[Enrique Serrano, ¿Por qué fracasa Colombia? Delirios de una nación que se desconoce a sí misma, Planeta, Bogotá 2016, 273 pages].

review / María Oliveros [English version].

Colombia's history has often been classified as one of the most violent. The long chapter of FARC terrorism or the confrontation of drug cartels are well present, but before that there were violent events in Colombia such as the Revolt of the Comuneros, the Thousand Days War or the Banana Plantation Massacre. A succession of events that has led most Colombians to believe that violence has characterized the country's history and that perhaps they can do little to avoid it.

That belief is challenged by Colombian communicator, philosopher and writer Enrique Serrano in ¿Por qué fracasa Colombia? Delusions of a nation that does not know itself. The book's purpose is to analyze why Colombia has not prospered more as a country. To answer that question, Serrano reviews in short chapters the Colombian mentality since the beginnings of the nation; there he finds reasons why Colombia is a country that has had a hard time getting ahead, growing in progress and being able to develop to its full potential.

¿Por qué fracasa Colombia? is a risky book, which combats thoughts that have long remained in the minds of Colombians. Against that central belief that violence has characterized the country's history, Serrano warns from the very first pages: "It is also presumed that this is a nation plagued by the most vicious violence, from its beginnings to the present day. However, it has been more peaceful than violent, at least during most of its slow training and that although the importance of violence cannot be denied, it is episodic, recent, similar to that of other peoples in transition".

Serrano tries to expose the history of a country that does not begin in 1810 with the independence, but its origins go much further back, to the moment when the Spaniards arrived in America and settled in Colombia. All this in order to show the reader that during the three hundred years that followed the arrival of the first conquistadors, Colombia was a peaceful and measured nation.

Serrano's main premise is that those who arrived in Colombia were mostly new Christians, descendants of Arabs and Jews, coming from southern Spain, who were looking for a place provisional to settle and avoid the religious conflicts that were occurring in Spain at that time. The newcomers settled in small urbanizations, some far from others, not only because that was what the country's geography allowed, but also because the last thing they wanted was to come into conflict with other settlers, both European and indigenous, according to Serrano.

In fact, it is questionable whether the new settlers were dominated by a refractory private religious approach or whether the search for refuge for their consciences motivated, in most cases, their departure to America. It seems that the author adjusts the starting point thinking of those later aspects that he wants to explain.

The author also defends the thesis that in Colombia there was a racial miscegenation, but not a cultural miscegenation, because the indigenous culture was very weak, which contributed to the assumption of the religion brought by the Spaniards. In the culture that the Spaniards transmitted to the new generations were ideas such as provisionality or even getting used to failure: "They also had to react in a peaceful, non-violent way when events were unfavorable and they could not fulfill their desires. Therefore, a relative tolerance and awareness that the frustration of the achievement of desires is something probable, is in the old patterns of upbringing of the Colombian nation".

Serrano suggests that this mentality that originated centuries ago is still present in Colombia: the idea of not making the maximum effort, of not taking too many risks for fear of failure, of doing things half-heartedly so as not to lose too much in case they go wrong. Probably this mentality that was created over the years explains why urbanization projects in the country do not progress properly, why the subway project in the Colombian capital has not been able to materialize, or why it has cost the country so much to exploit its resources to the maximum.

Although the book touches on other aspects such as language, body hygiene and social classes, history is undoubtedly the fundamental component. Referring to historical events of the Colombian past, Serrano proposes a vision of national history far from the usual one. Thus, as has been said, his story does not begin with the cry for independence of 1810, but explains the Spanish society of the 15th and 16th centuries, in order to understand the mentality of the first men, women and families who arrived in America. It is an optimistic vision that seeks to share the idea that not everything has been suffering in Colombian history. 

It is a fact that the country's history is not lived or remembered with much encouragement by Colombians. Remembering the past is for many a way of recalling the violence, wars and national polarization that began with the training of the two major parties, Liberals and Conservatives, in the mid-nineteenth century. Knowing the past well, in any case, is paramount for progress; that is what the new law decreed on January 1, 2018, which obliges all schools in the country to teach class Colombian History, seeks to do. 

The book concludes with a series of suggestions about the present and the future. That last chapter, graduate Where can such a nation go? tries to transmit a feeling of hope, while at the same time it is a call to a high level of responsibility. According to the author, knowing the past and not running away from it, but accepting it in order to improve mentalities and habits, is what will give the country the basis for not failing. 

[Mai'a K. Davis Cross, The Politics of Crisis in Europe. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 2017. 248 pages]

review / Mª Teresa La Porte [English version].

The main thesis of the extensive research presented in this work is condensed in one of its last conclusions: 'Indeed, what the crisis over Iraq, the constitution, and the Eurozone have revealed is that even in the face of extreme adversity, and even when the easy route of freezing or rolling back integration is on the table before them, Europeans routinely choose more Europe, not less' (p. 235). The author justifies this assertion by arguing that the perception of existential crisis that periodically plagues the European Union is a social construct, initiated and orchestrated by the media and public opinion shapers who control the elaboration of narratives and determine public perception of the facts. Media coverage amplifies a problem that, although undeniable, does not question the existence of the European Union. This negative vision provokes in citizens what Cross calls 'integrational panic', generating a feeling of catastrophe that is multiplied through political discourse. The absence of a 'real crisis' would be demonstrated by the fact that, after these apparent catastrophes, there is a noticeable advance in European integration and a renewed desire to find a consensus.

The book presents an analysis of three recent 'crises' that the European Union has gone through: the dispute over participation in the Iraq war (2003), the discussion over the European Constitution (2005) and the economic crisis in the Eurozone (2010-12). Each of the cases comprises a qualitative and quantitative study of international leading media content, an examination of public opinion reaction and a monitoring of political decision making. Despite the difference between the case studies, the author finds a common patron saint to all of them that allows the comparative study and is developed as follows: emergence of the conflict that provokes the discussion, negative reaction of the social instigators elaborating alarming narratives, perception of existential crisis by the citizenry, state of 'catharsis' (catharsis) in which tensions are relaxed and a serene reflection on the events takes place, and, finally, the resolution phase in which political measures are adopted that reinforce European integration (European Security Strategy, 2003 (European Security Strategy); Lisbon Treaty, 2009 (Lisbon Treaty); European Fiscal Compact, 2012 (Fiscal Compact)).

The European Union is understood as a project in the process of development: 'a work in progress, a project that is perennially in the middle of its evolution, with no clearly defined end goal' (p.2). The disagreements between the member states, in relation to foreign policy or to the Degree integration, are typical of an ambitious initiative, which is in the process of maturing and which is always moving forward with the agreement of each and every one of its members. However, the study does not underestimate the real difficulties faced by the Community institution, which are present throughout research.

Of particular interest is the close monitoring of the social dynamics generated by the interpretation of the 'crisis of existence' of the European Union. The processes of elaboration of narratives by the media, the multiplier effect through the discourses of political actors and experts, and the reaction of European and global public opinion provide a knowledge on the political impact of social behavior that should be further considered in the discipline of International Office. The study devotes special attention to the resolution of the crisis and the phenomenon of 'catharsis' that occurs as a consequence of political reflection. This stage would begin when the options are broadened and different solutions begin to be assessed, the political elites recover their decision-making power and the consideration of potential opportunities to generate consensus and advance integration begins. As the author remarks, catharsis does not eliminate tensions, but it allows an open discussion that concludes with a positive proposal .

The scientific review of the concept of 'crisis' in the main intellectual perspectives of subject is also a positive contribution: the systemic, behavioral and sociological views. Based on the previous production, the author contributes a new concept 'integrational panic' which she defines as 'a social overreaction to a perceived problem'.

The criticism coming from academia, while not failing to underline the interest of approach of work, considers the political analysis of each of the conflicts analyzed to be insufficient and claims that the book does not reflect well the complexity of the problems facing Europe. In particular, she questions whether the Brexit crisis and the rise of Eurosceptic parties do not dismantle the argumentation set out in these pages. The author includes a brief commentary on both issues (the British referendum coincides with the publication of the book) arguing that both problems respond to a national and not a European policy conflict, but the review considers it incomplete.

In any case, the relevance of work is justified for several reasons. Firstly, its novelty: although the crises that the European Union has gone through have been studied before, very few studies have done so in a comparative way and concluded common behaviors. Secondly, and although it is a debatable thesis , the analysis of the effect of the media and public opinion leaders on the existential crisis of the EU contributes to a more accurate and realistic political evaluation of the phenomenon. Finally, the research favors a better management of these periods of turbulence, allowing to reduce the wearing effects of a constant discussion on the survival of the institution inside and outside Europe.

[Graham Allison, Destined for War. Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Boston, 2017. 364 pages]

review/ Emili J. Blasco

This is what has been called Thucydides' trap: the dilemma faced by a hegemonic power and a rising power that threatens that hegemony. Is war inevitable? When Thucydides narrated the Peloponnesian War, he wrote about the inevitability for domineering Sparta and the emerging Athens of thinking of armed confrontation as a means of settling conflict.

The fact that these two Greek polises necessarily thought about war, and eventually came to it, does not mean that they had no other options. History has shown that there are: when Wilhelmine Germany threatened to outwhelm Britain's naval strength, the attempt at sorpasso (accompanied by various circumstances) led to World War I, but when Portugal was overtaken by Spain in overseas possessions in the sixteenth century, or when the United States replaced Great Britain as the world's leading power at the end of the nineteenth century, the transfer was peaceful.

The call to Washington and Beijing to do everything possible not to fall into the trap described by the Greek historian is made by Graham Allison in Destined for War. Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? The Dean The founder of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government reviews several historical precedents in his book. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the same university, where Allison is a member, has researched them director, in a program called Thucydides's Trap.

This concept is defined by Allison as "the strong structural stress caused when an emerging power threatens to unseat a reigning power. In such a status, not only extraordinary or unexpected events, but even ordinary flashpoints in international affairs can trigger large-scale conflicts."

This structural stress is produced by the clash of two profound sensitivities: the emerging power syndrome ("the reinforced sense that an emerging state has of itself, its interests, and its right to recognition and respect"), and its inverse image, the reigning power syndrome ("the established power exhibits a growing sense of fear and insecurity as it faces signs of decline").

Along with the syndromes, both rival powers also experience a security dilemma: "A rising power may disregard the fear and insecurity of a ruling state because it knows that it itself is well-intentioned. Meanwhile, his opponent misinterprets even positive initiatives, taking them as excessively demanding or even threatening."

The use of military force

Allison starts from the fact that China is already catching up with the United States as a power. It has done so in terms of the volume of its Economics (China has already surpassed the U.S. in purchasing power parity) and in relation to some aspects of military strength (a report Rand Corporation predicted that by 2017 China would have "advantage" or "approximate parity" in 6 of the 9 conventional capacity areas. The author's assumption is that China will soon be in a position to wrest the scepter of the greatest superpower from the United States. Arrived before this status, how will both countries react?

In the case of China, its millennial outlook will likely lead to an attitude of patience, as long as there is some small progress in its development. purpose to increase its global specific weight. Since 1949, China has only resorted to force in three of 33 territorial disputes. In those cases, China's leaders waged war – limited wars, conceived as notice to their opponents – even though the enemy was equal or greater, urged by a status of domestic unrest.

For Allison, "as long as events in the South China Sea generally move in China's favor, it seems unlikely that China will use military force. But the trends in the balance of power were to turn against it, particularly at a time of internal political instability, China would initiate a limited military conflict, against an even larger and more powerful state like the United States."

For its part, the United States can choose several strategies, according to Allison: adapt to the new reality, undermine Chinese power (trade war, foment provincial separatism), negotiate a lasting peace, and redefine the relationship. The author does not give a committee firm, but it seems to suggest that Washington should move between the latter two options.

Thus, he recalls how Britain understood that it could not rival the United States in the Western Hemisphere, and how from there a partnership between the two countries, manifested in the First and Second World Wars. That would have to involve accepting that the South China Sea is a area of Chinese influence. And this is not out of mere condescension, but because the United States is proceeding with a real clarification of its vital interests.

Despite its positive tone, Destined for War is one of the essays of the American establishment where the end of the American era and the passing of the baton to China are most openly announced (it does not seem to envision a multipolar or bipolar world, but rather one of primacy of the Asian power). He is also one of the least emphasises – less, of course, than he should – on the strengths that the United States maintains and the problems that could undermine China's coronation.