Implications of Kenya's designation as a 'Major Non-NATO Ally' for maritime security in the Horn of Africa

1. Introduction

visit On May 23, 2024, Kenyan President William Ruto became the first African leader to make a state visit to Washington in fifteen years on May 23, 2024. The highlight of the visit was that Joe Biden designated Kenya as a 'Major Non-NATO Ally' (MNNA), making Kenya the first sub-Saharan African country to receive such a designation in line with the 21PAS (21st Partnership for African Security) program, whose goal is "promote effective, accountable and responsible defense institutions capable of meeting the emerging threats of our time"[1].

The elevation of the status of bilateral relations with Kenya is no accident, as it is a strategic ally for U.S. interests. To begin with, Kenya has proven to be an agent with ample mediation and negotiation capabilities to bring stability to East Africa, a region suffering from multiple tensions. In addition, Kenya and the United States have a long history of cooperation on subject counterterrorism, especially against Islamic groups such as Al Shabab. To this should be added Kenya's advantageous geographical position in promoting maritime security in the Horn of Africa, as its territorial waters adjoin those of Somalia. Finally, it should also be added that Kenya has managed to deepen its relations with the United States during the last year due to its participation in the mission statement 'Multinational Security Support' (MSS) in Haiti, in which Kenya has committed to deploy up to a thousand policemen (belonging to the Recce Squad, Rapid Deployment Force and Special Operation Group) on Haitian territory[2]. mission statement Half of these 1,000 police are tasked with securing critical infrastructure (such as the airport), while the other half will have to fight the gangs that control 80% of the capital, Port au Prince[3].

It is important to note that the relevance of these aspects has been enhanced in recent months. Although the United Nations Security committee approved in November 2023 the deployment of Kenyan police in Haiti, the first wave of 200 police officers could not be deployed until May 2024, coinciding with the presidential visit to Washington. The decision to participate in the MSS operation has not been well received in the Kenyan public opinion[4] and so far Ruto has had a legislature marked mainly by the eruption of protests by the population due to tax increases[5]. This is why the appointment as NAM can be seen as a way for Biden to compensate Ruto in order to calm down the Kenyan mood and show the initiative as favorable to Kenyan interests in the international arena.

However, the designation is set against an even more complex geopolitical backdrop. Houthi attacks in the Bab el Mandeb Strait have increased the insecurity of maritime traffic through the Red Sea and Operation Prosperity Guardian has failed to achieve its objectives. The insecurity in the strait has resulted in ships generally opting for the alternative route via the Cape of Good Hope. To this status of maritime insecurity must be added the outbreak, last year, of the third civil war in Sudan, another state, close to the Red Sea, whose conflict is being exploited by other actors to gain influence as indicated by the support of the Russian group Wagner to Hemedti. This has prompted the United States to give more importance to the adjacent Horn of Africa region (which has been blamed for a lack of long-term strategic vision and inconsistencies[6]) in order to reduce instability in a region critical to international trade.

The goal of this essay is to analyze the implications and significance of Kenya's designation as an NAM for maritime security in the Indian Ocean and especially in the Horn of Africa. Above all, three main aspects will be taken into account. First, the partnership between Kenya and the United States in the fight against terrorism, especially against Al Shabab and its impact on Somalia. Then, the challenge of piracy off the coast of Somalia will be addressed. Finally, how the new status fits into the U.S. alliance system and its Indian Ocean strategy, especially with respect to China's presence in the region, will also be discussed. Similarly, this will be linked to the impact of the new status on U.S.-India relations.

2. Counterterrorism and regional stability

Since the 1998 Al Qaeda terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya and the United States have cooperated on subject counterterrorism, especially in the objectives of eliminating Al Qaeda and ISIS terrorist networks in East Africa and combating the expansion of Al Shabab in Somalia. Cooperation has taken shape in recent years through, among other things, the training of pilots, supply of military equipment and the supply of new ships for the Kenyan navy. To this must be added the presence of a US military installation in Manda Bay, close to the coast and the border with Somalia[7]. 

In this regard, the MNNA status has been accompanied by U.S. intentions to strengthen its presence near Somalia and its coastal waters. During the visit to Washington, the White House highlighted the commitment of Kenya and the United States in the fight against terrorism and announced that both countries were preparing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to expand the Manda Bay airfield with the construction of a new 3 km runway, with the purpose that Kenya would have the necessary infrastructure to increase operations against Al Shabab in Somalia[8].This MoU would be consistent with article §2350a of degree scroll 10 of the 'US Code', which indicates that MNNAs are "eligible to establish an MOU or other formal agreement with the US Defense department for the purpose of conducting cooperative research and development projects on defense equipment and munitions"[9]. The importance of this base is reflected in the conduct of activities such as the joint patrol conducted just a week after the visit of state, in which a Kenyan Marine Corps unit and a group of local village elders joined a US component consisting of elements of the private company Blacksheep, an Army Civil Affairs unit and Air Force civil engineers on patrol[10].

Although not directly, the new status as MNNA is also linked to the process Kenya is following to join the 'Gallant Phoenix' operation with the intention of deepening cooperation for exchange intelligence[11]. The said operation was initiated in 2013 with the goal track the flow of foreign terrorist fighters in and out of Iraq and Syria, evolving into what it is today. A platform where its members collect and share information on terrorist threats[12]. For Kenya, this involvement is essential considering that sporadic terrorist attacks on the country's infrastructure, civilians and security forces are on the rise, especially in the regions close to Somalia. 

Likewise, it is also important to bear in mind that, agreement with the clause §2321k of degree scroll 22 of the 'US Code', among the advantages that the MNNAs have in their relationship with the United States is the possibility of "being eligible, to the maximum extent possible, for priority submission of defense surplus"[14]. In this framework, precisely with the intention of strengthening the partnership against terrorism, it was agreed the submission to Kenya of 150 M1117 armored security vehicles from U.S. excess defense stocks. In addition, although the purchase of armaments by Kenya from the United States already has important precedents, during the official visit it was announced that Kenya would receive 8 UH-1 Hueys helicopters by September 2024, and 8 MD-500s by summer 2025, with the intention of reinforcing Kenya's response capacity in case regional security needs to be defended[15].  

Another aspect considered in this clause is the possibility of being able to establish "agreements with the United States for the cooperative provision of training on a bilateral or multilateral basis"[16]. There is a previous tradition of military training and capacity building between Kenya and the United States, but it is now, for the first time, that the Kenya Defence Forces are being offered the opportunity to conduct courses at the training land, sea and air officer academies[17].

Finally, one of Ruto's major concerns on subject counterterrorism (also shared by other regional leaders) is the expiration of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) by December 2024. According to the UN Security committee , a hasty reduction of the ATMIS staff would contribute to a security vacuum in the region[18]. One of the reasons for the non-continuation of this operation, despite the risks involved, is that its main financial contributors (the European Union and the United States) cannot ensure long-term funding[19]. This is why Ruto negotiated with Biden the possible options for a multilateral mission statement to serve as a continuation of ATMI[20]. Although these negotiations are not directly linked to MNNA status, it is important to consider them as a sample of the importance for the United States to provide Kenya with the necessary capabilities to combat terrorism.

3. Maritime security: Fight against piracy

Anything related to ensuring the stability of Somalia directly affects the maritime security of the Horn of Africa, as one of the main causes of piracy off the Somali coast is the country's inability to exercise sovereign authority over its own territory, leading to a sharp increase in criminality. Kenya's designation as an MNNA is not only relevant to the stability of Somali territory, but has also had an indirect impact on its waters.

In 2022, the United States began to give more importance to the African coast of the Indian Ocean in subject security, encouraging joint military exercises with actors in the region such as 'Justified Accord' and 'Cutlass Express', both of which were mentioned during the visit of state.[21]

The goal of 'Justified Accord' is to confront possible scenarios in which it is necessary to respond to guarantee the maintenance of peace, as well as to be prepared to act in the face of possible crises that may originate in the region. With this in mind, command post exercises, field training, live fire exercises, maritime operations and special operations training are being conducted. The exercise is conducted in Kenya under the leadership of the US Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF), and this year more than 20 countries participated[22]. The last 'Justified Accord' exercise was conducted in June 2024 and was therefore the first in which Kenya participated as an MNNA, which was a further projection of rapprochement towards the United States, highlighting its role in regional security.

The 'Cutlass Express' exercises are also led by US Naval Forces Europe-Africa/US Sixth Fleet and promoted by AFRICOM[23]. In their case they have a fully maritime projection and are aimed at increasing adherence to the rule of law, combating illicit maritime activities and improving the maritime domain knowledge . A total of 13 countries are involved and are preparing for scenarios that put their maritime interdiction capabilities, exchange of information between maritime operations centers and counter-proliferation interdiction capabilities at test [24].

Likewise, Kenya's new status not only implies a greater rapprochement with the United States, but also with other NATO allies[25]. In this sense, the most significant external actor in the coasts of Somalia has been the European Union through the 'Atalanta' operation. It is no coincidence, therefore, that just after the state visit , a joint bilateral exercise was also conducted between EU-NAVFOR, the Kenyan Navy and the Kenyan Coast Guard, and that during these exercises Kenya received a mandate to assist in the fight against piracy. Specifically, Kenya became the second country on the Indian coast, after Seychelles, to accept and prosecute suspects for piracy crimes. It is equally interesting to note that, at the closing of the exercises, Henriette Geiger, head of delegation to represent the European Commission in Kenya, indicated that thanks to work of operation 'Atalanta' the threat of piracy off the Somali coast is moderate, but that the main focus of concern now was Houthi attacks. "EU Navfor Somalia was successful in suppressing piracy in previous years, but with the current operation 'Atalanta', forces will work with different governments to address emerging piracy and illegal group in the Suez Canal," he said[26]. Equally, it must also be understood that although piracy has been largely suppressed, it has not been eradicated. In fact, there are currently at least two known groups operating close to Socotra Island and the Gulf of Aden, further increasing the insecurity of passage through the Red Sea. In addition, criminal networks associated with piracy have diversified their activities, redirecting them towards other crimes such as illicit arms trafficking and human trafficking[27].

One aspect that intensifies the linkage of Kenya's new NAM status with its coordination with US allies is the visit that Robert Scott, ambassador of the US Africa Command, made to Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles, with the intention of jointly addressing maritime security issues, while bilateral exercises with the EU were taking place [28]. Therefore, it can be observed that there is an effort on the part of the United States to give more relevance to the Indian coast of Africa from 2022, whose importance has been increased by the rearrangement of maritime traffic through the Cape of Good Hope.

4. U.S. alliance system and strategy for the Indian Ocean

It should be considered that the designation of Kenya as an MNNA not only responds to US regional interests, both on land and at sea, but, on the contrary, constitutes part of its strategy towards the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in general. 

The IAM is a region core topic for the United States for several reasons. The first is that the promotion of free trade has always been part of the strategic culture of the United States, and the IAM is essential for this, especially considering that almost all maritime trade between Asia and Europe-Middle East passes through this ocean, making it the connecting nerve of the 'Rimland'. But the second reason is precisely that the trade routes pass through several bottlenecks such as the Suez Canal and the straits of Bab el Mandeb, Hormuz and Malacca. For the United States, keeping these bottlenecks open is a vital interest, especially given the presence of systemic rivals such as China and Iran. A third reason would be that presence in the IAM is not only essential for the United States, but also for its allies. See in this sense the relevance of this space for India, the European Union, Japan or Australia[29].

As Sanjay Chaturvedi points out, the IAM is seen as a "region of interconnected but differentiated subregions"[30]. One of these subregions is the African littoral of the Indian Ocean; but it is important to note that from the U.S. perspective these waters form part of the security face of the Indo-Pacific. The reason is that China has maintained a constant presence in the region from a wide range of domains, including military, diplomatic, economic and even informational. Indeed, according to the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), the increase of this presence was even prior to the Belt and Road Initiative[31]. The relevance of these waters for China became clear when the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) installed in Djibouti the first logistics base for military purposes in its ocean waters policy. Chinese companies are also involved in the construction of ports and railways throughout East Africa.

In this sense, Kenya has been an important focus for Chinese investments, including the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), which currently connects the port city of Mombasa with Nairobi[32]. Similarly China Communications Construction Company also built the port of Lamu, at a cost of almost US$ 3 billion. In the end, this is intended to provide access to the East African hinterland[33]. However, the idea of connecting the hinterland to the coast has not borne fruit, as Chinese investors are increasingly reluctant to further expand the project, which was planned to continue the connection between Kenya and Naivasha[34].

Thus, MNNA's new status can be seen as a US method of undermining China's influence over one of the East African states in which Beijing has invested the most[35], thus launching the 'Nairobi-Washington Vision'[36]. Rather, in the context of Ruto's official visit to Biden, it was commented that an American company intended to compete with China in its railway connection between Mombasa and Nairobi[37]. It should be taken into consideration that although the port of Lamu is part of the Belt and Road Initiative, it is also part of the Chinese String of Pearls. This is a combination of commercial ports and military naval instructions through which China wants to exercise its maritime dominance by containing the United States and, above all, undermining India's maritime living space, completely encircling it.

Precisely the fact that the port of Lamu belongs to the String of Pearls means that, indirectly, the elevation of Kenya's NAM status brings India and the United States even closer together. From agreement with Rushali Saha, India stands out as the viable partner and coordinated Indo-US cooperation can strengthen support for a rules-based order in the region. To this end, naval cooperation must extend beyond existing navy-to-navy ties and focus on broad and comprehensive partnerships in the East African littorals[38].

5. Conclusion

The designation of Kenya as an MNNA by the United States is a significant milestone in the bilateral relations between the two countries and highlights Kenya's strategic relevance, placing it in a privileged position to receive logistical, military and economic support. It is no coincidence that the elevation to the status of MNNA occurs now, this happens when Kenya's intervention in Haiti is taking place and also in a context of instability both in East Africa and in its nearby waters (conflict in Bab el Mandeb). Thus, it is important to take into consideration that the MNNA status has a special meaning that sample how the United States has increased the importance given to this maritime space.

In the area of counter-terrorism, designation as an MNNA facilitates increased attendance and partnership, especially in the containment of Al Shabab in Somalia and other regional threats. The expansion of the Manda Bay airbase and Kenya's participation in operations such as 'Gallant Phoenix' underscore the depth of this cooperation and its impact on regional stability. In addition, Kenya is also seen as a country that needs to be given greater capacity to operate in the region, being a credible player in mediation and negotiation processes in its regional sphere. Ensuring security in the hinterland means calming the waters around it.

With regard to maritime security in particular, Kenya was already a partner core topic in the fight against piracy and other illicit activities in the waters off the Horn of Africa, but a progressive increase is observed at partnership. This is embodied in the joint military exercises conducted since 2022. On the other hand, MNNA's status has also meant a rapprochement with the United States' traditional allies, namely the European Union, through operation 'Atalanta', although Kenya seeks to preserve a certain balance. This reinforces Kenya's ability to maintain security along its coasts and contribute to the stability of international maritime traffic.

It is also important to keep in mind that the NAM designation should be conceived within a broader geopolitical context within the Indian Ocean region, as the strengthening of the alliance with Kenya, and the economic support that has accompanied it, represents a counterweight to Chinese influence over this country and the African coast of the Indian Ocean in general. China's presence in Kenya is also part of its 'String of Pearls' plan, which means that the rapprochement with Kenya is also of interest to India and favors cooperation with it.

In conclusion, Kenya's designation as an MNNA not only represents recognition of its role in regional security, but also reinforces the U.S. strategy in the Indian Ocean and East Africa.

* essay developed during an internship in the Naval War College (Spain)