U.S.-China relations do not satisfy either country; They probably never will. They must try to deal with them, peacefully

▲meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump [White House video screebshot]

ANALYSIS / María Granados

The National Security Strategy presented in December by Donald Trump label China and Russia as "rivals" of the United States. It portrays those two countries as actors that "challenge the power, influence, and interests" of Washington and "attempt to erode the security and prosperity" of Americans. Although the document also considers "renegade" states such as Iran and North Korea, and transnational organizations, both jihadist and organized crime, a threat, the arguments of the new US administration are especially focused on China. The Asian nation appears as the great obstacle to the realization of the "America First" promised by Trump, because of its unfair trade and monetary practices.

Thus, the first National Security Strategy document of the Trump era corroborates the speech which he had maintained as candidate. During the election campaign, Trump spoke of China as a "currency manipulator" and accused it of artificially keeping the yuan low. He also threatened Beijing with starting a trade war, complaining about the economic consequences for the U.S. of China's excessive trade surplus in bilateral relations, as well as the reduction of jobs in U.S. manufacturing. Shortly after being elected, before the inauguration of his term, Trump provoked a diplomatic friction with China by talking by phone with the president of Taiwan.

However, since his arrival in the White House, Trump has been concerned with ironing out those rough edges with China. He pledged to uphold the One China Policy, retracted his criticisms, and met in Florida with President Xi Jinping, agreeing to respect each other's sphere of influence and not intervene in each other's internal affairs. This, along with an incipient partnership in the sanctions against North Korea, it seemed to be giving birth to a rapprochement that has not yet materialized. In fact, the U.S. National Security Strategy's official "rival" treatment of China somewhat breaks with a long period of mutual acceptance that began in the 1970s.

Nixon's Opening

The United States and China started from serious antecedents: the Korean War (1950-1953), which pitted China and the USSR in the North against the American-backed South, of which the Vietnam War (1955-1975) was a collateral consequence; and the nuclear danger that began in 1949, the year in which the USSR carried out the first nuclear war. essay effective. For Washington, from an ideological and military point of view, China was an international actor that should be controlled. For Beijing, in alliance with the Soviet Union, it was urgent to spread the speech communism about the "imperialist enemy," which he repeated with intensity throughout the early years of the Cold War.

In 1969, the new U.S. president, Richard Nixon, included in his speech inauguration of mandate one reference letter against isolationism (1). From the other side of the world there were also new messages: the distance that Mao began to establish in relation to the USSR due to its border conflicts. This upset the triangle of international relations that existed in those years of the Cold War (China, USSR, USA), and began to create a bond between Beijing and Washington.

In this way, the first signs of approximation began to appear. In 1971, the U.S. voted to allow Taiwan to join the committee of the United Nations Security Council will be occupied by the People's Republic of China. In 1972 the statement of Shanghai, which established the instructions for the Sino-American rapprochement and which was embodied in five principles:

1. The One China Policy: Establishing diplomatic relations with China meant not being able to establish them with Taiwan, and vice versa, since both claim to be the true and only China.

2. Not supporting Taiwan independence.

3. Do not support the possible invasion of Japan.

4. The peaceful resolution of the conflict with Taiwan, reducing military installations on the island.

5. A commitment to continue to be peaceful allies in the pursuit of lasting cooperation.

Since the rapprochement of the 1970s, relations between the two countries have been heavily influenced by Washington and Beijing's attitude toward Taiwan and the two Koreas, in a sort of indirect Sino-American relations.

The Question of Taiwan

The self-styled Republic of China had been the main obstacle to the complete normalization of relations, as seen with the statement of Shanghai. Effective reunification by (mainland) China was prevented by U.S. troops.

After 1973 we find two important documents: the so-called Taiwan Relations Act, by which the United States recognized the island as before, but not that it was a sovereign nation, and the Taiwan Relations Act. statement Set (sometimes referred to as "Second statement of Shanghai"), drastically cutting arms sales to Taiwan. In 1979, Washington and Beijing exchanged ambassadors, and the Americans ceased formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Around 1980, the policy advocated by the mainland Chinese government was "one country, two systems", offering Formosa the exceptionality of a different and economically independent political system, but being part of the one China. However, this formula did not meet the wishes of the twenty-third province for independence. By 1985, the island's government was firmly moving towards democracy (2).

In the late 1990s, Beijing threatened Taiwan with military exercises in surrounding waters, in which missiles were deployed, prompting a forceful response from the United States: sending two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region; In doing so, Washington showed a clear determination to protect the former ally because of its strategic importance.

The status The current situation remains complex. No direct ties have been established between China and its rebel province through messaging or telecommunications; Neither are postal or parcel shipments sent, nor is there a direct connection of flights. Face-to-face meetings between delegates have been infrequent and not very productive.

The North Korea Problem

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for its part, is a particularly critical point in Sino-American relations, which also affects South Korea and Japan, which in turn are allies of the United States. Pyongyang has already carried out six underground nuclear tests and continues its missile launches over the Sea of Japan.

China is North Korea's only ally: it is its biggest partner commercial and its main source of food and energy. Beijing has historically opposed tough international sanctions against its neighbor. The will to survive communism is essential when it comes to understanding the close relationship between the sui generis Korean dictatorship and China. It's easy to guess why: if Kim Jong-Un's regime falls, Xi Jinping's could be destabilized. A refugee crisis, with thousands of North Koreans crossing the 1,400-kilometer border bordering the two countries, would have serious effects on the Asian giant. Although they remain strongly linked to Pyongyang, the Chinese have pushed for the resumption of the Six Dialogue and have accepted the application of certain international sanctions.

Trump's blunt assertion that "if China isn't going to solve the North Korea problem, we will" doesn't really dispel doubts about what might happen if Pyongyang crosses the threshold of nuclear capability. Certainly, as the Kim Jong-Un regime has approached that threshold, Beijing has increased its diplomatic, financial and commercial pressures on its neighbor (3). But the possibility that North Korea is already on the verge of reaching its goal The strategic strategy leaves the United States faced with the dilemma of military action, which can hardly be both effective and limited, or having to settle for a policy of containment.

Over the years, Washington has tried to encourage North Korea to irreversibly forget its nuclear program, proposing in return a reward consisting of financial aid, diplomatic advantages and the normalization of relations. At the same time, South Korea hosts 29,000 U.S. military personnel. In March 2017, executive orders from the President and the congress The U.S. government went beyond sanctions: a defense system known as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) (4) was programmed as a preventive measure against a possible attack by the North and with the aim of protecting the environment. goal to ensure the stability of the region.

The THAAD battery is particularly interesting to analyze, because of the double perspective it presents. Their limited range and capability should not worry China, as the interceptors would not be able to hit Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles at any point in their trajectory, from almost any of the possible launch locations. As such, neither Washington nor Seoul should present the system as a form of retaliation against Beijing for its failed sanctions on North Korea. Unfortunately, U.S. and South Korean officials suggest that the purpose of the installation of the THADD system is to send a warning message to China. This is somewhat counterproductive, since it only offers reasons to justify the nuclearization of the Asian hegemon, in the face of the apparent degradation of its medium-range technology, that of the second Degree nuclear response (second-strike capability).

Mutual dissatisfactions

If the issues of Taiwan and North Korea have occupied a large part of the diary In the bilateral relationship, the issue of China's economic transformation, since its impetus by Deng Xiaoping, has been central to the direct relationship between China and the United States.

Gǎigé kāifàng (reform and opening-up) emphasized modernization and economic and political reform. This led to normalized diplomatic relations and thedevelopment bilateral trade and investment. Cooperation in subject The political, economic and security relations with the former "American imperialists" were based on the prevention of terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula.

However, there are still unresolved issues. U.S. dissatisfaction stems from China's human rights policy and its financial moves to devalue the currency as a measure to control inflation. These monetary movements call into question the control of the market by the American hegemon, which currently has greater weight and primacy, among other things, because the dollar is the international currency of exchange (it could thus "export its inflation" to Beijing). Washington is also concerned about the U.S.'s dependence on imports from China, which creates a large bilateral trade deficit for Americans. Another potential problem is the sale of missiles and nuclear technology to third States in the Middle East and Asia.

From the Chinese perspective, their dissatisfaction is due to the U.S. arms sales to the rebel province (Taiwan), the defense system established in South Korea (both the THAAD system and the U.S. government). financial aid and a U.S. foreign policy that Beijing dismisses as threatening, imperialist and domineering.

Ways of cooperation

The U.S. consideration of China as a "rival," as stated in the Trump Administration's first National Defense Strategy document, is based on the realization that the Chinese regime is not moving towards democracy as many in the rest of the world had hoped. "For decades, U.S. policy was based on the belief that support for China's rise and its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China," the document says, noting that Beijing is not sliding toward a regime of political freedoms and respect for human rights, so Washington can no longer be as condescending to Beijing as it once was.

Probably, without China's assumption of the values and principles that give meaning to the United States, a real and confident rapprochement between the two superpowers is impossible. Still, for the survival of both, broad cooperation between them is necessary.

Although a war between the United States and China is not impossible, it is unlikely for a number of reasons, as Steinberg and O'Hanlon argue in Strategic Reassurance and Resolve (2015):

–The common objectives of economic prosperity, the exchange In terms of trade, interdependence, both at the stock market, financial and business levels, make a military confrontation very harmful to both countries. In addition, China has progressively adopted measures against fraud and destabilization by computer manipulation, at the behest of the United States; The issue of cyberespionage, although it continues to provoke mutual disagreements, is regularly addressed by both countries in their bilateral meetings, aware that it is likely to become more important over the years.

The South China Sea is a trade route that has never been closed, although it is a source of dispute to be taken into account, since they remain unresolved even though they have been brought before the Court dealing with the Law of the Sea (following the United Nations Convention on the Sea). The United States has strategic and commercial interests in the region that link it to its allies (Japan and South Korea), so it could be a source of tensions. In any case, it does not currently appear that China wishes to provoke a military escalation in the area, although it has established instructions on artificial islands and moved troops.

The ASEAN code of conduct for the South China Sea, which prevents the use of force, may cause Beijing to rethink increasing its aggressiveness in the region. That push by ASEAN for China to stop claiming maritime sovereignty that has been rejected by the international community are points against the war.

There are a number of joint counter-terrorism (ISIS) and anti-piracy operations involving the two superpowers.

China has increased its financial aid and its work in support of UN peacekeeping missions.

Faced with a scenario of no understanding between Beijing and Washington, but at the same time of no armed confrontation, the following actions should be suggested:

A negotiation that would include fewer arms sales to Taiwan by the US in exchange for greater security on the coasts, and a proportional reduction by China of threats to the island.

–Greater cooperation and transparency in the conduct of arms and troop movements, militarization, restructuring of the armed forces, and military exercises in the Pacific.

–Creation of joint organisations to combat organised crime and cyber-attacks, in particular threats to civilian infrastructure.

- Support and coherence in the prevention of nuclear escalation. Negotiation to reach a firm conclusion on how to weaken the Pyongyang regime. Serious and coherent criticism, knowing the impossibility (as well as harm) of its direct overthrow.

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(1) "We seek an open world--open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people--a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.
We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy". Inaugural Adress (January 20, 1969)

(2) It was the first time that the Democratic Progressive Party succeeded in pressing the elections to the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan and forming a unified coalition against the Kuomintang. In 1992, the first free legislative elections were held in Taiwan.

(3) "China will be most likely to put diplomatic and financial pressure on North Korea if it believes that failing to do so will lead the United States to destabilize the regime," write Joshua Stanton, Sung- Yoon Lee, and Bruce Klingner in Foreign Affairs.

(4) The system typically has between 48 and 62 interceptor missiles with ranges of up to 200 kilometers, supported by radar with a range of up to about 1,000 kilometers

[Enrique Serrano, ¿Por qué fracasa Colombia? Delirios de una nación que se desconoce a sí misma, Planeta, Bogotá 2016, 273 pages].

REVIEW / Maria Oliveros [English version].

Colombian history has often been classified as one of the most violent. The long chapter of FARC terrorism along with the confrontation of the drug cartels have always been present. But, earlier in history, events such as the Commoners Revolt, the War of One Thousand Days and the Banana Massacre, have been part of Colombia. This succession of events has induced the majority of Colombians to believe that violence has characterized the history of the country and that probably its people can do little to avoid it.  

This belief is defied by the Colombian communicator, philosopher and writer Enrique Serrano in ¿Por qué fracasa Colombia? Delirios de una nación que se desconoce a sí misma [Why does Colombia fail? Deliriums of a nation that is unknown to itself]. The purpose of the book is to analyze why Colombia has not prospered more as a country. To answer this question, Serrano analyzes in short chapters Colombian mentality from the beginning of the nation; there he finds reasons to explain why Colombia is a country in which it has been difficult to go forward, grow in progress and be able to develop to its maximum.

Why does Colombia fail? is a risky book, which defies thoughts that have remained in Colombian's minds for a long period of time. Opposite to this central belief based on the fact that violence has characterized the history of the country, Serrano warns, already from the first pages: "Also it is presumed that this is a nation infected by the most cunning violence, since its beginnings until the present day. Nevertheless, it has been more pacific than violent, at least during most part of its slow formation. And that in spite of the fact that it is not possible to deny the importance of violence; violence is something episodic and recent, similar to the one of other transitioning-nations."

Serrano tries to expose the history of a country that did not begin in 1810 with the shout of independence, but that its origins go back the moment when the Spaniards came to America and established themselves in Colombia. All of these, to show the reader that during the three hundred years after the arrival of the first conquerors, Colombia was a pacific and restrained nation.

The main premise of Serrano is that those who came to Colombia were mostly new Christians, descendants from Arabs and Jews, from the south of Spain. They were looking for a provisional place to accommodate and be able to avoid the religious conflicts taking place in Spain during that time. The newcomers established in small urbanizations, each one far from the other, not only because this was what the geography of the country permitted, but because the last thing that they wanted was to enter into conflict with other settlers, including both Europeans and indigenous people, as Serrano explains.  

Actually, it is questionable that among the new settlers there was a predominantly religiously-private approach or that the search of a refuge to their consciences motivated, in most of the cases, their march to America. It gives the feeling that the author accommodates the starting point with the mind in those posterior aspects that he wants to explain.

The author also defends the thesis that in Colombia there was a racial miscegenation, rather than a cultural miscegenation, due to the fact that the indigenous culture was very weak, which contributed to the assumption of the religion brought by the Spaniards. In the culture that they transmitted to the new generations, ideas like eventuality or even the fact to getting used to failure were present: "In addition they had to react in a pacific way, and not in a violent one whenever the events were unfavorable and could not fulfill their desires. Therefore, a relative tolerance and conscience that frustration from the pursue of desires is something probable, is present in the old guidelines of upbringing in the Colombian nation".

Serrano suggests that this mentality which originated centuries ago is still present in Colombia: the idea of not straining to the maximum, of not risking too much for fear to failure and of mediocrely performing tasks. Probably this mentality that built throughout the years is the one that explains why the projects of urbanization in the country do not advance correctly, why the project for the subway in Colombia's capital is not concrete yet, or why it has been difficult for the country to explode resources to the maximum.

Although in the book there are other themes like language, corporal hygiene and social classes, history is undoubtedly the fundamental component. Referring to historical facts of Colombian past, Serrano proposes a national history's vision far from the usual one. As it has been told, his account does not begin with the shout of independence in 1810, but rather explaining the Spaniard society during the 15th and 16th century. All of these, to understand the mentality of the first men, women, and families that arrived to America. It is all about an optimistic vision trying to share the idea that suffering has not been everything in Colombian history.

It is a fact that the history of the country neither lives and is not even remembered with enthusiasm by Colombians. To remember the past is for many people, a way to remember violence, wars and the national polarization that began with the formation of the 2 major political parties: Liberals and Conservatives, in the mid 19th century. To know well the past, in any case, is primordial for progress; actually, this is what the new law promulgated on January 1, 2018, which forces to all the colleges of the country to give class of Colombian History, tries to do to.

The book concludes with a series of suggestions about the present and the future. The last chapter titled "Where does a nation like that can go?" is all about transmitting a feeling of hope. According to the author, knowing the past and not fleeing from it, but accepting it in order to improve mentalities and habits, is what will give the base to the country not to fail.

[Enrique Serrano, ¿Por qué fracasa Colombia? Delirios de una nación que se desconoce a sí misma, Planeta, Bogotá 2016, 273 pages].

review / María Oliveros [English version].

Colombia's history has often been classified as one of the most violent. The long chapter of FARC terrorism or the confrontation of drug cartels are well present, but before that there were violent events in Colombia such as the Revolt of the Comuneros, the Thousand Days War or the Banana Plantation Massacre. A succession of events that has led most Colombians to believe that violence has characterized the country's history and that perhaps they can do little to avoid it.

That belief is challenged by Colombian communicator, philosopher and writer Enrique Serrano in ¿Por qué fracasa Colombia? Delusions of a nation that does not know itself. The book's purpose is to analyze why Colombia has not prospered more as a country. To answer that question, Serrano reviews in short chapters the Colombian mentality since the beginnings of the nation; there he finds reasons why Colombia is a country that has had a hard time getting ahead, growing in progress and being able to develop to its full potential.

¿Por qué fracasa Colombia? is a risky book, which combats thoughts that have long remained in the minds of Colombians. Against that central belief that violence has characterized the country's history, Serrano warns from the very first pages: "It is also presumed that this is a nation plagued by the most vicious violence, from its beginnings to the present day. However, it has been more peaceful than violent, at least during most of its slow training and that although the importance of violence cannot be denied, it is episodic, recent, similar to that of other peoples in transition".

Serrano tries to expose the history of a country that does not begin in 1810 with the independence, but its origins go much further back, to the moment when the Spaniards arrived in America and settled in Colombia. All this in order to show the reader that during the three hundred years that followed the arrival of the first conquistadors, Colombia was a peaceful and measured nation.

Serrano's main premise is that those who arrived in Colombia were mostly new Christians, descendants of Arabs and Jews, coming from southern Spain, who were looking for a place provisional to settle and avoid the religious conflicts that were occurring in Spain at that time. The newcomers settled in small urbanizations, some far from others, not only because that was what the country's geography allowed, but also because the last thing they wanted was to come into conflict with other settlers, both European and indigenous, according to Serrano.

In fact, it is questionable whether the new settlers were dominated by a refractory private religious approach or whether the search for refuge for their consciences motivated, in most cases, their departure to America. It seems that the author adjusts the starting point thinking of those later aspects that he wants to explain.

The author also defends the thesis that in Colombia there was a racial miscegenation, but not a cultural miscegenation, because the indigenous culture was very weak, which contributed to the assumption of the religion brought by the Spaniards. In the culture that the Spaniards transmitted to the new generations were ideas such as provisionality or even getting used to failure: "They also had to react in a peaceful, non-violent way when events were unfavorable and they could not fulfill their desires. Therefore, a relative tolerance and awareness that the frustration of the achievement of desires is something probable, is in the old patterns of upbringing of the Colombian nation".

Serrano suggests that this mentality that originated centuries ago is still present in Colombia: the idea of not making the maximum effort, of not taking too many risks for fear of failure, of doing things half-heartedly so as not to lose too much in case they go wrong. Probably this mentality that was created over the years explains why urbanization projects in the country do not progress properly, why the subway project in the Colombian capital has not been able to materialize, or why it has cost the country so much to exploit its resources to the maximum.

Although the book touches on other aspects such as language, body hygiene and social classes, history is undoubtedly the fundamental component. Referring to historical events of the Colombian past, Serrano proposes a vision of national history far from the usual one. Thus, as has been said, his story does not begin with the cry for independence of 1810, but explains the Spanish society of the 15th and 16th centuries, in order to understand the mentality of the first men, women and families who arrived in America. It is an optimistic vision that seeks to share the idea that not everything has been suffering in Colombian history. 

It is a fact that the country's history is not lived or remembered with much encouragement by Colombians. Remembering the past is for many a way of recalling the violence, wars and national polarization that began with the training of the two major parties, Liberals and Conservatives, in the mid-nineteenth century. Knowing the past well, in any case, is paramount for progress; that is what the new law decreed on January 1, 2018, which obliges all schools in the country to teach class Colombian History, seeks to do. 

The book concludes with a series of suggestions about the present and the future. That last chapter, graduate Where can such a nation go? tries to transmit a feeling of hope, while at the same time it is a call to a high level of responsibility. According to the author, knowing the past and not running away from it, but accepting it in order to improve mentalities and habits, is what will give the country the basis for not failing. 

Washington's Antilles energy diversification initiative moves forward

Given the success of Venezuela's oil diplomacy in the Caribbean countries (the islands account for 13 of the 35 votes in the OAS), the United States launched its own initiative in 2014 so that these small states have greater energy diversity and do not depend on Venezuelan crude. The Maduro regime's financial difficulties have reduced Chavista influence in the Caribbean, but Trump is also cutting back on U.S. aid. Diversification of energy sources, however, is moving forward because it is a real need for the islands.

▲ The tourism boom increases electricity consumption in the Caribbean islands, where there are hardly any energy sources of their own.

article / María F. Zambrano

In the Caribbean islands, energy security is at the center of national strategic concern, due to their high dependence on fossil fuels, mostly imported. Energy security is the focus where the geopolitical, diplomatic and economic interests of these small states converge, and not only of them: the great vulnerability due to the lack of their own energy sources was taken into account by Venezuela to promote in 2005 the Petrocaribe cooperation agreement , which gave it great influence in the Antilles; since 2014, the United States has been trying to counteract that program with the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI), launched by the Obama Administration.

The rivalry between the two energy diplomacy initiatives will not really be settled by a political pulse between Caracas and Washington, but by the real need of the Caribbean islands to diversify their energy sources. This will reduce Venezuela's influence in the region and open the way for the U.S. offer, focused precisely on promoting alternative sources.

The main risk to national security in the Antilles lies in the high costs of Caribbean electricity. On the one hand, the islands have replaced historically agricultural economies with others driven by tourism, which forces them not only to meet the needs of their citizens but also to rely on the fixed cost of an industry with high levels of electricity consumption. On the other hand, production does not have diversified generation Structures . With the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname and Belize, the islands are supplied by oil as the only installed production capacity; in addition, 87% of primary energy (basically crude oil) is imported. We are facing a problem of high consumption and another of oil dependence.

In view of this status, and given the demands posed by energy security, understood as the physical protection of infrastructure and also the effort to guarantee the continuity of supply, Petrocaribe became a clear option for Antillean interests. Generous financing credits -from 5% to 70% for a 25-year period- contributed to the extension of the program. During the first 10 years of Petrocaribe's existence, from agreement with data of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA), Venezuela covered on average 32% of the energy demand of the participating States; the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Haiti received 87% of the supplies. The agreement also led to investments in the islands' refineries, which increased their processing capacity to 135,000 barrels of crude oil per day between Cuba's Camilo Cienfuegos refinery (65,000), the refinery near Jamaica's capital (36,000) and the Dominican Petroleum refinery (34,000).

The alliance alleviated for these countries the rise in the price of crude oil, but the region was left in the hands of the volatility of market prices and those of the main supplier. A November 2017 IMFreport estimates that real crude oil price movements affect GDP growth in the Caribbean by 7%, with wide variations from country to country: 15% in Dominica, 9% in Jamaica and less than 1% in Guyana. In turn, the continued drop in Venezuela's production, which began to allocate fewer barrels to Petrocaribe, left the area predisposed to new approaches that would reduce its exhibition to market shocks.

Caribbean Energy Security Initiative

This expectation was addressed in a new energy security framework that sought to increase independence and reduce vulnerability through diversification. Taking advantage of the steep drop in crude oil prices in 2014, which relaxed energy costs for the islands and gave them more room to maneuver, Washington launched the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI). The program has focused on supporting countries in diversifying electricity generation, addressing their significant renewable energy potential. Thus, through CESI, US$2 million in technical support has been allocated to C-SERMS (Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy), a roadmap developed by CARICOM's energy policy division. This roadmap had already harmonized the goals of the 15 member states at subject in terms of energy efficiency and the implementation of renewable energies: two strategies that sought to solve the problems previously mentioned.

The Inter-American Bank of development (IDB) estimated that for the implementation of the C-SERMS roadmap the Caribbean energy sector would require an investment of 7% of the regional GDP between 2018 and 2023. Countries with stronger financial sectors would have the capacity to finance the projects without altering debt sustainability, with these projects being self-financed over a 20-year period.

In the framework of the U.S. initiative, energy efficiency was materialized in the CHEER program (Caribbean Hotel Energy Efficiency and Renewables program) that has provided attendance technical assistance to the hotel industry, the main consumption source . However, in this field, the IMF urges the implementation of broader public policies to further reduce oil imports and increase GDP in the long term deadline.

In the implementation of renewable energy, the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has promoted infrastructure with public-private financing. Among other projects, it financed the construction of a 36 MW wind power plant and a 20 MW solar power plant, both inaugurated in 2016 in Jamaica. These projects also have macroeconomic influences on reducing dependence on crude oil; in the case of Jamaica, however, dependence has been decreased mainly by the expansion of natural gas receiving capacity, which has allowed that country a reduction from 97% to 80% dependence on imported oil (in fact, it no longer imports Venezuelan crude oil). Since 2016, the business New Fortress Energy has been working on the submission of liquefied natural gas to Jamaica's Bogue plant.

Since its launch, OPIC has financed up to $120 million in energy agreements. Added to that are those promoted by the CEFF-CCA fund, also from the U.S. Government, which provided $20 million non-refundable for projects in initial phases; in 2015 began the project "Clean Energy in the Caribbean", with a duration of five years and with special incidence in Jamaica.

Venezuela... and Trump's clippings

The U.S. initiative for energy diversification in the Caribbean had its response from Venezuela. In 2015, Petrocaribe held a special summit where it quadrupled the ALBA Caribe fund, raising it from $50 million to $200 million, destined to finance mainly social projects, along the lines of what Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold have called "social power diplomacy". However, Venezuela's severe economic crisis and the reduced finances of its national oil company, PDVSA, have forced the government of Nicolás Maduro to cut back on Venezuelan oil diplomacy.

For its part, the arrival of the Trump Administration has led to a significant decrease in the investment earmarked for CESI. In the framework of a generalized cut to financial aid programs abroad, Washington reduced to $4.3 million the amount earmarked for boosting new energy sources in the Caribbean.

The United States, in any case, is not the only one trying to occupy the energy space previously filled by Venezuela. In 2015, the Renewable Energy and Efficient Energy Center was inaugurated in Barbados, promoted by UNID (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) with the support of Austrian and German funds. In addition, last year Russia made fuel shipments to Cuba, replacing supplies that Venezuela had not been able to cover.

Moscow continues militarization of the peninsula to prevent other forces from entering the region

Since the turn of the century, Russia had been losing economic, political and military influence in several Black Sea littoral countries; the seizure of Crimea attempted to correct the status. The Kremlin has just deployed a new missile group on the peninsula, in the framework of a long-term rearmament program deadline that seeks to ensure that operationally the Black Sea is a Russian 'lake'.

▲Putin in Sevastopol during the 2014 celebration of the victory in World War II [Kremlin].

article / Vitaliy Stepanyuk

"The bear will not ask anyone's permission." This was the allegory used by Russian President Vladimir Putin, at a Valdai Discussion Club meeting in October 2014, to reflect that Russia will not seek anyone's permission when pursuing its national interests and those of its people.

These words were pronounced a few months after the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula. The process of change of government had been initiated and troops had been mobilized to the newly incorporated territory, making any subject Ukrainian intervention to regain their land impossible. Approximately four years later, the militarization of the peninsula continues its course by the Russian Federation.

Thus, the deployment of a new defense system in Crimea has just become known, an action justified by Moscow as a measure to protect the airspace over the Russian-Ukrainian border, and also to deal with continued threatening activity on the border, arising mainly from the presence of NATO.

Since the occupation of Crimea, the Kremlin has initiated a long-term rearmament program deadline to achieve a zone (A2/AD) that would prevent other forces from accessing the region. This zone would limit the freedom of both air and ground maneuver for potential invaders. Together with other missile systems in Armenia, Krasnodar and elsewhere, this establishes a truly comprehensive anti-access zone. The establishment of advanced defense systems, the update of radars, the modernization of the Black Sea Fleet and the deployment of fighter aircraft are some of the initiatives undertaken to create such a blockade zone against any outside advance. In the coming years, six new attack submarines and six new surface ships are planned to be added to that Fleet, which could operate beyond the Black Sea, even supporting military operations in Syria.

Moving away from the old satellites

The increase in NATO troops and their presence in countries bordering Russia is seen by Russia as a threat to its security. Countries such as Poland, where NATO mobilized in January 2017 about 3.500 soldiers, and others such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary see the deployment as necessary in view of the status occurred in Ukraine and Russian military exercises near their borders: a clear example is Zapad 2017, a set of strategic and military exercises carried out jointly by Russian and Belarusian troops, in Belarus, in the Kaliningrad Oblast and along the entire northern strip bordering NATO countries.

Looking back over the recent history of the last 20 years, we can see how Russia has been losing economic, political and military influence over the territories bordering the Black Sea since the beginning of the century. Thus, in Georgia (2004) and Ukraine (2005), more pro-Russian presidents were replaced by more pro-Western ones. In addition, Bulgaria and Romania had become members of NATO, while Georgia and Ukraine were working on it.

Operations in the Black Sea area

Threatened by this status, Russia decided to do everything possible to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from becoming NATO members, while at the same time developing strategies to remove the remaining states from NATO's influence.

With the invasion of Georgia in 2008, the Kremlin showed its determination to contain NATO, maintaining to this day a B military influence in various regions of that country. The same happened in Ukraine after the flight of former President Viktor Yanukovych, when Russia invaded Crimea in March 2014. In this way, it secured control over the naval base of its Black Sea Fleet located in Sevastopol (Crimea). It also militarily supports pro-Russian separatists in the war in Eastern Ukraine, destabilizing the country.

In other countries bordering the Black Sea, Russia has acted differently. In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the only countries bordering the Black Sea that are members of the European Union, Russian influence prevails in supporting pro-Russian political parties and establishing strong ties at subject business. However, Romania is another region that constitutes a challenge to Russian foreign policy, due to its impetus in defending NATO's presence in the Black Sea.

In the case of Turkey, which unlike several of the countries mentioned above was not part of the USSR or the Soviet bloc, the Kremlin has supported the authoritarianism carried out by the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, seeking mainly two basic objectives: to dissociate Turkey from NATO, to which it has belonged almost since its beginnings (1952), and to ensure its friendship with the country that exercises control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, which allow access to the Mediterranean Sea. If Turkey were to close the straits, the Russian fleet would be isolated and unable to exert its influence beyond the Black Sea. This could happen if Turkey and Russia were to find themselves at odds with each other in a conflict. In such a case, as the second strongest military power in the region, Turkey could be a clear threat to isolated Russian troops. On the other hand, the relationship with Turkey presents numerous challenges for Moscow: one example is the disagreement over the Syrian conflict, where Turkey opposes the Assad regime, while Russia supports it. 

Importance of the Black Sea

At final, Russia seeks to strengthen its influence and dominance over the Black Sea. This is mainly due to some essential characteristics: firstly, this sea is an important strategic point, as it would allow access to the various adjoining territories; secondly, control over ports and trade routes would give the power to obstruct trade and energy supplies (it is a territory crossed by a multitude of energy transport pipelines); finally, Russia could greatly influence regions that share a common history with Russia, infringing on its relationship with NATO.

Immediate challenge

In conclusion, it is interesting to understand that the main challenge facing Russia is to maintain the status quo, according to Yuval Weber, a professor at Harvard University. To do so, Russia has to be able to maintain the separatist group in the Ukrainian war, until the Kiev government falls and can then engage in conversation with a possible puppet government that will accept a solution on Russian terms. However, maintaining such a state of affairs implies having to deal simultaneously with international intervention and Russia's own weak domestic economic status , where there is growing social dissatisfaction over wages, cutbacks in services, poverty in some regions, among other problems.

Both Russia's internal and external status , as well as that of its territories of influence, are contingent on the results of the upcoming Russian presidential elections, to be held on March 18, 2018. The World Cup is not the only thing at stake.

[Mai'a K. Davis Cross, The Politics of Crisis in Europe. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 2017. 248 pages]

REVIEW / M. Teresa La Porte [English version].

The main thesis of the extensive research that this work represents is condensed in its final conclusions: 'Indeed, what the crisis over Iraq, the constitution, and the Eurozone have revealed is that even in the face of extreme adversity, and even when the easy route of freezing or rolling back integration is on the table before them, Europeans routinely choose more Europe, not less' (p. 235). The author justifies this affirmation arguing that the perception of the existential crisis that periodically attacks the European Union is a social construct, initiated and orchestrated by the communication average and public opinion shapers that control the development of the narratives and determine the public perception of the events. The average coverage amplifies a problem which, though it is undeniable, does not question the existence of the European Union. This negative vision causes in the citizenry what Cross calls 'integrational panic', generating a sentiment of catastrophe that is multiplied through political discourse. The absence of the "real crisis" is demonstrated by the fact that, behind these apparent catastrophes, an evident advance in European integration and a renewed desire to find consensus are produced.

The book presents an analysis of the three recent "crises" through which the European Union has passed: the dispute relating to the participation of the war in Iraq (2003), the discussion about the European Constitution (2005) and the economic crisis of the Eurozone (2010-12). Each of these cases are comprised of a qualitative and quantitative study of the leading international average, an examination of the reaction of public opinion and a monitoring of the political decisions that were made. In spite of the differences among the cases of the study, the author finds a common pattern in all of them that allows for a comparative study and that develops in the following way: emergence of a conflict that provokes a discussion, negative reaction of social instigators producing alarming narratives, perception of existential crisis on the part of the citizenry, state of catharsis in which the tensions are relaxed and a calm reflection over the events is produced, and, finally, the phase of resolution in which political measures are adopted that reinforce European integration (European Security Strategy, 2003; Lisbon Treaty, 2009; Fiscal Compact, 2012).

The European Union is understood as 'a work in progress, a project that is perennially in the middle of its evolution, with no clearly defined end goal' (p.2). The disagreements among the member states, in relation to foreign policy or the degree of integration, are typical of an ambitious initiative, which is in full process of maturation and which goes forward always counting on the judgement of each and every one of its members. Nevertheless, the study does not underestimate the real difficulties that the communal institution is going through and they are present throughout the research.

What is especially interesting is the thorough tracking of the social dynamics that are generated by the 'crisis of existence' of the European Union. The processes of the development of the narratives by the average, the multiplying effect through the discourses of political actors and experts, and the reaction of European and global public opinion provide knowledge about the political impact of social behavior that should be taken more into consideration in the discipline of international relations. The study gives special attention to the resolution of the crisis and the phenomenon of 'catharsis' which is produced as a consequence of political reflection. This stage would begin when the options are broadened and different solutions begin to be valued, the political elites recover their power of decision-making and the consideration of potential opportunities to generate consensus and advance in integration is begun. As the author emphasizes, catharsis does not eliminate tensions, but it allows for an open discussion that concludes with a positive proposal. 

Another positive contribution is the scientific revision of the concept of 'crisis' in the principal intellectual perspectives of the material: the systematic vision, the behavioural and the sociological vision. Based on the previous production, the author provides a new concept, 'integrational panic', that is defined as 'a social overreaction to a perceived problem'.

The criticism coming from the academic sphere, although it highlights the interest of the focus of the work, considers the political analysis of each of the conflicts analyzed to be insufficient and affirms that the book does not reflect very well the complexity of the problems that confront Europe. Specifically, it is questioned whether the crisis of Brexit and the emergence of Eurosceptic parties does not dismantle the argumentation presented in these pages. The author includes a brief commentary about both questions (the British referendum coincides with the publication of the book) arguing that both problems respond to a conflict of national, and not European, politics, but the criticism considers it incomplete. 

In any case the relevance of the work is justified for various reasons. In the first place, its novelty: although the crises through which the European Union has passed have been studied previously, there are very few studies which have done it in a comparative way and concluding on common behaviours. Secondly, and although it may be a debatable thesis, the analysis of the effect of the average and of the leaders of public opinion in the existential crises of the EU contributes a political assessment of the phenomenon that is more accurate and realistic. Finally, the research favors a better management of these periods of turbulence, allowing for a reduction of the wearing effects of a constant discussion over the survival of the institution within and outside of Europe. 

[Mai'a K. Davis Cross, The Politics of Crisis in Europe. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 2017. 248 pages]

review / Mª Teresa La Porte [English version].

The main thesis of the extensive research presented in this work is condensed in one of its last conclusions: 'Indeed, what the crisis over Iraq, the constitution, and the Eurozone have revealed is that even in the face of extreme adversity, and even when the easy route of freezing or rolling back integration is on the table before them, Europeans routinely choose more Europe, not less' (p. 235). The author justifies this assertion by arguing that the perception of existential crisis that periodically plagues the European Union is a social construct, initiated and orchestrated by the media and public opinion shapers who control the elaboration of narratives and determine public perception of the facts. Media coverage amplifies a problem that, although undeniable, does not question the existence of the European Union. This negative vision provokes in citizens what Cross calls 'integrational panic', generating a feeling of catastrophe that is multiplied through political discourse. The absence of a 'real crisis' would be demonstrated by the fact that, after these apparent catastrophes, there is a noticeable advance in European integration and a renewed desire to find a consensus.

The book presents an analysis of three recent 'crises' that the European Union has gone through: the dispute over participation in the Iraq war (2003), the discussion over the European Constitution (2005) and the economic crisis in the Eurozone (2010-12). Each of the cases comprises a qualitative and quantitative study of international leading media content, an examination of public opinion reaction and a monitoring of political decision making. Despite the difference between the case studies, the author finds a common patron saint to all of them that allows the comparative study and is developed as follows: emergence of the conflict that provokes the discussion, negative reaction of the social instigators elaborating alarming narratives, perception of existential crisis by the citizenry, state of 'catharsis' (catharsis) in which tensions are relaxed and a serene reflection on the events takes place, and, finally, the resolution phase in which political measures are adopted that reinforce European integration (European Security Strategy, 2003 (European Security Strategy); Lisbon Treaty, 2009 (Lisbon Treaty); European Fiscal Compact, 2012 (Fiscal Compact)).

The European Union is understood as a project in the process of development: 'a work in progress, a project that is perennially in the middle of its evolution, with no clearly defined end goal' (p.2). The disagreements between the member states, in relation to foreign policy or to the Degree integration, are typical of an ambitious initiative, which is in the process of maturing and which is always moving forward with the agreement of each and every one of its members. However, the study does not underestimate the real difficulties faced by the Community institution, which are present throughout research.

Of particular interest is the close monitoring of the social dynamics generated by the interpretation of the 'crisis of existence' of the European Union. The processes of elaboration of narratives by the media, the multiplier effect through the discourses of political actors and experts, and the reaction of European and global public opinion provide a knowledge on the political impact of social behavior that should be further considered in the discipline of International Office. The study devotes special attention to the resolution of the crisis and the phenomenon of 'catharsis' that occurs as a consequence of political reflection. This stage would begin when the options are broadened and different solutions begin to be assessed, the political elites recover their decision-making power and the consideration of potential opportunities to generate consensus and advance integration begins. As the author remarks, catharsis does not eliminate tensions, but it allows an open discussion that concludes with a positive proposal .

The scientific review of the concept of 'crisis' in the main intellectual perspectives of subject is also a positive contribution: the systemic, behavioral and sociological views. Based on the previous production, the author contributes a new concept 'integrational panic' which she defines as 'a social overreaction to a perceived problem'.

The criticism coming from academia, while not failing to underline the interest of approach of work, considers the political analysis of each of the conflicts analyzed to be insufficient and claims that the book does not reflect well the complexity of the problems facing Europe. In particular, she questions whether the Brexit crisis and the rise of Eurosceptic parties do not dismantle the argumentation set out in these pages. The author includes a brief commentary on both issues (the British referendum coincides with the publication of the book) arguing that both problems respond to a national and not a European policy conflict, but the review considers it incomplete.

In any case, the relevance of work is justified for several reasons. Firstly, its novelty: although the crises that the European Union has gone through have been studied before, very few studies have done so in a comparative way and concluded common behaviors. Secondly, and although it is a debatable thesis , the analysis of the effect of the media and public opinion leaders on the existential crisis of the EU contributes to a more accurate and realistic political evaluation of the phenomenon. Finally, the research favors a better management of these periods of turbulence, allowing to reduce the wearing effects of a constant discussion on the survival of the institution inside and outside Europe.

ESSAY / Andrea Pavón-Guinea [English version].

1. Introduction

The recent terrorist attacks in European soil, together with the rise of the Daesh, the civil war in Syria and the refugee crisis have underlined the critical importance for European intercultural dialogues with the Islamic world, placing the interdependence of the European Union (EU) and its Southern neighborhood on the spotlight. The European Union is focusing their resources on civil society initiatives that based on soft power may contribute to radicalization prevention. Through the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, where all the Euro-Mediterranean partners are represented, the European Union has an unparalleled instrument for bringing peoples from both shores of the Mediterranean together and for contributing to the improvement of Euro-Mediterranean relations through people-to-people engagement.

2. Intercultural dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean relations

The abovementioned interdependence between the European Union and the South Mediterranean basin began[1] to be regulated by the so-called Barcelona Process in 1995[2].

The Barcelona Declaration formally initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which is a multilateral framework of relations 'based on a spirit of partnership' that aims at turning the Mediterranean basin into an 'area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity'. The Barcelona Process recalled one of the founding principles of the European Union: common objectives need to be addressed in a spirit of co-responsibility (Suzan, 2002). The Declaration's goals are threefold (also known as the EMP's three 'baskets'): the creation of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of security and political dialogues (political & security basket); the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through and economic and financial partnership (economic & financial basket); and the promotion of understanding between cultures through the exchange of civil societies - the so-called inter-cultural dialogue - (Social, cultural and human affairs basket).

More than twenty years after the Declaration, the recent events of today's politics in the European Southern Neighborhood have further underlined the critical importance for European security of dialogues with the Islamic world in a variety of issues. If European officials had rejected Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' thesis when it was first articulated, they started considering it as a plausible scenario after September 11: a scenario, however, that could be partly averted by making efforts through the third basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the form of enhanced dialogue and cultural cooperation (Gillespie, 2004).

3. Counter-radicalization through intercultural dialogue: The Anna Lindh Foundation

Emphasizing that dialogue among cultures, civilizations and religions throughout the Mediterranean Region is more necessary than ever before in order to promote understanding among them, the Euro-Mediterranean partners agreed during the 5th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers in Valencia (2002) to establish a foundation that distinctly deals with inter-cultural dialogue. This way, the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (ALF), based in Alexandria (Egypt), became operational in 2005. Being the first properly Euro-Mediterranean institution, it coordinates a region-wide network of over 4,000 civil society organizations belonging to the 42 UfM[3] partners.

Despite being created in 2005, the last few years have seen a dramatic growth of interest in intercultural dialogue as a means of radicalization prevention. For instance, the Mediterranean Forum of the Anna Lindh Foundation, hosted in Malta in October 2016, acknowledged the importance of intercultural dialogue in counteracting extremism. Furthermore, the outcomes of the Forum found that intercultural dialogue is already embedded in the policy discourse, evidenced by references to the Anna Lindh Foundation and its intercultural dialogue mandate in the new European Neighborhood Policy (18.11.2015) and HR Mogherini's Strategy for International Cultural Relations.

However, it has been the recent terrorist attacks in Europe the ones that have highlighted the urgent need to tackle the phenomenon of radicalization[4] that may lead to violent extremism and terrorism. In this regard, the prevention of radicalization[5] is a key part of the fight against terrorism, as was highlighted in the European diary on Security[6] in 2015. It is worth mentioning that the majority of the terrorist suspects implicated in those attacks were European citizens, born and raised in EU Member States, who were radicalized to commit acts of political violence. It evidences the 'transnational dimension of Islamist terrorism' (Kaunert and Léonard, 2011: 287) and the changing nature of the threat, whose drivers are different from, and more complex than, previous radicalization phenomena: 'Radicalization today has different root causes, operates on the basis of different recruitment and communication techniques; it is marked by globalized and moving targets inside and outside Europe and grows in various urban contexts'[7]. The following map shows the number of Jihadi arrests in European soil in 2016.

Consequently, against the background of the rising prominence of the 'clash of civilizations' discourse in the aftermath of the 9/11, the Anna Lindh Foundation could be understood as an alternative and non-confrontational response to the US-led war on terror (Malmvig, 2007). It aims at creating 'a space of prosperity, coexistence and peace' through 'restoring trust in dialogue and bridging gaps in mutual perceptions'. It thus represents the idea that encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies is a crucial element of any political and strategic program aimed at neighboring Mediterranean countries (Rosenthal, 2007). In other words, the creation of an area of dialogue, cooperation and exchange in the South Mediterranean is a key external relations priority for the European Union. Not only that but with the launching of the Anna Lindh Foundation, the EU recognizes that for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to work, dialogue between people - not just political elites - becomes essential.

This focus on civil society engagement is crucial in tackling radicalization processes, that precede the phase of violent extremism and future terrorist practices. For instance, the United Nations' Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force[8] has argued that the state alone does not have all the resources necessary to counter radicalization and therefore need partners to carry out this task. Involving civil society and local communities enhances trust and social cohesion and can be a means to reach segments of society that governments may have difficulty to engage with. The European Union has also highlighted the importance of local actors, who are usually best placed to prevent and detect radicalization both in the short-term and the long-term[9].

Conclusion

Intercultural dialogue may thus be seen as a desirable tool to address the phenomenon of radicalization in the region of the South Mediterranean, where the legacies of a colonial order demand that 'more credible interlocutors need to be found among non-governmental agents' (Riordan, 2005: 182). The European Union will ought to abandon its existing 'donor mentality' and move towards real partnerships and people-to-people confidence building measures (Amirah and Behr, 2013: 5), holding the assumption that practices based on dialogue and mutuality may offer a promising framework for improving the European Union's relations towards the South Mediterranean, and particularly, for countering radicalization processes occurring both in and outside Europe.

essay / Andrea Pavón-Guinea [English version].

1. Introduction

The combination of terrorist attacks on European soil, the rise of the Islamic State, the Syrian civil war and the refugee crisis have highlighted the importance of intercultural dialogue between the European Union and the Islamic world. In this context of asymmetric warfare and non-traditional security challenges, the European Union is focusing its resources on soft power-based civil society initiatives that can contribute to the prevention of radicalization. Through the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation for Intercultural development , the European Union has a unique instrument to bring civil societies on both shores of the Mediterranean closer together and contribute to the improvement of Euro-Mediterranean relations.  

2. Euro-Mediterranean relations and intercultural dialogue 

Relations between the European Union and the Southern Mediterranean began[1] to be formally regulated with the creation of the Barcelona Process in 1995[2].

The Barcelona Declaration would give rise to the creation of the association Euro-Mediterranean; a forum for multilateral relations which, 'based on a spirit of association', aims to turn the Mediterranean basin into a 'area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity'. The Barcelona Process would thus bring to mind one of the founding principles of the European Union, that of achieving common objectives through a spirit of co-responsibility (Suzan, 2002). The Declaration pursues three fundamental objectives: firstly, the creation of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of security and political dialogue (this would be the so-called 'political basket'); secondly, the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through the economic and financial association ('economic and financial basket'); and, thirdly, the promotion of understanding between cultures through civil society networks: the so-called intercultural dialogue ('social, cultural and human affairs' basket). 

More than twenty years after the Declaration, the claims of today's politics in the Southern Mediterranean underline the importance of development intercultural dialogue for European security. Although European politicians rejected Huntington's thesis of the clash of civilizations when it was first articulated, it would nevertheless become a scenario to be considered after the September 11 attacks: a scenario, however, that could be avoided through cooperation in the 'third basket' of the Euro-Mediterranean association , i.e. through enhanced dialogue and cultural cooperation (Gillespie, 2004).

3. Fighting radicalization through intercultural dialogue: the Anna Lindh Foundation 

Thus, emphasizing that dialogue between cultures, civilizations and religions throughout the Euro-Mediterranean region is more necessary than ever for promote mutual understanding, the Euro-Mediterranean partners agreed during the fifth Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers' meeting lecture in Valencia in 2002 to establish a foundation whose goal would be the development of intercultural dialogue. Thus was born the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures which, based in Alexandria, would start operating in 2005.

It should be noted that Anna Lindh is unique in its representation and configuration, as it brings together all Euro-Mediterranean partners in the promotion of intercultural dialogue, which is its only goal. To this end, it relies on the coordination of a regional network of more than 4,000 civil society organizations, both European and Mediterranean.

Although it has been in operation for more than ten years now, its work is currently focused on development intercultural dialogue in order to prevent radicalization. This emphasis has been continuously highlighted in recent years, for example at the Anna Lindh Foundation's Mediterranean Forum in Malta in October 2016, its mandate on intercultural dialogue contained in the new European Neighborhood Policy (18.11.2015) and in High Representative Mogherini's strategy for the promotion of culture at International Office.

However, it has been the recent terrorist attacks in Europe that have highlighted the urgent need to address the phenomenon of radicalization[3], which can ultimately written request lead to violent extremism and terrorism. In this sense, the prevention of radicalization[4] is a piece core topic in the fight against terrorism, as has been highlighted by the diary European Security in 2015[5]. This is so because most of the terrorists suspected of attacks on European soil are European citizens, born and raised in EU member states, where they have undergone radicalization processes that would culminate in acts of terrorist violence. This fact evidences 'the transnational dimension of Islamist terrorism' (Kaunert and Léonard, 2011: 287), as well as the changing nature of the threat, whose drivers are different and more complex than previous radicalization processes: 'Today's radicalization has different foundations, operates on the basis of different recruitment and communication techniques and is marked by globalized and mobile targets inside and outside Europe, growing in diverse urban contexts'[6]. The following map sample the issue of arrests for suspected jihadist terrorism in Europe in 2016.

Consequently, the Anna Lindh Foundation can be understood as an alternative and non-confrontational response to the speech of the clash of civilizations and the US-led war on terror (Malmvig, 2007). Its main goal which is to create 'a space of prosperity, coexistence and peace' by 'restoring confidence in dialogue and reducing stereotypes' is based on the importance given by the European Union to development intercultural dialogue between civilizations as a crucial element of any political and strategic program aimed at neighboring Mediterranean countries (Rosenthal, 2007). In other words, the creation of a area of dialogue, cooperation and exchange in the southern Mediterranean is a priority core topic of the European Union's foreign policy. Furthermore, with the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation, the European Union is recognizing that for the Euro-Mediterranean association to work, dialogue between civil society organizations, and not only between political elites, is essential.

Thus, Anna Lindh, as an organization based on network of civil society networks, becomes a crucial instrument to address the prevention of radicalization. Along these lines, the group of work of the United Nations counter-terrorism implementation[7] has argued that the State alone does not have the necessary resources to combat terrorist radicalization, and therefore needs to cooperate with partners of a different nature to carry out this task. The involvement of civil society and local communities would thus serve to increase trust and social cohesion, even becoming a means of reaching out to certain segments of society with which governments would find it difficult to interact. The nature of local actors, as highlighted by the European Union through the creation of the Anna Lindh Foundation, would be the most successful in preventing and detecting radicalization in both the short and long term deadline[8].

Conclusion

In this way, intercultural dialogue constitutes a tool to address the phenomenon of radicalization in the Southern Mediterranean region, where the legacies of a colonial past demand that 'more credible interlocutors be found among non-governmental organizations' (Riordan, 2005: 182). With the goal of preventing terrorist radicalization inside and outside Europe, and assuming that practices based on dialogue and mutuality can offer a suitable framework for the development and improvement of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the European Union should move towards real partnerships aimed at building trust between people and reject any unilateral action program that involves a reproduction of the speech of the clash of civilizations (Amirah and Behr, 2013: 5). 

High levels of corruption in public works projects and impunity from justice in the Latin American region continue to challenge attempts to successfully eradicate fraud in government dealings   

Odebrecht, one of the most important construction and engineering companies in Brazil, confessed to offering numerous bribes to political leaders, political parties and public officials. Its major aim was to obtain contracts for major public infrastructure projects within the region. The investigation has revealed a complex network of bribery that has become one of the largest corruption scandals in Latin American history. The B budget boosts in the region, thanks to commodities' "golden decade," occurred within a weak precedent for the Rule of Law and therefore lax anti-corruption measures permitted widespread illicit profits for major government contractors and inflated costs for tax payers.

ARTICLE / Ximena Barria [English version] [Spanish version].

Odebrecht is a Brazilian conglomerate that through several operational headquarters conducts businesses in multiple industries. It dedicates to areas such as engineering, construction, infrastructure and energy. Its headquarters is located in Brazil in the city of Salvador Bahia. The company operates in 27 countries of Latin-America, Africa, Europe and the Middle East. Throughout the years, Odebrecht has concluded contracts with governments to build public works, with the majority of its projects in the Latin-American region.

In 2016, United States Department of Justice published allegations which detailed evidence of the company bribing public officials in twelve different countries, ten of them in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela. As a result, a full investigation was launched after Odebrecht's senior executives confessed to bribery once discovered.

The corporation granted millions of dollars to local public officials from the countries previously mentioned, in exchange for obtaining public contracts to gain benefits from the projects constructed. Its purpose was to obtain a competitive advantage which permitted them to retain local governmental business in different countries.

In order to cover up illegal transactions, Odebrecht created fictitious, anonymous societies in such places as Belize, the Virgin Islands and Brazil. The company elaborated a secret financial structure to camouflage its payments. The investigation of the United States Department of Justice estimated that the bribes accounted for a total of $788 million dollars. Utilizing this illegal method, and contrary to every political and business code of ethics, the company signed one hundred projects generating $3.336 billion dollars in profits.

A weak judicial branch

This issue, also known as the Odebrecht Case, has created major divisions within Latin American societies. Its citizens consider that these acts should not remain unpunished, as countries need a stronger judicial branch to cement a strong and respected Rule of Law.

According to World Bank indicators, none of these ten Latin American countries impacted by this network of bribes hold 60% or more of the standard efficacy of the Rule of Law and control of corruption. Hence, this explains how the construction company was able to successfully bribe politicians.

The judicial independence and its efficacy are essential for the resolution of acts with these characteristics. The correct exercise of justice moulds an appropriate Rule of Law, preventing that illegal acts or other political decisions could infringe upon it. Contrary to this ideal configuration, the countries who were involved in the Odebrecht case, do not possess optimal judicial independence.  

Thus, according to the Global Competiveness Report for 2017-2018, the majority of the countries affected obtained a low score with respect to the independence of their courts. These figures indicate that the countries lack of an effective judicial system to judge the alleged suspects involved in this case. With the case of Panama and the Dominican Republic, they ranked in the places 120 and 127 respectively, according to the judicial independence of a list of 137 countries.

One of the problems suffered by the Judicial Branch of the Republic of Panama is that it has high number of pending cases awaiting trial at the Supreme Court of Justice. This congestion makes it difficult for the supreme court to work effectively. The high number of processed cases doubled between 2013 and 2016, as the Criminal Chamber of the Court processed 329 cases in 2013 and in 2016 they processed 857. Although the Panamanian Judicial Branch has expanded its budget, this has not represented a qualitative increase in its functions. These difficulties could explain the decision of the court to reject an extension of the Odebrecht investigations, although this may imply some impunity. In 2016, there were only two detainees in the Odebrecht case. In 2017, of the 43 defendants who could be involved in the acceptance of bribes valued at $60 million dollars, only 32 were prosecuted.

The Dominican Republic also faces a similar situation. According to a 2016 survey, only 38% of Dominican citizens trust their justice system. The low percentage may be a result of the fact that the Supreme Court judges who were elected are active members of political parties, something that obscures the credibility of justice and its independence. In 2016, Dominican courts only prosecuted one person related to the Odebrecht case, whereas the US Supreme Court estimated that the Brazilian company had given 92 million dollars in Dominican political bribes, one of the highest amounts outside of Brazil. In 2017, the Supreme Court of the Dominican Republic ordered the release of 9 of 10 suspects implicated in the case due to insufficient evidence.

The need for improved coordination and reform

In October 2017, public prosecutors from Latin America met in Panama City to share information on money laundering, especially related to the Odebrecht case. The officials expressed the need to not leave any case unpunished, in order to solve one of the biggest political, economic and judicial problems in the region. Some prosecutors reported having suffered threats in their investigations. The meeting was valued in a positive way, since it highlighted the need in for greater fiscal coordination and legislative harmony in Latin America. However, it is important to note that the Dominican Republic was absent from that meeting.

All awareness of the public ministries of Latin America is essential in view of the correlation observed among the countries affected by the Odebrecht bribes and their poor position in the indices provided by different international organizations and research centers. The ineffective Rule of Law shows in the lack of control over corrupt companies like Odebrecht, where they succeeded in their bribery policy to obtain a competitive advantage.

The shortcomings of the judicial systems in countries such as Panama and the Dominican Republic make it possible for public officials to go unpunished for the crimes they committed. In addition, the Odebrecht case has a great impact in the region, and could still impede the judicial process if effective reforms are not taken in each country.