The positive consequences of the free trade agreement will derive more from the end of uncertainty than from the new provisions introduced.

After a year and a half of negotiations, the new treaty between the United States, Canada and Mexico (this country has named it T-MEC, the other two speak of USMCA) is still pending approval by the legislative chambers of each country. In Washington, the political discussion should begin shortly; it will be important what effects are foreseen for the US Economics and that of its two neighbors. The first programs of study disagree on some aspects, although they agree that the changes introduced in the renegotiation of the agreement that existed since 1994 will not have a special impact.

▲ signature of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement at framework of the G-20 in November 2018 [Shealah Craighead-White House].

article / Ramón Barba

The renegotiation of the formerly North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, or NAFTA for its acronym in English) and now baptized as the Treaty of the United States, Mexico and Canada (T-MEC or, in its Anglo-Saxon version, USMCA), has been one of the main points on the Trump Administration's diary . C by the three negotiating parties at the end of 2018, now the treaty is pending ratification by the legislative chambers of each country.

Launched in 1994, the agreement had been described by Trump as "the worst trade agreement in history". From the beginning of his presidency, Trump set out to modify some aspects of agreement to reduce the large trade deficit with Mexico (some $80 billion, double the deficit the US has with Canada), and at the same time refund activity and jobs to the US Rust Belt, where the echo of his promises had been decisive for his electoral victory.

What has each country gained and what has each country lost in the renegotiation of the treaty? And, above all, what effects will it have on each country's Economics ? Will the United States improve its trade balance? Will Mexico or Canada be negatively affected by some of the modifications introduced? We will first examine how the claims of each of the partners were left at the end of the negotiations, and then we will look at the possible economic effect of the new version of the treaty in the light of two recent reports programs of study, one by an independent body of the U.S. Administration and the other by the IMF.

Tug of war

In the negotiations, which dragged on for nearly a year and a half, Mexico and Canada managed to "maintain the status quo in many important areas," but while the actual changes were modest, as analyzed by the Brookings Institution, they "went almost uniformly in the direction of what the United States wanted." "Trump's aggressive and threatening approach ," which challenged with breaking the treaty for good, "succeeded in obtaining modest concessions from his partners."

In the automotive industry core topic , the US managed to increase from 62.5% to 75% the proportion of the production of a car that must be made within the free trade area , to force 30% of the work needed to manufacture a car to have a wage of $16/hour (40% as of 2023) -a measure aimed at appeasing the US unions, since in Mexico the average wage of an automotive worker today is $4/hour-, and to set a tariff of 25% for cars coming from outside the country.

Mexico and Canada were granted their demand that an autonomous termination clause not be introduced after five years if there was no prior consensus for the renewal of the agreement, put on the table by Washington. Finally, the T-MEC will last for 16 years, renewable, with a review in the sixth year.

Justin Trudeau's government had to make some concessions to the U.S. dairy sector, but preserved what had been its main red line from the beginning: the validity of Chapter 19, concerning the settlement of disputes through independent binational arbitration.

Mexico, for its part, gained the peace of mind that comes with the survival of the agreement, avoiding future uncertainty and guaranteeing close trade relations with the large U.S. market. However, the labor conditions of Mexican workers can work as a double-edged sword for the Aztec Economics , since on the one hand it can favor an improvement in the standard of living and encourage consumption, but on the other hand it can affect the location of companies due to less competitive salaries.

Regardless of these changes in one direction or another, the update of the treaty was necessary after 25 years of a agreement that was signed before the Internet revolution and the digital Economics that it has brought. On the other hand, the change of name of the treaty was a "gimmick" devised by Trump to sell to his electorate the renewal of a agreement whose previous name was associated with criticisms made over the last two decades.

The discussion on the text will take place in the fall at the US congress , where Democrats will insist on strengthening assurances that Mexico will implement the committed labor measures. Prior to the vote the US must apply a exemption to Canada and Mexico of the steel and aluminum tariffs that the Trump Administration has imposed internationally.

Economic effect

The United States International Trade Commission (USITC), an independent body that has the status of a government agency, considers that the T-MEC will have a limited but positive impact on the US Economics . Thus, in a report published in April, it estimates that the entrance in force of the reformulated agreement will increase US production by 0.35%, with an increase in employment of 0.12%, figures somewhat lower than those predicted when NAFTA came into force in 1994, when the US expected a 0.5% increase in its Economics and a 1% rise in employment.

In any case, this timid impact would not be so much due to the content of the agreed text, but to its mere existence, since it eliminates uncertainties about US trade relations with its two neighbors.

The report believes that the T-MEC will lead to an increase in the production of automotive accessories in the US, dragging up the employment in that country, but making the products more expensive and, therefore, negatively affecting exports. The report also foresees that maintaining the current arbitration system, as demanded by Mexico and Canada, will discourage US investments in the Mexican market and boost them in the US.

These conclusions do not coincide with the assessment of the International Monetary Fund, although both bodies agree with agreement in ruling out major effects of agreement. Thus, an IMF study published in March believes that, at the aggregate level, the effects of the new wording "are relatively small". The new provisions "could lead to less economic integration of North America, reducing trade among the three North American partners by more than $4 billion (0.4%), while giving their members combined gains of $538 million". It adds that the real GDP effects of the free trade area are "negligible," and qualifies that many of the benefits "would come from trade facilitation measures that modernize and integrate customs procedures to further reduce trade costs and border inefficiencies."

The result of the study sample that the more demanding rules of origin in the automotive sector and labor value content requirements, issues that especially concern the US-Mexico relationship, "would not achieve their desired consequences". According to the IMF, "the new rules lead to a decline in vehicle and parts production in the three North American countries, with shifts toward increased sourcing of vehicles and parts from outside the region. Consumers will find higher vehicle prices and will respond with lower quantity demand".

As for Canada's dairy market, an issue of particular relevance in the US-Canada trade relationship, the effects of increased US access "would be very small and macroeconomically insignificant".

This disparity in forecasts between the USITC and the IMF is due to the fact that several variables are undetermined, such as the future of the trans-Pacific agreement , in which Canada and Mexico are involved, or the ongoing trade discussions between the US and China. One sample where the ground is especially shaky is the data that in January and February 2019 Mexico became the first trade partner of the US (a exchange of $97.4 billion), ahead of Canada ($92.4 billion) and China ($90.4 billion). That raised the US trade deficit with Mexico by $3 billion, just in the opposite direction of the Trump Administration's claims.

The change of government and its stricter vision have slowed down the implementation of agreement, but it is making progress in its application.

The implementation of the agreement peace agreement in Colombia is proceeding more slowly than those who signed it two years ago expected, but there has not been the paralysis or even the crisis predicted by those who opposed the election of Iván Duque as president of the country. The latest estimate speaks of a compliance with the stipulations of the peace agreement agreement close to 70%, although the remaining 30% is already not being complied with.

▲ Colombian President Iván Duque at a public event [Efraín Herrera-Presidencia].

article / María Gabriela Fajardo

Iván Duque arrived at the Casa de Nariño - the seat of the Colombian presidency - with the slogan "Peace with Legality", degree scroll that synthesized his commitment to implement the peace agreement , signed in November 2017, but reducing the margins of impunity that in his opinion and that of his party, the Democratic Center, existed for the former combatants of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). One year after his election as president, it is worth analyzing how the implementation of the peace agreement agreement is going.

agreement About 70% of the provisions of agreement have already been fulfilled, totally or partially, or will be fulfilled within the stipulated time, according to the estimate of high school Kroc, in charge of making the official estimate of the implementation of the peace process. According to its third report, published in April, 23% of the commitments have been completely fulfilled, 35% have reached advanced levels of implementation, and 12% are expected to be completely fulfilled by the stipulated time. However, almost 31% of the content of the agreement has not yet begun to be implemented, when it should have been underway.

The United Nations, to which the agreement grants a supervisory role, has underlined the efforts made by the new Government to activate the various instances provided for in the text. In his report to committee Security, the University Secretary of the UN, António Guterres, highlighted at the end of 2018 the launching of the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final agreement (CSIVI) and of the committee National Commission for Reincorporation (CNR).

As indicated by Raúl Rosende, chief of staff of the UN Verification mission statement in Colombia, Guterres' report positively estimated that it had "obtained the approval of 20 collective projects and 29 individual projects of ex-combatants in the process of reincorporation, valued at 3.7 million dollars and which will benefit a total of 1,340 ex-combatants, including 366 women". These projects have involved the participation of the governments of Antioquia, Chocó, Cauca, goal, Santander, Sucre and Valle del Cauca, which have facilitated departmental reincorporation roundtables to coordinate local and regional efforts, thus involving Colombian civil society to a greater extent.

The UN has also expressed some concerns, shared by Colombian civil society. The main one has to do with security in some of the historical conflict zones where a high issue number of social leaders have been killed. The murders have been concentrated in Antioquia, Cauca, Caquetá, Nariño and Norte de Santander. Thus, throughout 2018 at least 226 social leaders and Human Rights defenders were killed, according to data of the high school of programs of study for development and Peace(Indepaz). The Ombudsman's Office put the figure at 164.

In addition, as Rosende has recalled, many of the indigenous communities have suffered assassinations, threats and forced displacement. This has occurred in ethnic territories of the Awá, Embera Chamí and Nasa peoples in Caldas, Cauca, Chocó, Nariño and Valle del Cauca.

Along with the successes and concerns, the UN also points to a series of challenges that lie ahead in the post-conflict period. On the one hand, there is the challenge of guaranteeing former combatants the necessary legal security, generating confidence and producing real progress in terms of social and political reintegration. Another great challenge is to achieve the autonomous and effective functioning of mechanisms core topic such as the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition or Truth Commission. In addition, there is also the social challenge to attend to the communities affected by the conflict, which demand security, Education, health, land, infrastructure and viable alternatives against illegal economies.

Controversial aspects

Issues related to the SJP have been the focus of Duque's most controversial actions. In March, the president presented formal objections to the law regulating the SJP, which he wants to modify six points of its 159 articles. Two of them refer to the extradition of former combatants, something that is not contemplated now if they collaborate with the transitional justice system, especially in the case of crimes committed after the signature of agreement. Duque also proposes a constitutional reform that excludes sexual crimes against minors from the JEP, determines the loss of all benefits if there is recidivism in a crime and transfers to the ordinary justice system the cases of illegal conducts started before the agreement and continued after. The objections were rejected in April by the House of Representatives and also by the Senate, although the validity of the result in the latter was left in question, thus lengthening the discussion.

A new controversy may arise when the Territorial Spaces of training and Reincorporation (ETCR) are to be closed in August. Around 5,000 ex-combatants are still in or around them. The High Counselor for the Post-Conflict, Emilio Archila, has stated that by that time, with the financial aid of the FARC (the political party that succeeded the guerrilla) and the Government, the ex-combatants must have work, be clear about what their residency program will be and be prepared for reincorporation into civilian life.

Within the reincorporation process, the lack of compliance by FARC leaders with their commitment, stipulated in the peace agreement agreement , to remain until the end in the ETCRs in order to contribute with their leadership to the smooth running of the process, is a cause for concern. However, in recent months, several leaders have left these territories, among them "El Paisa", who has not presented himself before the JEP, which has demanded his capture.

Nor is former ringleader Ivan Marquez cooperating with the transitional justice system, successively delaying his appearance before the JEP citing security concerns. Márquez has cited the murder of 85 former guerrillas since the signature of the peace agreement , and has accused the government of serious failures to comply.

There is also the case of Jesús Santrich, who like Márquez had acquired a seat in the congress thanks to the implementation of the peace process. Santrich has been detained since April 2018 based on an Interpol red notice at the request of the United States, which accuses him of the shipment of 10 tons of cocaine made after the signature of the agreement peace .

A topic quite addressed from the time of the negotiations has to do with forced eradication and crop spraying. The illicit crop substitution program began to yield results in 2018, resulting in thousands of peasant families agreeing with the government to replace their coca crops with other licit crops. Although in some Departments such as Guaviare there was voluntary crop eradication, this was not enough to offset the increase in plantings in 2016 and 2017. In 2018, close to 100,000 families - responsible for just over 51,000 hectares of coca - signed substitution agreements and this issue is expected to continue to increase throughout 2019. According to the Colombian government, citing figures from the U.S. State Department's department , more than 209,000 hectares of coca leaf have been planted, far more than in the era of Pablo Escobar, according to figures presented by President Iván Duque last month before the Constitutional Court.

The benefits of peace are indisputable and much remains to be done to consolidate it. It is a task that cannot be left in the hands of the Government alone, but requires the support of former combatants, their former leaders and civil society. The great challenge is to accelerate the implementation of agreement and reduce political polarization, all in the search for national reconciliation.

Thierry Baudet's electoral surprise and the new Dutch right wing

The Netherlands has seen in recent years not only the decline of some of the traditional parties, but even the new party of the populist Geert Wilders has been overtaken by an even newer training , led by Thierry Baudet, also markedly right-wing but somewhat more sophisticated. The political earthquake of the March regional elections could sweep away the coalition government of the liberal Mark Rutte, who has provided continuity in Dutch politics over the past nine years.

▲ Thierry Baudet, in an advertising spot for his party, Forum for Democracy (FVD).

article / Jokin de Carlos Sola

On March 20, regional elections were held in the Netherlands. The parties that make up the coalition that keeps Mark Rutte in power suffered a strong punishment in all regions, and the same happened with the party of the famous and controversial Geert Wilders. The big winner of these elections was the Forum for Democracy (FvD) party, founded and led by Thierry Baudet, 36, the new star of Dutch politics. These results sow doubts about the future of Mark Rutte's government once the composition of the Senate is renewed next May.

Since World War II, three forces have been at the center of Dutch politics: the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), the Labor Party (PvA) and the liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). All three accounted for 83% of the Dutch electorate in 1982. Due to the Dutch system of proportional representation, no party has ever had an absolute majority, so there have always been coalition governments. The system also means that, because they are not punished, small parties always achieve representation, thus providing a great ideological variety in Parliament.

Over the years, the three main parties lost influence. In 2010, after eight years in government, the CDA went from 26% and first place in Parliament to 13% and fourth place. This fall brought the VVD to power for the first time under the leadership of Mark Rutte and triggered the entrance of Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV), a right-wing populist training , in Dutch politics. Shortly thereafter Rutte formed a Grand Coalition with the PvA. However, this decision caused Labour to drop from 24% to 5% in the 2017 elections. These results meant that both the VVD and Rutte were left as the last element of old Dutch politics.

These 2017 elections generated even greater diversity in Parliament. In them, parties such as the Reformed Party, of Calvinist Orthodox ideology; the baptized 50+, with the goal to defend the interests of retirees, or the DENK party, created to defend the interests of the Turkish minority in the country, achieved representation. However, none of these parties would later be as relevant as the Forum for Democracy and its leader Thierry Baudet.

Forum for Democracy

The Forum for Democracy was founded as a think tank in 2016, led by 33-year-old French-Dutchman Thierry Baudet. The following year the FvD became a party, presenting itself as a conservative or national conservativetraining , and won two MPs in regional elections. Since then it has been growing, mainly at the expense of Geert Wilders and his PVV. One of the main reasons for this is that Wilders is accused of having no program other than the rejection of immigration and the exit from the European Union. As celebrated as it was controversial was the fact that PVV presented its program on only one page. On the contrary, Baudet has created a broad program in which issues such as the introduction of direct democracy, the privatization of certain sectors, the end of military cuts and a rejection of multiculturalism in general are proposed. On the other hand, Baudet has created an image of greater intellectual stature and respectability than Wilders. However, the party has also suffered declines in popularity because of certain attitudes of Baudet, such as his climate change denialism, his relationship with Jean Marie Le Pen or Filip Dewinter, and his refusal to answer whether he linked IQ to race.

Regional Elections

The Netherlands is divided into 12 regions, each region has a committee, which can have between 39 and 55 representatives. Each committee elects both the Royal Commissioner, who acts as the highest authority in the region, and the executive, usually formed through a coalition of parties. The regions have a number of powers granted to them by the central government.

In the provincial elections last March, the FvD became the leading party in 6 out of 12 regions, including North Holland and South Holland, where the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague, which had been traditional VVD strongholds, are located. In addition to this, it became the party with the most representatives in the whole of the Netherlands. These gains were achieved mainly at the expense of the PVV. Although these results do not guarantee the FvD government in any region, they do give it influence and media coverage, something Baudet has been able to take advantage of.

Several media linked Baudet's victory to the murder a few days earlier in Utrecht of three Dutch nationals by a Turkish citizen, which authorities said was most likely terrorist motivated. However, the FvD had been growing and gaining ground for some time. The reasons for its rise are several: the decline of Wilders, the actions of Prime Minister Rutte in favor of Dutch companies such as Shell or Unilever (business where he previously worked), the erosion of the traditional parties, which in turn damages their allies, and the rejection of certain immigration policies that Baudet linked to the attack in Utrecht. The Dutch Greens have also experienced great growth, accumulating the young vote that previously supported Democrats 66.

Impact on Dutch Policy

The victory of the Baudet party over Rutte's party directly affects the central government, the Dutch electoral system and the prime minister himself. First of all, many media welcomed the results as a evaluation of the Dutch people on Rutte's government. The biggest punishment was for Rutte's allies, the Democrats 66 and the Christian Democratic Appeal, which lost the most support in the regions. Since coming to power in 2010, Rutte has managed to maintain the loyalty of his electorate, but all his allies have ended up being punished by their voters. Therefore, it is possible that Rutte's government will not be able to finish its mandate, if his allies end up turning their backs on him.

The result of the March regionals may have a second impact on the Senate. The Dutch do not appoint their senators directly, but the regional councils elect the senators, so the results of the regional elections have a direct effect on the composition of the upper house. It is therefore very likely that the parties that make up Rutte's government will suffer a major setback in the Senate, which will make it difficult for the Prime Minister to pass his legislative initiatives.

The third consequence directly affects Rutte himself. In 2019 Donald Tusk finishes his second term as president of the European committee and Rutte had a good chance of succeeding him, but with him being the main electoral asset of his party, his departure could sink the VVD. It could then happen as it did with Tusk's departure from Poland, which resulted in a conservative victory a year later.

Whatever the outcome, Dutch politics has in recent years shown great volatility and a lot of movement. In 2016 it was believed that Wilders would win the election and previously that D66 would wrest the Liberal leadership from the VVD. It is difficult to predict which way the wind will turn the mill.

The possibility that Bolsonaro's government may seek to label the Landless Movement as terrorists for forcibly occupying farms reopens a historic controversy.

When Brazil passed its first anti-terrorism legislation around the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, the initiative was seen as an example to be followed by other Latin American countries, until then generally unfamiliar with a phenomenon that since 9/11 had become pre-eminent in many other parts of the world. However, the possibility that, with the political momentum of Jair Bolsonaro, some social movement, such as the Landless Movement, may be labeled as terrorist, revives old fears of the Brazilian left and accentuates social polarization.

Flag of the Movimento Dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST)

article / Túlio Dias de Assis

At the last Berlin Film Festival, the famous Brazilian actor and filmmaker Wagner Moura presented a somewhat controversial film, "Marighella". The film portrays the life of a character from recent Brazilian history, loved by some and hated by others: Carlos Marighella, leader of the Ação Libertadora Nacional. This organization was a revolutionary guerrilla manager of several attacks against the military dictatorial regime that ruled Brazil between 1964 and 1985. For this reason, the film provoked very different reactions: for some, it is the just exaltation of an authentic martyr of the anti-fascist struggle; for others, it is an apology of armed guerrilla terrorism. This small ideological dispute about "Marighella", although it may seem insignificant, is the reflection of an old wound in Brazilian politics that is reopened every time the country discussion on the need for anti-terrorist legislation.

The concept of anti-terrorism legislation is something that has taken hold in many parts of the world, especially in the West after 9/11. However, this notion is not so common in Latin America, probably due to the infrequency of attacks of this type subject suffered by the region. However, the lack of attacks does not imply that there is no presence of such movements in American countries; in fact, several of them are known to be a "refuge" for such organizations, as is the case in the Triple Frontier, the contact area between the borders of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. What happens in that area is largely due to the lack of direct and effective legislation against organized terrorism by national governments.

In the case of Brazil, as in some of its neighboring countries, the lack of anti-terrorism legislation is due to the historical fear on the part of leftist parties of its possible use against social movements of a certain aggressive nature. In Brazil, this was already reflected in the political transition of the late 1980s, when there was a clear protest by the PT(Partido dos Trabalhadores), then under the leadership of Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva, against any attempt to introduce the anti-terrorist concept into legislation. Curiously, the 1988 Federal Constitution itself mentions the word "terrorism" twice: first, as something to be rejected in Brazilian foreign policy, and second, as one of the unforgivable crimes against the Federation. In spite of this, no attempt to define this crime was successful, and although after the 9/11 attacks discussions about a possible law were resumed, the Labor left - already during Lula's presidency - continued to justify its refusal by invoking the persecution carried out by the dictatorship's board Militar. See that the same former president Dilma Rousseff was imprisoned for being part of the VAR-Palmares(Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares), an extreme left-wing revolutionary group that was part of the armed civil service examination to the regime.

Terrorist threat at the Olympic Games

During the PT's terms of office (2003-2016) there was no subject legislative initiative by the Government on topic; moreover, any other project arising from the Legislature, whether the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies, was blocked by the Executive. Often the Government also justified its position by alluding to a supposed "neutrality", hiding behind the desire not to get involved in external conflicts. This attitude would lead to several fugitives accused of participating or collaborating in attacks in other countries taking refuge in Brazil. However, in mid-2015, as the start of the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro approached, the risk of a possible attack in the face of such an important event was assessed. This, together with pressure from the right wing at congress (bear in mind that Rousseff won the 2014 elections with a very narrow margin of less than 1%), led the Petista government to ask the parliament to draft a concise definition of terrorism and other related crimes, such as those related to financing. Finally, the first Brazilian anti-terrorism law was signed by Rousseff in March 2016. Although this is the "official" version of that process, there are not few who defend that the real reason for the implementation of the law was the pressure exerted by the FATF (group Financial Action Task Force against Money Laundering, created by the G8), since this entity had threatened to include Brazil in the list of non-cooperative countries against terrorism.

The Brazilian anti-terrorism law was effective, as it served as the legal framework for the so-called Operação Hardware. Through this operation, the Brazilian Federal Police managed to arrest several suspects of a DAESH branch operating in Brazil, who were planning to carry out an attack during the Rio Olympics. Federal Judge Marcos Josegrei da Silva convicted eight suspects for membership to an Islamic terrorist group , in the first sentence of this kind subject in the history of Brazil. The judge's decision was quite controversial at the time, largely due to Brazilian society's unfamiliarity with this subject risky . As a result, many Brazilians, including part of the press, criticized the "disproportionality" with which the defendants were treated.

Bolsonarist Momentum

Since then, Brazil has come to be considered as a sort of example among South American countries in the fight against terrorism. However, it does not seem that the status quo maintained during the end of the Rousseff administration and the short term of Temer will remain intact for long. This is due to the fiery discussion stirred up by the Bolsonarista right wing, which advocates for the criminal activities of several far-left groups, especially the MST(Movimento Dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra) to be classified as terrorism. The MST is the largest agrarian social movement, Marxist in nature, and is known nationally for its occupations of lands that the group considers "useless or underutilized" in order to "put them to better use". The ineffectiveness of the State in stopping the invasions of private property carried out by the MST has been recurrently denounced in the congress, especially during the PT government years, without major consequences. However, now that the right wing has greater weight, the discussion has come back to life and not a few deputies have already mentioned their intention to seek to denounce the Landless Movement as a terrorist organization. Bolsonaro himself has been a fierce advocate of outlawing the MST.

Also, at the same time that the current Minister of Justice, Sergio Moro, announces the possibility of the creation of an anti-terrorist intelligence system, following the model of his American counterpart, and the congress discussion the expansion of the current list of terrorist organizations to include groups such as Hezbollah, other Brazilian politicians have decided to launch in the Senate a proposal legislation to criminalize the actions of the MST. If approved, this initiative would make real the fear that the left has invoked all these years. After all, this is not the best way to fulfill the promise of "governing for all". Moreover, such a disproportionate measure for this subject of activities would only increase the already intense political polarization present today in Brazilian society: it would be tantamount to rubbing salt in an old wound, one that seemed to be about to heal.

Ukrainian Orthodox break with Russia shifts tension between Kiev and Moscow to the religious sphere

While Russia closed the Sea of Azov approaches to Ukraine, at the end of 2018, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church advanced its independence from the Moscow Patriarchate, cutting off an important element of Russian influence on Ukrainian society. In the "hybrid war" posed by Vladimir Putin, with its episodes of counter-offensives, religion is one more sphere of underhand pugnacity.

▲ Proclamation of autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, with attendance of Ukrainian President Poroshenko [Mykola Lazarenko].

article / Paula Ulibarrena

January 5, 2019 was an important day for the Orthodox Church. In historic Constantinople, today Istanbul, in the Orthodox Cathedral of St. George, the ecclesiastical rupture between the Kievan Rus and Moscow was verified, thus giving birth to the fifteenth autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

The Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew I, presided over the ceremony together with the Metropolitan of Kiev, Epiphanius, who was elected last fall by the Ukrainian bishops who wanted to split from the Moscow Patriarchate. After a solemn choral welcome for the 39-year-old Epiphanius, the church leaders placed on a table in the church the tomos (decree), a parchment written in Greek certifying the independence of the Ukrainian Church.

But the one who actually led the Ukrainian delegation was the president of that republic, Petro Poroshenko. "It is a historic event and a great day because we were able to hear a prayer in Ukrainian in St. George's Cathedral," Poroshenko wrote moments later on his account on the social network Twitter.

The event was strongly opposed by the Moscow Patriarchate, which has long been at odds with the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. Archbishop Ilarion, head of external relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, compared status to the East-West Schism of 1054 and warned that the current conflict could last "for decades and even centuries".

The great schism

This is the name given to the schism or separation of the Eastern (Orthodox) Church from the Catholic Church of Rome. The separation developed over centuries of disagreements beginning with the moment in which the emperor Theodosius the Great divided the Roman Empire into two parts between his sons, Honorius and Arcadius, upon his death (year 395). However, the actual split did not take place until 1054. The causes are ethnic subject due to differences between Latins and Easterners, political due to the support of Rome to Charlemagne and of the Eastern Church to the emperors of Constantinople but above all due to the religious differences that throughout those years were distancing both churches, both in aspects such as sanctuaries, differences of worship, and above all due to the pretension of both ecclesiastical seats to be the head of Christendom.

When Constantine the Great moved the capital of the empire from Rome to Constantinople, it became known as New Rome. After the fall of the Eastern Roman Empire to the Turks in 1453 Moscow used the name "Third Rome". The roots of this sentiment began to develop during the reign of the Grand Duke of Moscow Ivan III, who had married Sophia Paleologos who was the niece of the last ruler of Byzantium, so that Ivan could claim to be the heir of the collapsed Byzantine Empire.

The different Orthodox churches

The Orthodox Church does not have a hierarchical unity, but is made up of 15 autocephalous churches that recognize only the power of their own hierarchical authority, but maintain doctrinal and sacramental communion among themselves. This hierarchical authority is usually equated to the geographical delimitation of political power, so that the different Orthodox churches have been structured around the states or countries that have been configured throughout history, in the area that emerged from the Eastern Roman Empire, and later occupied the Ottoman Empire.

They are the following churches: Constantinople, the Russian (which is the largest, with 140 million faithful), Serbian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Cypriot, Georgian, Polish, Czech and Slovak, Albanian and American Orthodox, as well as the very prestigious but small churches of Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch (for Syria).

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church has historically depended on the Russian Orthodox Church, parallel to the country's dependence on Russia. In 1991, following the fall of communism and the disappearance of the USSR, many Ukrainian bishops self-proclaimed the Kiev Patriarchate and separated from the Russian Orthodox Church. This separation was schismatic and did not gain support from the rest of the Orthodox churches and patriarchates, and in fact meant that two Orthodox churches coexisted in Ukraine: the Kiev Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Church dependent on the Moscow Patriarchate.

However this lack of initial supports changed last year. On July 2, 2018, Bartholomew, Patriarch of Constantinople, declared that there is no canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine as Moscow annexed the Ukrainian Church in 1686 in a canonically unacceptable manner. On October 11, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople decided to grant autocephaly of the Ecumenical Patriarch to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and revoked the validity of the synodal letter of 1686, which granted the right to the Patriarch of Moscow to ordain the Metropolitan of Kiev. This led to the reunification of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and its severance of relations with the Moscow Orthodox Church.

On December 15, in the Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev, the Extraordinary Synod of Unification of the three Ukrainian Orthodox Churches was held, with the Archbishop of Pereýaslav-Jmelnitskiy and Bila Tserkva Yepifany (Dumenko) being elected as Metropolitan of Kiev and All Ukraine. On January 5, 2019, in the Patriarchal Cathedral of St. George in Istanbul Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew I initialed the tomos of autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

Does politics accompany division or is it the cause of it?

In Eastern Europe, the intimate relationship between religion and politics is almost a tradition, as it has been since the beginnings of the Orthodox Church. It seems evident that the political confrontation between Russia and Ukraine parallels the schism between the Orthodox Churches in Moscow and Kiev, and is even a further factor adding tension to this confrontation. In fact, the political symbolism of the Constantinople event was reinforced by the fact that it was Poroshenko, and not Epiphanius, who received the tomos from the hands of the Ecumenical Patriarch, whom he thanked for the "courage to take this historic decision". Previously, the Ukrainian president had already compared this fact with the referendum by which Ukraine became independent from the USSR in 1991 and with the "aspiration to join the European Union and NATO".

Although the separation had been years in the making, interestingly, the quest for such religious independence has intensified following Russia's annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea in 2014 and Moscow's support for separatist militias in eastern Ukraine.

The first result was made public on November 3, with a visit by Poroshenko to Fanar, Bartholomew's see in Istanbul, after which the patriarch underlined his support for Ukrainian ecclesiastical autonomy.

Constantinople's recognition of an autonomous Ukrainian church is also a boost for Poroshenko, who faces a tough election degree program in March. In power since 2014, Poroshenko has focused on the religious issue much of his speech. "Army, language, faith," is his main election slogan. In fact, after the split, the ruler stated, "the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is born without Putin and without Kirill, but with God and with Ukraine."

Kiev claims that Moscow-backed Orthodox churches in Ukraine - some 12,000 parishes - are in reality a propaganda tool of the Kremlin, which also uses them to support pro-Russian rebels in the Donbas. The churches vehemently deny this.

On the other side, Vladimir Putin, who set himself up years ago as a defender of Russia as an Orthodox power and counts the Moscow Patriarch among his allies, fervently opposes the split and has warned that the division will produce "a great dispute, if not bloodshed."

Moreover, for the Moscow Patriarchate -which has been rivaling for years with Constantinople as the center of Orthodox power- it is a hard blow. The Russian Church has about 150 million Orthodox Christians under its authority, and with this separation it would lose a fifth of them, although it would still remain the most numerous Orthodox patriarchate.

This fact also has a political twin, as Russia has stated that it will break off relations with Constantinople. Vladimir Putin knows that he is losing one of the greatest sources of influence he has in Ukraine (and in what he calls "the Russian world"): that of the Orthodox Church. For Putin, Ukraine is at the center of the birth of the Russian people. This is one of the reasons, along with Ukraine's important geostrategic position and its territorial extension, why Moscow wants to continue to maintain spiritual sovereignty over the former Soviet republic, since politically Ukraine is moving closer to the West, both to the EU and to the United States.

Nor should we forget the symbolic burden. The Ukrainian capital, Kiev, was the starting point and origin of the Russian Orthodox Church, something that President Putin himself often recalls. It was there that Prince Vladimir, a medieval Slavic figure revered by both Russia and Ukraine, converted to Christianity in 988. "If the Ukrainian Church wins its autocephaly, Russia will lose control of that part of history it claims as the origin of its own," Dr. Taras Kuzio, a professor at Kiev's Mohyla Academy, tells the BBC. "It will also lose much of the historical symbols that are part of the Russian nationalism that Putin advocates, such as the Kiev Caves monastery or St. Sophia Cathedral, which will become entirely Ukrainian. It is a blow to the nationalist emblems that Putin boasts of."

Another aspect to consider is that the Orthodox churches of other countries (Serbia, Romania, Alexandria, Jerusalem, etc.) are beginning to align themselves on one side or the other of the great rift: with Moscow or with Constantinople. It is not clear if this will remain a merely religious schism, if it occurs, or if it will also drag the political power, since it should not be forgotten, as has already been pointed out, that in that area which we call the East there have always been very strong ties between religious and political power since the great schism with Rome.

Why now?

The advertisement of the split between the two churches is, for some, logical in historical terms. "After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the independent Orthodox churches were configured in the 19th century from agreement to the national borders of the countries and this is the patron saint that, with delay, Ukraine is now following", explains the theologian Aristotle Papanikolaou director of the Center of programs of study Orthodox Christians of the University of Fordham, in the United States, in the above mentioned information of the BBC.

It must be seen as Constantinople's opportunity to detract power from the Moscow Church, but above all it is the reaction of general Ukrainian sentiment to Russia's attitude. "How can Ukrainians accept as spiritual guides members of a church believed to be involved in Russian imperialist aggressions?" asks Papanikolau, acknowledging the impact that the Crimean war and its subsequent annexation may have had on the attitude of Constantinople's churchmen.

There is thus a clear and parallel relationship between the deterioration of political relations between Ukraine and Russia and the separation between the Kievan Rus and the Moscow Church. Both Orthodox Churches are closely intertwined, not only in their respective societies, but also in the political spheres and these in turn use for their purposes the important ascendancy of the Churches over the inhabitants of the two countries. In final, the political tension drags or favors the ecclesiastical tension, but at the same time the aspirations of independence of the Ukrainian Church see this moment of political confrontation as the ideal moment to become independent from the Muscovite one.

After four years of board The upcoming elections open up the possibility of a return to a legitimacy too interrupted by coups d'état

Thailand has seen several coups d'état and attempts to return to democracy in its most recent history. The board The military that seized power in 2014 has called elections for March 24. The unsuccessful desire of the king's sister Maha Vajiralongkorn to run for prime minister has drawn global attention to a political system that fails to meet the political aspirations of Thais. 

▲ Bangkok Street Scene [Pixabay]

article / María Martín Andrade

Thailand is one of the fastest developing ASEAN countries in economic terms. However, these advances come up against a difficult obstacle: the political instability that the country has been dragging since the beginning of the 20th century and that opens a new chapter now, in 2019, with the elections that will take place on March 24. These elections mark a turning point in recent Thai politics, after General Prayut Chan-Ocha staged a coup d'état in 2014 and became Prime Minister of Thailand at the head of the NCPO (committee National Institute for Peace and Order), the board of government formed to run the country.

However, there are many who are sceptical about this new development. entrance of democracy. To begin with, the elections were initially set for 24 February, but shortly afterwards the government announced a change of date and called them for a month later. Some have expressed suspicions about a strategy to prevent the elections from taking place, since, according to the law, they cannot be held once one hundred and fifty days have elapsed since the publication of the last ten organic laws. Others fear that the NCPO has given itself more time to buy votes, while also raising concerns that the Electoral Commission, which is an independent administration, could be manipulated into a success that would in turn be a success. board It's going to be hard for you to insure.

Focusing this analysis on what the future holds for Thai politics, it is necessary to go back to its trajectory in the last century to realize that it follows a circular path.

Coups d'état are not new in the country (1). There have been twelve since the first constitution was signed in 1932. It all responds to an endless struggle between the "military wing", which sees constitutionalism as a Western import that does not quite fit in with the Structures Thai (it also defends nationalism and venerates the image of the king as a symbol of the nation, Buddhist religion and ceremonial life), and the "leftist orbit", originally composed of Chinese and Vietnamese emigrants, which perceives the country's institutionality as similar to that of "pre-revolutionary China" and which throughout the twentieth century expressed itself through guerrillas. To this last ideology must be added the student movement, which since the early 1960s has criticized "Americanization," poverty, the traditional order of society, and the military regime.

With the urban boom that began in the 1970s, the gross domestic product increased fivefold and the industrial sector became the fastest growing, thanks to the production of technological goods and the investments that Japanese companies began to make in the country. During this period, there were coups d'état, such as the one in 1976, and numerous student demonstrations and guerrilla actions. After the 1991 coup and new elections, a new discussion on how to create an efficient political system and a society adapted to globalization.

These efforts were cut short when the economic crisis of 1997 hit, which generated divisions and aroused rejection of globalization, considering it the evil force that had led the country to misery. It is at this point that someone who has since been core topic in Thai politics and who will undoubtedly mark the March elections: Thaksin Shinawatra.

Shinawatra, a prominent businessman, created the Thai Rak Thai (Thai loves Thai) party as a nationalist reaction to the crisis. In 2001 he won the elections and bet on economic growth and the creation of large companies, but at the same time he exercised intense control over the media, attacking those who dared to criticize him and allowing only the publication of positive news. In 2006, there was a coup d'état to overthrow Shinawatra, who was accused of serious corruption offences. However, Shinawatra won the election again in 2007, this time with the People Power Party.

In 2008 there was a new uprising, but the Shinawatra brand, represented by the sister of the former prime minister, won the elections in 2011, this time with the Pheu Thai party. Yingluck Shinawatra thus became the first woman to head the Government of Thailand. In 2014, another coup pushed her aside and set up a board who has ruled until now, with a speech based on the fight against corruption, the protection of the monarchy, and the rejection of electoral politics, considered as the national epidemic.

In this context, all the efforts of the board, running in March under the party name Palang Pracharat, has focused on weakening Pheu Thai and thus wiping out any remaining trace of Shinawatra from the map. To achieve this, the board it has proceeded to reform the electoral system (in 2016 a new constitution replaced the 1997 one), so that the Senate is no longer elected by the citizens.

Despite all the efforts made in vote-buying, the possible manipulation of the Electoral Commission and the reform of the electoral system, it is intuited that Thai society can make its voice heard in the weariness of the military government, which is also losing support in Bangkok and in the south. Added to this is the collective conviction that, rather than pursuing economic growth, the board has focused on achieving stability by doing the more unequal the Economics of Thailand, according to data of Credit Suisse. For this reason, the rest of the parties running in these elections, Prachorath, Pheu Thai, and Bhumjaithai, agree that Thailand has to rejoin the skill and that the capitalist market has to grow.

At the beginning of February, the context became even more complicated, when Princess Ulboratana, the sister of the current king, Maha Vajiralongkorn, announced the presentation of his candidacy in the elections as a representative of the Thai Raksa Chart party, an ally of Thaksin Shinawatra. This news was a great anomaly, not only because a member of the monarchy showed his intention to participate actively in politics, something that had not happened since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932, but also because all the coups d'état that have taken place in the country have had the support of the royal family. The last one, in 2014, had the blessing of the then King Bhumibol. Likewise The Royal Family has always had the support of the board military.

In order to avoid a confrontation that would damage the monarchy, the king reacted quickly and publicly showed his rejection of his sister's candidacy; finally, the Electoral Commission decided to withdraw it from the election process.

Poor governance

Over the last few years, the board military has been manager poor governance, the country's weak institutions, and a Economics threatened by international sanctions that seek to punish the lack of internal democracy.

To begin with, following the article 44 of the Constitution proclaimed in 2016, the NCPO has the legitimacy to intervene in the legislative, judicial and executive branches under the pretext of protecting Thailand from threats to public order, the monarchy or the judiciary. Economics. Not only does this preclude any possibility of interaction and effective conflict resolution with other actors, but it is an unmistakable feature of an authoritarian system.

It has been precisely its characteristics as an authoritarian regime, which is how its governmental system can be described, that have made the international community react since the 2014 coup, imposing various sanctions that may seriously affect Thailand. The U.S. suspended $4.7 million from attendance while Europe has objected to the negotiation of a agreement as Pirkka Tappiola, the EU's representative to Thailand, has pointed out, it will only be possible to establish a agreement of that subject with a democratically elected government. In addition, Japan, the main investor in the country, has begun to look for alternative routes, setting up factories in other parts of the region such as Myanmar or Laos.

Faced with the questioning of his managementthe board It reacted by devoting $2.7 billion to programs aimed at the poorest sections of the population, especially peasants, and investing nearly $30 billion in building infrastructure in unexploited areas.

Given that Thailand's exports account for 70 per cent of its GDP, the Government cannot afford to have the international community at loggerheads. That explains why the board create a committee to deal with human rights problems that have been reported from abroad, although the goal of the initiative seems to have been rather public.

In the face of a new democratic stage, the board He has a strategy. Having put most of its efforts into the creation of new infrastructure, it hopes to open an economic corridor, the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), with which to convert the three main coastal provinces (Chonburi, Rayong, and Chachoengsao) into special economic zones where industries such as automobiles or aviation are enhanced, and which will be attractive to foreign investment once democratic legitimacy is cleared.

It is difficult to predict what will happen in Thailand in the March 24 elections. Although almost everything speaks of a new return to democracy, it remains to be seen what will happen. result of the party created by the military (Pralang Pracharat) and its steadfastness in its commitment to a really honest institutional game. If Thailand wants to continue to grow economically and attract foreign investors again, the military should soon give way to a completely civilian process. Possibly it will not be a smooth road, since democracy is a dress that until now has been somewhat tight for the country.

(1) Baker, C., Phongpaichit, P. (2005). A History of Thailand. Cambridge, Univeristy Press, New York.

Strategic bombers will continue to matter in the geopolitical balance as "weapons of mass deterrence"

The U.S. fleet of B-52 bombers is set to receive a series of upgrades that will boost its working life at least until the 2050s. By then, the B-52 will have been flying for nearly 90 years, since its takeoff during Eisenhower's presidency. This will make him, by far, the model of the aircraft that will have been flying the longest with its main operator, in this case the USAF.

▲ A B-52G when in service [USAF]

article / Jairo Císcar Ruiz

The words "strategic bomber" may sound like the Cold War, the Soviet Union, and spy planes, but today it's a concept that's at its disposal. agenda despite sounding very far away. It is true that the status strategic aviation is constrained by the agreement of 2010 (START III), which restricts deployed nuclear weapon delivery to 700. These means of delivery include strategic bombers, ICBMs (intercontinental missiles) and SLBMs (submarine launches). Despite the fact that both Russia and the U.S. have now significantly reduced the issue of its bombers (the US has "only" 176), strategic weapons (and with it, bombers) will continue to be a fundamental part of the geopolitical balance in international relations.

There are only 3 countries in the world that have strategic bombers in their arsenal, the US, Russia and China (although the Chinese Xian H-6 is well below its Russian and American counterparts), and this shortage of aircraft makes them so prized and a differentiator on the battlefield. But it is not only on the battlefield that these aircraft cause an imbalance, but they especially stand out in the field of international relations as "weapons of mass deterrence".

A strategic bomber is an aircraft designed not for the battlefield directly, but to penetrate enemy territory and attack both strategic targets (instructions military headquarters, bunkers...) as critical locations for a country's war effort. The fact that a country has such an aircraft in its fleet of aircraft is clearly a deterrent to potential enemies. Both Russia and the U.S. – especially the latter country – are able to permanently have their bombers in the air (thanks to in-flight refueling) loaded with up to almost 32 tons of weaponry, with a flight duration only restricted to the endurance capacity of the crew. In this "diplomacy of fear", strategic bombers will continue to be prominent elements in the field of geostrategy and the balance of forces at the global level. The US is fully aware of this and is therefore embarking on a series of ambitious plans to continue to enjoy air and geostrategic superiority. Of these plans, one of the newest and, perhaps, most eagerly awaited is the advertisement that American B-52s will continue to fly until at least 2050.

Although it was assumed that this would be the case, the confirmation given by the US Air Force is no less surprising: the fleet of active B-52s is going to receive a series of improvements that will boost its active life until at least the 2050s. It wouldn't be too much news B taking into account that it is common to approve improvement packages, either avionics or software to increase the useful life of aircraft in service, but the reality is that the last B-52 Stratofortress left the Boeing assembly plant in Wichita (Kansas) in 1962. In other words, by 2050 the entire fleet would have been flying for nearly 90 years, which would make it by far the world's largest fleet in the world. model of the aircraft that will have been flying the longest with its main operator, in this case the USAF.

Versatility, deterrent effect and lower operating cost

But can an aircraft that was put into service from 1955, with Eisenhower as president, stand up to new bomber models, such as the B-2 or the future B-21 Raider? Is the enormous outlay that the government intends to make justifiable? congress of the U.S.? It is estimated that it could spend 11,000 million on engines alone; Almost €300 million have been approved for the 2019 financial year.

The answer is yes. Due to its strategic versatility, its deterrent effect and its comparatively low operating cost, the B-52 has become a vital aircraft for the United States.

Its versatility in combat has been long tested, since its "debut" in the Vietnam War, where it was the protagonist of carpet bombings (it is capable of launching more than 32 tons of explosives). As time progressed, it proved that it could not only drop bombs, but also long-range missiles such as the AGM-158 JASSM or the Harpoon anti-ship missile. Its great weapons capacity makes it one of the flagship long-range attack aircraft of the United States. This has been attested in the mission statement In which, until being relieved by the B-1, the B-52s flew 1,850 combat missions, dropping some 12,000 bombs, something that was fundamental to the victory over Daesh in Mosul.

Speaking of long distance is precisely where the B-52 is overwhelming: without refueling, a B-52 can fly more than 15,000 km, having flown 20,000 km in extraordinary situations. This offers a global attack capability, since in the event of refueling, only the crew's own endurance would prevent them from being in flight indefinitely. This capability makes them ideal not only for bombing from instructions Not only to participate in search tasks, being able to carry out a "scan" of 364,000 km2 between two aircraft in two hours. This is vital for use by the U.S. Navy in anti-submarine missions or to detect enemy navies.

The same parameters and advantages apply to the use of the B-52 as a "massive" deterrent. Initially created to permanently have a squadron in flight armed with nuclear bombs, and thus guarantee an immediate response to any aggression, the aircraft stationed in Guam are now used as part of the U.S. tactic of free passage through the international waters of the South China Sea. There have also been employee as permanent air support in areas of particular risk such as the Korengal Valley, in Afghanistan, or at the beginning of the war itself, in Tora Bora. By having a B-52 on standby, troops could have air support that would otherwise take time to arrive in a few moments (and for a long time).

Another indisputable advantage of these aircraft is their relatively low cost in proportion to the other bombers in the U.S. fleet. First of all, it should be clarified that the cost per flight hour is not only the fuel used, but also the cost of maintenance, spare parts, etc. It is true that these theoretical prices are not added to the cost of ammunition (which can amount to tens of millions) or other variables such as the salary of pilots, mechanics, insurance costs, cost of insurance, etc. car park in hangars or other variables that are classified, but they do serve to give us a global view of their operating cost. The B-52s cost the U.S. taxpayer about $70,000 per hour. It may seem like an extraordinarily high price, but its "sibling" the B-2 fetches $130,000 an hour. Despite being exorbitant prices for an army like the Spanish (Eurofighters cost about $15,000/hour), for the budget is not significant (Trump aims to reach $680 billion in U.S. dollars). budget).

Engine refurbishment

We have seen that the B-52, that Big Ugly Fat Fellow as it is affectionately nicknamed by its crews, may continue to be a vector to be reckoned with in the air for years to come, but the USAF does not want it to become a supporting actor, but to remain the main actor. To this end, it has created the Commercial Engine Reengineering Program (CERP) to replace the old original engines. The TF33 is now more than 50 years old, and in the last 20 years its cost has doubled, due to the lack of spare parts (currently they have to cannibalize the parts of retired engines) and their inefficient consumption. It should not be forgotten that it has 8 engines, so consumption is not a trivial matter. To replace them, the USAF has opened a competition that should be decided from mid-2019. At the moment, the USAF's specifications aim to achieve engines that are at least 25% more efficient and take 5 times longer to need repair, which would mean a 30-year saving (until 2050) of about 10,000 million dollars. With a very juicy contract (there is talk of the order of 11,000 million dollars to replace the 650 engines of the B-52 fleet), the large military aviation companies have begun to present their proposals, including Pratt & Whitney (with the PW815), General Electric (with the new Passport Advanced Turbofan) and Rolls-Royce (with the Pearl or the BR735). Other flagships of the aeronautical industry are pending their proposals.

But not only the engines will benefit from the improvements and investment, but precisely the purchase of new engines will make it necessary to change the instrumentation of the cockpit: in this way, they will also take advantage of the remodeling to change the old analogue indicators and cathode ray screens for the modern multifunctional screens that we see in any fighter today. USAF assistant secretary for procurement William Roper has also commented that new ejection seats are being considered.

Beyond speculation, it is certain that in the framework of the Radar Modernization Program (RMP), $817 million will be invested between fiscal years 2019 and 2023 in the purchase of new radar systems to replace the APQ-166 from the 1960s. New tactical software will also be purchased. data Link 16, as it is the only USAF aircraft that does not have it incorporated and is vital to carry out joint operations, both within the US military itself and with European NATO armies.

In the future, the software and the aircraft itself will be adapted to increase its offensive capabilities, as was already done with the IWBU program, which increased its cargo capacity in the hold by 67%. One of the main goals of offensive remodeling is to be able to carry at least one GBU-43/b (or MOAB; Mother of all bombs; the world's most powerful non-nuclear bomb). To this end, a new wing pylon is being designed that can support 9,000 kilos of weight. Looking ahead, the B-52 will be able to carry hypersonic missiles, but that won't be seen until the mid-2020s at the earliest.

In this way, the USAF aims to ensure that the B-52 Stratofortress remains the A option in its fleet when it comes to heavy bombing. Therefore, the B-52 will continue to be a fundamental strategic-military factor for understanding international relations in the years to come. No one would have claimed in 1955 that that plane, no matter how good it was, could still fly until a hundred years later. There are still 31 years to go, but we'll see what the B-52 has in store for us. subject fat and ugly" that he has become, thanks to his magnificent design and construction, in the Dean of bomber planes: the B-52 (arguably) the best bomber in the world.

From Soviet Aid to the degree program with the U.S. to take advantage of asteroid mineral wealth

The arrival of a Chinese device on the far side of the Moon has led world public opinion to focus on China's space program, which is more developed than many imagined. Aided by the Soviets in their early days, the Chinese have ended up taking the lead in some programs (probably more apparent than real, given certain setbacks suffered), such as the development of a permanent space station of their own, and compete with the United States in the desire to harness the mineral wealth of asteroids.

▲ Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center [CNSA]

article / Sebastián Bruzzone [English version]

The origin of China's space program1 can be traced back to the early Cold War, at the height of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union over control of international politics. Since 1955, Chairman Mao Zedong sought the respect of world powers and decided to follow in the footsteps of the neighboring country, the USSR. In March of the following year, the Fifth Academy of the Ministry of National Defense began the development of a first ballistic missile (China's Twelve-Year Aerospace Plan). After the launch of Sputnik 1 by the Soviet Union in 1957, Mao threw himself into the development of a Chinese artificial satellite that would be active in space two years later (project 581), in an effort materially and economically supported by the Soviet Union. However, in the early 1960s, the USSR withdrew all its attendance economic and technological crisis following Beijing's accusation that the first secretary of the committee The Central of the CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev, was a revisionist and wanted to restore capitalism.

The China National Space Administration (CNSA) is the manager of space programs. The first Chinese manned spaceflight took place in 2003, with Yang Liwei, aboard the Shenzhou 5 spacecraft, which docked with the Tiangong-1 space station. In doing so, China became the third nation to send men off Earth. The main goal One of the Shenzhou missions is the establishment of a permanent space station. To date, nine Chinese men and seven women have traveled into space. 


Since 2007, China has shown a special interest in Luna. China's lunar exploration program consists of four phases. In the first (Chang'e 1 and 2), carried out with CZ-3A, two unmanned lunar orbital probes were launched. In the second (Chang'e 3 and 4), in 2013, with CZ-5/E, the first moon landing of two rovers took place. The third (Chang'e 5 and 6) was executed in 2017 with CZ-5/E, consisting of a moon landing and sample return. The fourth, with CZ-7, is scheduled for 2024; will consist of a mission statement manned and the implementation of instructions on the lunar surface.

The mission statement Chang'e 4 was launched on December 8, 2018, and landed on the lunar surface on January 3, 2019, in the crater Von Kárman (186 kilometers in diameter), in the southern hemisphere of the far side of the satellite. Images transmitted by the Yutu-2 rover showed that this never-before-explored lunar surface is densely pierced by impact craters and that its crust is thicker than the visible side. As part of a essay A cotton seed could be sprouted, but high levels of radiation, gravity lower than Earth's, and sudden changes in temperature caused the cotton plant to succumb a few days later. Astronomers believe that the far side is protected from interference from Earth, so from there it would be possible to better study the evolution of stars and galaxies.

In mid-2017, Chinese intentions to search for minerals scarce on Earth on the surface of asteroids, and if possible in their interiors, were made public. Within China's space program, this topic Concrete occupies an important place. Of agreement with Ye Peijan, Maxim manager of the lunar exploration programme, his country had been studying in recent years the possibility of carrying out a mission statement to capture an asteroid to place it in the orbit of the Moon, so that it can be exploited minerally, or even used as a permanent space station, according to the South China Morning Post. The same manager He pointed out that in the Solar System and near our planet there are asteroids and stars with a large amount of precious metals and other materials. This plan will be implemented from 2020. To do this, the CNSA will use the Tianzhou cargo ships, as opposed to the manned Shenzhou exploration ships whose goal The main one is the establishment of a permanent space station, or the Chang'e lunar missions.

The cost of this futuristic plan would be very high, as it would involve the organization of complex and high-risk missions, but interest will not wane, as it could be very profitable in the long term and would give billions of dollars in profits. According to Noah Poponak, an analyst at Goldman Sachs, a single asteroid could have more than $50 billion worth of platinum, as well as other precious metals and water.

Capturing an asteroid requires, first, that a spacecraft land on its surface, in order to anchor itself. The spacecraft will need to have extremely powerful engines, so that, being anchored, it can be able to drag the entire asteroid into the orbit of the Moon. These thrusters, powerful enough to move a rock weighing thousands of tons, do not yet exist. Ye Peijan has warned that this technology needed for such a space experience could take approximately 40 years to develop. For the time being, in March 2017 China announced in the official press that it intended to send probes into the cosmos to study the trajectories and characteristics of some asteroids. With this, it goes live skill with NASA, which is also developing a program aimed at an asteroid.

Tiangong-1 was the first laboratory It is a space telescope that China launched into orbit in 2011, with a length of 10.5 meters, a diameter of 3.4 meters and a weight of 8.5 tons. His goal was to carry out experiments within the Chinese space program and launch the permanent station that the CNSA seeks to have in orbit by 2023. Against all odds, in 2016 digital control of the ship was lost and destroyed in pieces over the Pacific Ocean, northwest of New Zealand. That same year, 2016, a second module, Tiangong-2, with the same objectives. On the other hand, China is making progress on the plan to establish a permanent space station. According to Yang Liwei, the core capsule will be launched in 2020 and the two experimental modules in the following two years, with manned missions and cargo spacecraft.

Beijing accelerates its change in economic strategy as Germany tries to reinvent itself as a manufacturing powerhouse with its 'Industry 4.0'

From being the great factory of the lowest products in the world price chain to becoming a manufacturing powerhouse appreciated by the added value that China can contribute to its production. The 'Made in China 2025' plan is underway with the purpose to operate change in a few decades. The Chinese push is intended to be countered by Germany with its 'Industry 4.0', in order to preserve international recognition of what is produced by German industry.

▲ Huawei Booth at Mobile World Congress 2017 [Huawei]

article / Jimena Puga

"Made in China 2025" is a political-economic plan presented by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in May 2015. The main goal of this initiative is the growth of Chinese industry, and in turn to foster the development in China's poorest areas in the interior of the country, such as Qinghai, Xinjiang and Tibet provinces. One of the goals is to increase the domestic content of basic materials to 40% by 2020 and 70% by 2025.

But what does the People's Republic want to achieve with this initiative? As Mu Ronping announced, director of the Innovation Center and development According to the Chinese Academy of Science, "I don't think the Made in China 2025 plan and other industry-related plans pose a threat to the Economics and innovation. These industrial policies derive from traditional Chinese culture. In China, whenever we set a new political or economic measure, we have high expectations. So, if we get only half of it, we will be satisfied. This view has led China to change and, to some extent, innovation."

China's economic developments

In 1978 Deng Xiaoping came to power and changed all the Structures Maoists. Thus, from an economic perspective, law has become a decisive element in resolving conflicts and maintaining social order in China. Deng tried to establish a socialist system, but with "Chinese characteristics." In this way, a Economics and, consequently, the obligation to develop new rules and Structures. In addition, the president introduced the concept of democracy as a necessary instrument for the new socialist China. The most important legal reform was the possibility of creating private businesses. In 1992, the expression "Economics of the socialist market", a label to hide a real capitalism (1).

The current president of the People's Republic, Xi Jinping, has spoken out against economic protectionism and in favor of balancing globalization to "make it more inclusive and equitable." It also added an increase in the study of current capitalism and capitalism. development socialism with Chinese characteristics is typical of the country, since if the party were to abandon Marxism it would lose "its soul and leadership", in addition to describing it as "irreplaceable to understand and transform the world".

The Made in China 2025 plan and Industry 4.0

Over the past decade, China has emerged as one of the most significant manufacturing miracles in history since the Industrial Revolution began in Britain in the 18th century. By the end of 2012, China had become a global leader in manufacturing operations and the world's second-largest economic power ahead of Germany. The Made in China paradigm has been evidenced by products made in China, from high-tech products such as computers or mobile phones to consumer goods such as air conditioners. The goal of the Central Empire is to extend this plan to three phases. In the first, from 2015 to 2025, China aims to be on the list of global manufacturing powers. In the second, from 2026 to 2035, China expects to position itself at a medium level in terms of global manufacturing power. And finally, in the third phase, from 2036 to 2049, the year in which the People's Republic will celebrate its centenary, China wants to become the world's leading manufacturing country.

In 2013, Germany, a world leader in industrialization, published its Industry 4.0 strategic plan. Known for its prestigious brands such as Volkswagen or BMW, the country's leading industries have emphasized its innovative strength that allows them to reinvent themselves again and again. The Industry 4.0 plan is another example of the German country's manufacturing strategy to compete in a new industrial revolution based on industrial integration, the integration of industrial information, the Internet and artificial intelligence. Germany is known worldwide for thedesign and quality of their products. The Industry 4.0 plan, presented in 2013 by the German government, focuses on the smart factory, i.e. making the factories of the future more sustainable and intelligent; in cyber-physical systems, which integrate advanced technologies such as automotive, exchange of data in manufacturing technology and 3D printing, and in goods and people.

Both plans, Industry 4.0 and Made in China 2025 , focus on the new industrial revolution and employ elements of manufacturing digitalization. The core of the German plan is the cyber-physical system, i.e. a mechanism controlled or monitored by algorithms closely linked to the Internet and its users, and integration into dynamic value creation mechanisms. The Chinese plan, in addition to the "Internet Plus Industry" action plan, has a goal Particular focus is on consolidating existing industries, promoting diversity and widening the scope for action of many industries, enhancing regional cooperation through the use of the Internet for borderless manufacturing, innovation of new products and improvement of product quality.

By 2020, the United States will be the most competitive country in manufacturing in the world, followed by China, Germany, Japan, India, South Korea, Mexico, Taiwan, Canada, and Singapore. Of these ten countries, six are Asian countries, one is European and the remaining three are members of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement).

This new shift in industrial strategy translates into a world anticipation of a fourth industrial revolution brought about by technological advances. China will undoubtedly be one of the international leaders of this revolution thanks to the Made in China 2025 and One Belt One Road plans, however, the new emerging economies such as South Africa, Vietnam or Hungary that have contributed to the Economics in recent years will require more attention.

(1) Vid. ARANZADI, Iñigo González Inchaurraga, Derecho Chino, 2015, p. 197 et seq.

The need for close air support in the fight against ISIS has led to a rethink of the preference of technology over effectiveness

In recent decades, the constant commitment to technological improvement has led to the discarding of old models of combat aircraft that, properly equipped, are proving to be more effective in counterinsurgency operations. The urgencies posed especially by the fight against the Islamic State have turned these old models into a kind of Special Operations capability of the Air Force.

▲ OV-10 Bronco [USAF, TSgt Bill Thompson]

article / Ignacio Yárnoz

August 2015. In the framework of the "Combat Dragon II" Special Operations Program, two OV-10G+ Bronco jets take off from a U.S. air base in northern Iraq. The mission statement of these twin-engine aircraft from the time of the Vietnam War is double. Firstly, to help Peshmerga fighters in the face of attacks by Daesh insurgents (al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham); the second, to demonstrate the effectiveness of low-cost propeller aircraft in COIN (Counter Insurgency) operations. The mission statement It turned out to be a success and made many things rethink in the Pentagon, where astonishment flooded the offices at the mission statement counterinsurgency with aircraft from 50 years ago.

It is important to highlight the three fundamental pillars that made this mission statement a success. First of all, there is the human factor that was part of the mission statement. The brave pilots who embarked on it were carefully chosen for their experience in special missions, as well as being instructor officers of the USAF Weapons School. This was of great importance given the delicacy of the mission statement and the precision it required. Here's why.

The second pillar to highlight is the weaponry and material used. More specifically, these are the new, but very promising APKWS (Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System) laser-guided rockets and multiple modern infrared surveillance systems such as the MX-15HD FLIR. The first are 70 mm rockets similar to the "Hydra" (an American system of air-to-air/air-to-ground rockets known to be the most widely used in the world as helicopter weapons) to which a laser guidance and control system can be incorporated. They are rockets that can be fired either from very close or at longer distances at all angles you want, giving a very wide margin of fire to the pilot that gives him a significant tactical advantage. In addition, its high accuracy means that it can eliminate enemies or destroy lightly armored vehicles with an efficiency that other systems would not be able to achieve, at least not without causing greater collateral damage. There's the core topic Discussed in the first pillar: pilots experienced in the handling of precision weapons accompanied by the appropriate means make this a perfect combination that turned the OV-10G+ Bronco into true precision weapons.

Finally, and as a third pillar, there is the aircraft itself: the OV-10G+ Bronco (or "Black Pony"). This Vietnam War veteran is an aviation legend. The Bronco was born after the U.S. Navy and Air Force approved a triple-duty specification called "LARA" (Light Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft), issued in late 1963 and designed for that war. LARA was based on the need for a new subject light attack aircraft and observation for "jungle fighting". During the conflict, the Broncos conducted observation operations, forward air control, helicopter escort, armed reconnaissance, light transport services, and limited ground attack actions. The Broncos also conducted airborne radiological reconnaissance, tactical aerial observation and for naval artillery, as well as aerial control of tactical support operations and, on the battlefront, aerial photography of leave height.

However, doctrines have changed since smart bombs were integrated into air forces. Advanced air control, one of the primary missions of this aircraft, passed into the hands of elite ground troops with laser designators and digital transmissions. The concept of using Broncos to loiter over an area and drop ammo was not explored. Finally, the apparatus was given the necessary leave in July 1994.

OV-10 Bronco and A-10 Thunderbolt

It is a light attack and observation aircraft powered by two turboprops that, although it is a fixed-wing aircraft, meets the capabilities of a helicopter and a drone. Like drones, the OV-10 can hover over the battlefield for hours, but with greater visibility than an RQ9 Reaper and with greater weaponry capacity. The model The original was capable of flying at a speed of up to 560 km/h, carrying up to 3 tons of external ammunition and staying hover over an area for more than three hours. Finally, this versatile device is capable of operating from short or semi-prepared tracks (STOL) with low operating and maintenance costs. In most cases it can fly with only one engine. The latter makes the OV-10 Bronco and all its counterparts a great asset given that while jet aircraft have great fuel consumption on each flight (starting at $20,000 for the cheapest jet, the F16), light attack jets only cost a few thousand dollars per operation. In addition, the aircraft currently available can only take off and land on long, expensive runways that must be located hundreds of kilometres from the front line and, as a result, the effective time of their missions is shorter and their fuel consumption is higher.

However, the USAF's trend has always tipped the scales toward high-tech rather than effectiveness. Since World War II and the beginning of the Cold War, the American way of fighting has been to rely on superior technology. There has been a constant approach in the most important technological advances in which it is at the forefront. However, these effective aircraft have found a niche within the Army, possibly the Air Force Special Operations. The need for close air support in the fight against ISIS has led many commanders to rethink their strategy. In fact, it also helped convince the Air Force to reconsider its plans to retire the A-10 Thunderbolt II (A-10 Warthog as it is nicknamed in the USAF). The reasons turn out to be analogous to the start-up of aircraft such as the OV-10 Bronco: the need for effectiveness, experience, close air support and advanced air control, all combined with low maintenance costs.

In the case of the A-10 Thunderbolt II, it is an aircraft designed specifically around its main weapon, a 30mm GAU-8/A cannon mounted directly under the fuselage. With a 540 kg titanium armor, it incorporates two General Electric TF34-GE-100 turbines mounted in an elevated position, so that the aircraft can land in austere environments such as difficult, dirty or sandy terrain. In addition, the aerodynamics and technology of the engines allow the A-10 to fly slower and lower, and therefore closer to forces on the ground and enemy targets, specifically at 555 km/h and at an altitude of 30 meters. Last but not least, it's cheap to buy (a average $11 million for each of the 715 built) and operating (about $17,000 per flight hour).

Although the OV-10 Bronco was not ultimately selected by the USAF in the framework of the Combat Dragon II, has marked a milestone in aeronautical history. The USAF has finally decided to opt for the model Brazil's A29 SuperTucano, a two-seater aircraft that speeds around 580 km per hour and possesses the sophisticated avionics typical of fourth-generation fighters, including radar warning receivers, front-scan infrared sensors, and the ability to launch bombs and precision-guided missiles. In final, an aircraft with the same advanced air control and tactical observation capabilities as the OV-10 Bronco. This model it is already part of the Afghan, Lebanese and Nigerian air forces (countries with insurgency threats such as Boko Haram, Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda) as well as being in the process of replacing the Broncos in the Philippines, where the same counterinsurgency techniques used in Iraq to fight Daesh in this region are also being applied. Regardless of whether it's the legendary Bronco, the paradigm is still latent. It has been proven that light aviation can be able to establish itself as a powerful ally in today's COIN operations.