out about Donald Trump's references to gangs: "Trump talks about MS-13 to win votes under the premise of an immigration policy that ends up criminalizing all immigrants. It is outrageous that Trump presents them as the cause, when gangs started in the United States. In fact, the vast majority of migrants from the Northern Triangle come to the U.S. escaping gangs."

In Central America, gang control over a society that is poor ranges from demanding "rent" (extortion) from companies and people who have small businesses, to forcing older women to take care of babies that gang members have had, to "asking" young girls to be girlfriends of the gang's main leader if they don't want to be killed themselves and their families. The application of young girls is an extremely common cause of migration, which also denotes the misogynistic culture in rural areas of Latin American countries.

In most of his comments, Trump has described MS-13 as a threat to public safety and the stability of American communities. However, the programs of study of Immigration, a leading organization of research independent and non-profit, conducted aresearch on the impact of MS-13 in the United States and addressed the immigration measures that the Administration should take to control its presence. He considered that MS-13 and other gangs are certainly a threat to public safety, thus sharing Trump's point of view, but he disagreed with him by not linking immigration to the impact of gangs.

U.S. attorney Greg Hunter, who has been a member of the panel for Criminal Justice Law in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia since 2001 and has worked on gang-related matters, says that shoplifting and illegal immigration cases are far more prevalent than those that can be categorized as threats to public safety or the "American community." such as drug trafficking and murders. It also alludes to the fact that these organizations are not centralized, and although they operate under the same identity, they do not follow the same orders. He says the gangs have made efforts to centralize operations, but they haveresult Ineffective.

It is crucial to take into account the statistics on the influx of immigrants when assessing the recent caravans of migrants from the Northern Triangle that Trump has sought to link to gangs. The U.S. president called those migrants "stone-cold criminals."

However, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection record does not suggest this. In hisreport The 2017 Security Agency counts a total of 526,901 illegal immigrants who were denied entrance, of whom 310,531 were arrested and 31,039 arrested; of the latter, only 228 belonged to MS-13 and as many were members of other gangs (61 of them from Barrio-18).

skill of the two powers to have instructions in the Indian Ocean and to be active in strategic neighboring countries.

Rumors of possible future Chinese military use of area in Gwadar (Pakistan), where Beijing already operates a port, have added a great deal of attention in the last year to the rivalry between China and India to secure access to points in the region that will allow them to control the Indian Ocean. India regards this ocean as its own, while for China it is vital to ensure the security of its energy supplies from the Middle East.

▲ China's work to transform Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands into an island in 2015 [US Navy].

article / Jimena Puga

The two major Asia-Pacific powers, China and India, are vying for regional supremacy in the Indian Ocean by establishing military instructions and economic agreements with bordering countries such as Pakistan. The Indian Ocean, which borders Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Australia, is home to one of the most crucial and strategic points for international trade. Nearly 40% of the oil extracted from the sea is produced in the Indian Ocean, which also has rich mineral and fishing deposits.

Five years ago China began its major territorial reclamation in the South China Sea, and the country has established a territorial status quo in its favor without receiving any international impediments, in order to counter the US military presence in the region, established during the Cold War, and which controls the South China Sea and all goods coming from Africa, the Middle East and the Strait of Malacca. This territorial expansion of the Middle Empire began in December 2013; since then China has built more than average dozen more artificial islands, located in a strategic location through which a third of global maritime trade passes, and has deployed military assets on them.

However, the creation of these islands has caused great damage to the region's marine ecosystem. The coral reefs that China has destroyed in order to use them as a base for the establishment of its islands provided food and shelter for numerous marine species, as well as supplies for Asia's most important fishing companies. However, thanks to this territorial expansion China is in a better position not only for maritime and air control of the area but also to continue to advance its strategy of power projection in the Indian Ocean and part of the Pacific to satisfy its plans for power and supremacy in the region.

Neocolonization

In early 2018, some reports suggested that China plans to set up a naval base next to the port it is developing in Gwadar, in Pakistan, although Pakistani authorities deny that Beijing has requested that the facilities be put to that use. In any case, the docking of military vessels at area in Gwadar would connect that point with the country's recent military and naval base built in Djibouti - the first China has abroad - as part of a growing network own of instructions air and naval along the Indian Ocean.

India, the greatest power among regional countries, is responding to Chinese expansion with unexpected strength. Delhi aspires to control the most strategic maritime trade points in the Indian Ocean including the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz and the Mozambique Channel. In addition, India is gaining access to the instructions of its foreign allies in the region. In 2017 it signed a logisticsagreement with the US that would mean free access to US military installations across the region (agreement which perhaps has something to do with the US desire to create an alternative to the Silk Belt and Road Initiative and curb the rapid growth of the Asian superpower).

In January 2018, India also announced the agreement logistical exchange with France involving free access to French military facilities in Djibouti, namely in the Red Sea and on the island of meeting, south of the Indian Ocean (perhaps to counter Sino-European agreements). Finally, India is also building strategic relations and infrastructure near the Persian Gulf. And after years of negotiations, Delhi has managed to formalize a agreement with Iran to modernize and expand the port of Chabahar, near the Strait of Hormuz. While it is true that the vast majority of agreements are commercial in nature, they have enough potential to increase India's access and influence in Central Asia.

In response to Beijing's military base in Djibouti, New Delhi has begun seeking access to new facilities in Seychelles, Oman and Singapore. From Tanzania to Sri Lanka the two Asian powers are attempting to increase their military and economic presence in countries along the Indian Ocean in their mission statement for regional supremacy. Finally, it is possible that India's 2017 request for drones from the US was aimed at goal monitoring Chinese activity in the ocean.

"My Chinese colleagues have explicitly told me that if the U.S. continues to fly over and navigate in what they self-described as 'their waters,' China will shoot down the corresponding intruder," said Matthew Kroenig, a CIA and Pentagon analyst. "Maybe it's just a bluff, but if China were to shoot down an American plane, it would be the perfect scenario for a U.S. military buildup. It's hard to see President Trump or any other American leader turn his back on this issue."

Globalization

The moves by both powers stem from the fear that the other countries will join in coalition with their opponent in the future, but they also do not want to completely abandon the expansion of economic relations with each other by altering the regional order too drastically.

This power of the weak has limitations, but it has so far worked to the benefit of both India and China. Due to globalization, particularly in the economic sphere, weaker states have adopted asymmetric strategies to extract resources from their neighboring superpowers that aspire to be leaders on the international stage. Often, these border countries had to choose a superpower to obtain resources, as was the case during the Cold War. The difference in this era of globalization is that these states can extract concessions and resources from both Beijing and Delhi without formally aligning themselves with one of them, as is the case, for example, with Vietnam. The absence of a bloc rivalry, as was the case during the Cold War, and the high levels of economic interdependence between India and China make it easier for many of the smaller states to avoid signing an alliance with one of these leaders.

India's subtle strategy involves developing entente with Japan and the member countries of the association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as with the United States. Specifically, the quadrilateral negotiations initiated between India, Japan, the US and Australia are another stabilizing mechanism vis-à-vis China.

However, the strategies of the smaller states in South Asia have limitations. Although China is offering greater economic attendance , these countries, except Pakistan, are unlikely to form military alliances with China because if they do, it would provoke a negative response from India, the dominant power in the region, and the United States, the international superpower that still has a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean. We are witnessing a new dynamic of diplomatic relations in the Asia-Pacific region.

This new trend of rapprochement with smaller countries translates into an inclination to use economic appeal to persuade neighbors rather than military coercion. How long this trend will continue remains to be seen. India's new strategies with other international powers may be the key to complicating the freedom of action and decision that China is having in the military realm, especially in this time of peace. What is clear is that China's aspiration for supremacy is visible by all countries that are part of the Asia-Pacific region and will not be as easy to establish as the Empire at the Center thought.

The US will pull out of the treaty if Russia doesn't 'return to full compliance'. Putin has taken the dispute to the UN

With all the conflicts and issues threatening worldwide security, the last thing the world needs is a new arms race, or what many are calling a new Cold War. European countries in particular are worried that US President Donald Trump pulling out of the INF Treaty might lead to exactly that. United States, supported by NATO, accuses Moscow of cheating on the missile treaty. At the beginning of December, the Trump administration gave 60 days to Russia to "return to full and veritable compliance". President Vladimir Putin has taken the issue to the United Nations.

▲ Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan at the signing of the INF Treaty, in 1987 [Reagan Presidential Library]

ARTICLE / Nicole Davalos

To understand what the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is about and why the possible US withdrawal concerns most of the international community, we have first to understand why it was created and what its purpose is. The INF Treaty was signed in 1987 following the deployment by the Soviet Union of missile SS-20 in Europe, which was retaliated by American cruise missiles and their Pershing II missiles. The issue with intermediate-range missiles back then was that their flying time was as little as 10 minutes, which was seen as a possible trigger to nuclear war. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan signed the deal, prohibiting land-based cruise or ballistic missiles with ranges between 311 and 620 miles (500-1,000 kilometers, short-range) and between 620 and 3,420 miles (1,000-5,500 kilometers, intermediate-range).

It is important to note, however, that the treaty does not cover air or sea-launched weapons even though they can potentially fly the same distances. Russia's 3M-54 Kalibr, a sea-launched missile, is an example. The following charts retrieved from the official website of the US Department of State outline the affected missiles specified under the elimination protocol of the treaty:

The INF Treaty has helped not only to solve the problems of its time towards the end of the Cold War, but also serves still to this day as an umbrella of protection for US's allies in Europe. The INF provides a measure of strategic stability on the European continent.

According to the Stockholm National Peace Institute, by 1991, 2,692 missiles had been eliminated thanks to the treaty; 846 owned by the US and 1,846 owned by the USSR. The treaty also allows both parties to inspect each other's progress in eliminating the missiles to maintain transparency. So, if so much progress has been made as a result of the INF, then why is it that President Trump now insists on a US withdrawal?

President Trump has accused Russia of repeatedly violating the treaty. In fact, former President Obama first accused Russia of violations in 2014 during the Ukraine crisis, when Moscow allegedly deployed a prohibited missile. "I don't know why President Obama didn't negotiate or pull out" were the words of the current president, "... we're not going to let them violate a nuclear agreement and go out and do weapons and we're not allowed to... so we're going to terminate the agreement. We're going to pull out." Recently, the NATO confirmed Russia's violations. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO's Secretary General, urged Russia to address these concerns in a "substantial and transparent manner."

These accusations have truly created tensions between both parties of the treaty. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has repeatedly denied the violations. He even went as far as claiming that it was, in fact, the US who first violated the treaty, with "armed US drones" that "fly within the ranges prohibited by the treaty". As for the president, Vladimir Putin, he has replied with questionable threats such as "revenge is inevitable and they will be destroyed. And we, as victims of aggression, will go straight to heaven as martyrs while they will just croak." In general, the Kremlin sees a US withdrawal as a confirmation of how "unreliable" a partner the United States is when it comes to other countries' interests since it would be acting completely unilaterally and pulling out implies security concerns for many other countries, especially European countries.

Europe shows the most concern for the possible dissolution of the INF Treaty since it is believed that Russia's intermediate range missiles would pose the biggest threat to them. Many analysts agree that this is a particularly bad time for the US to make a decision that would further raise tensions within Europe since security-related tensions such that of immigration exist in the region already. EU spokeswoman for foreign affairs and security policy Maja Kocijancic stated that the United States and Russia should definitely engage in dialogue and try to preserve the treaty, since "the world doesn't need a new arms race."

The most unexpected and interesting role in all of this, however, is China's. It is no secret to anyone that what displeases President Trump the most about the INF Treaty is that China is not a signatory. If Russia is violating the treaty, and China, on the other hand, is not part of such an agreement that restricts its missile force, then the US seems to be at a disadvantage. "If Russia's doing it and if China's doing it and we're adhering to the agreement, that's unacceptable," stated President Trump last October. In fact, according to Admiral Harry Harris, head of the US Pacific Command, if China were part of the INF Treaty right now, around 95% of its missile force would be violating it. When it comes to China's reaction to the White House's desire to withdraw, to "think twice" is what Beijing wishes Washington would do. Hua Chunying, a foreign ministry spokeswoman, said US withdrawal would lead to a "multitude of negative effects."

What's now left to be seen is whether President Trump will, in fact, pull out from the treaty. Presidents Putin and Trump both met in Paris in November, but although many different issues were discussed, a potential meeting to formally discuss the future of the INF Treaty was not part of the conversation. But if the US does withdraw, will that really mean a new Cold War? According to many analysts, an arms race like the one the world was experiencing back when the treaty was originally signed, might definitely become a reality. The Kremlin has also hinted several times at the possibility of a new arms race; the Russians would be "forced to develop weapons" to "restore balance in the sphere" if the US were to pull out.

For now, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced on December 4 that the US "will suspend its obligations as a remedy effective in 60 days unless Russia returns to full and veritable compliance". Ten days later, Russia submitted a draft of resolution to the UN General Assembly in support of the INF Treaty calling on all sides to fulfill their obligations. It seems to be a move towards a bilateral negotiation, but 2019 will begin with uncertainty in a matter so critical as this.

The U.S. is keeping an eye on the innovation of methods that could also be used to introduce terrorist cells or even weapons of mass destruction

In the last ten years, the proliferation of submersible and semi-submersible vessels, which are difficult to detect, has accounted for a third of drug transport from South America to the United States. The incorporation of GPS systems by the cartels also hinders the global fight against narcotics. A possible use of these new methods for terrorist purposes keeps the United States on its toes.

▲ Narco-submarine found in the jungle of Ecuador in 2010 [DEA]

article/ Marcelina Kropiwnicka

Drug trafficking to large consumer markets, especially the United States and Europe, is particularly innovative: the magnitude of the business means that attempts are made to overcome any barriers put in place by States to prevent its penetration and distribution. In the case of the United States, where the illicit arrival of narcotics dates back to the 19th century – from opium to marijuana to cocaine – the authorities' continued efforts have succeeded in intercepting many drug shipments, but traffickers are finding new ways and methods to smuggle a significant volume of drugs into the country.

The most disturbing method in the last ten years has been the use of submersible and semi-submersible vessels, commonly referred to as narco-submarines, which allow several tons of substances to be transported – five times more than a fishing boat did – evading the surveillance of the coast guard [1]. Satellite technology has also led traffickers to leave loads of drugs at sea, then picked up by pleasure boats without arousing suspicion. These methods make reference letter recent reports from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

Through the waters of Central America

For many years, the usual way to transport drugs out of South America to the United States has been by fishing boats, speedboats, and light aircraft. Advances in airborne detection and tracking techniques have pushed drug traffickers to look for new ways to get their loads north. Hence the development of the narco-submarines, whose issue, since a first interception in 2006 by the US authorities, has seen a rapid progression.

This means of transport is one of the reasons why since 2013 there has been a 10% increase in trafficking on the drug route that goes from Colombia (a country that produces 93% of the cocaine consumed in the United States) to Central America and Mexico, from where the shipments are introduced into the United States. According to the DEA, this corridor now accounts for an estimated 93 percent of the movement of cocaine from South America to North America, compared to 7 percent of the route that seeks the Caribbean islands (mainly the Dominican Republic) to reach Florida or other places along the U.S. coast.

For a while, rumors spread among the U.S. Coast Guard that drug cartels were using narco-submarines. Without having seen any of them so far, the agents gave him the name 'Bigfoot' (as an alleged ape-like animal that would inhabit forests in the US Pacific is known).

The first sighting occurred in November 2006, when a U.S. Coast Guard patrol boat detected a blurred shape in the ocean, about 100 miles off the coast of Costa Rica. When agents approached, they discovered three plastic tubes emerging from the water, which came from a submersible craft that was making its way two meters below the surface. Inside they found three tons of cocaine and four men armed with an AK-47 rifle. The Coast Guard dubbed it 'Bigfoot I'.

Two years later there would be a 'Bigfoot II'. In September 2008, a U.S. Navy Coast Guard frigate seized a similar aircraft 350 miles from the Mexico-Guatemala border. The crew consisted of four men and the cargo was 6.4 tons of cocaine.

By then, U.S. authorities estimated that more than 100 submersibles or semi-submersibles had already been manufactured. In 2009, they estimated that they were only able to stop 14 percent of shipments and that this mode of transport supplied at least a third of the cocaine reaching the U.S. market. The navies of Colombia, Mexico and Guatemala have also seized some of these narco-submarines, which in addition to having been located in the Pacific have also been detected in the Caribbean and the Atlantic. Made by hand in the jungle, perhaps the most striking episode was that of having found one of them in the interior of Ecuador, in the waters of a river. 

Its technical innovation has frequently surprised counternarcotics officials.  Many of these self-propelled narco-submarines are up to fifteen meters long, made of synthetic materials and fiberglass, and have been designed to reduce radar or infrared detection. There have also been models with GPS navigation systems to be able to refuel and receive food at agreed appointments along the way.

GPS Tracking

The development and the generalization of GPS has also helped drug traffickers to introduce greater innovations. One procedure, for example, has been to fill a torpedo-shaped container – like a submersible, but this time without a crew – with drugs, attached to a buoy and a signal emitter. The container can hold up to seven tons of cocaine and is attached to the bottom of a ship by a cable. If the ship is intercepted, it can simply drop the container deeper, and then be retrieved by another vessel thanks to the satellite locator. This makes it extremely difficult for authorities to capture the drugs and apprehend traffickers.

The GPS navigation system is also used to deposit drug loads at points in U.S. territorial waters, where they can be picked up by pleasure boats or a small number of people. group of people without arousing suspicion. The package containing the cocaine is coated with several layers of material and then waterproofed with a subject foam. The package is placed inside a duffel bag that is deposited on the seabed to be later retrieved by other people.

As indicated by the AED in its report from 2017, "This demonstrates how drug trafficking organizations have evolved their methods of carrying out cocaine transactions using technology." And quotation the example of organizations that "transport kilos of cocaine in waterproof packages to a predetermined location and attach it to the ocean floor to be later removed by other members of the organization who have GPS location," which "allows members of drug trafficking organizations to compartmentalize their work, separating those who do the sea transport from the distributors on land."

Terrorist risk

The possibility that these hard-to-detect methods could be used to smuggle weapons or could be part of terrorist operations worries U.S. authorities. Retired Vice Admiral James Stravidis, former head of the U.S. Southern Command, has warned of the potential use of submersibles especially "to transport more than just narcotics: the movement of cash, weapons, violent extremists or, at the worst end of the spectrum, weapons of mass destruction."

This risk was also referred to by Rear Admiral Joseph Nimmich when, as commander of the group South of work A joint Inter-Agency Agency, it faced the rise of submersibles. "If you can transport ten tons of cocaine, you can transport ten tons of anything," he told The New York Times.

According to this newspaper, the stealth production of homemade submarines was first developed in Sri Lanka, where the group Tamil Tiger rebels used them in their confrontation with government forces. "The Tamils will go down in history as the first terrorist organization to develop underwater weapons," Sri Lanka's Defense Ministry said. In 2006, as the NYT states, "a Pakistani and a Srinlancan provided Colombians with blueprints to build semi-submersibles that were fast, quiet, and made of cheap materials that were commonly within reach."

Despite that origin, ultimately written request In light of the Tamil rebels, and the terrorist potential of the submersibles used by drug cartels, Washington has reported no evidence that the new methods of drug transportation developed by organized crime groups are being used by extremist actors of a different nature. However, the U.S. is keeping its guard up given the high rate of shipments arriving at their destination undetected.

[1] REICH, S., & Dombrowski, P (2017). The End of Grand Strategy. US Maritime Pperations in the 21st Century. Cornell University Press. Ithaca, NY. Pg. 143-145

Did the Provisional IRA lose its 'Long War'? Why are dissident Republicans fighting now?

ESSAY / María Granados Machimbarrena

In 1998, the Belfast Agreement or Good Friday Agreement marked the development of the political relations between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom. Several writers, politicians and academics claimed the British had won the 'Long War'. (1)

However, according to other scholars and politicians(2), the armed struggle has not left the region. The following paper delves into the question as to whether the war is over, and attempts to give an explanation to the ultimate quest of dissident Republicans.

On the one hand, Aaron Edwards, a scholar writing on the Operation Banner and counter- insurgency, states that Northern Ireland was a successful peace process, a transformation from terrorism to democratic politics. He remarks that despite the COIN being seen as a success, the disaster was barely evaded in the 1970s.(3) The concept of 'fighting the last war', meaning the repetition of the strategy or tactic that was used to win the previous war(4), portrays Edward's critique on the Operation. The latter was based on trials and tests undertaken in the post-war period, but the IRA also studied past interventions from the British military. The insurgents' focus on the development of a citizen defence force and the support of the community, added to the elusive Human Intelligence, turned the 'one-size-fits-all' British strategy into a failure. The British Army thought that the opponents' defeat would bring peace, and it disregarded the people-centric approach such a war required. The 'ability to become fish in a popular sea', the need to regain, retain and build the loyalty and trust of the Irish population was the main focus since 1976, when the role of the police was upgraded and the Army became in charge of its support. The absence of a political framework to restore peace and stability, the lack of flexibility, and the rise of sectarianism, a grave partner-economic phenomenon that fuelled the overall discontent, could have ended on a huge disaster. Nonetheless, Edwards argues the peace process succeeded because of the contribution of the Army and the political constraints imposed to it.(5)

In 2014, writer and veteran journalist Peter Taylor claimed that the British had won the war in Northern Ireland. He supported his statement through two main arguments: the disappearance of the IRA and the absence of unity between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Former Minister Peter Robinson (DUP Party) firmly rejected the idea of such a union ever occurring: 'It just isn't going to happen'. Ex-hunger striker Gerard Hodgins was utterly unyielding in attitude, crying: 'We lost. (...) The IRA are too clever to tell the full truth of what was actually negotiated. And unionists are just too stupid to recognise the enormity of what they have achieved in bringing the IRA to a negotiated settlement which accepts the six-county state.' They were all contested by Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams, a political fighter and defender of a united Ireland, and Hutchinson, who stated that the republicans were fighting a cultural battle to eradicate Britishness. He agreed that the war had changed in how it was being fought, "but it is still a war" he concluded. (6) Former IRA commander McIntyre disagrees, in his book he suggests that the PIRA(7) is on its death bed. So is the army council that plotted its campaign. 'If the IRA ever re-emerges, it will be a new organisation with new people'. (8)

There is an important point that most of the above-mentioned leaders fail to address: the so- called cultural battle, which is indeed about the conquest of 'hearts and minds'. Scholars(9) find there is a deep misunderstanding of the core of republicanism among politicians and disbelievers of the anti-GFA groups' strength. In fact, there has been an increase on the number of attacks, as well as on the Provisional movement's incompetence. Historical examples show that the inability to control the population, the opponent's motivation, or the average leads to defeat. E.g.: C.W. Gwynn realised of the importance of intelligence and propaganda, and H. Simson coined the term 'sub-war', or the dual use of terror and propaganda to undermine the government. (10) T.E. Lawrence also wrote about psychological warfare. He cited Von der Goltz on one particular occasion, quoting 'it was necessary not to annihilate the enemy, but to break his courage.' (11)

On the other hand, Radford follows the line of Frenett and Smith, demonstrating that the armed struggle has not left Northern Ireland. There are two main arguments that support their view: (1) Multiple groups decline the agreement and (2) Social networks strengthen a traditional-minded Irish Republican constituency, committed to pursue their goals.

In the aftermath of the GFA, the rejectionist group PIRA fragmented off and the RIRA was born. The contention of what is now called RIRA (Real IRA) is that such a body should always exist to challenge Great Britain militarily. Their aim is to subvert and to put an end to the Peace Process, whilst rejecting any other form of republicanism. Moreover, their dual strategy supported the creation of the political pressure group 32CSM. (12) Nonetheless, after the Omagh bombing in 1998, there was a decline in the military effectiveness of the RIRA. Several events left the successor strategically and politically aimless: A new terrorism law, an FBI penetration, and a series of arrests and arms finds. (13) In spite of what seemed to be a defeat, it was not the end of the group. In 2007, the RIRA rearmed itself, an on-going trend that tries to imitate PIRA's war and prevents the weaponry from going obsolete. In addition, other factions re-emerged: The Continuity IRA (CIRA), weaker than the RIRA, was paralysed in 2010 after a successful penetration by the security forces. Notwithstanding, it is still one of the richest organisations in the world. Secondly, the Oglaigh na hEireann (ONH) is politically aligned with the RSF and the RNU. They have not been very popular on the political arena, but they actively contest seats in the council. (14)

In 2009, the Independent Monitoring Commission acknowledged an increase in 'freelance dissidents', who are perceived as a growing threat, numbers ranging between 400-500. The reason behind it is the highly interconnected network of traditional republican families. Studies also show that 14% of nationalists can sympathetically justify the use of republican violence. Other factors worth mentioning include: A growing presence of older men and women with paramilitary experience; an increase of coordination and cooperation between the groups; an improvement in capability and technical knowledge, evidenced by recent activities. (15)

In 2014, a relatively focused and coherent IRA ('New IRA') emerged, with poor political support and a lack of funding, but reaching out to enough irredentists to cause a potential trouble in a not so distant future.

Conclusion

Von Bülow predicted: '[Our consequence of the foregoing Exposition, is, that] small States, in the future, will no more vanquish great ones, but on the contrary will finally become a Pray to them". (16) One could argue that it is the case with Northern Ireland.

Although according to him, number and organisation are essential to an army,(17) the nature of the war makes it difficult to fight in a conventional way. (18) Most documents agree that the war against the (P)IRA must be fought with a counterinsurgency strategy, since, as O'Neill thoughtfully asserts, 'to understand most terrorism, we must first understand insurgency.' In the 1960s, such strategies began to stress the combination of political, military, social, psychological, and economic measures. (19) This holistic approach to the conflict would be guided by political action, as many scholars put forward in counterinsurgency manuals (e.g.: Galula citing Mao Zedong's '[R]evolutionary war is 80 per cent political action and only 20 per cent military'.( 20) Jackson suggests that the target of the security apparatus may not be the destruction of the insurgency, but the prevention of the organisation from configuring its scenario through violence. Therefore, after the security forces dismantle the PIRA, a larger and more heavy response should be undertaken on the political arena to render it irrelevant. (21)

One of the main dangers such an insurgency poses to the UK in the long term is the re-opening of the revolutionary war, according to the definition given by Shy and Collier. (22) Besides, the risks of progression through repression is its reliance on four fragile branches, i.e.: Intelligence, propaganda, the secret services and the police. (23) The latter's coordination was one of the causes of the fall of the PIRA, as aforementioned, and continues to be essential: '(...) these disparate groups of Republicans must be kept in perspective and they are unlikely, in the short term at least, to wield the same military muscle as PIRA (...), and much of that is due to the efforts of the PSNI, M15 and the British Army' maintains Radford. Thus, 'Technical and physical intelligence gathering are vital to fighting terrorists, but it must be complemented by good policing'.

Hence, unless the population is locally united; traditional, violent republican ideas are rejected, and the enemy remains fragmented, the remnants of the 'Long War' are likely to persist and cause trouble to those who ignore the current trends. There is an urgent need to understand the strong ideology behind the struggle. As the old Chinese saying goes: 'It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred battles'. (24)

1. Writer and veteran journalist Peter Taylor, Former Minister Peter Robinson (DUP Party), ex-IRA hunger striker Gerard Hodgins, and former IRA commander and Ph.D. Anthony McIntyre.

2. M. Radford, Ross Frenett and M.L.R. Smith, as well as PUP leader Billy Hutchinson and Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams.

3. Edwards, Aaron. "Lessons Learned? Operation Banner and British Counter-Insurgency Strategy" International Security and Military History, 116-118.

4. Greene, Robert, The 33 Strategies of War. Penguin Group, 2006.

5. Edwards, Aaron. L.C.

6. Who Won the War? [Documentary]. United Kingdom, BBC. First aired on Sep 2014.

7. Provisional WRATH


8. McIntyre, Anthony. Good Friday: The Death of Irish Republicanism, 2008.

9. E.g.: R. Frenett, M. L. R. Smith.

10. Pratten, Garth. "Major General Sir Charles Gwynn: Soldier of the Empire, father of British counter- insurgency?" International Security and Military History, 114-115.

11. Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. New York: Anchor, 1991.

12. 'The 32 County Sovereignty Movement'

13. For instance, Freddie Scappatticci, the IRA's head of internal security, was exposed as a British military intelligence agent in 2003.

14. Radford, Mark. 'The Dissident IRA: Their 'War' Continues' The British Army Review 169: Spring/ Summer 2017, 43-49 f.f.

15. 'Terrorists continue to plot, attack and build often ingenious and quite deadly devices' Ibidem.

16. Von Bülow, Dietrich Heinrich. 'The Spirit of the Modern System of War'. Chapter I, p. 189. Cambridge University Press, Published October 2014.

17. Von Bülow, D.H., l.c. P. 193 Chapter II.

18. Indeed, some authors will define it as an 'unconventional war'. E.g.: 'revolutionary war aims at the liquidation of the existing power structure and at a transformation in the structure of society.' Heymann, Hans H. and Whitson W. W., 'Can and Should the United States Preserve A Military Capability for Revolutionary Conflict?' Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Ca., 1972, p. 5.p. 54.

19. O'Neill, Board E. Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005. Chapter 1: Insurgency in the Contemporary World.

20. Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger, 1964.

21. Jackson, B. A., 2007, 'Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a "Long War": The British Experience in Northern Ireland.' January-February issue, Military Review, RAND Corporation.

22. 'Revolutionary War refers to the seizure of political power by the use of armed force'. Shy, John and Thomas W. Collier. "Revolutionary War" in Peter Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986.

23. Luttwak, Edward. (2002). Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Cambridge, US: Belknap Press.

24. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Attack By Stratagem 3.18.

Bibliography

Edwards, Aaron. Lessons Learned? Operation Banner and British Counter-Insurgency Strategy International Security and Military History, 116-118.

Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger, 1964.

Greene, Robert. The 33 Strategies of War. Penguin Group, 2006.


Heymann, Hans H. and Whitson W. W.. Can and Should the United States Preserve A Military Capability for Revolutionary Conflict? (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Ca., 1972), p. 5.p. 54.

International Monitoring Commission (IMC), Irish and British governments report on the IRA army council's existence, 2008.


Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. New York: Anchor, 1991.


Luttwak, Edward. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Cambridge, US: Belknap Press, 2002.

McIntyre, Anthony. Good Friday: The Death of Irish Republicanism, 2008.


O'Neill, Board E.. Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005.


Pratten, Garth. Major General Sir Charles Gwynn: Soldier of the Empire, father of British counter-insurgency? International Security and Military History, 114-115.


Radford, Mark. The Dissident IRA: Their 'War' Continues The British Army Review 169: Spring/Summer 2017, 43-49.


Ross Frenett and M.L.R. Smith. IRA 2.0: Continuing the Long War—Analyzing the Factors Behind Anti-GFA Violence, Published online, June 2012.


Sepp, Kalev I.. Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Military Review 85, 3 (May-Jun 2005), 8-12.


Sun Tzu, S. B. Griffith. The Art of War. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. Print.


Taylor, Peter. Who Won the War? [Documentary]. United Kingdom, BBC. First aired on Sep 2014.


Thompson, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency. St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005.


Von Bülow, Dietrich Heinrich. The Spirit of the Modern System of War. Cambridge University Press, Published October 2014.

ESSAY / Blake Bierman

The Common Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy (CFSDP) of the European Union today acts a chameleonic hybrid of objectives and policies that attempt to resolve a plethora of threats faced by the EU. In a post 9/11 security framework, any acting policy measure must simultaneously answer to a wide array of political demands from member states and bureaucratic constraints from Brussels. As a result, the urgent need for consolidation and coherency in a common, digestible narrative has evolved into a single EU Global Strategy that boldly attempts to address today's most pressing security whilst proactively deterring those of tomorrow. In this analysis, I will first present a foundational perspective on the external context of the policy areas. Next, I will interpret the self-perception of the EU within such a context and its role(s) within. Thirdly, I will identify the key interests, goals, and values of the EU and assess their incorporation into policy. I will then weigh potential resources and strategies the EU may utilize in enacting and enforcing said policies. After examining the aforementioned variables, I will end my assessment by weighing the strengths and weaknesses of both the EU's Strategic Vision and Reflection Paper while identifying preferences within the two narratives.

EU in an External Context: A SWOT Analysis

When it comes to examining the two perspectives presented, the documents must be viewed from their correlative timelines. The first document, "From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1," (I will refer to this as the Implementation paper) serves as a realist review of ongoing action within the EU's three policy clusters in detailing the beginning stages of integrated approach and outlook towards the internal-external nexus along with an emphasized role of public diplomacy in the mix. On the other hand, the second document, "Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence," (I will refer to this as the Reflection paper) acts more so as a planning guide to define the potential frameworks for policies going forward into 2025. Once these documents are viewed within their respective timelines, a balanced "SWOT" analysis can assess the similarities and divergences of the options they present. Overwhelmingly, the theme of cooperation acts as a fundamental staple in both documents. In my opinion, this acts a force for unification and solidarity amongst member states from not only the point of view of common interest in all three policy areas, but also as a reminder of the benefits in the impact and cost of action as prescribed in the UN and NATO cases. Both documents seem to expand the EU's context in terms of scope as embracing the means and demands for security in a global lens. The documents reinforce that in a globalized world, threats and their responses require an approach that extends beyond EU borders, and therefore a strong, coherent policy voice is needed to bring together member states and allies alike to defeat them.

Examining the divergences, much is left to be desired as far as the risks and opportunities are presented. In my perspective, I believe this was constructed purposefully as an attempt to leave the both areas as open as possible to allow for member states to interpret them in the context of their own narratives. In short, member state cohesion at literally every policy inroad proves to be the proverbial double-edged sword as the single largest risk and opportunity tasked by the organisation. I think that the incessant rehashing of the need to stress state sovereignty at every turn while glamorizing the benefits of a single market and economies of scale identifies a bipolar divide in both documents that seems yet to be bridged by national sentiments even in the most agreeable of policy areas like diplomacy. The discord remains all but dependent on the tide of political discourse at the national level for years to come as the pace maker to materialize sufficient commitments in everything from budgets to bombs in order to achieve true policy success.

Who is the EU? Self-Perception and Potential Scenarios

After understanding the external context of the EU policy areas, we now turn to the element of self-perception and the roles of the EU as an international actor. Examining the relationship between the two stands as a crucial understanding of policy formulation as central to the core identity to the EU and vice versa. In this case, both documents provide key insight as to the position of the EU in a medium-term perspective. From the Implementation Paper, we see a humbled approach that pushes the EU to evolve from a regional, reactionary actor to a proactive, world power. The paper hones in on the legal roots and past successes of an integrated approach outside EU borders as a calling to solidify the Union's mark as a vital organ for peace and defence. The paper then broadens such an identity to incorporate the elements of NATO and the UN cooperation as a segmenting role for member states contributions, such as intelligence collection and military technology/cyber warfare. In the Reflection Paper, I think the tone and phrasing speak more to the self-perceptions of individual citizens. The emotive language for the promotion of a just cause attitude stands reinforced by the onslaught of harmonizing buzzwords throughout the paper and the three scenarios such as "joint, collaborative, solidarity, shared, common, etc.". In my perspective, such attempts draw in the need to reinforce, protect, and preserve a common identity both at home and abroad. This formation speaks to the development of both military and civilian capabilities as a means of securing and maintaining a strong EU position in the global order while supplementing the protection of what is near and dear at home.

Policy Today: Interests, Goals, and Values

When developing a coherent line of key interests, goals, and values across three focal policy structures, the EU makes strategic use of public perception as a litmus test to guide policy narratives. In the Reflection Paper, indications clearly point to a heightened citizen concern over immigration and terrorism from 2014-2016 taking clear priority over economic issues as the continent recovers. Such a reshuffling may pave the way for once-apprehensive politicians to re-examine budgeting priorities. Such a mandate could very well be the calling national governments need to allocate more of their defence spending to the EU while also ramping up domestic civilian and military infrastructure to contribute to common policy goals. Extending this notion of interest-based contributions over to the goals themselves, I think that member states are slowly developing the political will to see that a single market for defence ultimately becomes more attractive to the individual tax payer when all play a part. As the Reflection Paper explains, this can be translated as free/common market values with the development of economies of scale, boosted production, and increased competition. In each of the three scenarios outlined, the values act as matched components to these goals and interests. Therefore, readers retain a guiding set of "principles" as the basis for the plan's "actions" and "capabilities." The alignment of interests, goals, and values remains a difficult but necessary target in all policy areas, as the final results have significant influence over the perception of publics that indirectly vote the policies into place. In my perspective, a lack of coherence between the three and the policies could be a potential pitfall for policy objectives as lost faith by the public may sink the voter appetite for future defense spending and action.

Making it Happen: Resources and Strategies

As the balance between the EU's ways and means become a focal point for any CFSDP discussion, I wanted to enhance the focus between the resources and strategies to examine the distribution between EU and member state competencies. When it comes to resources in all three policy areas, individual member states' own infrastructures become front and centre. Even in the "collaborative" lens of a 21st century EU, foreign affairs, defence, and security mainly revolve as apparatuses of a state. Therefore, in order to achieve a common strategy, policy must make a concerted effort to maximize collective utilization of state assets while respecting state sovereignty. In the Reflection paper, an attempt to consolidate the two by bolstering the EU's own defence budget acts as a middle ground. In this regard, I think the biggest opportunity for the EU to retain its own resources remains in technology. States are simply more eager to share their military tech than they are their own boots on the ground. Similarly, technology and its benefits are more easily transferrable between member states and the EU. Just as well, selling the idea of technology research to taxpayers that may one day see the fruits of such labor in civilian applications is an easier pill to swallow for politicians than having to justify the use of a state's limited and precious human military capital for an EU assignment not all may agree with. A type of "technological independence" the third scenario implies would optimally direct funding in a manner that balances state military capacity where it acts best while joining the common strategy for EU technological superiority that all member states can equally benefit from.

Narratives and Norms: A Final Comparison

After reviewing the progress made in the Implementation Paper and balancing it with the goals set forth in the Reflection paper, it remains clear that serious decisions towards the future of EU CFSDP still need to be made. The EU Global Strategy treads lightly on the most important topics for voters like immigration and terrorism that remain works in progress under the program's steps for "resilience" and the beginnings of an integrated approach. That being said, my perspective in this program lens remains that the role and funding of public diplomacy unfortunately remains undercut by the giant umbrella of security and defense. To delve into the assessment of counterterrorism policy as a solely defensive measure does a disservice to the massive, existing network of EU diplomatic missions serving abroad that effectively act as proactive anti-terrorism measures in themselves. At the same time, supplementing funding to public diplomacy programs would take some of the pressure off member states to release their military capabilities for joint use. In this facet, I empathize with the member state politician and voter in their apprehensiveness to serve as the use of force in even the most justifiable situations. A refocus on funding in the diplomacy side is a cost effective alternative and investment that member states can make to reduce the likelihood that their troops will need to serve abroad on behalf of the EU. The success of diplomacy can be seen in areas like immigration, where the Partnership Framework on Migration has attempted to work with countries of origin to stabilize governments and assist civilians.

Turning the page to the Reflection Paper, I think much is left to be desired in terms of the development of the three scenarios. Once again, the scenario parameters are purposefully vague to effectively sell the plan to a wide variety of narratives. At the same time, I found it reprehensible that despite the massive rhetoric to budgetary concerns, none of the three scenarios incorporated any type of estimate fiscal dimension to compare and contrast the visions. Obviously, the contributions of member states will vary widely but I think that a concerted campaign to incentivize a transparent contribution table in terms financing, military assets, diplomatic assets, or (ideally) a combination of the three would see a more realpolitik approach to what the EU does and does not possess in the capacity to achieve in these policy areas. Ultimately, I believe that Scenario C "Common Defense and Security" retains the most to offer member states while effectively balancing the contributions and competencies equally. I think that the scenario utiles the commitments to NATO and reinforces the importance of technological independence. As such, the importance of a well-defined plan to develop and maintain cutting-edge technology in all three policy areas cannot be overstated and, in my opinion, will become not only the most common battlefield, but also the critical one as the world enters into a 21st century of cyber warfare.

WORKS CITED

European Union (2016). From Shared Vision to Common Action: The EU's Global Strategic Vision: Year 1.

European Union (2016). Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence.

The Fleet was restored in 2008 due to Venezuela's geopolitical alliances

Of the U.S. naval forces, the Sixth and Seventh Fleets — based in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, respectively — have traditionally been the most in the news. Usually the Fourth Fleet goes unnoticed. In fact, it barely has any staff, and when you need boats you have to borrow them from other units. However, its restoration in 2008, after being deactivated in 1950, indicates that Washington does not want to neglect security in the Caribbean in the face of moves by Russia and China.

▲The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower arriving in 2010 in Mayport, Florida [US Navy]

article / Dania del Carmen [English version]

The Fourth Fleet is part of the U.S. Southern Command . It is located in Mayport, Florida, and its area of operations are the waters that bathe Central and South America. The ships that are based in Mayport do not strictly belong to the base and there are currently none deployed in the waters of the region. The staff The fleet is stationed at approximately 160 people, including military, federal civilians and contractors. They work at the headquarters of the U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (USNAVSO). The commander of Southern Command is also commander of the Fourth Fleet, currently Rear Adm. Sean S. Buck.

It was originally established in 1943, during World War II, to protect the United States from German naval actions, both surface attacks and blockade operations and submarine incursions. After the war ended in 1945, the FOURTHFLT remained active until 1950. At that time, his area was handed over to the Second Fleet, which had just been established to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). [1]

The Fourth Fleet was reactivated in 2008, during the presidency of George W. Bush, as a reaction to possible threats stemming from anti-American sentiment promoted by then-Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. During that time, Venezuela received loans from Russia for the purchase of weapons and for the development of the country. development Venezuelan military. In 2008, Venezuela conducted a joint naval exercise with Russia in the Caribbean as a way of supporting Russia's intentions to increase its geopolitical presence, in counterweight to the power of the United States.

The fact that Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador had an ideology similar to Venezuela's reinforced Washington's conviction to reactivate the fleet, as a reminder that the United States maintained its interest in being the sole military power in the Western Hemisphere. Although the U.S. territory could hardly be threatened, preventing any status free access to the Panama Canal has been a permanent task for the Southern Command. In recent years, Russia has sought to expand its military presence in the Americas, through particular relations with Cuba and Nicaragua, while China has increased its military presence . investments in the area of the Panama Canal.

Current Activity

According to the USNAVSO/FOURTHFLT website In your section from "mission statement", the Fourth Fleet "employs maritime forces in cooperative maritime security operations to maintain access, improve interoperability, and establish lasting partnerships that foster regional security in the region." area responsibility of USSOUTHCOM." As mentioned, when ships and other equipment are assigned to SOUTHCOM and the Fourth Fleet, they are provided by other U.S. Navy commands with broader geographic responsibilities, based in other parts of the world.

FOURTHFLT has three main lines of action: maritime security operations, security cooperation activities and contingency operations.

—In terms of its maritime security operations, it currently provides maritime forces to Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South) in support of Operation MARTILLO. JIATF South "conducts detection and monitoring (D&M) operations throughout its area joint operation to facilitate the interdiction of illicit trafficking in support of national security and the partner nation." It utilizes the resources of the Fourth Fleet or temporarily employs other assets, such as the USS George Washington Carrier Strike Group or individual ships from other fleets such as Norfolk, VA Fleet Forces Command, or the Third Fleet, based in San Diego, California. For its part, Operation MARTILLO is mainly aimed at combating international drug trafficking, improving regional security and promote peace, stability and prosperity in Central and South America. As part of Operation MARTILLO, in a joint operation with the U.S. Coast Guard, the USS Vandegrift stopped a suspicious vessel off the coast of Central America in 2014. The staff security found nearly 2,000 pounds of cocaine. Most recently, in January 2015, the USS Gary and the U.S. Coast Guard seized more than 1.6 tons of cocaine from a fast vessel. However, the Fourth Fleet's absence of dedicated assets demonstrates that its counternarcotics missions are a lower priority for the U.S. Navy, though they are significantly less demanding, operationally.

As far as security cooperation activities are concerned, the two main events of participation with other nations are the UNITAS and PANAMAX exercises. UNITAS was conceived in 1959 and first realized in 1960. It is an annual exercise whose purpose is to demonstrate the United States' commitment to the region and to maintaining strong relationships with its partners. PANAMAX dates back to 2003 and has become one of the largest multinational training exercises in the world. It is primarily focused on ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal, one of the most strategic and economically important infrastructure in the world.

"Finally, the Fleet is always ready to carry out contingency operations: basically attendance humanitarian and financial aid in the event of a disaster. The U.S. Navy's hospital ship regularly travels throughout the area of the Caribbean and Central America to provide humanitarian support. In the framework As part of the Continuing Promise 2015 program, the Comfort visited a total of 11 countries, from Guatemala to Dominica, performing procedures such as general surgery, ophthalmic surgery, veterinary services and training in public health. The vessel previously participated in the 2007, 2009 and 2011 programs.

Objectives met at reasonable cost

As an integrated part of U.S. Southern Command, the Fourth Fleet has been involved in major humanitarian operations, such as the response to the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010. FOURTHFLT had naval command in Operation Unified Response, which was the largest contingency response in the world. attendance humanitarian and financial aid in disasters.

The budget for these missions, it does not depend only on the Navy, as stated by a spokesperson for the Southern Command, but there is also a contribution of resources from "other U.S. entities, such as the Coast Guard and the Customs and Border Protection agency, which also provide platforms and forces, both maritime and air, which are core topic for the support of those missions. So, we're looking for a good counterweight of expense-reward."

In addition to carrying out effective humanitarian actions, at a limited economic cost, the Fourth Fleet also fulfils the purpose that the United States has a significant military presence in the Western Hemisphere in the eyes of Latin American and Caribbean states, and also of superpowers such as Russia and China.

1. The Second Fleet was deactivated in 2011 and re-established in 2018.

2. REICH, Simon and DOMBROWSKI, Peter. The End of Grand Strategy. US Maritime Operations In the 21st Century. Cornell University Press. Ithaca, NY, 2017. p. 144

[Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski, The End of Grand Strategy. US Maritime Operations In the 21st Century. Cornell University Press. Ithaca, NY, 2017. 238 pages]

review / Emili J. Blasco

The concept of Grand Strategy is not univocal. In its most abstract sense, used in the field of geopolitics, the Grand Strategy refers to the geopolitical imperatives of a country and determines what a state must necessarily do in order to achieve its success. purpose primary and fundamental in their relationship with others, usually in terms of power. In a minor Degree In abstraction, the Grand Strategy is understood as the principle that should govern the way in which a country deals with conflicts on the international stage. This is what, in the case of the United States, is often referred to as the Doctrine of a President and aspires to create a rule for the response, especially the military one, that must be given to the challenges and threats that arise.

This second, more concrete sense is used in The End of Grand Strategy. Its authors do not question that there are geopolitical imperatives that should mark a certain action of the United States, constant over time, but that it is intended to provide a unique strategic response to the variety of security risks that the country faces. "Strategies need to be calibrated in a timely manner. agreement with operational circumstances. They exist in the plural, not in a singular grand strategy," warn Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski, professors at Rutgers University and the Naval War College, respectively, and both experts on defense affairs.

For both authors, "the notion of a grand strategy implies the vain search of order and coherence in an increasingly complex world", "the very idea of a single grand strategy that serves everything is of little use in the twenty-first century. In fact, it's often counterproductive."

Despite the doctrines that are sometimes invoked in some presidencies, in reality different strategic approaches often coexist in the same mandate or there are even specific strategies that transcend presidencies. "The U.S. does not favor a dominant strategy, nor can it," Reich and Dombrowski warn.

"The concept of grand strategy is discussion in Washington, in academia and in the media in the 'singular' rather than the 'plural'. The implication is that there is a path to securing U.S. interests in a complicated world. Debaters even tend to accept a fundamental premise: that the United States has the ability to control events, and that in this way it can afford to be inelastic in the face of a changing and increasingly challenging strategic environment," the two authors write.

The book examines U.S. military operations so far this century, focusing on naval operations. As a maritime power, it is in this domain that the actions of the United States have the greatest strategic expression. The result of that review is a list of six strategies, grouped into three types, that the U.S. has operated "in parallel" and "out of necessity."

1. Hegemony. It is based on the global dominance of the United States: a) primacist forms are commonly associated with American unilateralism, which in the twenty-first century has included the neoconservative variant of nation building (Iraq and Afghanistan); b) leadership strategy or "cooperative security" is based on the traditional coalition in which the United States assumes the role of first inter par; it seeks to ensure greater legitimacy for U.S. policies (military exercises with Asian partners).

2. sponsorshiptags. It involves the provision of material and moral resources in support of policies basically advocated and initiated by other actors: a) formal strategies, which are specifically authorized by law and international protocols (partnership against pirates and terrorists); (b) informal strategies, which respond to the request of a loose coalition of states or other entrepreneurs rather than being authorized by intergovernmental organizations (catches at sea).

3. Entrenchment: a) isolationism wants to withdraw U.S. forces from the instructions reducing U.S. commitments in international alliances and reassuring U.S. control through strict border control (a barrier against drug trafficking from South America); b) containment, which implies selective participation or balancing from outside (Arctic).

The description of all these different actions shows that, in the face of the approach As a theorist looking for a unifying principle, there are actually a variety of situations, as the military knows. "Military planners, by contrast, recognize that a variety of circumstances require a menu of strategic choices," say Reich and Dombrowski. U.S. policy, in the internship, does not replicate any single strategy. It reflects all of them, with the application of different strategic approaches, depending on the circumstances."

The authors conclude that "if observers were to accept that no grand strategy is capable of prescribing responses to all threats to U.S. security, they would necessarily recognize that the purpose The primary part of a grand strategy is only rhetoric – a statement of values and principles that lack operational utility." "By definition, the design The architectural structure of any single, abstract strategy is relatively rigid, if not static in fact – intellectually, conceptually, analytically, and organizationally. And yet that one grand strategy is expected to work in a context that demands enormous adaptability and routinely punishes rigidity. The military leadership is far more aware than academics or politicians of this inherent problem."

What are the benefits of a plurality of calibrated strategies? According to the authors, it underscores to politicians and citizens the limits of U.S. power, sample that the U.S. is also influenced by global forces that it cannot fully control and tempers expectations about what U.S. military power can achieve.