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Logo of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence organization. It depicts Pakistan's national animal, Markhor, eating a snake [Wikipedia].
ESSAY / Manuel Lamela
Jihadism continues to be one of the main threats Pakistan faces. Its impact on Pakistani society at the political, economic and social levels is evident, it continues to be the source of greatest uncertainty, which acts as a barrier to any company that is interested in investing in the Asian country. Although the situation concerning terrorist attacks on national soil has improved, jihadism is an endemic problem in the region and medium-term prospects are not positive. The atmosphere of extreme volatility and insistence that is breathed does not help in generating confidence. If we add to this the general idea that Pakistan's institutions are not very strong due to their close links with certain radical groups, the result is a not very optimistic scenario. In this essay, we will deal with the current situation of jihadism in Pakistan, offering a multidisciplinary approach that helps to situate itself in the complicated reality that the country is experiencing.
1. Jihadism in the region, a risk assessment
Through this graph, we will analyze the probability and impact of various risk factors concerning jihadist activity in the region. All factors refer to hypothetical situations that may develop in the short or medium term. The increase in jihadist activity in the region will depend on how many of these predictions are fulfilled.
Risk Factors:
A1: US-Taliban treaty fails, creating more instability in the region. If the United States is not able to make a proper exit from Afghanistan, we may find ourselves in a similar situation to that experienced during the 1990s. Such a scenario will once again plunge the region into a fierce civil war between government forces and Taliban groups. The proposed scenario becomes increasingly plausible if we look at the recent American actions regarding foreign policy.
A2: Pakistan two-head strategy facing terrorism collapse. Pakistan's strategy in dealing with jihadism is extremely risky, it's collapse would lead to a schism in the way the Asian state deals with its most immediate challenges. The chances of this strategy failing in the medium term are considerably high due to its structure, which makes it unsustainable over the time.
R3: Violations of the LoC by the two sides in the conflict. Given the frequency with which these events occur, their impact is residual, but it must be taken into account that it in an environment of high tension and other factors, continuous violations of the LoC may be the spark that leads to an increase in terrorist attacks in the region.
R4: Agreement between the afghan Taliban and the government. Despite the recent agreement between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Albduallah, it seems unlikely that he will be able to reach a lasting settlement with the Taliban, given the latter's pretensions. If it is true that if it happens, the agreement will have a great impact that will even transcend Afghan borders.
R5: Afghan Taliban make a coup d'état to the afghan government. In relation to the previous point, despite the pact between the government and the opposition, it seems likely that instability will continue to exist in the country, so a coup attempt by the Taliban seems more likely than a peaceful solution in the medium or long term
R6: U.S. Democrat party wins the 2020 elections. Broadly speaking, both Republican and Democratic parties are betting on focusing their efforts on containing the growth of their great rival, China.
R7: U.S. withdraw its troops from Afghanistan regarding the result of the peace process. This is closely related to the previous point as it responds to a basic geopolitical issue.
R8: New agreement between India and Pakistan regarding the LoC. If produced, this would bring both states closer together and help reduce jihadist attacks in the Kashmir region. However, if we look at recent events, such a possibility seems distant at present.
2. The ties between the ISI and the Taliban and other radical groups
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been accused on many occasions of being closely linked to various radical groups; for example, they have recently been involved with the radicalization of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh[1]. Although Islamabad continues strongly denying such accusations, reality shows us that cooperation between the ISI and various terrorist organisations has been fundamental to their proliferation and settlement both on national territory and in the neighbouring states of India and Afghanistan. The West has not been able to fully understand the nature of this relationship and its link to terrorism. The various complaints to the ISI have been loaded with different arguments of different kinds, lacking in unity and coherence. Unlike popular opinion, this analysis will point to the confused and undefined Pakistani nationalism as the main cause of this close relationship.
The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, together with the Intelligence Bureau and the Military Intelligence, constitute the intelligence services of the Pakistani State, the most important of which is the ISI. ISI can be described as the intellectual core and center of gravity of the army. Its broad functions are the protection of Pakistan's national security and the promotion and defense of Pakistan's interests abroad. Despite the image created around the ISI, in general terms its activities and functions are based on the same "values" as other intelligence agencies such as the MI6, the CIA, etc. They all operate under the common ideal of protecting national interests, the essential foundation of intelligence centers without which they are worthless. We must rationalize their actions on the ground, move away from inquisitive accusations and try to observe what are the ideals that move the group, their connection with the government of Islamabad and the Pakistani society in general.
2.1. The Afghan Taliban
To understand the idiosyncrasy of the ISI we must go back to the war in Afghanistan[2], it is from this moment that the center begins to build an image of itself, independent of the rest of the armed forces. From the ISI we can see the victory of the Mujahideen on Afghan territory as their own, a great achievement that shapes their thinking and vision. But this understanding does not emerge in isolation and independently, as most Pakistani society views the Afghan Taliban as legitimate warriors and defenders of an honourable cause[3]. The Mujahideen victory over the USSR was a real turning point in Pakistani history, the foundation of modern Pakistani nationalism begins from this point. The year 1989 gave rise to a social catharsis from which the ISI was not excluded.
Along with this ideological component, it is also important to highlight the strategic aspect; we are dealing with a question of nationalism, of defending patriotic interests. Since the emergence of the Taliban, Pakistan has not hesitated to support them for major strategic reasons, as there has always been a fear that an unstable Afghanistan would end up being controlled directly or indirectly by India, an encirclement strategy[4]. Faced with this dangerous scenario, the Taliban are Islamabad's only asset on the ground. It is for this reason, and not only for religious commitment, that this bond is produced, although over time it is strengthened and expanded. Therefore, at first, it is Pakistani nationalism and its foreign interests that are the cause of this situation, it seeks to influence neighbouring Afghanistan to make the situation as beneficial as possible for Pakistan. Later on, when we discuss the situation of the Taliban on the national territory, we will address the issue of Pakistani nationalism and how its weak construction causes great problems for the state itself. But on Afghan territory, from what has been explained above, we can conclude that this relationship will continue shortly, it does not seem likely that this will change unless there are great changes of impossible prediction. The ISI will continue to have a significant influence on these groups and will continue its covert operations to promote and defend the Taliban, although it should be noted that the peace treaty between the Taliban and the US[5] is an important factor to take into account, this issue will be developed once the situation of the Taliban at the internal level is explained.
2.2. The Pakistani Taliban (Al-Qaeda[6] and the TTP)
The Taliban groups operating in Pakistan are an extension of those operating in neighbouring Afghanistan. They belong to the same terrorist network and seek similar objectives, differentiated only by the place of action. Despite this obvious similarity, from Islamabad and increasingly from the whole of Pakistani society, the two groups are observed in a completely different way. On the one hand, as we said earlier, for most Pakistanis, the Afghan Taliban are fighting a legitimate and just war, that of liberating the region from foreign rule. However, groups operating in Pakistan are considered enemies of the state and the people. Although there was some support among the popular classes, especially in the Pashtun regions, this support has gradually been lost due to the multitude of atrocities against the civilian population that have recently been committed. The attack carried out by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)[7] in the Army Public School in Peshawar in the year 2014 generated a great stir in society, turning it against these radical groups. This duality marks Pakistan's strategy in dealing with terrorism both globally and internationally. While acting as an accomplice and protector of these groups in Afghanistan, he pursues his counterparts on their territory. We have to say that the operations carried out by the armed forces have been effective, especially the Zarb-e-Azb operation carried out in 2014 in North Waziristan, where the ISI played a fundamental role in identifying and classifying the different objectives. The position of the TTP in the region has been decimated, leaving it quite weakened. As can be seen in this scenario, there is no support at the institutional level from the ISI[8], as they are involved in the fight against these radical organisations. However, on an individual level if these informal links appear. This informal network is favoured by the tribal character of Pakistani society, it can appear in different forms but often draw on ties of Kinship, friendship or social obligation[9]. Due to the nature of this type of relationship, it is impossible to know to what extent the ISI's activity is conditioned and how many of its members are linked to Taliban groups. However, we would like to point out that these unions are informal and individual and not institutional, which provides a certain degree of security and control, at least for the time being, the situation may vary greatly due to the lack of transparency.
2.3. ISI and the radical groups that operate in Kashmir
Another part of the board is made up of the radical groups that focus their terrorist attention on the conflict with India over control of Kashmir, the most important of which are: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Let) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Both groups have committed real atrocities over the past decades, the most notorious being the one committed by LeT in the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008. There are numerous testimonies, in particular, that of the American citizen David Haedy, which point to the cooperation of the ISI in carrying out the aforementioned attack.[10]
Recently, Hafiz Saeed, founder of Let and intellectual planner of the bloody attack, was arrested. The news generated some turmoil both locally and internationally and opened the discussion as to whether Pakistan had finally decided to act against the radical groups operating in Kashmir. We are once again faced with a complex situation, although the arrest shows a certain amount of willpower, it is no more than a way of making up for the situation and relaxing international pressure. The above coincides with the FATF's[11] assessment of Pakistan's status within the institution, which is of great importance for the short-term future of the country's economy. Beyond rhetoric, there is no convincing evidence that suggests that Pakistan has made a move against those groups. The link and support provided by the ISI in this situation are again closely linked to strategic and ideological issues. Since its foundation, Pakistani foreign policy has revolved around India[12], as we saw on the Afghan stage. Pakistani nationalism is based on the maxim that India and the Hindus are the greatest threat to the future of the state. Given the significance of the conflict for Pakistani society, there has been no hesitation in using radical groups to gain advantages on the ground. From Pakistan perspective, it is considered that this group of terrorists are an essential asset when it comes to putting pressure on India and avoiding the complete loss of the territory, they are used as a negotiating tool and a brake on Indian interests in the region.
As we can see, the core between the ISI and certain terrorist groups is based on deep-seated nationalism, which has led both members of the ISI and society, in general, to identify with the ideas of certain radical groups. They have benefited from the situation by bringing together a huge amount of power, becoming a threat to the state itself. The latter has compromised the government of Pakistan, sometimes leaving it with little room for maneuver. The immense infrastructure and capacity of influence that Let has thanks to its charitable arm Jamaat-ud-Dawa, formed with re-localized terrorists, is a clear example of the latter. A revolt led by this group could put Islamabad in a serious predicament, so the actions taken both in Kashmir and internally to try to avoid the situation should be measured very well. The existing cooperation between the ISI and these radical groups is compromised by the development of the conflict in Kashmir, which may increase or decrease depending on the situation. What is certain, because of the above, is that it will not go unnoticed and will continue to play a key role in the future. These relationships, this two-way game could drag Pakistan soon into an internal conflict, which could compromise its very existence as a nation.
[1] Ahmed, Zobaer. "Is Pakistani Intelligence Radicalizing Rohingya Refugees? | DW | 13.02.2020". DW.COM, 2020.
[2] Idrees, Muhammad. Instability In Afghanistan: Implications For Pakistan. PDF, 2019.
[3] Lieven, Anatol. Pakistan a Hard Country. 1st ed. London: Penguin, 2012.
[4] United States Institute for Peace. The India-Pakistan Rivalry In Afghanistan, 2020.
[5] Maizland, Lindsay. "U.S.-Taliban Peace Deal: What To Know". Council On Foreign Relations, 2020.
[6] Blanchard, Christopher M. Al Qaeda: Statements And Evolving Ideology. PDF, 2007.
[7] Mapping Militant Organisations. "Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan." Stanford University. Last modified July 2018.
[8] Gabbay, Shaul M. Networks, Social Capital, And Social Liability: The Fall Of Pakistan ISI, The Taliban And The War Against Terrorism.PDF, 2014. http://www.scirp.org/journal/sn.
[9] Lieven, Anatol. Pakistan a Hard Country. 1st ed. London: Penguin, 2012.
[10] Lieven, Anatol. Pakistan a Hard Country. 1st ed. London: Penguin, 2012.
[11]"Pakistan May Remain On FATF Grey List Beyond Feb 2020: Report". The Economic Times, 2019.
[12]"India And Pakistan: Forever Rivals?". Aljazeera.com, 2017.
▲ Attack in Kashmir linked to groups of Pakistani origin [twitted by @ANI].
ESSAY / Isabel Calderas [Ignacio Lucas as research assistant].
There is a myriad of security concerns regarding external factors when it comes to Pakistan: India, Afghanistan, the Saudi Arabia-Iran split and the United States, to name a few. However, there are also two main concerns that come from within: jihadism and organised crime. They are interconnected but differ in many ways. The latter is frequently overlooked to focus on the former, but both have the capacity of affecting the country, internally and externally, as the effectiveness of dealing with them impacts the perception the international community has of Pakistan. While internally disrupting, these problems also have international reach, as such groups often export their activities, adversely affecting at a global scale. Therefore, international actors put so much pressure on Pakistan to control them. Historically, there has been much scepticism over the government's ability, or even willingness to solve these risks. We will examine both problems separately, identifying the impact they have on the national and international arena, as well as the government's approach to dealing with either and the future risks they entail.
1. JIHADISM
Pakistan's education system has become a central part of the country's radicalization phenomenon[1], in the materialization of madrassas. These schools, which teach a more puritanical version of Islam than had traditionally been practiced in Pakistan, have been directly linked to the rise of jihadist groups[2]. Saudi Arabia, who has always had very close relations with Pakistan, played a key role in their development, by funding the Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi madrassas since the 1970s. The Iranian revolution bolstered the Saudi's imperative to control Sunnism in Pakistan, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave them the vehicle to do so[3]. In these schools, which teach a biased view of the world, students display low tolerance for minorities and are more likely to turn to jihadism.
Saudi and American funding of madrassas during the Soviet occupation helped the Pakistani army's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), become more powerful, as they channelled millions of dollars to them, a lot of which went into the madrassas which sent mujahedeen fighters to fight for their cause[4]. The Taliban's origins can also be traced to these, as the militia was raised mainly from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Saudi-funded madrassas[5].
Madrassas are especially popular in the poorer provinces of the country, where parents send their children to them for several non-religious reasons. First, because the Qur'an is written in Arabic and madrassas teach this language[6]. The dire situation of many families forces millions of Pakistanis to migrate to neighbouring, oil-rich Arabic-speaking countries, from where they send remittances home to help support their families. Secondly, the public-school system in Pakistan is weak, often failing to teach basic reading skills[7], something the madrassas do teach.
Partly in response to the international pressure[8] it has been under to fight terrorism within its territory; Pakistan has tried to reform the madrassas. The government has stated its intention to bring madrassas under the umbrella of the education ministry, financing these schools by allocating cash otherwise destined to fund anti-terrorism security operations[9]. It plans to add subjects like science to the curriculum, to lessen the focus on Islamic teachings. However, this faces several challenges, among which the resistance from the teachers and clerical authorities who run the madrassas outstands[10].
Before moving on to the prominent radical groups in Pakistan, we would like to make a brief summary on a different cause of radicalization: the unintended effect of the drone strategy adopted by the United States.
The United States has increasingly chosen to target its radical enemies in Pakistan through the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which can be highly effective in neutralizing objectives, but also pose a series of risks, like the killing of innocent civilians that are in the neighbouring area. This American strategy, which Pakistan has publicly criticized, has fomented anti-American sentiment among the Pakistanis, at a ratio on average of every person killed resulting in the radicalization of several more people[11]. The growing unpopularity of drone strikes has further weakened relations between both governments, but shows no signs of changing in the future, if recent attacks carried by the U.S. are any indication. Pakistan's efforts to de-radicalize its population will continue to be undermined by the U.S. drone strikes[12].
Pakistan's anti-terrorism strategy is linked to its geostrategic and regional interests, especially dealing with its eastern and western neighbours[13]. There are many radical groups operating within their territory, and the government's strategy towards them shifts depending on their goal[14]. Groups like the Afghan Taliban, who target foreign invasions in their own country, and Al Qaeda, whose jihad against the West is on a global scale, have been allowed to use Pakistani territory to coordinate operations and take refuge. Their strategy is quite different for Pakistani Taliban group, Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) who, despite being allied with the Afghan Taliban, has a different goal: to oust the Pakistani government and impose Sharia law[15]. Most of the military's campaigns aimed at cracking down on radicals have been targeted at weakening groups affiliated with TTP. Lastly, there are those groups with whom some branches of the Pakistani government directly collaborate with.
Pakistan has been known to use jihadi organisations to advance its security objectives through proxy conflicts. Pakistan's policy of waging war through terrorist groups is planned, coordinated, and conducted by the Pakistani Army, specifically the ISI[16] who, as previously mentioned, plays a vital role in running the State.
Although this has been a longstanding cause of tension between the Pakistani and the American governments, the U.S. has made no progress in persuading or compelling the Pakistani military to sever ties with the radical groups[17], even though the Pakistani government has stated that it has, over the past year, 'fought and eradicated the menace of terrorism from its soil' by carrying out arrests, seizing property and freezing bank accounts of groups proscribed by the United States and the United Nations[18]. Their actions have been enough to keep them off the FATF's blacklist for financing terrorism and money laundering[19], which would prevent them from getting financing, but concerns remain about ISI's involvement with radical groups, the future of the relations between them, the overall activity of these groups from within Pakistani territory, and the risk of a future attack to its neighbours.
We will use two of Pakistan's main proxy groups, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, to analyse the feasibility of an attack in the near future.
1.1. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)
Created to support the resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, LeT now focuses on the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Kashmir, the highest priorities for the Pakistani military's foreign policy. The Ahl-e-Hadith group is led by its founder, Hafiz Saeed. Its headquarters are in Punjab. Unlike its counterparts, it is a well-organized, unified, and hierarchical organization, which has become highly institutionalized in the last thirty years. As a result, it has not suffered any major losses or any fractures since its inception[20].
Since the Mumbai attacks in 2008 (which also involved ISI), for which LeT were responsible, its close relationship with the military has defined the group's operations, most noticeably by restraining their actions in India, which reflects both the Pakistani military's desire to avoid international pressure and conflict with their neighbour and the group's capability to contain its members. The group has calibrated its activities, although it possesses the capability to expand its violence. Its outlets for violence have been Afghanistan and Kashmir, which align with the Pakistani military's diary: to bring Afghanistan under Pakistan's sphere of influence while keeping India off-balance in Kashmir[21]. The recent U.S.-Taliban deal in Afghanistan and militarization of Kashmir by India may change this. LeT has benefited handsomely for its loyalty, receiving unparalleled protection, patronage, and privilege from the military. However, after twelve years of restraint, Lashkar undoubtedly faces pressures from within its ranks to strike against India again, especially now that Narendra Modi is prime minister.
1.2. Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)
The Deobandi organisation, led by its founder Masood Azhar, has had close bonds with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban since they came into light in 2000. With the commencement of the war on terror in Afghanistan, JeM reciprocated by launching an attack on the Indian Parliament on December 2001, in cooperation with LeT. However, it ignored the Pakistani military's will in 2019 when it launched the Pulwama attack, after which the government of Pakistan launched a countrywide crackdown on them, taking leaders and members into preventive custody[22].
1.3. Risk assessment
Although it has gone rogue before, Jaish-e-Muhammad has been weakened by the recent government's crackdown. What remains of the group, consolidated under Masood Azhar, has repaired ties with the military. Although JeM has demonstrated it still possesses formidable capability in Indian Kashmir, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba represents the main concern for an attack on India in the near future.
Lashkar has been both the most reliable and loyal of all the proxy groups and has also proven it does not take major action without prior approval from the ISI, which could become a problem. Pakistan has adopted a policy of maintaining plausible deniability for any attacks in order to avoid international pressure after 9/11, thus LeT's close ties with the military make it more likely that its actions will provoke a war between the two countries.
The United States has tried for several years to get Pakistan to stop using proxies. There are several scenarios in which Lashkar would break from the Pakistani state (or vice versa), but they are farfetched and beyond foreign influence: a) a change in Pakistan's security calculus, b) a resolution on Kashmir, c) a shift in Lashkar's responsiveness and d) a major Lashkar attack in the West[23].
a) A change in Pakistan's security calculus is the least likely, as the India-centric understanding of Pakistan's interests and circumstances is deeply embedded in the psyche of the security establishment[24].
b) A resolution on Kashmir would trouble Lashkar, who seeks full unification of all Kashmir with Pakistan, which would not be the outcome of a negotiated resolution. More so, Modi's recent decision regarding article 370 puts this possibility even further into the future.
c) A shift in Lashkar responsiveness would be caused by the internal pressures to perform another attack, after more than a decade of abiding by the security establishment's will. If perceived as too powerful of insufficiently responsive, ISI would most likely seek to dismantle the group, as they did with Jaish-e-Muhammad, by focusing on the rogue elements and leaving Lashkar smaller but more responsive. This presents a threat, as the group would not allow itself to be simply dismantled but would probably resist to the point of becoming hostile[25].
d) The last option, a major Lashkar attack in the West, is also unlikely, as the group has not undertaken any major attack without perceived greenlight from ISI.
This does not mean that an attack from LeT can be ruled out. ISI could allow the group to carry out an attack if, in the absence of a better reason, it feels that the pressure from within the group will start causing dissent and fractures, just like it happened in 2008. It is in ISI's best interest that Lashkar remains a strong, united ally. Knowing this, it is important to note that a large-scale attack in India by Lashkar is arguably the most likely trigger to a full-blown conflict between the two nations. Even a smaller-scale attack has the potential of provoking India, especially under Modi.
If such an attack where to happen, India would not be expected to display a weak-kneed gesture, as PM Modi's policy is that of a tough and powerful approach in defence vis-à-vis both Pakistan and China. This has already been made evident by its retaliation for the Fidayeen attack at Uri brigade headquarters by Jaish-e-Muhammad in 2016[26]. It has now become evident that if Pakistan continues to harbour terrorist groups against India as its strategic assets, there will be no military restraint by India as long as Modi is in power, who will respond with massive retaliation. In its fragile economic condition, Pakistan will not be able to sustain a long-drawn war effort[27].
On the other hand, Afghanistan, which has been the other focus of Pakistan's proxy groups, is now undergoing a process which could result in a major organisational shift. The Taliban insurgent movement has been able survive this long due to the sanctuary and support provided by Pakistan[28]. Furthermore, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba's participation in the Afghan insurgency furthered the Pakistani military's goal of having a friendly, anti-India partner on its western border[29]. The development and outcome of the intra-Afghan talks will determine the continued use of proxies in the country. However, we can realistically assume that, at least in the near future, radical groups will maintain some degree of activity in Afghanistan.
It is highly unlikely that the Pakistani intelligence establishment will stop engaging with radical groups, as it sees in them a very useful strategic tool for achieving its security goals. However, Pakistan's plausible deniability approach will come into question, as its close ties with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba make it increasingly hard for it to deny involvement in its acts with any credibility. Regarding India, any kind of offensive from this group could result in a large-scale conflict. This is precisely the most likely scenario to occur, as Modi's history with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and their twelve-year-long "hiatus" from impactful attacks could propel the organisation to take action that will impact the whole region.
2. DRUG TRAFFICKING
Drug trafficking constitutes an important problem for Pakistan. It originates in Afghanistan, from where thousands of tonnes are smuggled out every year, using Pakistan as a passageway to provide the world with heroin and opioids[30]. The following concept map has been elaborated with information from diverse sources[31] to present the different aspects of the problem aimed to better comprehend the complex situation.
Afghanistan, one of the world's largest heroin producers, has supplied up to 60% and 80% of the U.S. and European markets, respectively. The landlocked country takes advantage of its blurred border line, and the remoteness and inaccessibility of the sparsely populated bordering regions with Pakistan, using it as a conduit to send its drugs globally. The Pakistani government is under a lot of pressure from the international community to fight and minimise drug trafficking from its territory.
Pakistan feels a special kind of pressure from the European Union, as its GSP+ status could be affected if it does not control this problem. The GSP+ is dependent on the implementation of 27 international conventions related to human rights, labour rights, protection of the environment and good governance, including the UN Convention on Fighting Illegal Drugs[32]. Pakistan was granted GSP+ status in 2014 and has shown commitment to maintaining ratifications and meeting reporting obligations to the UN Treaty bodies[33]. However, one of the aspects of the scheme is its "temporary withdrawal and safeguard" measure, which means the preferences can be immediately withdrawn if the country is unable to control drug trafficking effectively[34]. This has not been the case, and the EU has recognised Pakistan's efforts in the fight on drugs; the UN has also removed it from the list of cannabis resin production countries[35]. Anti-corruption frameworks have been strengthened, along with legislation review and awareness building, but they have been advised that better coordination between law enforcement agencies is needed[36].
The GSP+ status is very important to Pakistan, as the European Union is their first trade partner, absorbing over a third of their total exports in 2018, followed by the U.S., China and Afghanistan[37]. The Union can use this as leverage to obtain concessions from Pakistan. However, the approach they have taken so far has been of collaboration in many areas, including transnational organised crime, money laundering and counter-narcotics[38]. In this sense, the EU ambassador to Pakistan recently stated that the new Strategic Engagement Plan of 2019 would "further boost their relations in diverse fields"[39].
Even with combined efforts, eradicating the drug trafficking problem in Pakistan has proven to be very difficult. This is because production of the drug is not done in its territory, and even if border patrols are strengthened, it will be very hard to stop drugs from coming in from its neighbour if the Afghan government doesn't take appropriate measures themselves.
A "5 whys" exercise has led us to understand that the root cause of the problem is the fact that most farmers in Afghanistan are too poor to turn to different crops. A nearly two decade war has ravaged the country's land, leaving opium crops, which are cheaper and easier to maintain, as the only option for most farmers in this agrarian nation. A substantial investment in the country's agriculture to produce more economic options would be needed if any serious advance is expected to be made in stopping illegal drug trafficking. These investments will have to be a joint effort of the international community, and funding for the government will also be necessary, if stability is to be reached. Unless this is done, opium will likely remain entangled in the rural economy, the Taliban insurgency, and the government corruption whose sum is the Afghan conundrum.[40]. And as long as this does not happen, it is highly unlikely that Pakistan will be able to make any substantial progress in its effort to fight illicit drugs.
[1] Khurshid Khan and Afifa Kiran, "Emerging Tendencies of Radicalization in Pakistan," Strategic Studies, vol. 32, 2012.
[2] Hassan N. Gardezi, "Pakistan: The Power of Intelligence Agencies," South Asia Citizenz Web, 2011, http://www.sacw.net/article2191.html.
[3] Madiha Afzal, "Saudi Arabia's Hold on Pakistan," 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/saudi-arabias-hold-on-pakistan/.
[4] Gardezi, "Pakistan: The Power of Intelligence Agencies."
[5] Ibid.
[6] Myriam Renaud, "Pakistan's Plan to Reform Madrasas Ignores Why Parents Enrol Children in First Place," The Globe Post, May 20, 2019, https://theglobepost.com/2019/05/20/pakistan-madrasas-reform/.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Drazen Jorgic and Asif Shahzad, "Pakistan Begins Crackdown on Mlitant Groups amid Global Pressure," Reuters, March 5, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-pakistan-un/pakistan-begins-crackdown-on-militant-groups-amid-global-pressure-idUSKCN1QM0XD.
[9] Saad Sayeed, "Pakistan Plans to Bring 20,000 Madrasas under Government Control," Reuters, April 29, 2019.
[10] Renaud, "Pakistan's Plan to Reform Madrasas Ignores Why Parents Enrol Children in First Place".
[11] International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clininc (Stanford Law Review) and Global Justice Clinic (NYE School of Law), "Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan," 2012, https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/313671/doc/slspublic/Stanford_NYU_LIVING_UNDER_DRONES.pdf.
[12] Saba Noor, "Radicalization to De-Radicalization: The Case of Pakistan," Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 5, no. 8 (2013): 16-19.
[13] Muhammad Iqbal Roy and Abdul Rehman, "Pakistan's Counter Terrorism Strategy (2001-2019): Evolution, Paradigms, Prospects and Challenges," Journal of Politics and International Studies 5, no. July-December (2019): 1-13.
[14] Madiha Afzal, "A Country of Radicals? Not Quite," in Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State (Brookings Institution Press, 2018), 208, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/chapter-one_-pakistan-under-siege.pdf.
[15] Ibid.
[16] John Crisafulli et al., "Recommendations for Success in Afghanistan," 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20107.7.
[17] Tricia Bacon, "The Evolution of Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Tayyiba," Orbis, no. Winter (2019): 27-43.
[18] Susannah George and Shaiq Hussain, "Pakistan Hopes Its Steps to Fight Terrorism Will Keep It off a Global Blacklist," The Washington Post, February 21, 2020.
[19] Husain Haqqani, "FAFT's Grey List Suits Pakistan's Jihadi Ambitions. It Only Worries Entering the Black List," Hudson Institute, February 28, 2020.
[20] Bacon, "The Evolution of Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Tayyiba."
[21] Ibid.
[22] Farhan Zahid, "Profile of Jaish-e-Muhammad and Leader Masood Azhar," Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 11, no. 4 (2019): 1-5, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26631531.
[23] Tricia Bacon, "Preventing the Next Lashkar-e-Tayyiba Attack," The Washington Quarterly 42, no. 1 (2019): 53-70.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Abhinav Pandya, "The Future of Indo-Pak Relations after the Pulwama Attack," Perspectives on Terrorism 13, no. 2 (2019): 65-68, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26626866.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Crisafulli et al., "Recommendations for Success in Afghanistan."
[29] Bacon, "The Evolution of Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Tayyiba."
[30] Alfred W McCoy, "How the Heroin Trade Explains the US-UK Failure in Afghanistan," The Guardian, January 9, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jan/09/how-the-heroin-trade-explains-the-us-uk-failure-in-afghanistan.
[31] Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray and Dr. Shanthie Mariet D Souza, "The Afghanistan-India Drug Trail - Analysis," Eurasia Review, August , https://www.eurasiareview.com/02082019-the-afghanistan-india-drug-trail-analysis/; Mehmood Hassan Khan, "Kashmir and Power Politics," Defence Journal 23, no. 2. 2 (2019); McCoy, "How the Heroin Trade Explains the US-UK Failure in Afghanistan"; Pakistan United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Country Office, "Illicit Drug Trends in Pakistan," 2008, https://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/central-asia/Illicit Drug Trends Report_Pakistan_rev1.pdf; "Country Profile - Pakistan," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2020, https://www.unodc.org/pakistan/en/country-profile.html.
[32] European Commission, "Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP)," 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/.
[33] High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 'The EU Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance ('GSP+') Assessment of Pakistan Covering the Period 2018-2019' (Brussels, 2020).
[34] Dr. Zobi Fatima, "A Brief Overview of GSP+ for Pakistan," Pakistan Journal of European Studies 34, no. 2 (2018), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333641020_A_BRIEF_OVERVIEW_OF_GSP_FOR_PAKISTAN.
[35] High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "The EU Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance ('GSP+') Assessment of Pakistan Covering the Period 2018-2019".
[36] Fatima, "A Brief Overview of GSP+ for Pakistan."
[37] UN Comtrade Analytics, "Trade Dashboard," accessed March 27, 2020, https://comtrade.un.org/labs/data-explorer/.
[38] European External Action Services, 'EU-Pakistan Five Year Engagement Plan' (European Union, 2017), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-pakistan_five-year_engagement_plan.pdf; European Union External Services, 'EU-Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan 2019' (European Union, 2019), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-pakistan_strategic_engagement_plan.pdf.
[39] "EU Ready to Help Pakistan in Expanding Its Reports: Androulla," Business Recorder, October 23, 2019.
[40] McCoy, "How the Heroin Trade Explains the US-UK Failure in Afghanistan".
ESSAY / Andrea Pavón-Guinea [English version].
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Introduction
The recent terrorist attacks in European soil, together with the rise of the Daesh, the civil war in Syria and the refugee crisis have underlined the critical importance for European intercultural dialogues with the Islamic world, placing the interdependence of the European Union (EU) and its Southern neighborhood on the spotlight. The European Union is focusing their resources on civil society initiatives that based on soft power may contribute to radicalization prevention. Through the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, where all the Euro-Mediterranean partners are represented, the European Union has an unparalleled instrument for bringing peoples from both shores of the Mediterranean together and for contributing to the improvement of Euro-Mediterranean relations through people-to-people engagement.
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Intercultural dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean relations
The abovementioned interdependence between the European Union and the South Mediterranean basin began[1] to be regulated by the so-called Barcelona Process in 1995[2].
The Barcelona Declaration formally initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which is a multilateral framework of relations 'based on a spirit of partnership' that aims at turning the Mediterranean basin into an 'area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity'. The Barcelona Process recalled one of the founding principles of the European Union: common objectives need to be addressed in a spirit of co-responsibility (Suzan, 2002). The Declaration's goals are threefold (also known as the EMP's three 'baskets'): the creation of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of security and political dialogues (political & security basket); the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through and economic and financial partnership (economic & financial basket); and the promotion of understanding between cultures through the exchange of civil societies - the so-called inter-cultural dialogue - (Social, cultural and human affairs basket).
More than twenty years after the Declaration, the recent events of today's politics in the European Southern Neighborhood have further underlined the critical importance for European security of dialogues with the Islamic world in a variety of issues. If European officials had rejected Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis when it was first articulated, they started considering it as a plausible scenario after September 11: a scenario, however, that could be partly averted by making efforts through the third basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the form of enhanced dialogue and cultural cooperation (Gillespie, 2004).
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Counter-radicalization through intercultural dialogue: The Anna Lindh Foundation
Emphasizing that dialogue among cultures, civilizations and religions throughout the Mediterranean Region is more necessary than ever before in order to promote understanding among them, the Euro-Mediterranean partners agreed during the 5th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers in Valencia (2002) to establish a foundation that distinctly deals with inter-cultural dialogue. This way, the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (ALF), based in Alexandria (Egypt), became operational in 2005. Being the first properly Euro-Mediterranean institution, it coordinates a region-wide network of over 4,000 civil society organizations belonging to the 42 UfM[3] partners.
Despite being created in 2005, the last few years have seen a dramatic growth of interest in intercultural dialogue as a means of radicalization prevention. For instance, the Mediterranean Forum of the Anna Lindh Foundation, hosted in Malta in October 2016, acknowledged the importance of intercultural dialogue in counteracting extremism. Furthermore, the outcomes of the Forum found that intercultural dialogue is already embedded in the policy discourse, evidenced by references to the Anna Lindh Foundation and its intercultural dialogue mandate in the new European Neighborhood Policy (18.11.2015) and HR Mogherini's Strategy for International Cultural Relations.
However, it has been the recent terrorist attacks in Europe the ones that have highlighted the urgent need to tackle the phenomenon of radicalization[4] that may lead to violent extremism and terrorism. In this regard, the prevention of radicalization[5] is a key part of the fight against terrorism, as was highlighted in the European diary on Security[6] in 2015. It is worth mentioning that the majority of the terrorist suspects implicated in those attacks were European citizens, born and raised in EU Member States, who were radicalized to commit acts of political violence. It evidences the 'transnational dimension of Islamist terrorism' (Kaunert and Léonard, 2011: 287) and the changing nature of the threat, whose drivers are different from, and more complex than, previous radicalization phenomena: 'Radicalization today has different root causes, operates on the basis of different recruitment and communication techniques; it is marked by globalized and moving targets inside and outside Europe and grows in various urban contexts'[7]. The following map shows the number of Jihadi arrests in European soil in 2016.
Source: Europol (2016) |
Consequently, against the background of the rising prominence of the 'clash of civilizations' discourse in the aftermath of the 9/11, the Anna Lindh Foundation could be understood as an alternative and non-confrontational response to the US-led war on terror (Malmvig, 2007). It aims at creating 'a space of prosperity, coexistence and peace' through 'restoring trust in dialogue and bridging gaps in mutual perceptions'. It thus represents the idea that encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies is a crucial element of any political and strategic program aimed at neighboring Mediterranean countries (Rosenthal, 2007). In other words, the creation of an area of dialogue, cooperation and exchange in the South Mediterranean is a key external relations priority for the European Union. Not only that but with the launching of the Anna Lindh Foundation, the EU recognizes that for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to work, dialogue between people - not just political elites - becomes essential.
This focus on civil society engagement is crucial in tackling radicalization processes, that precede the phase of violent extremism and future terrorist practices. For instance, the United Nations' Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force[8] has argued that the state alone does not have all the resources necessary to counter radicalization and therefore need partners to carry out this task. Involving civil society and local communities enhances trust and social cohesion and can be a means to reach segments of society that governments may have difficulty to engage with. The European Union has also highlighted the importance of local actors, who are usually best placed to prevent and detect radicalization both in the short-term and the long-term[9].
Conclusion
Intercultural dialogue may thus be seen as a desirable tool to address the phenomenon of radicalization in the region of the South Mediterranean, where the legacies of a colonial order demand that 'more credible interlocutors need to be found among non-governmental agents' (Riordan, 2005: 182). The European Union will ought to abandon its existing 'donor mentality' and move towards real partnerships and people-to-people confidence building measures (Amirah and Behr, 2013: 5), holding the assumption that practices based on dialogue and mutuality may offer a promising framework for improving the European Union's relations towards the South Mediterranean, and particularly, for countering radicalization processes occurring both in and outside Europe.
[1] The first attempt to regulate such interdependence was the launch of the Euro-Arab Dialogue (1973-1989); conceived as a forum for dialogue between the European Community and the Arab League, their efforts nevertheless were frustrated because of the international tensions of the Gulf War and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Khader, 2015).
[2] The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been complemented by the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. Modeled on the enlargement policy, its underlying rationale is the same: "Attempting to shape the neighborhood by exporting the EU's norms and values" (Gstöhl, 2016: 3). In response to the conflicts in the ENP regions, the rise of extremism and terrorism and the refugee flows to Europe, the ENP has been revised both in 2011 and 2015, calling for a focus on stabilization and further differentiation among the ENP countries. The ENP is based on differential bilateralism (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005), and abandons the prevalence of the principle of regionality that was inherent in the Barcelona Process.
[3] The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was created by 43 Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State and Government on 13 July 2008 at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean. It was launched as a continuation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euro-Med), also known as the Barcelona Process, which was established in 1995.
[4] Although there are different types of political extremism, this article focuses on Islamist extremism and jihadist terrorism, since violent Sunni extremists have been responsible for the largest number of terrorist attacks worldwide (Schmid, 2013). It is also worth noting that 'a universally accepted definition of the concept of radicalization is still to be developed' (Veldhuis and Staun, 2009: 4).
[5] Since 2004, the term 'radicalization' has become central to terrorism studies and counter-terrorism policy-making in order to analyze 'homegrown' Islamist political violence (Kundnani, 2012).
[6] The European diary on Security, COM (2015) 185 of 28 April 2015.
[7] The prevention of radicalization leading to violent extremism, COM (2016) 379 of 14 June 2016.
[8] First Report of the Working Group on Radicalization and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programs (2006)
[9] The prevention of radicalization leading to violent extremism, COM (2016) 379 of 14 June 2016.
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