Ankara is implementing a strategic plan for the control of the three maritime zones surrounding the country

▲ Parade of members of the Turkish Naval Force [Nérostrateur].

ANALYSIS / Lucas Martín*.

Several actions carried out by Turkey in recent times indicate the implementation of the so-called "Blue Homeland" doctrine.

Among the various facts to be taken into account we can take as an initial element the agreement signed with one of the two contenders vying for power in Libya, the GNA to be more precise.

Through it, the GNA de facto handed over control of Libyan territorial waters to Turkey while establishing a maritime corridor for Ankara in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.

The importance of having de facto control of these waters is not only the enormous volume of maritime traffic that passes through them, but also the fact that they contain strategic natural gas reserves and are also a transit area for several gas pipelines that supply Europe.

If we add this treaty to Turkey's movements in the Mediterranean, the Aegean, as well as its involvement in the conflicts in Syria and Libya, we see that they are but different but complementary parts of an ambitious plan meticulously drawn up by Ankara for some years now to gain maritime control of the Eastern Mediterranean and adjacent areas. The ultimate aim of this plan would be to grant Turkey economic and energy independence to ensure the country's growth in all areas.

"Mavi Vatam" - Blue Homeland

The so-called "Gerasimov Doctrine", which theorizes on the evolution of war conflicts and provides guidelines for action in the current framework , is well known. But much less known is that a country like Turkey developed its own doctrine almost two decades ago, trying to draw the necessary geostrategic movements to reach some basic objectives for the development of the Turkish nation and to achieve its leading role in the international concert.

The father of the plan is Admiral Cem Gurdeniz, and it was first exposed in 2006 under the name "Blue Homeland Doctrine".

The admiral bases his theory on three pillars, which would take a long time to discuss in detail. However, and for the case at hand, it is interesting to dwell at least briefly on the second pillar. Under this, Gurdeniz defines what he considers to be the areas of maritime jurisdiction that belong to Turkey and which he values as vital for its survival and development. These encompass areas of the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. By defining these he establishes the territorial waters, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

agreement The admiral himself recognizes that the problem is far from being in the Black Sea, where an agreement was reached with the extinct Soviet Union to establish the limits of the continental shelf in 1978 and later, in 1987, the EEZ. Moreover, after the demise of the USSR, agreements were reached with Georgia, Bulgaria and Ukraine.

The issue is centered on the Mediterranean and the Aegean. Precisely the current epicenter of events.

The current established limits, EEZ agreements, etc., have been imposed on Turkey by the European Union, according to our protagonist, who considers them particularly burdensome as far as the Greek area and Cyprus are concerned. Turkey focuses on the EU the responsibility to prevent in a certain way the Turkish development , which is interesting when Turkey itself has tried to become part of the Union.

The axis on which Turkish actions have been pivoting in recent times is defiance. And this is again to be found in the admiral's own words, who states that the "Blue Homeland" "notoriously challenges and defies the current map".

But despite what it may seem, this is not the final goal of the "Mavi Vatam" doctrine. This challenge is the way to achieve its true end, and this is none other than to achieve control and consolidation of the three maritime areas surrounding the country in order to exert its influence both regionally and internationally, gaining the energy resources necessary to sustain Turkey's economic and demographic growth without having to depend on third countries.

But as is rule in these matters, history always plays a key role, and this time is no different.

The Turks continue to view as an affront the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923, which circumscribes the country to its current borders and limits. This invalidated the much more beneficial Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the Ottoman Empire after the First World War.

In Lausanne, the fragmentation of the empire was dictated de facto, defining not only the borders of Turkey, but also those of Greece and Bulgaria, concluding Turkish sovereignty over the Dodecanese islands, Cyprus, Egypt, Sudan, Syria and Iraq. Kurdistan ceased to be a unit, being divided among several countries, and Armenia was divided between Turkey and the USSR. The conditions limited the Turks' ability to act, placing the country under the umbrella of the Western powers, status which has been maintained for almost 100 years since signature.

In order to understand the current status it is necessary to take into account a series of factors and circumstances that constitute the basis for it.

During the Cold War period and with the existence of the communist bloc and its military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, the Western protective umbrella over Turkey became more of a necessity forced by circumstances than an imposition. The geostrategic status of the Ottoman country gave it a vital importance for both blocs, and in the event that hostilities broke out it would be one of the first territories to suffer the consequences. As a living example of this geostrategic core topic , it is worth recalling the role played by the American instructions equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles located on Turkish soil in the negotiations to de-escalate what later became known as the "Cuban missile crisis".

But from the distant 1960s to the present, the world has changed completely. The balances of power have shifted, and events since the beginning of the 21st century, and especially during the last decade, have led today's leaders to believe that their time has come.

At the time, the fall of the communist bloc and the period of Russia's weakness began to lay the groundwork instructions for an idea deeply rooted in today's Turkey whose main thrust is that the protective umbrella of the West is no longer so necessary (it cannot be forgotten that this umbrella was also seen in some ways as a corset).

The consolidation of this idea has coincided with a period of great economic and demographic growth in the Ottoman country, with forecasts of reaching 90 million inhabitants by 2030. Both parameters have great economic implications, as they imply an increase B in the country's energy needs. If these needs are not met, it will not be possible to sustain this population growth or to match it with an adequate industrial development .

The basis of the essential industrial development is energy independence. It is one of the factors core topic that can allow the different projects to go ahead. At present, energy needs are covered by supplies from third countries. The main exporters of energy resources to Turkey are Russia, Iran, Iraq and Libya. This external dependence is one of the reasons for the spectacular development of Turkey's military capabilities in recent years and its direct involvement in various unstable scenarios: keeping the energy supply uninterrupted. And therein lies one of the main reasons for the interventions in northern Syria, northern Iraq, or Libya.

However, this is not the only reason for such interventions; there are other political motivations, commitments that force Turkey to take sides in one way or another. The Kurdish problem, worthy in itself of a monographic paper, is one of them.

But despite possible political motivations, in the "Blue Homeland Doctrine" the main focus is the need to achieve energy independence. For this it is necessary to take control of the necessary energy resources and achieve freedom of action in this field.

Two are the spheres he defines to achieve this goal. The first would consist of the establishment of a security area and immediate control of the seas surrounding the country: the Mediterranean, the Aegean and the Black Sea. The second, of a strategic nature, extends to the Red Sea, the Caspian Sea and the Arabian Sea, including the Persian Gulf.

Turkish dominance of the maritime space indicated includes control over the gas and oil reserves in those waters. This position of maritime dominance is reinforced through the establishment of alliances with the countries in the area, providing them with support, establishing instructions military on their territory and providing military material and training to their armies, thus ensuring their support. This is a fact, and Turkey already has instructions in Somalia, Sudan, Libya and Qatar, countries to which it supplies weapons systems of its own manufacture and with which it has military agreements of various kinds.

An aside should be made at this point. These moves are not welcomed by all the countries in the region, some of which see their current position and their own aspirations for growth in power and influence in the region threatened. The existence of a dominant regional power does not usually leave much room for maneuver. And it is also important to quote at this point other words of the father of the "Blue Homeland" doctrine: "Turkey does not need any ally to protect the Homeland. The Homeland is the Homeland. Our continental shelf is our homeland and we have to protect it".

However, he claims that in the future relations between Italy, Tunisia, Libya and Turkey will be the main axis of the Mediterranean. He deliberately leaves out countries such as France, Greece and Spain.

area Traditionally, the Turkish Naval Force's usual area of operations was the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Aegean. However, it has recently extended its area of operation to the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and even operates in close partnership with Pakistan.

This strategic vision, centered on the control of the sea, apart from the reasons previously mentioned regarding the control of energy resources, can be explained by Turkey's conviction that its special orography, very abrupt, already offers a natural and dissuasive defense against any aggression by land.

Moreover, the "Blue Homeland" doctrine is based on the assumption that Turkey must be an eminently maritime power. It is, therefore, a realistic doctrine of self-defense of the maritime areas that rightfully belong to Turkey, in order to protect them with an eye to future generations.

Therefore, the maritime borders, which extend over three different seas, are so far perceived as the weak point of the nation. And that is precisely what is in the process of transformation.

This point of view has its historical roots in the former Ottoman Empire, to which Admiral Cem Gürdeniz refers reference letter on numerous occasions in his writings. It was the one that led Erdogan, shortly after coming to power, to initiate a comprehensive program of development and modernization of his Naval Force known as "Milgem". In this project , heavy investments have been made all over subject, and no effort has been spared, because in order to achieve the development of armed forces, especially in its maritime aspect, that will sustain the goal of establishing itself as a regional and international power, it is core topic an independent technological development of the Turkish industry.

In recent years, the Turkish defense industry has undergone a spectacular evolution, demonstrating the effectiveness of its developments in the Libyan, Syrian and, more currently, in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Great emphasis has been placed on the development of warships, unmanned aerial systems (UAVs) and advanced weapons systems of high quality. Especially the chapter on UAVs is particularly significant, and should be the subject of an in-depth study, including from the national point of view in Spain.

Again, here we find two clearly defined intentions. On the one hand, to reach a leading technological level in its armed forces to support the achievement of the objectives previously mentioned, and on the other hand, to position itself as reference letter in the field of arms exports, to achieve income and to be able to influence the countries of its interest and their policies in the same way as the United States, China and Russia do.

More specifically, the framework "Milgem" program has built four anti-submarine corvettes, one intelligence gathering vessel, four surface warfare frigates and four anti-aircraft frigates. The program also includes four state-of-the-art corvettes for the Pakistan Navy as a way of exporting its advances, enhancing the already close partnership relationship between the two countries and, of course, obtaining economic benefits for the arms industry.

Similarly, 33 new landing barges capable of transporting both troops and armored vehicles have been delivered to the Turkish Naval Force. The development and improvement of Turkey's amphibious assault capabilities are a factor to be taken into account in a hypothetical increase in tension with Greece, especially with regard to claims over the islands located to the east of the country and its waters.

The development of the naval warfare capabilities is completed with the manufacture of six new submarines of invoice German built under licence of HDW in Turkey itself, namely of the model U-214. These new submersibles are equipped with an AIP system that allows them to remain for long periods without surfacing, and join the ten that the Ottoman country operated so far.

This is one of the most significant data from the point of view of its destabilizing capacity. Until now it has been Greece that has maintained a certain technological superiority in this field. But the entrance in service of the new Turkish units significantly changes the direction of the balance. The submarines, in addition to serving as perfect intelligence gathering platforms, especially in the SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) and COMINT (Communications Intelligence) disciplines, are excellent deterrent weapons, capable of denying an entire fleet access to an extensive area.

The most significant element of the pretentious Turkish program is an amphibious assault ship (LHD) called "Anadolu". This ship, with very similar characteristics to the "Juan Carlos I" operated by the Spanish Navy, is a qualitative leap in terms of the capabilities it provides, as it can not only transport landing barges, but also operate different types of helicopters, UAVs and, if necessary, vertical take-off combat aircraft from its deck.

Currently, the only such aircraft compatible with the ship is the American F-35 B, which is the vertical take-off and landing (VSTOL) variant. Turkey was among the nations that had decided to acquire this fighter aircraft, although in its A version, which is the standard version for the Air Force, the submission of whose first units had already been scheduled.

But the Ankara government's decision to acquire state-of-the-art Russian anti-aircraft equipment, such as the S-400 system, has led the United States to veto its continuation in the F-35 B acquisition program. In fact, the first aircraft destined for the Ottoman country have been sold to the USAF. In any case, Turkey's intention was not to acquire the VSTOL version, which leaves in the air its real intention as to which aircraft will equip the ship.

The project will be completed with the construction of a second amphibious assault ship, the "Trakya". The possession of two units of this subject provides the Turkish naval force with capabilities far superior to those of its neighbors in the region, granting it the ability to project its amphibious force in strategic operations and in two scenarios simultaneously.

The real value of these capabilities is not the operative itself, but the deterrent capability it represents.

Turkey's involvement in the conflicts in Syria and Libya has provided the Turkish Armed Forces, and within these its naval units, with an enormous and valuable combat experience that has been of great use for update and improving its doctrine and operational capabilities. This, together with the high quality of training its units, the quality of their equipment and the technological and armament development described, are the three pillars necessary for the implementation of the "Blue Homeland" doctrine. The great unknown is how the other regional powers, directly affected by the progress of this strategic plan, will react.

By way of conclusion, it can be said that the interests are multiple and often crossed, and affect not only the countries bordering this area of the Mediterranean, but also powers such as Russia and France and international organizations such as NATO.

Incidents have already occurred between nations that were supposed to be allies, even leading France to withdraw from the NATO operation in the Mediterranean due to the problem between a French and a Turkish frigate, and resulting in an attack on Turkish positions by "Rafale" aircraft from instructions in the United Arab Emirates, but whose nationality remains unclear.

status There is no doubt that the Turkish attitude, and the implementation of its plan, puts the Atlantic Alliance in a weak position, as one of the reasons behind the plan is Turkey's perception that it no longer needs the protection of the Western umbrella for the defense of its interests.

On the other hand, Turkey is playing with the trump card of holding the key to the door of entrance to the torrent of immigrants from Syria, Libya, Somalia and Eritrea to the European Union. And it will use it as a means of pressure against any reaction or positioning of Europe against its interests.

The Eastern Mediterranean has regained the leading role in world geopolitics that it had in the 16th century, only this time we have new powers such as Russia that also claim their space and their need for a permanent and strong presence in that area. We cannot ignore the relationship that this Russian need has with the Crimean conflict and the strategic need to be able to control in a certain way both sides of the Bosporus and to ensure the exit of the Black Sea fleet to the Mediterranean.

All these economic, energy and political interests are creating a very complicated status where the "internal" conflicts in Syria and Libya also come together, creating an over-presence of military units, combatants, private military companies, weapons systems, aircraft, UAVs, etc. that at any moment, and due to any unexpected error, can lead to an incident that, however slight, can have unforeseeable and irreparable consequences.

* The author is a lieutenant colonel of Infantry and Geopolitical Analyst.

REFERENCES

Kasapoglu, 'The Blue Homeland': Turkey's largest naval drill. Anadolu Agency 27 February.

SETA Security Sadar Turkey's geopolitical landscape in 2020

Kara Harp Okulu Bilim Dergisi, "An assesment of eastern mediterranean maritime boundary delimitation agreement between Turkey and Libya" Science Journal of Turkish Military Academy Haziran /June 2020.

Eyal Pinko, "Turkey's Maritime Strategy Ambitions: The Blue Homeland Doctrine (Mavi Vatan)" Research Institute for European and American Studies(www.rieas.gr) April 2020.

Armenia and Azerbaijan face each other in a conflict in which Turkey and Russia are also involved.

▲ Monument to the Armenian capture of the city of Shusha in the war over Nagorno Karabakh in the 1990s [Wikipedia].

ANALYSIS / Irene Apesteguía

The region of Nagorno-Karabakh, traditionally inhabited by Christian Armenians and Muslim Turks, is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. However, its population is Armenian-majority, with a pro-independence sentiment. In Soviet times it became an autonomous region within the republic of Azerbaijan and it was in the war of the 1990s when, in addition to leaving some 30,000 dead and about one million people displaced, separatist forces captured additional Azeri territory. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, ethnic discrepancies between Azerbaijan and Armenia have deepened. Even a 2015 census of Nagorno Karabakh reported that no Azeris lived there, whereas, in Soviet times, Azeris made up more than one-fifth of the population. Since the truce between the two former Soviet republics in 1994, there has been a status stalemate, with the failure of several negotiations to reach a permanent peace agreement . The dispute has remained frozen ever since.

Last September 27, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan once again led to a military confrontation. The latest developments go far beyond the usual clashes, as there are reports of downed helicopters, use of combat drones and missile attacks. In 2016 there was a violent escalation of the conflict, but Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, was not occupied, nor was any martial law declared. If one thing is clear, it is that the current escalation is a direct consequence of the freezing of the negotiation process. Moreover, this is the first time that armed outbreaks have occurred at such short intervals, the last escalation of the conflict having taken place last July.

Azerbaijani Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov threatened on September 27 with a "big attack" on Stepanakert if the separatists did not stop shelling its settlements. Nagorno Karabakh declared that it would respond in a "very painful" way. Armenia, for its part, warned that the confrontation could unleash a "full-scale war in the region".

The leaders of both countries hold each other responsible for this new escalation of violence. According to Azerbaijan, the Armenian Armed Forces constantly provoked the country, firing on the army and on crowds of civilians. Moreover, on multiple local Azerbaijani TV channels, President Ilham Aliyev has declared that Armenia is preparing for a new war, concentrating all its forces in Karabakh. Even the Azeri authorities have restricted the use of the internet in the country, mainly limiting access to social networks.

In its counter-offensive operation, Azerbaijan mobilized staff and tank units with the support of artillery and missile troops, front-line aviation and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), said the Ministry's press statement . In addition, from agreement with the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a number of Syrians from jihadist groups, from Turkish-backed factions, are fighters in Nagorno-Karabakh. This has been corroborated by Russian and French sources. In any case, it would not be surprising when Turkey sits side by side with Azerbaijan.

For its part, Armenia blames Azerbaijan for starting the fighting. Armenian authorities announced that the Azerbaijani army had attacked with rocket-propelled grenade launchers and missiles. Armenia has not stopped preparing, as in the weeks prior to the start of the battle, multiple shipments of Russian weapons had been detected in the country through heavy transport flights. On the other hand, Armenia's defense minister has accused Turkey of exercising command and control of Azerbaijan's air operations through Boeing 737 Airborne Early Warning & Control aircraft , as Turkey has four of these planes.  

Triggers

Both powers were on alert due to the July clashes. Since then, they have not abandoned military preparedness at the hands of their external allies. Therefore, the current events cannot be described as coming out of the blue. After the July outbreak, the feeling has persisted that the armed confrontation had simply been left at Fail.

Hours after the outbreak of fighting, Armenia declared martial law and general mobilization. Azerbaijan, on the contrary, declared that such action was not necessary, but finally the parliament decided to impose martial law in some regions of the country. Not only was martial law decreed, but also the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense declared the liberation of seven villages, the establishment of a curfew in several cities and the recapture of multiple important heights. It is clear that all occupied territories have crucial strategic value: Azerbaijan has secured visual control of the Vardenis-Aghdara highway, which connects to Armenian-occupied Karabakh. The road was completed by Armenia three years ago in order to facilitate quick military cargo transfers, an indication that this is a strategic position for Armenia.

Drone warfare has also been present in the conflict with Turkish and Israeli drones used by Azerbaijan. The anti-drone measures that Armenia has to carry out are involving Iran in the matter.

An important factor that may have led to the conflict was the changes in the diplomatic leadership in Baku. Elmar Mammadyarov, Azerbaijan's foreign minister, left his position during the July clashes. He has been replaced by the former minister of Education, Jeyhun Bayramov, who does not have much diplomatic experience. Meanwhile, Hikmet Hajiyev, advisor foreign policy of Azerbaijan's president has seen his role in these areas increased.

But the problem is not so much centered on the new appointments. For the past few years, Mammadyarov was the biggest optimist about the concessions Armenia might be willing to make under Nikol Pashinyan's new government. And that is because ever since Armenia's Velvet Revolution, which brought Pashinyan to the post of prime minister in 2018, Azerbaijan had harbored the hope that it could resolve the conflict. This hope was shared by many diplomats and experts in the West. Moreover, even within Armenia, Pashinyan's opponents called him a traitor because, they claimed, he was selling the country's interests in exchange for Western money. All this hope for Armenia disappeared, as the new Armenian Prime Minister's position on Nagorno-Karabakh was harsher than ever. He even declared on several occasions that "Karabakh is Armenia". All this led to the strengthening of Azerbaijan's position, which hardened after the July clashes. Baku has never ruled out the use of force to try to solve the problem of its territorial integrity.

In the 2016 conflict there were many efforts to minimize these armed disturbances, mainly by Russian diplomacy. These have been supported by the West, which saw Moscow's mediation as positive. However, negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have not resumed, and the excuse of the coronavirus pandemic has not been very convincing, according to domestic media.

More points have led to the current escalation, such as increased Turkish involvement. After the July clashes, Turkey and Azerbaijan conducted joint military exercises. Ankara's representatives began talking about the ineffectiveness of the peace process, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, speaking last month at the UN General Assembly, described Armenia as the biggest obstacle to long-term peace in the South Caucasus. This is not to say that Turkey provoked the new escalation, but it certainly helped push Azerbaijan into a more emboldened attitude. The Turkish president stated on Twitter that "Turkey, as always, stands with all its brothers and sisters in Azerbaijan." Moreover, last August, the Azeri defense minister said that, with the financial aid of the Turkish army, Azerbaijan would fulfill "its sacred duty," something that can be interpreted as the recovery of lost territories.

International importance

In a brief review of the allies, it is worth mentioning that the Azeris are a majority population of Turkish origin, with which Turkey has close ties, although unlike the Turks, most Azeris are Shiite Muslims. As for Armenia, Turkey has no relations with Armenia, since the former is a majority Orthodox Christian country that historically has always relied on Russia.

As soon as the hostilities began, several states and international organizations called for a cease-fire. For example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in a telephone conversation with his Armenian counterpart, Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, called for an end to the fighting and declared that Moscow would continue its mediation efforts. Meanwhile, as it did after the July clashes, Turkey again expressed through various channels its plenary session of the Executive Council support for Azerbaijan. The Turkish Foreign Ministry assured that Ankara is ready to help Baku in any way. The Armenian president, hours before the start of the fire, mentioned that a new conflict could "affect the security and stability not only of the South Caucasus, but also of Europe". US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expressed serious concerns and called on both sides to stop the fighting.

On the other hand, there is Iran, which is mainly Shiite and also has a large ethnic Azeri community in the northwest of the country. However, it maintains good relations with Russia. Moreover, having borders with both countries, Iran offered to mediate peace talks. This is where Iran's current problem over the new conflict is centered. Azeri activists called protests in Iranian Azerbaijan, which is the national territory of Azeris under Iranian sovereignty, against Tehran's support for Armenia. The arrests carried out by the Iranian government have not prevented further protests by this social sector. This response in the streets is an important indicator of the current temperature in northwest Iran.

As for Western countries, France, which has a large Armenian community, called for a cease-fire and the start of dialogue. The United States claimed to have contacted both sides to urge them to "cease hostilities immediately and avoid words and actions of little financial aid".

Russia may have serious concerns in the resumption of full-scale hostilities. It has made it clear on multiple occasions that the important thing is to prevent the conflict from escalating. One reason for that insistence may be that the Kremlin already has open fronts in Ukraine, Syria and Libya, in addition to the current status in Belarus, and the poisoning of Alexei Navalni. Moreover, despite the current attempt by the presidents of Russia and Turkey to show that relations between their countries are going well, the discrepancies between them, such as their views on Syria or Libya, are becoming greater and more diverse. And now, Vladimir Putin could not leave Armenia in the hands of Azerbaijan and Turkey.

The Minskgroup of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has as its main mission statement the mediation of peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and is co-chaired by Russia, France and the United States. In response to the present conflict, it called for a "return to ceasefire and resumption of substantive negotiations". Earlier this year, Armenia rejected the Madrid Principles, the main conflict resolution mechanism proposed by the Minsk group . Moreover, this initiative has been made increasingly impossible by the Armenian Defense Ministry's concept of "new war for new territories," as well as Nikol Pashinyan's idea of unification of Armenia and Karabakh. All this has infuriated the Azeri government and citizenry, which has increasingly criticized the Minsk group . Azerbaijan has also criticized the passivity of the group in the face of what it considers inflammatory actions by Armenia, such as the transfer of the capital of Karabakh to Susa, a city of great cultural importance for Azerbaijanis, or the illegal settlement of Lebanese and Armenians in occupied Azerbaijani territories.  

If any conclusion is to be drawn from this it is that, for many in both Azerbaijan and Armenia, the peace process has been discredited over the past three decades of failed negotiations, prompting increasing warnings that the status quo would lead to further escalation of the conflict.

Among some experts there is growing concern that Western countries do not understand the current status and the consequences that could result from the worst flare-up in the region in years. The director of the South Caucasus Office at the Heinrich Boell Foundation, Stefan Meister, has stated that the fighting between these two regions could go far. In his opinion, "the European Union and the West underestimate the conflict".

The European Union has also taken a stand. It has already order to Armenia and Azerbaijan to reduce cross-border tensions, urging them to stop the armed confrontation and to refrain from actions that provoke further tension, and to take measures to avoid further escalation.

The conflict in the Caucasus is of great international importance. There are regular clashes and resurgence of tensions in the area. The relevance centers on the fact that any escalation of violence could destabilize the global Economics , given that the South Caucasus is a corridor for gas pipelines running from the Caspian Sea to world markets, and more specifically, to Europe. If Armenia decides that Azerbaijan has escalated too far, it could attack Azerbaijan's South Caucasus Pipeline, which sends gas for Turkey's TANAP, and terminates with TAP, which supplies Europe. Another strategic aspect is the control of the city of Ghanai, as controlling it could connect Russia to Karabakh. In addition, control of that site could cut off connectivity between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey in relation to gas pipelines. There were already conflicts in this area last July, therefore, as a result of the new conflict Azerbaijan has been predisposed to close the airspace of the region.

In bright green, territory of Nagorno-Karabakh agreed in 1994; in soft green, territory controlled by Armenia until this summer [Furfur/Wikipedia].

A new war?

There are several possible outcomes for the current status . The most likely is a battle for small and not particularly important areas, allowing the symbolic declaration of a "victory". The problem centers on the fact that each opponent may have a very different view of things, thus making a new side of confrontation inevitable, raising the stakes of the conflict, and leading to a lower possibility of understanding between the parties.

Although unlikely, many analysts do not rule out the possibility that the current escalation is part of the preparations for negotiations and is necessary to shore up diplomatic positions and increase pressure on the opponent before resuming talks.

Whatever the reasoning behind the armed clashes, one thing is clear: the importance of military force in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is growing by the day. The absence of talks is becoming critical. If the Karabakh pendulum is not mended soon and does not swing from generals to diplomats, it may become irreparable. And it will be then that the prospects of another regional war breaking out once again will cease to be a mere scenario described by experts.

While Russia continues to insist that there is no other option but the peaceful way, the contact Line between the two sides in Nagorno Karabakh has become the most militarized area in Europe. Many experts have repeatedly shown as a possible scenario that Azerbaijan decides to launch a military operation to regain its lost territory. The country, whose main revenue source is its Caspian Sea oil wealth, has spent billions of dollars on new weaponry. In addition, it has been Azerbaijan that has replaced Russia as the largest carrier of natural gas to Turkey.

A major consequence of the conflict centers on potential losses for Russia and Iran. One more casualty of the conflict may be Russia's position as the leader of Eurasia. Another argument is based on the Turkish committee , which has demanded Armenia's withdrawal from Azerbaijani lands. The problem lies in the fact that the members of that committee, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are also members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), led by Russia together with Armenia. On the other hand, moreover, Iran sample panics at the total solidarity expressed by Turkey to Azerbaijan, as more Azeris live in Iranian Azerbaijan than in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

We are facing one of the many conflicts exemplifying the new and current "style" of warfare, where great powers place themselves behind the backs of small conflicts. Nevertheless, the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh will be small in extension, but not in importance, since besides contributing to the continuity in the destabilization of the Caucasian area , it can affect nearby powers, and even Europe. The West should give it the importance it deserves, because if it continues in the same line, the door is open to a more violent, extensive and prolonged military conflict.

▲ Nicolás Maduro during a broadcasted speech [Gov. of Venezuela].

ESSAY / Isabelle León Graticola

It is no secret to anyone that Venezuela is going through the most convoluted economic and social crisis in its history, a crisis in which the creators have manipulated the existence of the people, degrading its integrity, and extinguishing everything that once characterized Venezuela.

The country holds a key geopolitical location that serves as a route for North America and the Caribbean to the rest of South America. Likewise, the country is endowed with abundant natural resources like natural gas, iron ore, diamonds, gold, and oil.1 Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in the world, with 302 billion barrels in January 2018, emanating an extremely rich country with astonishing potential.2 However, this crisis has not only hindered people's lives but has ironically dissipated the country's resources to consolidate the pillars of the regime to such an extent that today the government of Nicolás Maduro is importing oil from Iran. Inadequate policies that have weakened the society's sense of responsibility and nationalism, decreased foreign investment out of lack of trust, and annihilated the state-led oil production, therefore reinforcing the country's economic downfall and hyperinflation.

The Venezuelan government, headed by Nicolás Maduro, has managed its way to continue holding power despite accusations of corruption, crimes against humanity, and even drugs trafficking involvement. The perplexing partner-economic and political crisis has created an unsustainable and violent context in which poorly informed people are manipulated by the government through speeches that take big significance on how society perceives the actual situation, as well as other countries' statements on the crisis. Up to this point, it has become difficult to understand what keeps bolstering this regime, but if the situation is analyzed from the nucleus, the well-orchestrated rhetoric of Chávez and his successor, Maduro, has contributed to support the ends and sustainment of the regime. 

Since Maduro reached power, poverty motivated violence has been rampant in Venezuela and insecurity has become a significant part of society's dynamics. Consequently, many protests against the government demanding for freedom and better living standards have taken place. Maduro's regime has been forced to employ tools such as fake news and hateful rhetoric to soften the anger of the people by manipulating them and brainwashing the armed forces to avoid uprisings. 

This article aims to analyze how Maduro's rhetoric has maintained a minority in the wrong side of history and a majority in constant battle by making erroneous accusations to third parties to justify the perturbed situation, while the government keeps enriching its wallet at the cost of the people and its smudged operations. Such feverish society gave rise to pure uncertainty, to a place where disinformation takes the form of a lethal weapon for the dangerous context in which it exists.

The background: Chávez's indoctrinated society

First, it is necessary to clarify that the focus of this article is merely on the rhetorical aspect as a pillar of the regime. However, when it comes to the background that has sustained Maduro's administration up to this day, there is a more complex reality, full of crime, death, manipulation, and corruption. Venezuela is an almost abnormal reality because, after more than twenty years, it is still tied to a group of people who have taken absolutely everything from it. From a man that portrayed nothing but hope for the poor, to one who has managed his way sticking to policies damaging to the very people they mean to help, and which, sooner or later, will make the regime collapse.

Hugo Chávez's presidency was characterized by a tremendous and persuasive oratory; he knew how to get to the people. Chávez's measures and campaigns were based on a psychological strategy that won him the admiration of the most impoverished classes of the country. Chávez arrived and gave importance and attention to the big mass of the population that previous governments had systematically neglected. People felt the time had come for them to have what they never had before. Filled with charisma and political mastery, his speeches always contained jokes, dances, and colloquial phrases that were considered indecent by the country's highest class and often misunderstood abroad.

Chávez always built a drastic separation between the ideals of the United States and Venezuela and looked for ways to antagonize the former with his rhetoric. He began to refer to George W. Bush as "Mr. Danger", an imperial literary character of one of the most famous Venezuelan novels, Doña Bárbara.3

Hugo Chávez is one of the most revolutionary characters in Venezuelan history, one who brought the convoluted situation that today perpetuates in the country. Chávez persecuted journalists and political opponents, expropriated lands, nationalized Venezuela's key industries such as telecommunications, electricity, and the refining processes of heavy crudes, and slowly degraded the society as the exercise of power was directed to hold complete control of Venezuela's internal dynamics.4

Chávez extended education and medical assistance to the least favored classes and improved the living conditions of the needy. This policy did nothing but create among these classes a culture of dependence on the government. Chávez's supporters or Chavistas were the pillars that buttressed the government, while the wealthy were cataloged as "squealing pigs" and "vampires. "5 The Chavistas admired Chavez's charismatic character and his constant gifts; he gave them fridges and TVs, gadgets that they could never afford on their own. He also constructed buildings, under the "mission statement Vivienda" initiative, to give people living in slums a 'proper' home. All of this was possible because the oil prices at the time were skyrocketing; he used the oil income to buy his support. The general standard of life, however, continued to be poor. The government knew what to give and how to manipulate to stay in power, and that is precisely what made Hugo Chávez so powerful and almost impossible to defeat despite strong opposition. 

Historically, the United States has opposed left-wing governments in Latin America, so Chávez condemned the US, by referring to them as an imperialist power, or the "Empire". He disgraced US leaders and actions and transferred that anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalist approach to the population, part of which supported him and was blindly loyal to the cause. Chávez's alliance with Cuba under Fidel Castro led to the supply of oil at cut-rate prices, all related to the desire of reducing US economic influence in South America. Chavez's populist initiatives were the tenets of his administration and controversial foreign policy. These, along with his rhetoric and opposition from the Venezuelan wealthy class, deeply polarized the society and gave rise to what Venezuela has today: a divided society that has suffered from the lack of basic necessities, disinformation, and integrity.

Currently, the spokesmen of the Government of Nicolás Maduro address citizens at all hours from public channels and social networks to stir up the disgruntlement of the population toward the external enemy.6 Despite the poorly prepared speeches, the lack of vocabulary, and the improper formulation of sentences, Maduro has kept the colloquial and unformal rhetoric that characterized Chávez, but has failed to draw the connection that the late president enjoyed. The anti-imperialist strategy has been maintained, and, as the justification of the crisis, it has become the epicenter of the regime's speech. Nicolás Maduro's rhetoric revolves around two words: the US and the "Patria", a word frequently used by Chávez.

The base of Maduro's rhetoric: the love for Chávez

Shortly before dying in March 2013, Hugo Chávez appointed Vice President Nicolás Maduro as his successor. Chávez's charisma and legacy are what somehow ensured him that Maduro would provide a smooth transition. After Chávez's passing, Maduro took advantage of the momentum and sentiment that the Chavistas revealed and ensured that if picked, he would follow the steps of his predecessor and would continue to strengthen the 'Bolivarian Revolution'. Along with the continuity with Chávez's legacy, the defense of Venezuelan sovereignty in front of the US, and the social equality became the key messages of his administration.7 Nevertheless, Maduro had little support from the elites and inherited a country that was already economically weak due to the downfall of the oil prices and corruption.

In Chávez's wake, Maduro appealed to the emotion of the audience. He strongly claimed that the people were there for the 'Comandante' and said that "his soul and his spirit was so strong that his body could not stand it anymore, and he was released and now through this universe expanding filling us with blessings and love". He knew what this meant for the people and a crying audience exclaimed "Chávez lives, the fight goes on".

Maduro filled his rhetoric with the love for Chávez. He acknowledged that the Chavistas worshipped him as if he was God and that for ideological reasons, support for Maduro was guaranteed. Nevertheless, others recognized that the situation in the country was not favorable and questioned Maduro's ability to fill the void left by Chávez. When Maduro took power, the country entered a period of reinforced economic decline accompanied by hyperinflation that nowadays exceeds 10 million percent.8 As it was previously stated, the conditions of poverty surpass anything seen before in the country, which is now on the brink of collapse.

Furthermore, Venezuela went through two rounds of mass protests, in 2014 and 2018, that demanded freedom and change. Unfortunately, and as was expected from the government, thousands of violations of human rights were part of the demonstration's dynamics as brutal repression and the unjust imprisonment of demonstrators took place all along. Simultaneously, Maduro managed to call for rallies on the days of the major opposition's marches and retained the populist speech based on ideological arguments and emotional appeals among the minority of supporters to consolidate his power in Venezuela. Last year, in a regime rally on February 23rd, he condemned the elites as he explained that he was certain that from the bottom of his Chavista sentiment of loyalty to this battle, he was never going to be part of one. He stated that Venezuela will continue to be Patria for more many years to come. 

The ongoing crisis has forced many to survive rather than to live, but despite all, Maduro remains in control. Maduro has kept Chávez's anti-imperialist policy and has rejected any minimum support from the United States. The government takes advantage of the hunger and the vulnerable situation of its people and makes sure that it remains as the only source of food. It does not take responsibility and instead, blames the crisis on the 'economic war' that the US has imposed on Venezuela.9 When Juan Guaidó sworn himself the legitimate president, Maduro's supporters started raising firms in a campaign called "Hands off Venezuela", while the US was trying to get humanitarian assistance into Venezuela through the Colombian border in the name of Guaidó. 

In this sense, he explained in the same concentration speech that they were defending the national territory and the right to live freely and independently. Although it may seem ironic, because the government has killed hundreds of people with its police brutality and torture, this rhetoric is what has kept him the support of the hardcore revolutionary followers. The "Hands off Venezuela", was shouted and accompanied by the worst English pronunciation -that characterizes Maduro-, and followed with insults to Guaidó.

As Maduro yelled "puppet, clown, and beggar of imperialism and Donald Trump. If he is the President, where are the economic and social measures that he has applied for the people? It is a game to deceive and manipulate, it is a game that has failed, the coup d'état has failed" as the network audience shouted, "jail him, jail him!". He drew his speech to a hardcore anti-imperialist audience and firmly stated that the US intended to invade Venezuela and enslave it. Maduro finalized his speech by shouting "wave up the flag, up the Patria, for the people in defense of the Revolution".

Recently, the US State Department released a price for the capture of Maduro and his cabinet, not only for the crimes committed against the Venezuelan population, but also because of their involvement in a huge drug-trafficking network. With this, the regime's position has become more vulnerable and simultaneously pragmatic, but as tough actions were taken against possible threats and opposing figures, Maduro's rhetoric remains to deny its status and manipulating those that still support him. In another public speech, he stated that "Donald Trump's government, in an extravagant and extreme, vulgar, miserable action, launched a set of false accusations and like a racist cowboy of the 21st century, put a price on the heads of revolutionaries that are still willing to fight them". He one more time accused the US of being the main cause of the economic crisis of Venezuela.

Nicolás Maduro's speech has always been directed to the hardcore revolutionaries, those that worship Chávez since the beginning and who firmly believe in the socialist cause. Maduro has maintained his rhetoric despite the changes in the internal situation of the country; he has held an enduring method for antagonizing the opposition, the Venezuelan upper class, and the United States. On the other hand, regarding the strategic foreign allies, the regime openly gives declarations to support them, but again to somehow antagonize the United States. Indeed, this was the case of the US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian top commander, in which government representatives attended the Iranian embassy to give the condolences in the name of the regime and swore to avenge Soleimani's death. The administration of Nicolás Maduro has no gray areas, everything is either black or white; the opposition, the upper class, the US, and the US-influenced countries are the enemies, and the rhetoric rarely leans toward a conciliatory message, rather has always revolved around these conflicting parties.

What is left

Twenty years have passed since the Chavismo arrived in the country. Nowadays, a passionate minority of the population keeps supporting Maduro. His regime continues to train armed groups to combat discontent headed by opposition leader Juan Guaidó. The Chavismo keeps being strong, but it has been fragmented by those who believe that the revolution ended at the moment Chávez died, and the ones that are convinced that supporting Maduro means being loyal to Chávez. In the case of Juan Guaidó, he keeps doing his efforts. He still has relative support and keeps being a source of hope. Nevertheless, many criticize the fact that he let again the people cool down. A close change is expected, but no one knows what the movements behind are. Meanwhile, the people will continue suffering and trying to survive.

Upon reflection, it can be noticed that Maduro's entire argumentation revolves around a confrontational rhetoric: the US and capitalism against Venezuela; Guaidó against the Patria; the elites against the Revolution.10 Far from recognizing the reality that the country faces and taking actions to improve it, this confrontational approach simply places the blame on those who have tried to bring a change in the internal dynamics of Venezuela. The regime has managed to construct a national united front against a common foreign enemy and to demonize the opposition.

Chávez and Maduro's rhetoric has followed a tangible objective: the Revolution. Maduro's regime up to this point is searching for a way to consolidate its power and sustain itself as the best way to elude a rather somber future in jail. This never-ending nightmare should have long ago collapsed due to the economic catastrophe, hyperinflation, political repression, human rights violations, and the lack of direction for Venezuela. Behind what maintains this structure there is nothing but the exercise of power and the almost absolute control of society. The Patria that they constantly speak of is running out of fuel to keep going. Nonetheless, the rhetorical deceptions of the Bolivarian revolution, which for two decades have appealed to the popular classes, settled in the collective mindset of the Chavismo and brought space for support in the Venezuelan society.

Chávez and Maduro's presidencies have been based on educating and changing the mindset of the population as they wanted; a population that is content with one box of food a month and which, unfortunately, hunts for the easy means to achieve its goals instead of fighting to improve its lot.

Today, the regime is fed on the memory of Hugo Chávez, on his promises, on his battle. As long as it keeps generating an illusion on the supporters, Maduro will appeal to it as a pillar of his administration and of the Revolution.

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Venezuela facts and figures. 2019, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/171.htm. Accessed 28 Nov. 2019.

2. US Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis. Venezuela. Jan. 2019, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=VEN. Accessed 28 Nov. 2019.

3. Livingstone, G. (2013, March 10). The secret of Hugo Chavez's hold on his people. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-secret-of-hugo-chavezs-hold-on-his-people-8527832.html

4. El País. (2007, January 08). Chávez announces the nationalization of the electric service and telecommunications. Retrieved July 01, 2020, from https://elpais.com/internacional/2007/01/08/actualidad/1168210811_850215.html

5. The Guardian (2012, October 08). Hugo Chávez: A victory of enduring charisma and political mastery. Retrieved March 17, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/08/hugo-chavez-victory-political-venezuela

6. Twitter, F., & Miraflores, P. (2017, July 23). Maduro, his ministers and the corruption of language. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/07/22/opinion/1500746848_239358.html

7. Grainger, S. Hugo Chávez and Venezuela Confront his Succession. Dec. 2012. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20678634. Accessed 29 Nov. 2019.

8. Sánchez, V. Venezuela hyperinflation hits 10 million percent. 'Shock therapy' may be only chance to undo economic damage. Aug. 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/02/venezuela-inflation-at-10-million-percent-its-time-for-shock-therapy.html. Accessed 29 Nov. 2019.

9. TVVenezuela. CLAP boxes no longer have what to feed Venezuelans. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MelhZDbiFQQ. Sept. 2019. Accessed 30 Nov. 2019.

10. Delgado, A., & Herrero, J. (2019, February 12). Venezuela rhetorics on Twitter: Guaidó vs. Maduro. Retrieved March 18, 2020, from https://beersandpolitics.com/retoricas-de-venezuela-en-twitter-guaido-vs-maduro

Faced with the biggest economic crisis since World War II, the EU itself has decided to borrow to help its member states.

▲ Commission President Von der Layen and the President of the European committee , Charles Michel, after announcing agreement in July [committee European]

ANALYSIS / Pablo Gurbindo Palomo

"Deal!". With this "tweet" at 5:30 a.m. last July 21, the president of the European committee , Charles Michel, announced the achievement of a agreement after the longest meeting in its history (more than 90 hours of negotiations). 

After the failed summit in February, European countries were aware of the importance of reaching a agreement, but certain countries saw it as more urgent than others to close the framework Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the next seven years. However, as with everything else, the Covid-19 pandemic has overturned this lack of urgency and has even forced the Member States to negotiate, in addition to the budget, aid to alleviate the effects of the pandemic on the 27.

The agreement consists of an MFF of 1.074 trillion euros. A figure lower than that demanded in February by the so-called friends of cohesion (a conglomerate of countries from southern and eastern Europe) and the Commission itself, but also higher than the figure that the frugal ones (the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Sweden) were willing to accept. But it was not this figure that was the subject of the discussion, but how much and how the post-pandemic recovery fund was to be set up to help the countries most affected by the pandemic. The agreed Fund was 750 billion, divided into 390 billion to be given to the Member States in the form of subsidies, and the remaining 360 billion to be given in the form of a 70% disbursable loan between 2021 and 2022.

The figures are dizzying, and starting from the February negotiations, where part of the members preferred something more austere, one might ask: And how did we arrive at this agreement?

The Hamilton moment

With the arrival of Covid-19 in Europe and a considerable paralysis of all the world's economies, the European capitals quickly realized that the blow was going to be significant and that a strong response was going to be necessary to soften the blow. Proposals at the European level were not long in coming. For example, the European Parliament proposed a recovery package of 2 trillion euros on May 15, to be included in the MFF 2021-2027.

The most outstandingproposal was presented on May 18 by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. And not only because it was promoted by the two main economies of the Union, but also because of its historic content.

There has been talk of Hamilton momentin allusion to Alexander Hamilton, one of the founding fathers of the United States and the first Secretary of the Treasury of the newly founded republic. In 1790 the thirteen states that made up the young American nation were heavily indebted due to the war effort of the Revolutionary War, which had ended only seven years earlier. To solve this problem, Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, succeeded in convincing the federal government to assume the states' debt by "mutualizing" it. This event marked the strengthening of the American federal government and served to create the instructions of the US national identity. 

It seems that with the Franco-German proposal that Hamilton moment has arrived. The proposal is based on four pillars: 

1. European health strategy, which may include a joint reservation of medical equipment and supplies, coordination in the acquisition of vaccines and treatments. In turn, epidemic prevention plans shared among the 27 and common methods for registering the sick.

2. A boost to the modernization of European industry, supported by an acceleration of the ecological and digital transition.

3. Strengthening of the European industrial sector, supporting production in the Old Continent and diversification of supply chains to reduce global dependence on the European Economics .

4. 500 billion reconstruction fund for the regions most affected by the pandemic based on EU budgetary programs.

It is this fourth pillar which we can call "Hamiltonian" and which is historic as it would allow for the first time in history the EU itself to issue debt to finance this fund. This proposal has broken years of a German stance against any subject of collective indebtedness. "We are experiencing the biggest crisis in our history... Due to the unusual nature of the crisis we are choosing unusual solutions," Merkel said in the joint video conference with Macron.  

According to this proposal the funds would not be reimbursed directly by the countries but through the long-term community funds, either through their usual resources or through new sources of income. It should also be noted that the proposal spoke of the submission of this fund in the form of subsidies, i.e., without any subject of interest for the recipient countries.

Among the reactions to this proposal were those of the frugal, who rejected that the funds should be provided in the form of subsidies. "We will continue to show solidarity and support for the countries most affected by the coronavirus crisis, but this must be in the form of loans and not subsidies," said Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. The proposal of the frugal is that the financial aid raised on the debt markets should be submit to the states at low interest rates, i.e. as a loan, and conditional on a reform program.

On May 27, the Commission announced its proposalThe Commission announced on May 27 its new, very similar to the Franco-German one, but enlarged. The proposal is composed of a 1.1 trillion euro MFF and a 750 billion euro recovery plan called Next Generation EU. This recovery plan is based on three pillars financed with new instruments but within pre-existing headings:

The first pillar covers 80% of the recovery plan. It deals with support to Member States in their investments and reforms following the Commission's recommendations. For this purpose, the pillar has the following instruments:

• Recovery and Resilience Mechanism (the most important part of the proposal): financial support for investments and reforms of the States, especially those related to the ecological and digital transition and the resilience of national economies, linking them to EU priorities. This mechanism would be composed of 310 billion in grants and 250 billion in loans.

• React-EU Fund within the cohesion policy with 55 billion. 

• Increase in the Just Transition Fund: this fund is intended to support States in undertaking the energy and ecological transition, to move towards a policy of climate neutrality. It would be increased to 40 billion.

• Increase of the European Agricultural Fund of development Rural: it serves to support rural areas to comply with the European Green agreement . It would be increased by 15 billion.

The second pillar covers 15% of the plan. It focuses on boosting private investment, and its funds would be managed by the European Investment Bank (EIB):

• 31 billion Solvency Support Instrument

• EU-Invest program increased to $15.3 billion

• New Strategic Investment Fund to promote investment in strategic European sectors 

The third pillar covers the remaining 5%. It includes investments in aspects that have result key to the coronavirus crisis:

• EU4Health program to strengthen health cooperation. With a budget of 9.4 billion.

• Strengthening of rescEU, the European Union's Civil Protection Mechanism, by 2 billion.

• project Horizon Europe for the promotion of research and innovation worth 94.4 billion.

• 16.5 billion in support for the financial aid external humanitarian aid.

To obtain the financing, the Commission would issue its own debt on the market and introduce new taxes of its own, such as a border carbon tax, emission rights, a digital tax or a tax on large corporations.

It should also be noted that both access to MFF and Next Generation EU aid would be conditional on compliance with the rule of law. Something that did not please countries such as Hungary or Poland, which, among others, consider that it is not clear and that it is a form of interference by the EU in their internal affairs.

Negotiation at the European Summit

With this proposal on the table, the heads of state and government of the 27 met on July 17 in Brussels amid great uncertainty. They did not know how long the summit would last and were pessimistic about reaching an agreement agreement.

The hot points of the negotiation were mainly on the amount and form of the Reconstruction Fund. Countries such as Spain, Italy and Portugal wanted the aid to come in the form of subsidies in full and without any conditionality subject . On the other hand, the frugal ones, led during the summit by Mark Rutte of the Netherlands, wanted the reconstruction fund to be reduced as much as possible, in any case in the form of loans to refund and as an "absolute precondition". "Any financial aid from the North means making reforms in the South. There is no other option," Rutte said at a press conference in The Hague.

As in any negotiation, positions were loosening. It was already clear that neither of the two positions was going to remain unscathed and that a mixed solution with both subsidies and loans was going to be the solution. But in what percentage? And with reform conditionality?

For Spain, Italy and Portugal, the subsidies could not be less than 400 billion, which was already a concession of the 500 billion from which they had started. For the frugal, who were joined by Finland, this figure could not exceed 350 billion, which would reduce the total Fund to 700 billion. This was a major concession by the frugals, who went from talking about zero subsidies to accepting them as 50% of the amount. Michel's final proposal was 390 billion in subsidies and 360 billion in loans to try to convince all parties.

The big stumbling block, apart from the percentage, was the conditionality of reforms for the submission of aid defended by the frugal. The ghost of the Troika imposed after the 2008 crisis was beginning to appear, to the disgrace of countries such as Spain and Italy. Rutte demanded that the national plans that countries had to submit to the Commission to receive the Fund should also pass through the committee of the 27 and that unanimous approval was necessary. This formula basically allowed any country to veto the national plans. Germany did not go as far as the required unanimity, but did ask for some control by the committee.

Rutte's stance angered many countries that saw proposal as a way to force reforms that have nothing to do with economic recovery.

The president of the committee presented a proposal to bring the parties closer together: the "emergency brake". According to Michel's proposal countries will have to send their reform plan to committee and it will have to be C by qualified majority. After its approval, any country is allowed to submit to committee its doubts about the fulfillment of the plans presented by a State; in that case the committee would have a maximum period of three months to pronounce itself. As long as the country does not receive a decision, it will not receive the aid.

For those who may be surprised by the large concessions of the frugal, we must mention the figure of the "rebates" or compensatory checks. These are rebates on a country's contribution to budget and were introduced in 1984 for the United Kingdom. The British were one of the main net contributors to the European budget , but they hardly benefited from its aid, 70% of which went to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Cohesion Fund. It was therefore agreed that the British would have a permanent discount on their contribution. Since then, other net contributor countries have been receiving these checks. Although in these cases they had to be negotiated with each MFF and were partial on a specific area.

It is a very controversial figure for many countries, and an attempt was already made to remove it in 2005. But what is undeniable is that it is a great bargaining chip. The frugal countries have wanted to keep it from the beginning, and even strengthen it. And faced with the difficulties of negotiation, the rest of the Member States have seen that it is an "affordable" and not very elaborate way to convince the "hawks of the north". After an initial stance, they ended up increasing it: Denmark will receive 377 million (considerably higher than the initial 222 million); Austria will double its initial amount to 565 million; Sweden will receive 1,069 million (higher than the initial 823 million); and the Netherlands will receive 1,575 million. Germany, as the largest net contributor, will receive 3.671 billion.

The last important negotiation point to be addressed is the conditionality of compliance with the rule of law in order to receive the different funds and aid. Hungary and Poland, for example, have an open transcript for possible violation of article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which allows sanctioning a Member State for violating basic values of the Union such as respect for human rights or the rule of law. Many countries have pressed the issue, but in the face of difficult negotiations and a possible risk of a veto of agreement depending on the vocabulary used by the Hungarian President Viktor Orban, this clause has come to nothing.

To recapitulate, and as stated at the beginning of article, the agreement ended up with an MFF of 1.074 trillion euros; and a post-pandemic reconstruction fund, the Next Generation EU, of 750 billion, divided into 390 billion in the form of subsidies and 360 billion in the form of loans. To this must be added Michel's "emergency brake" for the submission of aid and the significant sum of the "rebates".

The cutbacks

Yes, there have been. Apart from the already explained rule of law clause, there have been several cuts in several of the items proposed by the Commission. Firstly, a significant cut in the Just Transition Fund, which has been reduced from the initial 40 billion in the initial proposal to 10 billion, to the anger of Poland in particular. Secondly, the Funds for the rural development are reduced from 15 billion to 7 billion. Thirdly, both the external humanitarian financial aid support fund of 16.5 billion, the solvency support instrument of 31 billion (in its proposal by the Commission) and the EU4Health program of 9.4 billion have come to nothing. And finally, the project Horizon Europe would drop from the 94.4 billion proposed by the Commission to barely 5 billion.

Winners and losers?

It is difficult to speak of winners and losers in a negotiation where all parties have given quite a lot in order to achieve agreement. Although it remains to be seen whether the positions of the countries were truly immovable from the beginning or whether they were simply used as an instrument of pressure in the negotiation.

The countries most affected by the pandemic, such as Italy and Spain, can be happy because they will receive a very large sum in the form of subsidies, as they wanted. But this conditionality that they were not going to accept in any way, in a way, is going to come to them softened in the form of Michel's "emergency brake". And the reforms they did not want to be forced to make, they will have to carry out from agreement with the recovery plan they send to committee, which if they are not sufficient may be rejected by the latter.  

The frugal have succeeded in getting conditional aid, but more than half of it will be in the form of subsidies. And as a rule, the monetary limits they advocated have been exceeded.

Countries such as Poland or Hungary have succeeded in making the conditionality of the rule of law ineffective in the end, but on the other hand they have received considerable cuts in funds, such as Just Transition, which are important especially in Central Europe for the energy transition.

But, on final, each Head of State and Government has returned to his country claiming victory and assuring to have fulfilled his goal, which is what a politician has to do (or appear to do) at the end of the day.

For both the MFF 2021-2027 and Next Generation EU to go ahead, the European Parliament's ratification is still pending. Although the Parliament has always advocated for a more ambitious package than the one agreed, there is no fear that it will block it.

Conclusion

As I have stated, this agreement can be described as historic for several reasons. Apart from the obvious extension of the European committee or the Covid-19 pandemic itself, it is historic because of the Hamilton moment that seems to be about to take place.

It seems that the Member States have learned that the formula used after the crisis in 2008 did not work, that crises affect the entire Union as a whole and that no one can be left behind. Cases such as Brexit and the rise of Eurosceptic movements across the continent set a dangerous precedent and could even jeopardize the continuity of project.

The "mutualization" of debt will allow States already heavily indebted, and which due to their high risk premium would have problems to finance themselves, to get out of the crisis sooner and better. This decision will obviously lead to problems that remain to be seen, but it shows that the 27 have realized that a joint financial aid was necessary and that they cannot go to war on their own. As Merkel said when presenting her post-pandemic plan together with Macron: "This is the worst crisis in European history", and she added that, in order to emerge "stronger", it is necessary to cooperate.

This step of some fiscal unity can be seen as a rapprochement to the Federal Europe, at least in the Eurozone, that has been discussed for decades now. Whether this is a path with or without return remains to be seen.

[Richard Haas, The World. A Brief Introduction (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2020), 378 p]

August 31, 2020

review / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

During a fishing workshop on Nantucket with a friend and his son, then a computer engineering student at the prestigious Stanford University, Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, engaged the young man in conversation about his programs of study, and asked him what subjects he had taken, apart from the strictly technical ones. To his surprise, Haass noted how limited issue of these he had taken. No Economics, no history, no politics. 

Richard Haass uses this anecdote, which he refers to in the introduction to The World. A Brief Introduction, to illustrate the general state of the Education higher education in the United States -which is not, we might add, very different from that of other countries-, and which can be summarized in this reality: many students in the country that has the best universities in the world and which is also the most powerful and influential on the planet, which makes its interests global, can finish their university-level training without a minimum knowledge -let alone an understanding- of the world around them, and of its dynamics and functioning.

The World. A Brief Introduction is a direct consequence of the author's concern about the seriousness of this important gap for a nation like the United States, and in a world like today's, in which what he calls the "Las Vegas rule" - what happens in the country stays in the country - does not work, given the interconnectedness resulting from an omnipresent globalization that cannot be ignored.

The book is conceived as a basic guide intended to educate readers - hopefully including at least a portion of that plethora of uneducated students - of varying backgrounds and levels of knowledge, in the basic issues and concepts commonly used in the field of international relations.

By the very nature of the work, no informed reader should expect to find in this book great discoveries, revolutionary theories or novel approaches to contemplate the international order from a new perspective. Instead, what it offers is a systematic presentation of the essential concepts of this field of knowledge straddling History, Political Science, Sociology, Law, or Geography.

The book avoids any theoretical approach. On the contrary, its goal is eminently practical, and is none other than to present in an orderly and systematic way the information that an average reader needs to know about the world in order to form a criterion of how it works and how it is articulated. It is, in final, to make him or her more "globally educated".

From his vantage point as president of one of the leading global think-tanks, and with the experience gleaned from his years of service as part of the security establishment of the two Bush presidents, Richard Haass has made numerous important contributions to the field of international relations. In the case of the book before us now, the author's merit lies in the effort he has made to simplify the complexity inherent in international relations. In a simple and attractive prose, accessible to readers of all subject, Richard Haass, demonstrating a great understanding of each of the subjects he deals with, has managed to distill their essence and capture it in the twenty-six chapters of this brief compendium, each of which would justify, on its own, an enormous literary production.

Although each chapter can be read independently, the book is divided into four parts in which the author approaches the status of today's world and the relations between states from different angles. In the first part, Haass introduces the minimum historical framework necessary to understand the configuration of the current international system, focusing in particular on the milestones of the Peace of Westphalia, the two World Wars, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War world.

The second part devotes chapters to different regions of the world, which are briefly analyzed from a geopolitical point of view. For each region, the book describes its status, and analyzes the main challenges it faces, concluding with a look at its future. The chapter is comprehensive, although the regional division used for the analysis is somewhat questionable, and although it inexplicably omits any reference letter to the Arctic as a region with its own geopolitical identity and called to play a growing role in the globalized world to which the book constantly alludes.

The third part of the book is devoted to globalization as a defining and inescapable phenomenon of the current era with enormous impact on the stability of the international order. In several chapters, it reviews the multiple manifestations of globalization - terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, migration, cyberspace, health, international trade, monetary issues, and development- describing in each case its causes and consequences, as well as the options available at all levels to deal with them in a way that is favorable to the stability of the world order.

Finally, the last section deals with world order - the most basic concept in international relations - which it considers essential given that its absence translates into loss of life and resources, and threats to freedom and prosperity at the global level. Based on the idea that, at any historical moment and at any level, forces that promote the stability of order operate alongside others that tend towards chaos, the chapter deals with the main sources of stability, analyzing their contribution to international order -or disorder-, and concluding with the significance this has for the international era we are living in. Aspects such as sovereignty, the balance of power, alliances, or war, are dealt with in the different chapters that comprise this fourth and final part.

The coda of the book, entitled Where to Go for More, is of particular interest to those who wish to delve deeper into these matters. This final chapter offers the reader a well-balanced and authoritative compendium of journalistic, digital and literary references whose frequent use, highly recommended, will undoubtedly contribute to the educational goal proposed by the author.

It is an informative book, written to improve the training of the North American and, beyond that, global public, in matters related to the world order. This didactic character is not, however, an obstacle for Haass, in some moments, and in spite of his promise to provide an independent and non-partisan criterion that makes the reader less manipulable, to tinge those matters with his staff vision of the world order and how it should be, nor to exercise a criticism -somewhat veiled, it must be said- to the international policy, not very globalist, of the current tenant of the White House. Nevertheless, The World. A Brief Introduction offers a simple and complete introduction to the world of international relations, and is almost a must-read for anyone who wants to get started in the knowledge of the world order and the mechanisms that regulate it.

August 31, 2020

COMMENTARY / Luis Ángel Díaz Robredo*.

It may be sarcastic to some, and even cruel, to hear that these circumstances of a global pandemic by COVID-19 are interesting times for social and individual psychology. And it may be stranger still, to take these difficult times into account when establishing relationships with the security and defense of states.

First of all, we must point out the obvious: the current circumstances are exceptional because we have never before known such a threat to health that transcends such diverse and decisive areas as the world Economics , international politics, geostrategy, industry, demography... Individuals and institutions were not prepared a few months ago and, even today, we are still dealing with them with a certain degree of improvisation. The fees mortality and contagion rates have skyrocketed and the resources that the public administration has mobilized are unknown to date. Without going any further, the Balmis operation -mission statement of support against the pandemic, organized and executed by the Ministry of Defense - has deployed in 20,000 interventions, during 98 days of state of alarm and with a total of 188,713 mobilized military.

In addition to the sanitary tasks of disinfection, logistics and health support, there have been other tasks more typical of social control, such as the presence of the military in the streets and at critical points or reinforcement at borders. This work, which some people may find disconcerting due to its unusual nature of authority over the population itself, is justified by atypical group behaviors that we have observed since the beginning of the pandemic. Suffice it to cite a few Spanish examples that reflect how in some moments there have been behaviors that are not very logical for social imitation, such as the accumulation of basic necessities (food) or not so basic necessities (toilet paper) that emptied supermarket shelves for a few hours.

There have also been moments of lack of solidarity and even of certain social tension due to the fear of contagion against vulnerable groups, such as the elderly with COVID-19 who were transferred from one town to another and who were booed by the neighborhood that received them and had to be escorted by the police. Also, infrequently but equally negative and unsupportive, there have been cases in which some health workers suffered fear and rejection by their neighbors. And lately, the sanctioning and arrest of people who did not respect the rules of social distance and individual protection has been another common action of the authorities and State Security Forces and Corps. These events, which fortunately have been limited and quickly solved by the authorities, have been more than surpassed by many other positive social behaviors of solidarity, altruism and generosity among citizens.

However, since national security must contemplate not only ideal scenarios but also situations with shortages or possible risks, these social variables must be taken into account when establishing a strategy.

Secondly, the flow of information has been a veritable tsunami of forces and interests that have overwhelmed the information capabilities of entire societies, business groups and even individuals. Official media, private media, social networks and even anonymous groups with destabilizing interests have competed in this game to capture the citizen's attention. If this status has shown anything, it is that the excess of information can be as disabling as the lack of information and that even the use of false, incomplete or somehow manipulated information makes us more influential in front of the public.
This is a clear danger for social stability, the operability of health services, the facilitation of organized crime or even the mental health of the population.

Third and finally, we cannot forget that society and our institutions - including those related to security and defense - have their greatest weakness and strength based on the people who make them up. If there is one thing that the pandemic is putting at test it is the psychological strength of individuals due to the circumstance of uncertainty towards the present and future, management of fear of illness and death, and an innate need for attachment to social relationships. Our ability to cope with this new VUCA (Vulnerability, Uncertainty, Complexity, Ambiguity) scenario that affects each and every social and professional
social and professional environments requires a strong leadership style, adapted to this demanding status , authentic and based on group values. There is no unilateral solution today, if not with the effort of many. It is not empty words to affirm that the resilience of a society, of an Armed Forces or of a human group , is based on working together, fighting together, suffering together, with a cohesion and a team work properly trained.

That said, we can understand that psychological variables - at the individual and grouplevels - are at play in this pandemic status and that we can and should use the knowledge provided by Psychology as a serious science, adapted to real needs and with a constructive spirit, to plan the tactics and strategy of the current and future scenarios derived from Covid-19.

Undoubtedly, these are interesting times for psychology.

* Luis Ángel Díaz Robredo is a professor at Schoolof Educationand Psychology at the University of Navarra.

[Parag Khanna, The Future is Asian. Simon & Schuster. New York, 2019. 433 p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

Parag Khanna's book can be received with suspicion from entrance because of the apparent axiomatic character of its degree scroll. However, the blunt assertion on the cover is softened when one begins to read the pages inside. The thesis of the work is that the world is in a process of asianizationnot of chinizationMoreover, this process is presented as another coat of paint on the planet, not as a color that will be clearly predominant or definitive.

It is possible that the discussion about whether the United States is in decline and will be replaced by China as the preeminent superpower prevents seeing other parallel developments. Those watching Beijing's rise in the world order, writes Khanna, "have often been paralyzed by two views: either China will devour the world or it is on the verge of collapse. Neither is correct." "The future is Asian, even for China," he asserts.

Khanna believes that the world is moving towards a multipolar order, something that is also true in Asia, even if China's size often dazzles.

It is possible that this judgment is influenced by the author's Indian origin and also by his time living in the United States, but he offers figures to support his words. Of the 5 billion people living in Asia, 3.5 billion are not Chinese (70%): China, then, has only one third of Asia's population; it also accounts for slightly less than half of its GDP. Other data: half of the investments leaving the continent are non-Chinese, and more than half of foreign investments go to Asian countries other than China. Asia, therefore, "is more than China plus".

It is not just a question of size, but of wills. "A China-led Asia is no more acceptable to most Asians than the notion of a U.S.-led West is to Europeans," says Khanna. He rejects the idea that, because of China's power, Asia is heading toward a kind of tributary system like the one ruled in other centuries from Beijing. He points out that this system did not go beyond the Far East and was based mainly on trade.

The author reassures those who fear Chinese expansionism: "China has never been an indestructible superpower presiding over all of Asia like a colossus". Thus, he warns that while Europe's geographical characteristics have historically led many countries to fear the hegemony of a single power, in the case of Asia its geography makes it "inherently multipolar", as natural barriers absorb friction. In fact, the clashes that have taken place between China and India, China and Vietnam or India and Pakistan have ended in stalemates. "Whereas in Europe wars have occurred when there is a convergence in power between rivals, in Asia wars have taken place when there is a perception of advantage over rivals. So the more powerful China's neighbors like Japan, India or Russia are, the less likelihood of conflict between them."

For Khanna, Asia will always be a region of distinct and autonomous civilizations, especially now that we are witnessing a revival of old empires. The geopolitical future of Asia will not be led by the United States or China: "Japan, South Korea, India, Russia, Indonesia, Australia, Iran and Saudi Arabia will never come together under a hegemonic umbrella or unite in a single pole of power".

There will not be, then, a chinization of the world, according to the author, and the Asianization that is taking place - a shift of the planet's specific weight towards the Indo-Pacific - should not be seen as a threat to those who live elsewhere. Just as there was a Europeanization of the world in the 19th century, and an Americanization in the 20th century, in the 21st century we are witnessing an Asianization. Khanna sees this as "the most recent sedimentation substrate in the geology of global civilization," and as a "layer" he does not assume that the world Withdrawal to what came before. "Being more Asian doesn't necessarily mean being less American or European," he says.

The book analyzes the weight and fit of different Asian countries in the continent. Of Russia, he says it is strategically closer to China today than at any time since its communist pact in the 1950s. Khanna believes that geography leads to this understanding, as it invites Canada to maintain good relations with the United States; he predicts that climate change will further open up the lands of Siberia, which will integrate them more with the rest of the Asian continent.

As for India and China's relationship, Khanna believes that both countries will have to accept each other as powers more normally. For example, despite India's reluctance towards China's Silk Road and India's own regional connectivity projects, in the end the two countries' preferred corridors "will overlap and even reinforce each other," ensuring that products from Asia's interior reach the Indian Ocean. "Geopolitical rivalries will only accelerate the Asianization of Asia," Khanna sentences.

When assessing the importance of Asia, the book includes Middle East oil. Technically, this region is part of the continent, but it is such a separate chapter with its own dynamics that it is difficult to see it as Asian territory. The same is true when label is used to refer to Israel or Lebanon. It may give the impression that the author is lumping everything together to make the figures more impressive. He argues that the Middle East is becoming less and less dependent on Europe and the United States and is looking more towards the East.

Khanna is in a position to reasonably defend himself against most of the objections that can be made to his text. The most controversial, however, is the justification, close to defense, that he makes of technocracy as a system of government. Beyond the descriptive attitude of a model that in some countries has hosted an important economic and social development , Khanna even seems to endorse its moral superiority.

▲ Members of Colombia's National Liberation Army [Voces de Colombia].

ESSAY / Angel Martos

Terrorism and transnational organized crime are some of the most relevant topics nowadays in international security. The former represents a traditional threat that has been present during most our recent history, especially since the second half of the twentieth century. International organized crime, on the other hand, has taken place throughout history in multiple ways. Examples can be found even in the pre-industrial era: In rural and coastal areas, where law enforcement was weaker, bandits and pirates all over the world made considerable profit from hijacking vehicles along trade routes and roads, demanding a payment or simply looting the goods that the merchants carried. The phenomenon has evolved into complex sets of interconnected criminal networks that operate globally and in organized way, sometimes even with the help of the authorities.

In this paper, the author will analyze the close interaction between terrorism and organized crime often dubbed the "crime-terror continuum". After explaining the main tenets of this theory, a case study will be presented. It is the network of relations that exists in Latin America which links terrorist groups with drug cartels. The evolution of some of these organizations into a hybrid comprising terrorist and criminal activity will also be studied.

Defining concepts

The crime-terror nexus is agreed to have been consolidated in the post-Cold War era. After the 9/11 attacks, the academic community began to analyze more deeply and thoroughly the threat that terrorism represented for international security. However, there is one specific topic that was not paid much attention until some years later: the financing of terrorist activity. Due to the decline of state sponsorship for terrorism, these groups have managed to look for funding by partnering with organized criminal groups or engaging in illicit activities themselves. Starting in the 1980s with what later came to be known as narco-terrorism, the use of organized crime by terrorist groups became mainstream in the 1990s. Taxing drug trade and credit-card fraud are the two most common sources of revenues for these groups (Makarenko, 2010).

The basic level of relationship that exists between two groups of such different nature is an alliance. Terrorists may look for different objectives when allying with organized crime groups. For example, they may seek expert knowledge (money-laundering, counterfeiting, bomb-making, etc.) or access to smuggling routes. Even if the alliances may seem to be only beneficial for terrorist groups, criminal networks benefit from the destabilizing effect terrorism has over political institutions, and from the additional effort law enforcement agencies need to do to combat terrorism, investing resources that will not be available to fight other crimes. Theirs is a symbiotic relation in which both actors win. A popular example in the international realm is the protection that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) offered to drug traders that smuggle cocaine from South America through West and North Africa towards Europe. During the last decade, the terrorist organization charged a fee on the shipments in exchange for its protection along the route (Vardy, 2009).

The convergence of organizations

Both types of organizations can converge into one up to the point that the resulting group can change its motives and objectives from one side to the other of the continuum, constituting a hybrid organization whose defining points and objectives blur. An organization of this nature could be both a criminal group with political motivations, and a terrorist group interested in criminal profits. The first one may for example be interested in getting involved in political processes and institutions or may use violence to gain a monopolized control over a lucrative economic sector.

Criminal and terrorist groups mutate to be able to carry out by themselves a wider range of activities (political and financial) while avoiding competitiveness, misunderstandings and threats to their internal security. This phenomenon was popularized after the 1990s, when criminal groups sought to manipulate the operational conditions of weak states, while terrorist groups sought to find new financial sources other than the declining state sponsors. A clear example of this can be found in the Italian Mafia during the 1990s. A series of deliberate bombing attacks were reported in key locations such as the Uffizi Galleries in Florence and the church of St. John Lateran in Rome. The target was not a specific enemy, but rather the public opinion and political authorities (the Anti-Mafia Commission) who received a warning for having passed legislation unfavorable to the interests of the criminal group. Another example far away from Europe and its traditional criminal groups can be found in Brazil. In the early 2000s, a newly elected government carried out a crackdown on several criminal organizations like the Red Commandthe Amigos dos Amigos, and the group Third Commandwhich reacted violently by unleashing brutal terrorist attacks on governmental buildings and police officers. These attacks gave the Administration no other choice but to give those groups back the immunity with which they had always operated in Rio de Janeiro.

On the other side of the relationship, terrorist organizations have also engaged in criminal activities, most notably illicit drug trade, in what has been a common pattern since the 1970s. Groups like the FARC, ETA, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), or Shining Path are among them. The PKK, for example, made most of its finances using its advantageous geographic location as well as the Balkan routes of entry into Europe to smuggle heroin from Asia into Europe. In yet another example, Hezbollah is said to protect heroin and cocaine laboratories in the Bekaa Valley, in Lebanon.

Drug trafficking is not the only activity used by terrorist groups. Other criminal activities serve the same purpose. For example, wholesale credit-card fraud all around Europe is used by Al Qaeda to gain profits (US$ 1 million a month). Furthermore, counterfeit products smuggling has been extensively used by paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland and Albanian extremist groups to finance their activities.

Sometimes, the fusion of both activities reaches a point where the political cause that once motivated the terrorist activity of a group ends or weakens, and instead of disbanding, it drifts toward the criminal side and morphs into an organized criminal association with no political motivations) that the convergence thesis identifies is the one of terrorist organizations that have ultimately maintained their political façade for legitimation purposes but that their real motivations and objectives have mutated into those of a criminal group. They are thus able to attract recruits via 2 sources, their political and their financial one. Abu SayyafThe Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and FARC are illustrative of this. Abu Sayyaf, originally founded to establish an Islamic republic in the territory comprising Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago (Philippines), is now dedicated exclusively to kidnapping and marijuana plantations. The former granted them US$ 20 million only in 2000. Colombian FARC, since the 1990s, has followed the same path: according to Paul Wilkinson, they have evolved from a revolutionary group that had state-wide support into a criminal guerrilla involved in protection of crops and laboratories, also acting as "middlemen" between farmers and cartels; kidnapping, and extortion. By the beginning of our century, they controlled 40 per cent of Colombia's territory and received an annual revenue of US$ 500 million (McDermott, 2003).

"Black hole states

The ultimate danger the convergence between criminal and terrorist groups may present is a situation where a weak or failed state becomes a safe haven for the operations of hybrid organizations like those described before. This is known as the "black hole" syndrome. Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Angola, Sierra Leone and North Korea are examples of states falling into this category. Other regions, such as the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan, and others in Indonesia and Thailand in which the government presence is weak can also be considered as such.

Afghanistan has been considered a "black hole state" since at least the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989. Since the beginning of the civil war, the groups involved in it have sought to survive, oftentimes renouncing to their ideological foundations, by engaging in criminal activity such as the production and trafficking of opiates, arms or commodities across the border with Pakistan, together with warlords. The chaos that reigns in the country is a threat not only to the nation itself and its immediate neighbors, but also to the entire world.

The People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is, on the other hand, considered a criminal state. This is because it has engaged in transnational criminal activities since the 1970s, with its "Bureau 39", a government department that manages the whole criminal activity for creating hard currency (drug trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, privacy, etc.). This was proved when the Norwegian government expelled officials of the North Korean embassy in 1976 alleging that they were engaged in the smuggling of narcotics and unlicensed goods (Galeotti, 2001).

Another situation may arise where criminal and terrorist groups deliberately foster regional instability for their own economic benefits. In civil wars, these groups may run the tasks that a state's government would be supposed to run. It is the natural evolution of a territory in which a political criminal organization or a commercial terrorist group delegitimizes the state and replaces its activity. Examples of this situation are found in the Balkans, Caucasus, southern Thailand and Sierra Leone (Bangura, 1997).

In Sierra Leone, for example, it is now evident that the violence suffered in the 1990s during the rebellion of the Revolutionary United Forces (RUF) had nothing to do with politics or ideals - it was rather a struggle between the guerrilla and the government to crack down on the other party and reap the profits of illicit trade in diamonds. There was no appeal to the population or political discourse whatsoever. The "black hole" thesis illustrates how civil wars in our times are for the most part a legitimization for the private enrichment of the criminal parties involved and at the same time product of the desire of these parties for the war to never end.

The end of the Cold War saw a shift in the study of the nexus between crime and terrorism. During the previous period, it was a phenomenon only present in Latin America between insurgent groups and drug cartels. It was not until the emergence of Al Qaeda's highly networked and globally interconnected cells that governments realized the level of threat to international security that non-state actors could pose. As long as weak or failed states exist, the crime-terror nexus will be further enhanced. Moreover, the activity of these groups will be buttressed by effects of globalization such as the increase of open borders policies, immigration flows, international transportation infrastructure, and technological development. Policymakers do not pay enough attention to the criminal activities of both types of organizations. Rather than dealing with the political motivations of a group, what really makes the difference is to focus on its funding resources - credit-card frauds, smuggling, money laundering, etc.

The following section focuses on the crime-terror continuum that exists between illegal drug trade and terrorist networks. This phenomenon has emerged in many regions all around the world, but the case of Latin America, or the Andean region more specifically, represents the paradigm of the characteristics, dangers and opportunities of these situations.

NARCO-TERRORISM CASE STUDY:

When drug trafficking meets political violence

The concept of narco-terrorism was born in recent years as a result of the understanding of illicit drug trade and terrorism as two interconnected phenomena. Traditionally linked with Latin America, the concept can now be found in other parts of the world like, for example, the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan), or the Golden Triangle (Thailand, Laos and Myanmar).

There is no consensus on the convenience and accuracy of the term "narco-terrorism," if only because it may refer to different realities. One can think of narco-terrorism as the use of terrorist attacks by criminal organizations such as the Colombian Medellin Cartel to attain an immediate political goal. Or, from a different point of view, one can think of a terrorist organization engaging in illicit drug trade to raise funds for its activity. Briefly, according to Tamara Makarenko's Crime-Terror Continuum construct all organizations, no matter the type, could at some point move along this continuum depending on their activities and motivations; from the one extreme of a purely criminal organization, to the other of a purely political one, or even constituting a hybrid in the middle (Makarenko, 2010).

There is a general perception of a usual interaction between drug-trafficking and terrorist organizations. Here, it is necessary to distinguish between the cooperation of two organizations of each nature, and an organization carrying out activities under both domains. There are common similarities between the different organizations that can be highlighted to help policymaking more effective.

Both type of organizations cohabit in the same underground domain of society and share the common interest of remaining undiscovered by law enforcement authorities. Also, their transnational operations follow similar patterns. Their structure is vertical in the highest levels of the organization and turns horizontal in the lowest. Finally, the most sophisticated among them use a cell structure to reduce information sharing to the bare minimum to reduce the risk of the organization being unveiled if some of its members are arrested.

The main incentive for organizations to cooperate are tangible resources. Revenues from narcotics trafficking might be very helpful for terrorist organizations, while access to explosive material may benefit drug trade organizations. As an example, according to the Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2004, an estimated US$ 2.3 billion of the total revenue of global drug trade end up in the hands of organizations like Al Qaeda. Another example is the illegal market of weapons emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, field of interest of both types of networks. On the other hand, intangible resources are similar to tangible in usefulness but different in essence. Intangible resources that drug trafficking organizations possess and can be in the interests of terrorist ones are the expertise on methods and routes of transports, which could be used for terrorist to smuggle goods or people - drug corridors such as the Balkan route or the Northern route. On the other way around, terrorists can share the military tactics, know-how and skills to perpetrate attacks. Some common resources that can be used by both in their benefit are the extended networks and contacts (connections with corrupt officials, safe havens, money laundering facilities, etc.) A good example of the latter can be found in the hiring of ELN members by Pablo Escobar to construct car bombs.

The organizations are, as we have seen, often dependent on the same resources, communications, and even suppliers. This does not lead to cooperation, but rather to competition, even to conflict. Examples can be traced back to the 1980s in Peru when clashes erupted between drug traffickers and the terrorist Shining Pathand in Colombia when drug cartels and the FARC clashed for territorial matters. Even the protection of crops terrorists offer to drug traffickers is one of the main drivers of conflict, even if they do find common grounds of understanding most of the time; for example, in terms of government, revenue-motivated organizations are a threat to the state as they fight to weaken some parts of it such as law enforcement or jurisdiction, while politically-motivated ones wish not only to undermine the state but to radically change its structures to fit their ideological vision (state-run economy, religious-based society, etc.).

The terrorism and drug connection in the Andean Region

Nowhere has the use of illicit drug trade as a source of funds for terrorism been so developed as in the Andean Region (Steinitz, 2002). Leftist groups such as FARC and Peruvian Shining Pathas well as right-wing paramilitary organizations such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) are involved in this activity. At the beginning, the engagement between terrorists and drug traffickers was limited only to fees imposed by the former on the latter in exchange for the protection of crops, labs and shipments. Later, FARC and AUC have further expanded this engagement and are now involved in the early stages of the traffic itself - the main substance being cocaine, and the main reward money and arms from the drug syndicates. The terrorist cells can therefore be considered a hybrid of political and criminal groups. The following paragraphs will further analyze each case.

Peru's Shining Path

Shining Path (SL) started to operate in the Huallaga Valley, a strong Peruvian coca region, several years after its foundation, in 1980. Peru was at the time the world's first producer of coca leaf. The plant was then processed into coca paste and transported to Colombian laboratories by traffickers. Arguably, the desire for profit from the coca business rather than for political influence was the ultimate motive for Shining Path's expansion into the region. SL protected the crops and taxed the production and transportation of coca paste: the 1991 document "Economic Balance of the Shining Path" shows that the group charged US$ 3,000-7,000 per flight leaving Huallaga. Taxes were also levied in exchange for a service that the group provided the coca growers: negotiating favorable prices with the traffickers. In the late 1980s, SL's annual income from the business was estimated at US$ 15-100 million (McClintock, 1998).

The Peruvian government's fight against SL represents a milestone in the fight against the terrorism-crime nexus. Lima set up a political-military command which focused on combating terrorism while ignoring drugs, because a reasonable percentage of the Peruvian population eked out a living by working in the coca fields. The government also avoided using the police as they were seen as highly corruptible. They succeeded in gaining the support of peasant growers and traffickers of Huallaga Valley, a valuable source of intelligence to use against SL. The latter finally left the Valley.

But it was not a final victory. Due to the vacuum SL left, the now more powerful traffickers reduced the prices paid for the coca leaf. SL was no longer there to act as an intermediary in defense of peasants and minor traffickers, so thanks to the new lower prices, the cocaine market experienced a boom. The military deployed in the area started to accept bribes in exchange for their laissez-faire attitude, becoming increasingly corrupted. President Fujimori in 1996 carried out a strategy of interdiction of the flights that departed from the Valley carrying coca paste to Colombia, causing the traffickers and farmers to flee and the coca leaf price to fall notably. However, this environment did not last long, and the country is experiencing a rise in drug trade and terrorist subversive activities.

The Colombian nexus expands

The collapse of the Soviet Union and an economic crisis in Cuba diminished the amount of aid that the FARC could receive. After the government's crackdown, with the help of Washington, of the Medellin and Cali cartels, the drug business in Colombia was seized by numerous smaller networks. There was not any significant reduction of the cocaine flow into the United States. The FARC benefited greatly from the neighboring states' actions, gaining privileged access to drug money. Peru under Fujimori had cracked down on the coca paste transports, and Bolivia's government had also put under strict surveillance its domestic drug cultivation. This elimination of competitors caused a doubling of coca production in Colombia between 1995 and 2000. Moreover, opium poppy cultivation also grew significantly and gained relevance in the US' East-coast market. The FARC also benefited from this opportunity.

According to the Colombian government, in 1998 the terrorist groups earned US$ 551 million from drug, US$ 311 million from extortion, and US$ 236 million from kidnapping. So much so that the organization has been able to pay higher salaries to its recruits than the Colombian army pays its soldiers. By 2000, the FARC had an estimated 15,000-20,000 recruits in more than 70 fronts, de facto controlling 1/3 of the nation's territory. Most of the criminal-derived money in the country comes nowadays from taxation and protection of the drug business. According to the Colombian Military, more than half both the FARC's fronts were involved in the collection of funds by the beginning of the 2000s decade, compared to 40% approx. of AUC fronts (Rebasa and Chalk, 1999).

The situation that was created in both scenarios required created a chaos in which the drug cartels, the cultivation syndicates and the terrorist organizations were the strongest actors. This makes it a very unstable environment for the peoples that lived in the territories under criminal/terrorist control. The tactics of law enforcement agents and government, in these cases, need to be carefully planned, so that multilateral counter-drug/counter-terrorist strategies can satisfactorily address threats existing at multiple dimensions. In the following section, the author will review some key aspects of the policies carried out by the US government in this domain.

The "War on Drugs" and the "War on Terror".

Since 9/11, policies considering both threats as being intertwined have become more and more popular. The separation of counter terrorism and counter-narcotics has faded significantly. Although in the Tashkent Conferences of 1999-2000 the necessary link between both was already mentioned, the milestone of cooperative policies is the Resolution 1373 of the UN Security Council (Björnehed, 2006). In it, emphasis is given to the close connection between terrorism and all kinds of organized crime, and therefore coordination at national, regional and global level is said to be necessary. War on drugs and war on terror should no longer be two separate plans of action.

The effectiveness of a policy that wishes to undermine the threat of illicit drug trade and terrorism is to a high degree dependent on successful intelligence gathering. Information about networks, suspects, shipments, projects, etc. benefits agencies fighting drug trafficking as well as those fighting terrorism, since the resources are most of the times shared. Narco-terrorism nexus is also present in legal acts, with the aim of blocking loopholes in law enforcement efforts. Examples are the Victory Act and the Patriot Act, passed in the US. Recognizing the natural link and cooperation between drug trade and terrorism leads to security analysts developing more holistic theories for policymakers to implement more accurate and useful measures.

However, there are many aspects in which illicit drug trade and terrorist activity differ, and so do the measures that should be taken against them. An example of a failure to understand this point can be found in Afghanistan, where the Taliban in 2000 set a ban on poppy cultivation which resulted in a strong increase of its price, this being a victory for traffickers since the trade did not stop. Another idea to have in mind is that strategies of a war on drugs differ greatly depending on the nature of the country: whether it is solely a consumer like the UK or a producer and consumer like Tajikistan. In regard to terrorism, the measures adopted to undermine it (diplomacy, foreign aid, democratization, etc.) may have minimal effect on the fight against drug trade.

Sometimes, the risk of unifying counter-policies is leaving some areas in which cooperation is not present unattended. Certain areas are suitable for a comprehensive approach such as intelligence gathering, law enforcement and security devices, while others such as drug rehabilitation are not mutually beneficial. Not distinguishing the different motivations and goals among organizations can lead to a failed homogenous policy.

CONCLUSIONS:

Multilevel threats demand multilevel solutions

Terrorism has traditionally been considered a threat to national and international security, while illicit drug trade a threat to human security. This perception derives from the effects of drugs in a consumer country, although war on drugs policies are usually aimed at supplier ones. Although it was already constituting a threat to regional stability during the twentieth century, it was not considered a crucial political issue until 9/11 attacks, when the cooperative link between criminal and terrorist organizations became evident. An example of unequal attention paid to both threats can be found in US's Plan Colombia in 2000: one of the main advocators of the legislation stated that the primary focus was on counter-drug, so the United States would not engage with Colombian counterinsurgency efforts (Vaicius, Ingrid and Isacson, 2003).The same type of failure was also seen in Afghanistan but in the opposite way, when the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) completely neglected any action against drug traffickers, the trade or the production itself.

The merging of drug trafficking and terrorism as two overlapping threats have encouraged authorities to develop common policies of intelligence gathering and law enforcement. The similarities between organizations engaged in each activity are the main reason for this. However, the differences between them are also relevant, and should be taken into consideration for the counter policies to be accurate enough.

Evidence of a substantial link between terrorists and criminals has been proved all along our recent history. Around the world, leaders of mafias and terrorist commanders have oftentimes worked together when they felt that their objectives were close, if not similar. When cohabitating in the outlaw world, groups tend to offer each other help, usually in exchange for something. This is part of human behavior. Added to the phenomenon of globalization, lines tend to be blurred for international security authorities, and thus for the survival of organizations acting transnationally.

The consequences can be noticed especially in Latin America, and more specifically in organizations such as the FARC. We can no longer tell what are the specific objectives and the motivations that pushed youngsters to flee towards the mountains to learn to shoot and fabricate bombs. Is it a political aspiration? Or is it rather an economic necessity? The reason why we cannot answer this question without leaving aside a substantial part of the explanation is the evolution of the once terrorist organization into a hybrid group that moves all along the crime-terror continuum.

The ideas of Makarenko, Björnehed and Steinitz have helped the international community in its duty to protect its societies. It cannot be expected for affected societies to live in peace if the competent authorities try to tackle its structural security issues only through the counter-terrorist approach or through the organized crime lens. The hybrid threats that the world is suffering in the twenty-first century demand hybrid solutions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY .

Bangura, Y. (1997) 'Understanding the political and cultural dynamics of the sierra leone war', Africa Development, vol. 22, no. 3/4 [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Björnehed, E., 2006. Narco-Terrorism: The Merger Of The War On Drugs And The War On Terror. [online] Taylor & Francis. Available at [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Galeotti, M. (2001) 'Criminalisation of the DPRK', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 13, no. 3 (March) [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Makarenko, T., 2010. The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing The Interplay Between Transnational Organised Crime And Terrorism. [online] Taylor & Francis. Available at [Accessed 3 April 2020].

McClintock, C. Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 341 [Accessed 10 April 2020].

McDermott, J. (2003) 'Financing insurgents in Colombia', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 15, no. 2.

(February) [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Mutschke, R., (2000) 'The threat posed by organised crime, international drug trafficking and terrorism', written testimony to the General Secretariat Hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime (13 December) [Accessed 14 June 2020].

Rebasa and Chalk, pp. 32-33; "To Turn the Heroin Tide," Washington Post, February 22, 1999, p. A9; "Colombian Paramilitary Chief Shows Face," Associated Press, March 2, 2000.

Steinitz, M., 2002. The Terrorism And Drug Connection In Latin America'S Andean Region. [online] Brian Loveman, San Diego State University. Available at [Accessed 10 April 2020].

Vaicius, Ingrid and Isacson, Adam "'The War on Drugs' meets the 'War on Terror' " (CIP International Policy Report February 2003) p. 13.

Vardy, N., 2009. Al-Qaeda's New Business Model: Cocaine And Human Trafficking. [online] Forbes. Available at [Accessed 14 June 2020].

Three visions

However, the desire to create a cooperative body within the Weimar Triangle is quite a challenge challenge, as each country represents, in one way or another, one of three of the foreign policy agendas dividing Europe.

At one end of the spectrum is French Gaullism, which advocates an independent Europe and is wary of the presence of the United States in Europe, as it should be remembered that France already has a strong army. Paris abandoned this perspective for the Atlanticist one in 2007 under Sarkozy, but it has been regained by Macron. This means that Macron's rhetoric could lead to clashes with the Americans, while he also seeks to mark profile his own position vis-à-vis Moscow and Beijing.

In the middle is German pragmatism: Germany does not want to increase conflicts and prefers to focus on its Economics. On the one hand it is negotiating with the Russians to receive gas for its industrial activity and on the other it wants US troops to remain on its territory, as their departure would force it to increase the expense in security. In the European plans for recovery after the Covid-19 pandemic, Germany has been clearly more absent and Macron has been the one who has taken the initiative.

Finally we find Polish Atlanticism. Poland is perhaps the most Atlanticist country in the EU. Even under the Trump Administration there has been a high level of pro-Americanism among the population and the political class . The government has bid to succeed in hosting a U.S. base, and Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak has enthusiastically praised the U.S. role as a defender of the free world. This is not new, as already the 2003 invasion of Iraq was supported by Poland, in the face of French and German rejection. Poland continues to see Russia as its greatest threat and the United States and NATO as guarantors of protection.

The Triangle returns

Its status geographical explains Poland's position and it is not going to stop wanting NATO's instructions on its territory. However, it understands that it needs close allies with greater internal stability - hence its rapprochement with Germany and France - than that offered by the Trump Administration, whose international image is badly damaged, or a United Kingdom more occupied with managing Brexit than security issues.

On the other hand, Macron wants to prevent Poland from replacing the United Kingdom as the representative of American policy in Europe, so he has changed his strategy to avoid alienating it by criticizing its judicial reforms. Macron did not mention them in his visit to Warsaw in February this year and only encouraged to "respect European values". Somehow Macron understands that after Brexit he is going to need Poland to advance his European foreign policy plans and that is why it is important to bring it into conference room command. Macron went so far as to say in Warsaw that Poland, Germany and France should lead the post-Brexit Union. He also announced the dispatch of 600 more men to Poland, which will bring the number of French soldiers in Poland to 5,100.

At meeting, the two leaders agreed to meet with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, although the constraints imposed by the coronavirus pandemic have slowed down some contacts, while waiting for Economics to begin to recover. The recently inaugurated German presidency of the committee , moreover, discourages Berlin from appearing overly aligned with a certain European vector. A certain temporary hibernation of the Weimar Triangle may therefore occur; in any case, although it is a risky formula, if coordinated with the Parliament and the Commission, its consolidation could represent a step forward in European cohesion and governance.

[Bruno Maçães, History Has Begun. The Birth of a New America. Hurst and Co. London, 2020. 203 p.]

review / Emili J. Blasco

What if the United States were not in decline, but quite the opposite? The United States could actually be in its beginnings as a great power. This is what Bruno Maçães argues in his new book, the degree scroll -History Has Begun- in a certain sense refutes Fukuyama's end of history, which saw the democratization of the world at the end of the 20th century as the culmination of the West. Precisely, the hypothesis of the internationalist of Portuguese origin is that the United States is developing its own original civilization, separate from what has been understood until now as Western civilization, in a world in which the very concept of the West is losing strength.

Maçães' work follows three lines of attention: the progressive separation of the USA from Europe, the characteristics that identify the specific American civilization and the struggle between the USA and China for the new world order. The author had already developed aspects of these themes in his two immediately preceding works, already reviewed here: The Dawn of Eurasia y Belt and Roadand now focuses on the US. The three titles are basically a sequence: the progressive dissolution of the European peninsula in the Eurasian continent as a whole, the emergence of China as the superpower of this great continental mass and the remaining role of Washington on the planet.

As to whether the U.S. is going up or leave, Maçães writes in the book's introduction, "Conventional wisdom suggests that the United States has already reached its peak. But what if it is simply now beginning to forge its own path forward?" The volume is written before the coronavirus crisis and the deep unease now apparent in American society, but even before that some signs of U.S. domestic unrest, such as political polarization or divergence over the direction of its foreign policy, were already evident. "The present moment in the history of the United States is both a moment of destruction and a moment of creation," says Maçães, who considers that the country is going through "convulsions" typical of this process of destructive creation. In his opinion, in any case, they are "the birth pangs of a new culture instead of the death throes of an old civilization".

It could be thought that the United States is simply evolving towards a mixed culture, the result of globalization, so that the influence that some European countries have had in shaping U.S. society in recent centuries is now being joined by Asian immigration. In fact, it is expected that by mid-century immigrants from the other side of the Pacific will outnumber those arriving from Mexico and Central America, which, although imbued with indigenous cultures, largely follow the Western paradigm. Between the first European and the new Asian heritage, a "hybrid Eurasian" culture could develop in the United States.

Indeed, at one point in the book, Maçães asserts that the US "is no longer a European nation," but "in fundamental respects now seems more similar to countries like India or Russia or even the Republic of Iran." However, he disagrees with this hybrid Eurasian perspective and argues instead for the development of a new, indigenous American society, separate from modern Western civilization, rooted in new sentiments and thoughts.

When describing this different way of being, Maçães deals mainly with some manifestations, from which he gradually deduces deeper aspects. "Why do Americans speak so loudly?" he asks, referring to one such symptom. His theory is that American life emphasizes its own artificiality as a way of reminding its participants that, at bottom, they are experiencing a story. "The American way of life is consciously about language, storytelling, plot and form, and is meant to draw attention to its status as fiction." An entire chapter, for example, is devoted to analyzing the importance of television in the US. In the midst of these considerations, the reader may come to think that the reasoning has been drifting towards a cultural essay , leaving the field of international relations, but in the conclusion of the work the ends are conveniently tied up.

Having left this loose end here, the book goes on to analyze the pulse between Washington and Beijing. He recalls that since its rise as a world power around 1900, the permanent strategic goal of the USA has been to prevent a single power from controlling the whole of Eurasia. Previous threats in this regard were Germany and the USSR and today it is China. employee Normally, Washington would resort to the balance of power, using Europe, Russia and India against China (using a game historically played by Great Britain for the goal to prevent a single country from controlling the European continent), but for the moment the US has focused on directly confronting China. Maçães sees the Trump Administration's policy as confusing. "If the US wants to adopt a strategy of maximum pressure against Beijing, it needs to be clearer about the end game": is this constraining Chinese economic power or converting China to the Western model , he asks. He intuits that the ultimate goal is to "decouple" the Western world from China, creating two separate economic spheres.

Maçães believes that China will hardly manage to dominate the supercontinent, since "the unification of the whole of Eurasia under a single power is so far from being inevitable that in fact it has never been achieved". In any case, he considers that, because of its interest as a superpower, the US may end up playing not so much the role of "great balancer" (given the weight of China it is difficult for any of its neighbors to exercise a counterweight) as that of "great creator" of the new order. "China must be trimmed down in size and other pieces must be accumulated, if a balance is to be the final product," he asserts.

It is here that the American character as a builder of stories and narratives finally comes back into the picture, with a somewhat flimsy argument. Maçães can see the US succeeding in this task of "great creator" if it treats its allies with autonomy. As in a novel, his role as narrator "is to bring all the characters together and preserve their own individual spheres"; "the narrator has learned not to impose a single truth on the whole, and at the same time no character will be allowed to replace him." "For the United States," Maçães concludes, "the age of nation-building is over. The age of world building has begun."