In the largest countries in the region, there are four times as many private guards as police officers and ten times more weapons than in Europe

The high rates of violence in Latin America and the deficient presence of the authority of the respective States in parts of the territory have led to the proliferation of private security companies throughout the region. His issue It now has more than 16,000 companies, in an industry that involves more than 2.4 million people. The sector faces significant challenges, such as vague legality in many cases, a lack of experience, ways that are incompatible with civil and human rights in certain places, and the risk of escalating stockpiles.

article / Martín Biera Muriel

The proliferation of private security companies in Latin America is linked to crime and violence statistics in the region. It is estimated that 19 out of every 20 violent crimes that occur in the world take place in Latin America, where 17 of the 20 most violent cities in the world and 4 of the 5 most violent countries are located.

The status has led to an "explosive growth" in the privatization of security in Latin America, as the report "Security for Sale" by the Inter-American Dialogue. The rise of the issue of Private Defense and Security Companies (PMSCs) has occurred not only in countries with marked conflicts, such as Colombia, where in the last ten years there has been an increase of 126%, but also in countries of greater social peace and institutionality such as Chile, which in five years has seen an increase of 50%. The total number of companies engaged in this function in Latin America reached 16,174 in 2017, as specified at the time by the Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Geneva (DCAF).

The PMSC sector

The term PMSC includes both security companies in use in developed countries, normally dedicated to the safekeeping of establishments or individuals, as well as defence companies that can replace functions usually reserved for the State. The latter developed after the end of the Cold War and have become an important player in international relations, with participation in conflicts of interest. leave and even high intensity.

These defence companies operate in a framework The regulation of which was attempted to be standardized in 2008 with the Montreaux Document, a compilation of legal obligations and good practices aimed at guaranteeing the sovereignty of States and protecting Human Rights. While the text applies more directly to situations of armed conflict, it also provides a framework for security companies in general, given the tenuous boundary between a subject Especially in Latin America, where the authority of the State often does not extend to the entire national territory, some civil conflicts are especially virulent and some use the Armed Forces in the fight against criminal violence and the maintenance of public order.

More Guards Than Cops

The more than 16,000 PMSCs in Latin America employ around 2.4 million people. While security guards outperform in issue to members of the police around the world, in many Latin American countries there is a particular imbalance between the issue components of the police forces and that of private agents: in Colombia, Brazil and Mexico, the ratio is one police officer to four members of EMSP; in countries of extreme violence such as Honduras and Guatemala, the ratio is even as high as one to seven. It is also the case that many members of the police resort to moonlighting, acting as police officers during the day and becoming security agents at night in some neighborhood. business or building.

The largest companies are those that are engaged in the surveillance and escort of VIP clients. The largest are of European and American origin and specialise in a part of the sector, especially in the protection of private property. Most of them operate in cities or in centres of natural resource extraction isolated from urban areas. In relation to the frequent criticism that these companies receive, for alleged supplanting of functions proper to the legally constituted authority, it is necessary to emphasize that the framework The legal system in which large companies operate is strict and supervised.

degree program Armament

It can be argued that the skill among operators has generated a kind of degree program armaments in which each business You want to offer more efficient services. At the same time, as there is a greater issue With more modern weapons, criminals also tend to increase their firepower and their capabilities to meet their objectives, which consequently leads companies to also increase the caliber of their weapons, in a spiral that is difficult to control. Statistics show that Latin America has the highest ratio of firearms to security guards in the world outside of conflict-affected areas. This ratio is ten times higher than that of small arms in Europe.

This has led to the fact that certain PMSCs have been criticized in the Latin American scenario for having contributed, directly or indirectly, to illegal arms trafficking and the increase in armed gangs, generating a vicious circle. For example, in 2015 ninety people were arrested in San Francisco (some of them linked to PMSCs) for belonging to a network of arms trafficking linked to the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). There have also been cases of theft and loss of weapons imported from the region, both by individual private security contractors and by the military itself; These weapons then enter the black market. Thus, more than 40% of illegal weapons in El Salvador are linked to some 460 private security companies, despite the obligation to have an official registry for their identification.

Challenges

Reducing high levels of insecurity is one of the main challenges for many Latin American countries. The reasons for the persistent violence in their societies are manifold; These include political corruption and economic inequality. The richer classes can be considered targets of attempted robberies or kidnappings, but the working classes also suffer from high crime figures, in their case without the possibility of resorting to private security.

Private security in Latin America faces two major challenges. One is illegality on the part of the sector: illegal companies grow faster than in the legal sector; in Brazil, for example, the issue of guards employed informally outnumbered formal ones. The other is the lack of training or experience of a certain volume of private guards. To meet the need for greater legal regulation, and for a regulation more adjusted to national specificities, and to the convenience of greater training It will help to reduce the grey area in which in many cases it operates and the violations of Human Rights.

The deterioration of recent years seems to have been corrected in several indicators on democratic health and economic environment.

Costa Rica has traditionally been a model of democratic functioning in a region with serious institutional deficits, which has earned it a mediating role in different conflicts. The increase of internal problems -strikes, citizen protests, bipartisan crisis...- have seemed to have diminished Costa Rica's international prestige in recent years. Is Costa Rica suffering from democratic and institutional deterioration?

▲ Facade of the National Theater of Costa Rica, in San José [Pixabay].

article / Ramón Barba

The political unrest of recent years in Costa Rica, in a regional context of the "angry vote" and the consequent "outsider phenomenon", has given the impression of a setback in the country's institutional virtues. The goal of this article is to determine, based on different indicators on democratic health and economic and political satisfaction, if there are objective data that ratify this perception.

For this purpose we will first analyze a set of indicators, elaborated by the World Bank, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and The Economist magazine, and then we will also take into account some results of the survey Latinobarómetro. We will compare the values recorded in 2010, 2013, 2016 and, when possible, 2018.

Indicators

Regarding the Democracy Index elaborated by The Economist, although Costa Rica maintains its second place among Latin American democracies, behind Uruguay and ahead of Chile (these are the three countries that usually obtain better grade in the different institutional parameters of the region), in the last decade a Costa Rican democratic decline is observed, apparently overcome in the most recent report. From a score of 8.04 achieved in the 2010 Democracy Index, Costa Rica dropped to 8.03 in 2013 and 7.88 in 2016, to regain ground in 2018 with an 8.07. The country remains the best democracy in Central America, followed at a distance by a stable Panama.

The deterioration of recent years has also been picked up by the Index of development of Democracies in Latin America (IDD-LAT), of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which has not yet published data referring to 2018, so this index cannot endorse whether there has been a recent recovery. In 2010, Costa Rica had a score average of 9.252; it barely varied in 2013, with a figure of 9.277, but dropped clearly in 2016, with 8.539 points. The components of the index that suffered the most were welfare policy creation and economic efficiency, where it dropped from 1st and 5th place, respectively, to 8th and 12th. The fact that Costa Rica remained between 1st and 3rd place in civil and political rights and in institutional and political efficiency in those years sample shows that the social concern of those years was more in the economic sphere than in the institutional sphere.

The World Bank's Good Governanceindicators also registera small regression in the case of Costa Rica between the years 2013 and 2016 (data more recent ones have not yet been published). Regarding the Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness scales the score dropped from 0.6 and 0.5, respectively, to 0.5 and 0.4. There has been little change in the Control of Corruption scale.

evaluation citizen

The above indicators are prepared by experts who, by applying standardized criteria, seek to offer an objective estimate. But we also wanted to take into account the opinion of the citizens themselves, as expressed in the survey Latinobarómetro. These can be useful to indicate the perception that exists among the population regarding the institutional health of the country: the satisfaction that exists regarding the government system and the economic system.

The value of democracy is maintained in high percentages in Costa Rica, despite a negative trend in the region as a whole. Attending to four values that Latinobarómetro has included in its surveys corresponding to the years here chosen for our comparison, we see that indeed in 2016 the citizen perception was that of a worsening of status, but in 2018 an improvement is observed, reaching even more positive levels than in 2013. As for the evaluation of democracy, its consideration as the best system of government dropped from 77% to 72% and then has risen again to 77%, while its cataloging as a preferable system has been increasing: 53%, 60% and 63%.

The perception of the economic environment, for its part, had a blip in 2013, but today it is in better condition. The statement "progress is being made" fell from 15% to 12%, but in 2018 it reached 22%, while satisfaction with future personal economic prospects fell from 45% to 20% to stand in 2018 at 52%.

Political unrest

Costa Rica is a country that retains strong institutions, although the political landscape is more divided. test of this is the end of the two-party system (1953-2014), brought about by less support for the National Liberation Party (PLN) and the Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) and the emergence of the Citizen Action Party (PAC), to which the country's current president, Carlos Alvarado, belongs.

Corruption issues such as the "cimentazo case", the high public debt that has forced cutbacks in a country with certain well-established social benefits and a regional and international environment prone to populist solutions may be behind the political unrest observed in Costa Rica in recent years.

This occurs in a context of the "angry vote" in Latin America, which arises as a consequence of the political actions of the last twenty years in the region and a strengthening of the middle classes. Citizen dissatisfaction has led to the emergence of outsider politicians: people with relative popularity, short degree program political, without a determined strategy and with an "anti-political" speech . This is a patron saint that, although it is in the emergence of the PAC, in any case does not fully correspond to the personality of President Alvarado, who actually seems to have contributed to redirect the Costa Rican restlessness.

Conclusions

Thus, from the analysis of the data observed here, it can be concluded that there was indeed a slight deterioration in both institutional circumstances and especially in economic conditions or expectations between 2013 and 2016, but the different scales have returned in 2018 to previous values, even improving in some cases to levels of ten years ago. This is something that can be observed both in the indicators at position of experts that follow standardized objective procedures and in the surveys of subjective citizen perception.

The sample used and the temporal tastings carried out have not been exhaustive, so it is not possible to specify whether the variations noted here are circumstantial fluctuations or part of a trend pointing in a certain direction.

The upcoming gas self-sufficiency of its two major buying neighbors forces the Bolivian government to look for alternative markets

▲ Yacimientos Pretrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) gas plant [Corporación YPFB].

ANALYSIS / Ignacio Urbasos Arbeloa

Bolivia, under Evo Morales, is the only economic success story of all the Latin American countries that embraced left-wing populism at the beginning of this century. Together with Panama and the Dominican Republic, Bolivia has achieved the highest GDP growth in the region in the last five years, and all this in a difficult context of decline on the part of its main trading partners: Argentina and Brazil[1]. The political stability brought by Evo Morales since 2006, coupled with prudent counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies and a new hydrocarbons management are part of the formula for this success. Nevertheless, there are enormous economic and political risks for Bolivia. On the one hand, natural gas accounts for 30% of exports and its destination is exclusively Brazil and Argentina, countries that are close to gas self-sufficiency. Finding alternative routes is not an easy task for a landlocked state, with a diplomatic conflict with Chile and separated by the Andes Mountains from Peru. Moreover, the Bolivian government's bid to exploit lithium through national companies that integrate its processing to favor industrialization is a risky strategy that could leave the country out of the growing world lithium market. Finally, Evo Morales and the MAS have followed a growing authoritarian trend, allowing the reelection of the president, undermining the separation of powers and the recent 2009 constitution. The new Bolivia faces in the next decade the challenge of reorienting its natural gas exports, diversifying its Economics and consolidating a real democracy that will allow a sustained growth of its Economics and its role as a regional actor.

Natural Gas: at the center of the 21st century political discussion

During the failed oil explorations in the Chaco in the 1960's, abundant natural gas reserves of great economic potential were found at finding . Although it was a resource of lesser value than crude oil, an incipient gas industry was soon developed by foreign companies, mainly American, such as Standard Oil. In 1972 a first nationalization took place, with the emergence of YPFB as the state-owned business in charge of the exploration, production, transportation and refining of Bolivian energy resources in partnership with foreign companies. That same year, the first export gas pipeline to Argentina was built. By 1999, Bolivia will export natural gas to Brazil through the Santa Cruz-Sao Paulo pipeline, whose project took more than eight years of negotiations and construction work and introduced Petrobras as an important player in the sector. Thus, Bolivia enters the 21st century with a growing gas industry, mostly privatized by the first government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, and boosted by a very favorable fiscal model for foreign companies[2].

The year 2001 marks the beginning of a convulsive political stage in Bolivia with the so-called Water War. A wave of protests arose from the privatization of municipal water services in the framework of financial negotiations between the IMF and the government of Hugo Banzer. At the nerve center of these protests in Cochabamba emerged the figure of Evo Morales, a coca growers' leader who will increase his popularity unstoppably. Gas became the protagonist in 2003, with a new wave of protests against the construction of a natural gas pipeline from Tarija to Mejillones (Chile) for consumption by the Chilean mining industry and export to Mexico and the USA in the form of LNG. The civil service examination at project argued the historical incoherence of contributing Bolivian resources to the exploitation of the mining region lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) and which deprived Bolivia of an outlet to the sea. In addition, an alternative, more costly gas pipeline through Peru was proposed, but which would supposedly benefit the northern region of Bolivia and would not be a national humiliation. The protests took a nationalist and indigenist turn and became a real revolution that blocked La Paz, the international airport and plunged the whole country into violence and shortages. President Lozada resigned and most of his government fled abroad, while the project was cancelled and buried forever.

The new president Mesa comes to power with the promise to call for a binding referendum on gas, the establishment of a Constituent Assembly and a reform of the Hydrocarbons Law, including a review of the privatization processes. The referendum ended up giving the victory to Carlos Mesa's proposals, although with a leave participation and a confusing essay of the questions. President Mesa, unable to capitalize on the legitimacy granted by the plebiscite Withdrawal to position and called early presidential elections in 2005, which brought to power the first indigenous president in the history of Bolivia, Evo Morales, with an absolute majority. Natural gas thus became the main catalyst for political change in Bolivia.

Hydrocarbon reform

The arrival of Evo Morales brought about a profound change in the hydrocarbons legal framework . In 2006 the new hydrocarbons law "Heroes del Chaco" was enacted, nationalizing Bolivia's energy resources, expropriating 51% of the shares of companies involved in the sector and establishing a direct tax on hydrocarbons of 50% subject to an extra royalty of 32% to YPFB in those fields with more than 100 mcf of annual production[3]. This legislation, in the words of Evo Morales "turned the tables, going from 18% to 82% of the State's income on hydrocarbons"[4]. The legislation, although adorned with a radical revolutionary rhetoric, has proven to be moderate and viable in the medium term, since it allows in the internship much less burdensome tax formulas for energy multinationals and did not imply large expropriations of assets. As can be seen in the graph below, tax revenues from natural gas have grown enormously since 2005, the year of the reform, without dramatically affecting natural gas production. Moreover, this reform was accompanied by record highs in the price of raw materials in 2006, 2007 and 2008, cushioning the percentage reduction in foreign companies' revenues. In 2009 Bolivia included in article 362 the primacy of oil service contracts, a formula in which multinationals do not obtain any rights over the hydrocarbons extracted, but are remunerated for the services rendered. 

Since the reform, exports have been relatively stable, buoyed by growing demand in both Brazil and Argentina. The most controversial case occurred in the particularly cold winter of 2016, when Bolivia halted exports due to maintenance work at the Margarita field. This event unmasked a stubborn reality about Bolivia's proven natural gas reserves and the need to increase exploration and drilling work in the country. Bolivia's current reserves amount to 283 bcm (10 tcf), enough for only 10 years of export activity at the current rate. Aware of this status limit, the YPFB corporation has launched an investment campaign for 2019 amounting to 1.45 billion dollars, of which 450 million dollars will be dedicated to exploration work[5]. Much of the investment in the sector in recent years has been aimed at industrializing natural gas production instead of exploration work, building refining plants such as the Bulo Bulo ammonia and urea plant[6]. Total, Shell, Repsol and Petrobras are currently working in exploration and production[7]. This effort is intended to answer the IMF's report , which considered Bolivia's natural gas reserves to be too scarce to turn the country into a regional energy center, Evo Morales' greatest aspiration[8]. For YPFB, there are probable reserves of 850 bcm (35 tfc) that would guarantee a long life for the gas sector, but it should rethink its fiscal policy in order to attract foreign companies, which currently account for only 20% of total investment[9].

The future of Bolivian natural gas

From agreement with the contracts signed with Brazil (1999) and Argentina (2005) export prices are indexed to a basket of hydrocarbons, which in general has guaranteed Bolivia a very favorable price, higher than the Henry Hub, but which makes the country equally dependent on fluctuations in international commodity prices. However, the revolution of non-conventional technology and new forms of transportation, now more economical, such as LNG, are transforming the reality of the natural gas market in the Southern Cone. This new situation, linked to the end of the contracts with Brazil in 2019 and Argentina in 2026, puts in check the future of the main asset of the Bolivian Economics .

As shown in the graph sample , the Bolivian trade balance and its fiscal stability depend on the exported volumes of natural gas and its international price. The survival of the current Bolivian economic model and the presidency of Evo Morales depend to a great extent on the income derived from this hydrocarbon, being a fundamental factor for the future of the Plurinational Republic of Bolivia.

Brazil

Since 1999, Brazil has become the main destination for natural gas exports, being Bolivia's only client in the 2001-2005 period. This position allowed the entrance of Petrobras as the main investor in the sector until the year of the nationalization, which meant an important diplomatic friction between both countries. It was the complicity between Morales and Lula, as well as the importance of maintaining harmony between the leftist governments in the region, which allowed avoiding a major confrontation between the two countries. Despite the words of Petrobras' president in 2006, Sergio Gabrielli, announcing the end forever of the company in Bolivia, it has continued to be an important investor due to the profitability of its activities and the strategic importance of Bolivian gas for Brazil.

It seems clear that natural gas will play an important role in Brazil's future, since the main source source of electricity in the country, hydroelectric power, requires other sources to replace it when there is a shortage of rainfall, as occurred between 2012 and 2014. This context favored the entrance of natural gas in the electricity mix, which went from 5% in 2011 to 25% by 2015[10]. However, Brazil started a decade ago with the revolutionary pre-salt hydrocarbon exploitations, which have allowed the country to increase its crude oil production from 1.8 mbd in 2008 to 2.6 mbd in 2018. Natural gas production associated with these fields is expected to enter the Brazilian market as the necessary infrastructure connecting the off-shore fields to the still insufficient network of gas pipelines is built, something that is expected to improve with the entrance of private players to the sector following the 2016 energy reform. Likewise, Brazil already has 3 plants to import LNG, allowing it to diversify its imports, as it did during 2018 when Bolivia was unable to supply the 26 million cubic meters per day agreed in 1999. All this puts Petrobras and Bolsonaro, located in the ideological antipodes of Morales, in a privileged position for negotiation, and who could bet on increasing imports of the increasingly cheaper North American LNG and reducing the volume of Bolivian gas. In any case, due to certain non-compliances in the supply of gas from Bolivia, the contract will be extended for at least two more years until the pending volumes of submit , which Brazil has already paid for, are reached.

Argentina

The other natural gas market for Bolivia is also undergoing profound transformations, in this case derived from unconventional shale and tight oil techniques. The Vaca Muerta field, considered one of the largest shale deposits in the world, has begun to produce the first returns after years of investments by YPF and other multinationals. Despite Argentina's economic instability and the fiscal reforms demanded by the IMF that will delay the total development of this giant field[11], it is expected that by 2022 its production will cover approximately 80% of Bolivian imports, returning to the path of self-sufficiency achieved in much of the 1990s and 2000s[12]. For the time being, Argentina has already managed to renegotiate the volumes of natural gas imported in summer and winter in a way that is more favorable to domestic demand[13]. In addition, Argentina authorized natural gas exports to Chile after 12 years of interruption[14] and made its first LNG export in May 2019[15], which are early signs of growing domestic production.

It seems clear that the Argentine market will not have a long run for Bolivian natural gas and will probably put an end to its imports when the contract ends in 2026. Other options are to use the complete network of Argentine pipelines as transit to other destinations via LNG or to neighbors such as Uruguay, Paraguay or even Chile.

Peru

For some months now, Bolivia has been engaged in a public diplomacy campaign to extend a gas export pipeline to Puno, a Peruvian city located on Lake Titikaka. Although Peru has significant natural gas production in Camisea that allows it to export large quantities of LNG, the country launched a program known as Siete Regiones (Seven Regions) to universalize access to natural gas. Southern Peru can be supplied more economically through Bolivian imports due to the proximity of the La Paz pipeline, but there is reluctance, especially in the pro-Fujimori civil service examination , to import a surplus good in the country. This formula would be integrated into a plan to export liquefied petroleum gas from Bolivia to the same area, while Peru would build a gas pipeline to import oil and derivatives from the Pacific port of Ilo to La Paz. For Bolivia, the Peruvian market may be a temporary solution while exports continue to diversify, but it will have an early expiration date given the Peruvian natural gas reserves, double the Bolivian reserves, and the logical trend towards greater domestic production to cover the demand of the entire country. Likewise, it seems sensible to think that the Peruvian coast will in the future be one of the points through which Bolivia could export its natural gas in the form of LNG if the regional market is saturated.

Chile

From an economic point of view, Chile is the most attractive country for Bolivian exports. It lacks natural gas reserves and its mining area, with high energy demand, is located in an area relatively close to Bolivia's gas pipelines and fields network . However, the now century-old dispute over Bolivia's original territories annexed by Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) has been an insurmountable obstacle in the present century. It is worth mentioning that during the 50's and 60's Bolivia exported oil to Chile and the USA through the Sica Sica-Arica pipeline; that is to say, the refusal to export natural gas to Chile has been a flag used by Evo Morales and not a historical tradition in the relationship between these countries.

After the huge mobilizations caused by the Gas War, Evo Morales was able to catalyze popular fervor and use the territorial dispute to increase his popularity. In fact, a good part of his efforts in the previous legislature were focused on achieving the longed-for exit to the sea through the International Court of Justice in The Hague. In 2018 this court ruled favorably for Chile, ruling that this country has no duty to negotiate with Bolivia a territorial settlement. Morales' refusal to export natural gas to Chile looks set to continue for the duration of his presidency.

However, the 1904 Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed by both states grants Bolivia full customs autonomy in the Chilean ports of Arica and Antofagasta and the right to keep goods in transit for 12 months, with free storage for its imports, and 60 days of free storage for its exports. These conditions seem ideal for the construction of an LNG plant in Arica or Antofagasta to export natural gas by sea while supplying the Chilean north, in need of cheap natural gas to displace coal. The difficult political relations between both countries complicate the viability of this project, which should not be discarded when Morales leaves the presidency and there is greater harmony, as happened with Pinochet and Banzer in power.

Domestic consumption

Domestic consumption of natural gas in Bolivia has grown at an annual rate of 4.5% in the 2008-2018 period driven by subsidized prices for consumption and the implementation of state projects that aim to provide added value natural gas extraction such as the Bulo Bulo urea plant or the Mutun steel industry. It is expected that per capita income in Bolivia and electricity consumption will continue to increase over the next decade. If the volume of natural gas subsidies grows similarly while export revenues decline, Bolivia's delicate fiscal balance could take a similar path to that of Argentina. The process of domestic industrialization through natural gas does not seem far-fetched either, as long as it is based on market rules and not at the expense of public finances. The country has already achieved self-sufficiency in fertilizers and is already a growing exporter, an example of the economic diversification pursued by the Morales government.

The question: Is there a market for everyone?

After reviewing the regional context, it may appear that the natural gas market in South America will be saturated by future oversupply. As can be seen in the graph, natural gas demand in the Bolivian neighborhood will increase from 107 bcm to 140 bcm per year by 2030. Peru, Argentina and Brazil are likely to increase their production and may reach self-sufficiency during the 2020s. This complicates the commercialization of Bolivian gas, but does not make it impossible. In the first place, the geographical reality of South America makes certain cross-border projects more economical than other internal ones, as in the case of southern Peru. Likewise, the increasingly lower costs of exporting gas by sea make it possible to find a market for surplus regional production, as in the case of Peru, which concentrates its gas exports to Spain. In a context of increasing energy interconnection, Bolivia will be able to continue exporting natural gas, albeit from a less privileged position and having to invest in export infrastructure. The major challenges are focused on increasing exploration activities by attracting more foreign and private investment, as well as the search for new markets, with the Chilean issue being a central element in this discussion.

The arrest of Barakat, a major financial operator in the group, was made possible by the partnership from Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil

• In January 2018, the Trump Administration reconstituted a research about Hezbollah and in October tagged the group of a transnational criminal organization

• The arrival to the presidency of Abdo Benítez in Asunción and Jair Bolsonaro in Brasilia has activated action against drug trafficking, money laundering and smuggling in the country. area

• Assad Ahmad Barakat and fifteen members of his clan were arrested throughout 2018, in a "significant milestone" of the action against Hezbollah in Latin America

▲ Friendship Bridge, which connects the Paraguayan town of Ciudad del Este with the Brazilian town of Foz do Iguaçu [BienvenidoaParaguay.com]

report SRA 2019 / Lisa Cubías [PDF Version]

Pressure actions on Hezbollah have increased significantly in the Western Hemisphere over the past year. Both the United States and the countries of the Triple Frontier – a border area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, which shelters a dense network funding of the organization – have taken some measures that, with different Degree have led to the arrest of a number of people and the dismantling of their Structures money laundering.

In the case of the United States, the change in the administration meant a change in policy. Some testimony from Obama-era officials has suggested that the previous presidency had a attention Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shiite organization with a dual political and military facet, is soft on the activities on the continent. The purpose this would have been to avoid inconveniences in the denuclearization negotiation with Iran, one of the organization's most notorious pillars of support. Thus, the Obama Administration would have hindered efforts to implement the "project Cassandra," developed by the DEA, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, to uncover the sources of Hezbollah's funding in Latin America for its illicit activities.

The "project Cassandra," widely exposed by Politico in late 2017, bore some fruit despite that alleged interference, denied by other Obama administration officials. In March 2017, Kassim Tajideen, a major financier of the terrorist organization, was captured and pleaded guilty in December 2018. In June 2017, Paraguayan Ali Issa Chamas was extradited to the U.S. to face charges of conspiracy to traffic drugs.

The change in the White House, in any case, led to the dismantling of some research that the Trump Administration had reinstated the effort against Hezbollah. Thus, in January 2018 the department announced the Creating a Unit of research Hezbollah's Narco-Terrorism and Financing Team, and later, in October, designated Hezbollah as a transnational criminal organization, considering its drug trafficking and money-laundering activities beyond thelabel terrorist organization that the U.S. already granted him.

For its part, throughout 2018 the department The U.S. Treasury Department has placed 31 individuals and entities linked to Hezbollah on its sanctions list, including Lebanese financier Adham Tabaja, while the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has placed 31 Hezbollah-related individuals and entities on its sanctions list, including Lebanese financier Adham Tabaja. department In November, the U.S. government designated Jawad Nasrallah, the son of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, as a terrorist and imposed sanctions on several Iraqi members of the organization.

These actions have basically affected operatives residing in the Middle East, but they have hardly affected the structure of Hezbollah in the Tri-Border Region or in Venezuela, places indicated by the Administration as sites of implantation of that organization. Thus, the Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorist Financing, Marshall Billingslea, spoke at the end of October of a "deep and substantial footprint" of Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere, with a "very robust presence" in the Tri-Border Area, while Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has repeatedly underlined the relationship between Nicolás Maduro's regime and Hezbollah, affirming in February 2019 that in Venezuela there are "active cells" of that kind of disease. group.

Action in the Tri-Frontier

Nonetheless, the efforts of both the Trump Administration and the governments of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, to varying degrees, led to a major operation in 2018 in the Tri-Border, the most significant in a long time: the arrest of Assad Ahmad Barakat, considered one of Hezbollah's main operatives in the area. who had already been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2004. For expert Joseph Humire, this constituted "a significant milestone in the regional effort against terrorism and transnational crimes practiced by Hezbollah in Latin America."

According to fellow experts Emanuelle Ottolenghi and José Luis Stein, three factors have led to this new emphasis on the risk posed by Hezbollah. First, the clues that the funds that the group The economic crisis obtained from its funding networks in Latin America have grown markedly, both because their needs have increased and because U.S. sanctions on Iran may be restricting the economic support provided by the Iranian regime. Second, Washington is acting in the face of the increased use of its financial system by the amounts generated for Hezbollah in Latin America. And thirdly, the greatest reaction in Brasilia, Asunción and Paraguay is due to the changes of government: in April 2018 Abdo Benítez was elected president of Paraguay and in October Jair Bolsonaro won the elections in Brazil (Mauricio Macri had previously replaced Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in the Casa Rosada).

Hezbollah's beginnings in Latin America are directly related to the civil war in Lebanon, which in the 1980s led to a wave of migration to the American continent, particularly South America, and especially in areas of easy trade, such as the Tri-Border Area, where one of the largest free trade zones on the continent is located. Family and background connections served the group, through infiltrated elements, to carry out recruitment, fundraising and money laundering activities.

It was not until 1994, however, that Hezbollah's presence in Latin America became noticeable. That year saw the attack on the headquarters of the association Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) in Buenos Aires, in which 85 people died. Although it was initially claimed by a group Soon investigations led to the Tri-Border Region and targeted Hezbollah. At the time, it was also suspected that the organization may have been behind the attack two years earlier on the Israeli embassy in the Argentine capital, which killed 22 people. Everything indicates that in both cases the Tri-Border Area was used for the logistics of the attacks and for the refuge of the perpetrators.

That is why the latest security operations in that area are of particular importance. At the request of the United States, Paraguayan police arrested Nader Mohamad Fahrat in May 2018 and Mahmoud Ali Barakat a month later, both for drug trafficking and money laundering, in what would be a year especially concentrated in the clan led by Assad Ahmad Barakat. In July, Argentina's Financial Intelligence Unit froze the assets of 14 Lebanese (eleven with residency program in Brazil and three in Paraguay), all of them belonging to the clan. That network He allegedly laundered money and evaded $10 million worth of foreign currency at a casino in the Argentine border city of Puerto Iguazú. In August, Paraguay's Attorney General's Office issued an arrest warrant for the clan chief, alleging the use of a false Paraguayan passport. Assad Ahmad Barakat was arrested in September by Brazilian police. In Paraguay and Argentina, members of the clan were arrested, played and convicted of crimes of money laundering, smuggling, product evasion and drug trafficking.

Panamanian authorities recorded the transit of 2,100 people of "interest" to Washington in 2018.

• Of the 8,445 illegal migrants located in Darien (an increase of 20% in two years), 91% were from Asia and Africa, with goal mostly from reaching the US.

• The US Southern Command deployed helicopters in January and February 2019 to improve surveillance capabilities in the dense jungle area.

• Washington's awareness of the presence of AIS in the Central American migrant caravans last autumn prompts it to focus on the Darien Gap.

report SRA 2019 / Alex Puigrefagut[PDF version].

One of the best-known icons on the American continent is the Pan-American Highway: network of roads that runs from Argentina to the United States and even goes as far as Alaska. Between one end and the other, there is only one point where you have to get out of your car: 130 kilometres of dense vegetation between Panama and Colombia, which is truly impassable, even difficult to cross on foot. It is the Darién jungle, which is known as the Darién Gap.

Precisely because it blocks land transit between South America and Central America, it has traditionally been a area with little surveillance of migratory flows. This lack of monitoring, however, has led in recent years to a call effect of illegal immigration, mainly from Asia and Africa, which is of concern to the United States. Many of these immigrants are classified by Washington as Special Interest Aliens (SIAs), as they come from countries that, according to the US, show a tendency to promote, produce or protect criminal organisations, mostly terrorist organisations. If they emerge in Panama, they can easily use Central American migratory routes to the US, as has been denounced in the recent crisis of the caravans that departed from Honduras.

Panama' s National Migration Service recorded the passage through Darién of 8,445 illegal immigrants in 2018 (with December still to be counted), of which 5,400 were from Asia and 2,287 from Africa, which together accounted for 91 per cent of the entire contingent. This is an increase of 20 per cent in two years. Of these, 2,123 were nationals from countries the US sees as a potential terrorist threat: most were from Bangladesh (1,440), but also from Eritrea (418), Pakistan (151), Yemen (34), Somalia (32), Afghanistan (10), Iraq (10), Mauritania (10), Syria (7) and Egypt (2). At the end of 2017, the Panamanian National Border Service detained 26 Yemeni nationals with suspected links to terrorist groups.

This migration flow of people labelled as SIAs by Washington was already alerted in 2016 by the US Homeland Securitydepartment , which sent a memo to US border authorities to be vigilant.

With a focus on Darién, in June 2018 the US and Panama agreed to establish a Joint Migration Task Force (JMTF), goal to ensure more effective and comprehensive coordination to address illegal and uncontrolled immigration in the region. Security authorities from both administrations prioritised action against drug trafficking and other types of organised crime that could pose a threat to the security of both Panama and the US, as well as the region as a whole. In January and February 2019, the US Southern Command used helicopters for transports to improve surveillance facilities in Darién.

USA and Colombia

The main purpose of the JMTF created between the two States is that there can be exchange of information and resources to establish strategic border points and thus combat all subject of organised crime on the southern border of Panama, such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking, human trafficking and above all for the comprehensive monitoring of the possible penetration of illegal migrants considered CIS that may be effectively related to international terrorist organisations. In addition, for the proper functioning of the JMTF, the two governments agreed to meet bilaterally twice a year to effectively supervise and coordinate the border security groups.

Already in 2016, the governments of Panama and Colombia implemented further measures in the Binational Border Security Commission (COMBIFRON) to strengthen the fight against drug trafficking and organised crime, as well as illegal migration. These measures included the creation of two shared surveillance points between the two navies in order to control migratory flows along the border of both countries, especially in the Darién region. The area had historically been a place of influence for Colombian cartels and a rearguard for guerrilla forces, so the peace process with the FARC was an opportunity to seek greater state control.

The main problem in the Darién challenge in recent decades, according to some observers, was the passivity shown by Colombia, which gradually decreased patrolling and land control of its part of the border, leaving Panama with limited resources in the face of criminal groups, which led to a considerable increase in the illegal trafficking of drugs, arms and people along the border. This Colombian passivity was mainly due to the fact that the transit of illegal migrants did not create migratory pressure on Colombia, as the flows were towards the northern part of the continent. Although today both countries pay attention to the Darién, control of the area is still deficient, partly because maritime security is prioritised over land security, especially in the case of Colombia.

Central American caravans

The illegal passage through the Darién of people Washington considers "of interest" because they come from countries that may foment terrorism is part of international routes to the southern border of the United States. Ample evidence sample that the Darién Gap has become a strategic point for regional and US security.

The presence of individuals labelled as SIAs was at the centre of the discussion on the various migrant caravans that in autumn 2018 departed from Central America - emerging in Honduras and increasing in size as they passed through El Salvador and Guatemala - and headed for the US-Mexico border. According to the US think-tank Center for a Secure and Free Society (SFS), these caravans involved individuals from outside Central America, from the Middle East, Asia and Africa, some of whom entered the label of SIA. According to agreement with SFS, these individuals had a privileged attention in the development of the convoys, which could even indicate collusion between SIA networks and certain Central American migration channels. The same centre found that Guatemalan officials detected no less than 157 irregular migrants from other continents, at least 17 of whom were of "special interest" to the US because they came from countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Eritrea.

It is difficult to establish how many people with profile SIAs actually transit through Central America to the US, as their identities are falsified in order to go unnoticed during their journey. On the other hand, the US president exaggerated the state of alarm over the large Central American caravans, because even if there were grounds for the alert, it should not be forgotten that the vast majority of Special Interest Aliens who enter the US and who are highly dangerous because of their direct connections to terrorism arrive by air and not by land. According to an explanatorystatement of the US Homeland Security department , average of ten people on the "terrorist watch list" are apprehended every day (3,700 in the last fiscal year), although few of them enter through the US-Mexico border.

Venezuela's worsening crisis reduces vigilance at sea, increases official corruption and pushes coastal villages to seek subsistence

• April 2018 saw the attack with the highest death toll in recent years issue : 15 Guyanese fishermen died in Surinamese waters

• Increased attacks prompted Trinidad and Tobago authorities to create an elite air unit to fight piracy

• Coast-wide alert as news broke in 2018 that the previous year's incidents had risen from 27 to 71, up 167 percent

▲ Coast of Guyana, whose fishermen have been affected by increased piracy.

report SRA 2019 / Manuel Lamela[PDF Version].

The significant increase in piracy in the Atlantic waters between Colombia and Suriname, with Venezuela at the center of this criminal activity, has fueled media headlines about "the new pirates of the Caribbean".

Although far from the scale of piracy recorded in and around the Gulf of Aden between 2008 and 2012, and then in the Gulf of Guinea, the issue of attacks in these other waters increased markedly in 2017, and 2018 saw the highest issue casualty attack.

The deterioration of maritime security, which mainly harms local fishermen and some pleasure boats, from which pirates steal gasoline, engines, fish and whatever valuables they can find on board, has gone hand in hand with the worsening of the Venezuelan status and also affects neighboring countries.

Suriname and Guyana

The attack on four boats on which twenty Guyanese fishermen were fishing, which occurred between April 27-28, 2018, turned out to be the piracy incident with the highest issue death toll in recent years. Suriname authorities recovered five bodies and reported ten fishermen missing, whose bodies were possibly left at the bottom of the sea, as the perpetrators of the attack forced the crew members to throw themselves into the water with the anchor or other weights attached to their feet, from agreement with the official report. Only five occupants of the fishing boats were able to save themselves, with at least one of them freeing himself from the ballast to which he was tied, according to his own testimony. Subsequently, a thirty-man group was arrested for these events.

Despite the fact that the status is not unknown to Guyana or Suriname the increase in both issue and violence of this subject of incidents in the last year is remarkable. At the beginning of 2018, a report published by the NGO One Earth Future, within its Oceans Beyond Piracy program, indicated that the issue of attacks recorded in Latin American waters increased in 2017 from 27 in the previous year to 71, an increase of 167%. Most of them (64) occurred in territorial waters, without affecting international routes as was the case with Somali pirates or happens in the Gulf of Guinea. While on these routes the main targets were merchant ships or large fishing vessel owners, including the hijacking of vessels and crews, in the case of what is occurring mainly in the waters of Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Suriname it affects small boat owners.

Gulf of Paria, Trinidad and Tobago

Particularly thorny is status in the Gulf of Paria, located between the coasts of the Venezuelan state of Sucre and the island of Trinidad, separated by only 10 nautical miles at their closest point. The geographical peculiarity of the area is a perfect scenario for illicit activities. The area was already known for the existence of several gangs dedicated to smuggling and trafficking of basic necessities, such as diapers and other items in high demand among the Venezuelan population. Given the shortage suffered by Venezuela, this is a relief for the demand of certain products and injects dollars to the already large Economics submerged. To the ineffectiveness and passivity of the governments of both countries when it comes to combating piracy, as reflected in their failed bilateral negotiations in 2017, is joined by a more than presumable cooperative relationship between officials and criminal gangs, as pointed out by the Venezuelan NGO association civil de Gente de Mar.

Other areas of Trinidad and Tobago's territorial waters, in addition to those of the Gulf of Paria, are affected by piracy, which is contributed to by local gangs fed by the arrival of Venezuelans who find it difficult to find a job employment. In the last few years some 40,000 Venezuelans have migrated to the neighboring country, destabilizing the already precarious working conditions of Trinidadian society. With a population of just 1.3 million, the archipelago has a relatively high crime rate, which in 2018 manifested itself in the commission of close to 500 murders. These figures are starting to hurt tourism, which is one of the main economic assets. Trinidad and Tobago is at risk of being perceived as a successor to the infamous Tortuga Island, a haven for 17th century Caribbean pirates.

Faced with this status, the island authorities announced at the end of January 2019 the creation of an elite air unit within the Police to act against illegal migration, piracy, kidnapping and smuggling of weapons and drugs. The advertisement came immediately after six fishermen from Trinidad were kidnapped and taken to Venezuela by their kidnappers, who demanded a ransom of $200,000.

Venezuela: Sucre and Anzoátegui

The economic and social crisis in Venezuela is one of the main causes of the increase in piracy. This is carried out especially from the state of Sucre, which has already been mentioned, and from the coastal state of Anzoátegui.

The criminals operating in the area can be divided into two types. On the one hand, there are well-trained, well-armed attackers who are part of a criminal organization and related to the drug trafficking that controls the Paria peninsula (the eastern end of Sucre). Specifically, there are two different criminal gangs fighting for control of the area. These drug trafficking groups are based in the towns of San Juan de Unare and San Juan de las Galdonas, in the municipality of Arismendi. Through violence and extortion, they have managed to take over the most important maritime routes, driving away all fishermen who might witness their actions. Their activity is mainly focused on drug and arms trafficking. written request Regarding the former, the merchandise is obtained from Colombia and after crossing Venezuela is shipped to the coasts of Trinidad and Tobago to be transported to the European market, sometimes with a stopover in West Africa. As for the arms, the shipments are obtained in Venezuela itself, coming from theft and smuggling (corruption and lack of security also affect the national factories that produce armament; in 2019 it is foreseen the entrance operation of a factory with capacity to produce 25,000 AK 103 rifles per year).

On the other hand, piracy activity is also carried out by simple thugs, of a lesser criminal profile and with less equipment and resources. Despite this, they are the ones that create the greatest alarm, given their proliferation among a population with hardly any sources of income and coordinates of action that are less specific than those of organized crime, which makes their attacks more unpredictable.

Chavista mismanagement in the fishing industry is another of the main factors that have generated this increase of criminals coming from the local population, mostly dedicated to fishing. With the arrival of Hugo Chavez to power in 1999, a great process of nationalization of this sector was carried out, with the expropriation of shipyards, boats, ports... Following this process of reforms and further strengthening its relationship with Cuba, in 2008 a binational public business called business Joint Socialist Joint Industrial Fisheries of the Bolivarian Alliance (PESCALBA) was created with the goal to make the product more accessible to the social strata with less purchasing power. All this contributed to the fact that between Chávez's ascension to the presidency and 2017, the catch decreased by 60%, with a flight of ships to other countries, such as Panama or Ecuador, the cessation of activity of processing plants, the mooring of ships due to lack of maintenance and the increase of unemployment. As a result, the state of Sucre has result with a broken society, with no means of subsistence, which finds in crime its only way to survive.

Panama's place on the Silk Road and the break with Taiwan of new countries on area place Chinese interests on the doorstep of the United States.

• U.S. alert for the Chinese management of terminals on both sides of the Panama Canal, of a possible port in El Salvador and of the space station opened in Patagonia.

• Beijing maintains its support for Maduro with a new US$5 billion credit , the implementation of the Carnet de la Patria for social control and the sending of a hospital ship.

• Chinese financial financial aid to Latin America exceeds $140 billion since 2005; some 150 infrastructure projects have been signed, half are underway in 2018

project Chinese port terminal at one of the mouths of the Panama Canal

report SRA 2019 / Jimena Villacorta[PDF Version].

The People's Republic of China strengthened its relationship with Latin America in 2018, especially with Central America. While its level of official lending decreased in the last two years, Beijing developed other actions in the region and especially improved its strategic position in Central America, to the concern of the United States.

Throughout 2018 two new countries ceased their diplomatic recognition of Taiwan to move to full relations with China. The Dominican Republic, a country integrated into some of the Central American agreements, did so in May, and El Salvador did so in August. Panama took the step the previous year, in June 2017 (and Costa Rica in 2007). While this leaves Taiwan still with four partners in Central America (of the 18 countries that continue to recognize Taiwan worldwide, four are in the American isthmus-Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Belize; and four others are in the Caribbean: Haiti and three micro-states), China already has sufficient space for its logistical operations.

Panama has become an interesting goal for Beijing. At the beginning of 2018 Panama received the designation of most favored nation by China, and in December Xi Jinping made the first visit of a Chinese president to the country. In the framework of that visit, Beijing announced that there are 20 Chinese companies carrying out operations in Panamanian territory, such as the construction of maritime terminals on both sides of the interoceanic canal, of which China is the world's second largest customer (30.7% of all traffic), after the United States. There are also another 70 companies installed in the Colon Free Zone, of which China is the main provider. Panama is a fundamental piece for the purpose suggested by the Chinese authorities to extend to Latin America the maritime route of the New Silk Road, for which both countries signed a memorandum, the first for that purpose in the region.

US Alert

Beijing's influence in Panama has generated suspicions in Washington. In February 2018, Admiral Kurt Tidd, head of the US Southern Command, already indicated in his appearance before the Senate the concern about the Chinese positioning in the Canal environment. In September, the US called for consultations with the chargé d'affaires of its Panamanian embassy to analyze that activity, and in October the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, expressed his concern in a visit to the country. In February 2019, Admiral Craig Faller, the new head of the Southern Command, insisted before the Senate on how "particularly worrisome" is "China's effort to exercise control over infrastructures core topic associated with the Panama Canal". Faller also warned about China's construction of ports on the Latin American coast. "In the future," the admiral said, "China could use its control of deepwater ports in the Western Hemisphere to enhance its global operational position."

Precisely one of the ports that China could take control of was the subject of discussion political in El Salvador, where the government of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) promoted in July 2018 a law to designate the area around the port of La Union, in the Gulf of Fonseca, as a special economic zone. The US ambassador in El Salvador welcomed the initiative, warning that the interest shown by China towards La Unión, recognized by the Salvadoran authorities, could result in the use of the facilities as a Chinese military base.

The increase in China's activity in Latin America in 2018 was matched, as can be seen, with a parallel increase in alerts from the US. Another such signal was regarding the space tracking and observation station built and managed by China in Argentine Patagonia, to which in February the head of the Southern Command referred to in the framework of his visit to Capitol Hill. The fear is that, being managed by a business under the Chinese Army, the station could have a military use, although the Argentine government has requested Beijing's commitment that this will not happen.

Loans and Venezuela

In the financial chapter, China granted a total of 7.7 billion dollars in credits to the region in 2018, which represented a slight increase compared to 2017, after two years of decreases, although far from the amount of the exercises with the highest volume, from agreement with the China-Latin America financialdatabase of Inter-American Dialogue. Since 2005, Chinese direct investment has amounted to $141 billion, most of it coming from the development Bank of China (CDB) and almost half of it destined for Venezuela ($67.2 billion). Of the 7.7 billion granted in 2018, 5 billion corresponded to Venezuela, which thus obtained a attendance that since 2007 began it only lacked in 2008 and 2017.

If initially the investment was more aimed at the extractive industry, over time China has also been entering the infrastructure sector. Some 150 transport infrastructure projects have been signed since 2002, of which almost half had been started by 2018.

The special financial linkage with Caracas, basically in exchange for oil in the future, has led Beijing to act in defense of the government of Nicolás Maduro. In addition to denying recognition of the designation of Juan Guaidó as president in charge of the country, China denied in March 2019 the visa to the representative appointed by Guaidó in the directory of the Inter-American Bank of development (IDB), an entity that for the first time was going to hold its annual meeting on Chinese territory. This was seen as China's first intervention in American regional politics, using the growing weight of its credits and investments in various countries.

China has expressed its support to Maduro in different ways. In 2018, details of the technological financial aid provided by the Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE to develop the Carnet de la Patria promoted by the Venezuelan government, in an implementation that seeks social control, became known.

There was also support for the Chavista regime with the dispatch of a hospital ship to Venezuela in September 2018. The Peace Ark spent a week in Venezuelan waters, a month after the Pentagon announced that it was scheduling to send the Comfort, a ship with several operating rooms and other medical facilities, to Colombia to treat Venezuelans who had fled the humanitarian crisis in the neighboring country.

The group reaches 2,000 members, including demobilized elements returning to arms and new recruits.

• Coordination between FARC remnants and ELN detected, with participation of "demobilized" members of the old guerrilla leadership such as Iván Márquez.

• Iván Duque's government reacts to U.S. pressure with committed eradication of 70,000 hectares of coca crops

• The highest concentration of coca production on the border with Ecuador pours violence on this country, where throughout 2018 "El Guacho", ex-FARC, was active.

▲ Walter Patricio Arizala, alias "el Guacho", before falling in a Colombian Army operation.

report SRA 2019 / María Gabriela Fajardo[PDF Version].

The doubt that existed when in December 2016 the Colombian peace agreement was signed, about whether the dissidence of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) would be something residual or rather would reach a certain entity, assuming a clear security problem, has been cleared. The dissidents have been growing in issue progressively and throughout 2018 they have consolidated in their criminal activity.

In the first half of 2017, some 6,800 FARC guerrillas were demobilized following the submission of nearly 9,000 weapons. The government estimated that of the total number of FARC troops, some 400 fighters (a residual 5%) would likely refuse to follow the instructions of the guerrilla leadership. In November 2017, on the first anniversary of the signature of the Havana agreement , the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation published a report estimating that the dissidence had reached around 700 members. In February 2018 the Ideas for Peace Foundation raised the figure to between 1,000 and 1,500. At the end of 2018 two intelligence reports, both disseminated by Colombian media that claimed to have had access to their contents, placed the dissident bulk between 1,750 and 3,000 troops.

The maximum figure in this range was established by a report released in October, of which hardly any details were given, while the lowest was provided by an alleged document from the Defense department sent to congress and revealed in December. The latter fixed the issue number of members of all illegal groups in the country at 7,260, of which 2,206 belonged to the ELN (National Liberal Army, the last guerrilla as such still active in Colombia), 1,749 to the FARC dissidence and 1,600 to the Clan del Golfo, an organized crime group . If both estimates on the size of the dissidence really come from government agencies, we would be facing a lack of contrasted information on the part of the State, although everything could be due to the fact that the reports were elaborated at different times, besides not corresponding to the time of their diffusion in the media.

In view of the evolution of the phenomenon, it would probably not be wrong to think that at the beginning of 2019 the issue number of FARC dissidents may be around 2,000. This volume includes both people who never demobilized, as well as former combatants who took up arms again in the face of the difficulties encountered in the transition to civilian life and also new recruits.

Reorganization

With the political banner transferred to the new Revolutionary Alternative Force of the Commons (which thus maintains the FARC acronym), the dissidents no longer have the narrative of social struggle that previously accompanied the activities they continue to carry out: drug trafficking, smuggling, extortion and other illicit businesses. So they have become another example of organized crime, articulated in different groups that, although they are converging, do not have the hierarchical structure of the old guerrilla leadership.

The leadership could be strengthened if some of the leaders who have expressed disagreement with the implementation of the peace process and have disappeared for some time, such as Iván Márquez, return to the guerrillas. For the moment, in any case, what is being observed is rather an organizational confluence with the ELN. Thus, several media outlets published in December 2018 about that coordination, aimed especially at getting cocaine shipments out through Venezuela, a country where the ELN has increased its activity. Army commanders have confirmed this cooperation. A high-level meeting would have involved, in addition to Iván Márquez, other FARC leaders who had supposedly laid down their arms, such as El Paisa and Romaña.

These contacts took place after the talks between the government and the ELN, opened on Ecuadorian soil to explore a peace agreement , were suspended in September by decision of President Iván Duque when no progress was made and it was understood that, in reality, the ELN were getting stronger, occupying territories formerly controlled by the FARC. The dialogue was broken off following the ELN attack against the General Santander National Police Cadet School in Bogota on January 17, 2019, which left 21 dead and 80 wounded.

On the other hand, the demobilization of the FARC, although incomplete as we can see, has given rise to the presence in Colombia of Mexican cartels, which are thus trying to extend their dominance to cocaine production sites as well, something that has been highlighted by the Attorney General of the nation.

Coca and domain disputes

Among the priorities of the new government of Iván Duque, who became position president of the country in August 2018, has been to try to reduce the high production of coca leaf and cocaine, which in recent years has seen a sharp increase. Between 2013 and 2017, the issue of hectares with coca bush rose from 48,000 to 171,000 hectares, according to The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The United States makes those estimates up ward for the same period: from 80,500 to 209,000 hectares (the latter figures would have meant a jump in potential cocaine production from 235 to 921 tons).

The outgoing government of Juan Manuel Santos committed in March 2018 to the eradication guide of 70,000 hectares of coca bush over the course of the year (compared to the 52,000 that, according to Colombian authorities, were eradicated in 2017), in the framework of a five-year plan agreed with the United States, whose Administration had complained about the substantial increase in cocaine production in the country in recent years. The Colombian Ministry of Defense announced that as of June 2018, 42,000 hectares had been voluntarily replaced, according to the latest report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which, for its part, certified that between May 2018 and January 2019, almost 35,000 hectares had been eradicated. These figures represent over 90% compliance with the Comprehensive National Program for the Substitution of Illicitly Used Crops (PNIS) at various Departments. However, the urgency to achieve the objectives of reducing production space could be leading to forced eradication, not followed by other plantings, which in the medium term deadline could mean a return to coca cultivation.

In 2018, the murders of social leaders and human rights defenders continued to increase, amounting to a record issue of 164. According to the Ombudsman's Office, from the beginning of 2016 to the end of 2018, more than 420 activists who developed a leadership role in different communities in the country were killed. This violence is related to the territorial reorganization of criminal groups. There was particular incidence in some Departments of access to the Pacific, such as Cauca and Nariño, where a higher concentration of cocaine production and the initial demobilization of the FARC caused tensions between criminal organizations to ensure dominance of the territory. These frictions caused casualties among community leaders who wanted to free themselves from the control that cartels and criminal groups had been exerting. Meanwhile, a total of 85 former FARC members were killed since the signature of the peace agreement , as recorded in the 2018report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia.

Increased criminal activity in the border area with Ecuador, with a cocaine export hub in the port of Tumaco, has led to violence spilling over to the other side of the border. In early 2018 several attacks on Ecuadorian police and army installations, as well as several kidnappings, were attributed to FARC dissidents led by "el Guacho." Colombia and Ecuador proceeded to increase the deployment of soldiers along the border to address status. In December 2018 "el Guacho" was killed in Nariño by a Colombian Army unit.

The change of government and its stricter vision have slowed down the implementation of agreement, but it is making progress in its application.

The implementation of the agreement peace agreement in Colombia is proceeding more slowly than those who signed it two years ago expected, but there has not been the paralysis or even the crisis predicted by those who opposed the election of Iván Duque as president of the country. The latest estimate speaks of a compliance with the stipulations of the peace agreement agreement close to 70%, although the remaining 30% is already not being complied with.

▲ Colombian President Iván Duque at a public event [Efraín Herrera-Presidencia].

article / María Gabriela Fajardo

Iván Duque arrived at the Casa de Nariño - the seat of the Colombian presidency - with the slogan "Peace with Legality", degree scroll that synthesized his commitment to implement the peace agreement , signed in November 2017, but reducing the margins of impunity that in his opinion and that of his party, the Democratic Center, existed for the former combatants of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). One year after his election as president, it is worth analyzing how the implementation of the peace agreement agreement is going.

agreement About 70% of the provisions of agreement have already been fulfilled, totally or partially, or will be fulfilled within the stipulated time, according to the estimate of high school Kroc, in charge of making the official estimate of the implementation of the peace process. According to its third report, published in April, 23% of the commitments have been completely fulfilled, 35% have reached advanced levels of implementation, and 12% are expected to be completely fulfilled by the stipulated time. However, almost 31% of the content of the agreement has not yet begun to be implemented, when it should have been underway.

The United Nations, to which the agreement grants a supervisory role, has underlined the efforts made by the new Government to activate the various instances provided for in the text. In his report to committee Security, the University Secretary of the UN, António Guterres, highlighted at the end of 2018 the launching of the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final agreement (CSIVI) and of the committee National Commission for Reincorporation (CNR).

As indicated by Raúl Rosende, chief of staff of the UN Verification mission statement in Colombia, Guterres' report positively estimated that it had "obtained the approval of 20 collective projects and 29 individual projects of ex-combatants in the process of reincorporation, valued at 3.7 million dollars and which will benefit a total of 1,340 ex-combatants, including 366 women". These projects have involved the participation of the governments of Antioquia, Chocó, Cauca, goal, Santander, Sucre and Valle del Cauca, which have facilitated departmental reincorporation roundtables to coordinate local and regional efforts, thus involving Colombian civil society to a greater extent.

The UN has also expressed some concerns, shared by Colombian civil society. The main one has to do with security in some of the historical conflict zones where a high issue number of social leaders have been killed. The murders have been concentrated in Antioquia, Cauca, Caquetá, Nariño and Norte de Santander. Thus, throughout 2018 at least 226 social leaders and Human Rights defenders were killed, according to data of the high school of programs of study for development and Peace(Indepaz). The Ombudsman's Office put the figure at 164.

In addition, as Rosende has recalled, many of the indigenous communities have suffered assassinations, threats and forced displacement. This has occurred in ethnic territories of the Awá, Embera Chamí and Nasa peoples in Caldas, Cauca, Chocó, Nariño and Valle del Cauca.

Along with the successes and concerns, the UN also points to a series of challenges that lie ahead in the post-conflict period. On the one hand, there is the challenge of guaranteeing former combatants the necessary legal security, generating confidence and producing real progress in terms of social and political reintegration. Another great challenge is to achieve the autonomous and effective functioning of mechanisms core topic such as the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition or Truth Commission. In addition, there is also the social challenge to attend to the communities affected by the conflict, which demand security, Education, health, land, infrastructure and viable alternatives against illegal economies.

Controversial aspects

Issues related to the SJP have been the focus of Duque's most controversial actions. In March, the president presented formal objections to the law regulating the SJP, which he wants to modify six points of its 159 articles. Two of them refer to the extradition of former combatants, something that is not contemplated now if they collaborate with the transitional justice system, especially in the case of crimes committed after the signature of agreement. Duque also proposes a constitutional reform that excludes sexual crimes against minors from the JEP, determines the loss of all benefits if there is recidivism in a crime and transfers to the ordinary justice system the cases of illegal conducts started before the agreement and continued after. The objections were rejected in April by the House of Representatives and also by the Senate, although the validity of the result in the latter was left in question, thus lengthening the discussion.

A new controversy may arise when the Territorial Spaces of training and Reincorporation (ETCR) are to be closed in August. Around 5,000 ex-combatants are still in or around them. The High Counselor for the Post-Conflict, Emilio Archila, has stated that by that time, with the financial aid of the FARC (the political party that succeeded the guerrilla) and the Government, the ex-combatants must have work, be clear about what their residency program will be and be prepared for reincorporation into civilian life.

Within the reincorporation process, the lack of compliance by FARC leaders with their commitment, stipulated in the peace agreement agreement , to remain until the end in the ETCRs in order to contribute with their leadership to the smooth running of the process, is a cause for concern. However, in recent months, several leaders have left these territories, among them "El Paisa", who has not presented himself before the JEP, which has demanded his capture.

Nor is former ringleader Ivan Marquez cooperating with the transitional justice system, successively delaying his appearance before the JEP citing security concerns. Márquez has cited the murder of 85 former guerrillas since the signature of the peace agreement , and has accused the government of serious failures to comply.

There is also the case of Jesús Santrich, who like Márquez had acquired a seat in the congress thanks to the implementation of the peace process. Santrich has been detained since April 2018 based on an Interpol red notice at the request of the United States, which accuses him of the shipment of 10 tons of cocaine made after the signature of the agreement peace .

A topic quite addressed from the time of the negotiations has to do with forced eradication and crop spraying. The illicit crop substitution program began to yield results in 2018, resulting in thousands of peasant families agreeing with the government to replace their coca crops with other licit crops. Although in some Departments such as Guaviare there was voluntary crop eradication, this was not enough to offset the increase in plantings in 2016 and 2017. In 2018, close to 100,000 families - responsible for just over 51,000 hectares of coca - signed substitution agreements and this issue is expected to continue to increase throughout 2019. According to the Colombian government, citing figures from the U.S. State Department's department , more than 209,000 hectares of coca leaf have been planted, far more than in the era of Pablo Escobar, according to figures presented by President Iván Duque last month before the Constitutional Court.

The benefits of peace are indisputable and much remains to be done to consolidate it. It is a task that cannot be left in the hands of the Government alone, but requires the support of former combatants, their former leaders and civil society. The great challenge is to accelerate the implementation of agreement and reduce political polarization, all in the search for national reconciliation.

Moscow strengthens its relationship with Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, in the 'near abroad' of the U.S.

• Putin's military display in Caracas: sending bombers (December 2018), special forces (January 2019) and a hundred military personnel (March 2019).

• The head of the US Southern Command denounces "not benign" purposes of the Police School opened by Russia in Managua for the training Central American agents.

• The agreement to install a Glonass station in Cuba revives suspicions that the Russians may again use the island for spying on the US as in the Cold War.

▲ Venezuelan defense minister's reception of two Russian bombers at Maiquetia airport, December 2018 [RT broadcast].

report SRA 2019 / Irene Isabel Maspons [PDF Version].

In recent years Latin America has become an increasingly strategic arena for Vladimir Putin's Russia. Although it is not the main focus of the Kremlin's attention area , its calculated moves in the area allow it to gain influence on the southern flank of the United States. Since 2006 Russia has increased its interests in the region, taking as an incentive the lesser attention of the US towards the rest of the continent due to the change of priorities implied by 9/11 in 2001 and taking advantage of the appearance since then of leftist populist governments, in a political cycle inaugurated with the arrival of Hugo Chavez to power.

Russia's relationship has been special with the ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) countries -Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba and Bolivia-, particularly with the first three, as this allows it to geopolitically confront the United States in the Caribbean, as the USSR did in its day. Being one of the main arms producing countries, Russia has also sold arms to other Latin American countries, but in addition to a commercial attention , in the case of Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba a strategic relationship has been established.

The ties with these three nations have grown closer in the last year: the latest major crisis in Venezuela has made this country even more dependent on Moscow; the presidential and constitutional change in Cuba has led Havana to secure the Russian sponsorship in this time of complicated transition, while Russia's activity in Nicaragua has raised the Pentagon's public alert.

The fact that since last fall the United States has been referring to Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua as the "axis of evil" in the Western Hemisphere is precisely due to the perception in Washington of increased Russian activity in the region. If the last decade marked the "return" of Russia to the Caribbean, 2018 saw the "return" of the United States to a policy of priority attention to what is happening in that geographical area, precisely because of the increased activity of Russia, and also of China. Moscow is showing the US (and its allies) that it can be reciprocal in the face of the pressure it is receiving in its own near abroad, as highlighted by a recent report of high school Elcano, and Washington has begun to answer those moves.

On the other hand, 2018 was an election year in a good issue of countries. The White House warned of the possibility that Moscow wanted to interfere especially in Mexico, to propitiate the election of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, considering him uncomfortable for the US. Although in small volumes, Mexico is Russia's second largest commercial partner in Latin America, after Brazil, and the second largest buyer of Russian arms, far behind Venezuela (the third country is Peru). However, there was no evidence of particular Russian activity in these or other Latin American elections. There is evidence, however, that Russian capabilities for the dissemination of fake news in the Spanish-speaking globosphere have counted on the financial aid of Venezuelan networks.

Venezuela

Russia's influence in Venezuela in the last year has been visible in various aspects. To follow a temporal order, it is worth mentioning the launch of the Petro cryptocurrency, presented in February 2018 as a form of digital cash supposedly linked to the value of Venezuela's oil reserves. A research conducted by Time magazine revealed that Russian businessmen had acted as advisors to the Government of Nicolás Maduro for the launch of the Petro, although the Russian Ministry of Finance denied that Moscow authorities were involved in the initiative. With the creation of this virtual currency, Maduro hoped to have a mechanism to evade the sanctions decreed by the United States against Venezuelan bonds and PDVSA. If there was a Russian interest, it could have been to take advantage of the Petro to evade some of the sanctions imposed on Russia by the US and the European Union, although the Petro soon proved to be of little use as a financial vehicle.

With the worsening of the status in Venezuela -from the presidential elections advanced to May 2018, whose result was not recognized by a large issue of countries, to the consequences of the swearing-in of Juan Guairó in January 2019 as legitimate president of the country-, Russian military elements have staged a show of support for Maduro. In December, two Tupolev-160 strategic bombers landed at Maiquetia airport as part of alleged joint maneuvers between the two countries. The following month, Reuters reported the presence in Venezuela of private military contractors arrived from Russia, belonging to the private company Wagner, which has provided various services to the Kremlin. In March 2019, two cargo planes of the Russian Ministry of Defense unloaded in Maiquetia a hundred military personnel, with General Vasily Tonkoshkurov, head of staff of the Army, at the head and 35 tons of various unspecified military equipment, which allegedly could have been destined for the implementation of the anti-aircraft protection of the area of Caracas.

In 2018 Russia continued, with its credit policy, to take positions in the Venezuelan oil and mining sectors. Although the $17 billion that Russia has given in credit to Venezuela since 2006 - mostly for the purchase of Russian armaments - lag far behind the $67.2 million granted by China since 2007 in exchange for oil in the future, the fact is that the Kremlin has become in the last couple of years a major supporter of the Maduro regime: in 2016 China lowered to $2.200 million dollars its loans to Venezuela and granted none in 2017; only at the end of 2018 it returned to previous volumes, with a credit of 5 billion dollars. In contrast Russia has been very actively aiding the Venezuelan energy sector through Rosneft, which in 2016 took as collateral for a loan with 49% of the shares of Citgo, PDVSA's subsidiary and one of the Venezuelan state-owned company's major assets. In 2017 Russia agreed to refinance US$3.15 billion of the debt contracted by Venezuela, delaying almost all payments until 2023.

The last commitment took place in the meeting that Putin and Maduro held in December in Novo Ogaryovo, the Russian presidential residency program on the outskirts of Moscow. At its conclusion, Maduro announced that meeting had "guaranteed" an oil investment of more than 5 billion dollars and contracts for more than 1 billion dollars for the exploitation of gold", thus expanding the portfolio of Russian interests in the Caribbean country to that precious metal as well.

On the other hand, in March 2019 Maduro ordered the transfer of PDVSA's office for Europe from Lisbon to Moscow, with the goal to avoid its confiscation in view of the recognition progressively obtained by Juan Guaidó as president in European countries.

Nicaragua

Part of the U.S. warning expressed in the last year about Russia's increasing activity in the region ran to position from the Pentagon. In his February 2018 appearance before the congress , the then head of the Southern Command, Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, already conveyed U.S. concern about the increased presence of Russia and China in areas of the Americas of strategic interest to Washington. That complaint took on greater specificity in the following annual appearance on Capitol Hill by his successor, Admiral Craig S. Faller, who in his February 2019 speech indicated that Russia is using the region "to disseminate information, gather intelligence on the United States and project power." In an interview then granted to Voice of America, Faller referred, among other specifics, to several Russian initiatives in Nicaragua.

The Southern Command chief placed special emphasis on the training Professional Police Center that Russia has built and runs in Nicaragua, inaugurated in October 2017 and intended for the training of Central American police officers in the fight against drugs and organized crime. "I don't know what other purposes that center might serve, but I'm sure they are not all naive and benign," Faller said.

Already in 2017 it was reported that around two hundred Russian military personnel rotate their presence in Nicaragua, garrisoned mostly at the Puerto Sandino military facility on the Pacific coast, which for all practical purposes functions as a Russian base.

Faller's warnings about intelligence gathering in the region by Russia have to do to some extent with a satellite station installed by Russia in Managua, a short distance from the U.S. Embassy. Since 2013, Russia has stationed four stations of its Glonass positioning system in Latin America: four stations are in Brazil and in 2017 one Nicaragua was installed. Unlike the stations in Brazil, which are managed with transparency and easy access, the one built in Managua is surrounded by secrecy and this has generated doubts about its real use, and it could be an installation intended for eavesdropping.

In May 2018, the scientific industrial corporation High Precision Equipment Manufacturing Systems (SPP, for its acronym in Russian) reported having signed a contract to locate a measurement station for the Glonass navigation system in Cuba.

Cuba

That last advertisement gave rise to new rumors about the possibility of Russia reactivating the Lourdes base in Cuba, which during the Cold War had great resources as a signals intelligence center for U.S. espionage. Moscow has so far denied that there are any such projects. On the other hand, it has expressed the desire to have a military base in Cuba, Venezuela or Nicaragua, as the Russian Ministry of Defense itself has suggested on some occasions, but these plans have not been officially put into practice.

In 2018, relations between Havana and Moscow became institutionally closer, with the first visit of a Cuban president to Russia in almost a decade. The replacement of Raúl Castro by Miguel Díaz-Canel led both countries to stage their mutual commitment in the face of Western expectations about political changes on the island. A few months before that visit, both countries signed several agreements for the partnership in areas such as the steel industry, sports and customs services, while betting on strengthening the bilateral partnership , trade and investments of the Eurasian country in the island.

As a result of the serious Venezuelan crisis, in May 2017 Russia resumed the submission of significant quantities of oil to Cuba, as it had done decades ago, in order now to compensate for the reduction of crude oil sent by Venezuela. In a first agreement, Rosneft committed to supply 250,000 tons of oil and refined products, although it is not stated for how long and it was possibly a temporary or intermittent aid.