conference proceedings of congress International Bioethics 1999. Bioethics and dignity in a pluralistic society
Table of contents
Euthanasia and politics
Andrés Ollero Tassara.
Full Professor of Philosophy del Derecho.
University of Granada.
summary drafted by Marina Camps Merlo.
department Philosophy del Derecho. University of Navarra.
There is no one more appropriate to enlighten us with authority -and a magnificent oratory- on the topic announced here than Mr. Andrés Ollero Tassara, Full Professor of Philosophy of Law, who is also a Member of Parliament for Granada since the III Legislature. His academic and political career has allowed him to achieve that difficult -and desired- amalgam of living from what he studies and studying from what he lives. And this is reflected, mainly, in the veracity and conviction that his words transmit -whether written or verbal- when referring to such complex and current problems as the one that, on the occasion of this International Bioethics conference , he has developed: Euthanasia and Politics. And this is related to a fundamental problem, such as the relationship that exists between law, morality and religion in a Western society such as today's, which is characterized by its multiculturalism.
Faced with the political-legislative speech that characterises the end of the century, tinged mainly with consensualism and ethical relativism, Andrés Ollero unmasks the paradoxical underlying reality with an astonishing critical analysis. In this sense, he does not hesitate to denounce realistically that "behind more than one proclamation of the [moral] 'neutrality' of the public sphere, one can detect the faith in the pre-established harmony of individualist morality" [italics by the editor]. This is the success achieved by the unthinking cliché that "pairs democracy with axiological relativism". This reality has been enhanced in our multicultural societies where such ethical relativism is obviously less complicated - and even seems to be the only feasible option - than attempting to arrive at a dialogical agreement. This is the central idea around which lecture is built.
A philosophical-legal analysis of the problem of euthanasia is available at purpose . Through the arguments put forward in favour of its decriminalisation, Andrés Ollero highlights the clear anthropological and even religious discrepancies that this problem causes in this emerging multicultural society. Among these arguments are those which affirm that law must limit itself to a morally neutral regulation of the public sphere; this is mainly based on freedom of conscience; furthermore, law cannot serve to impose its own convictions on others; nor can law be used to repress freedom; the free development of the personality can include a right to death; in that case it would be a matter of a quality of life below the minimum standards required by dignity, and therefore waivable; at final, the state must adopt a neutral position on morally controversial issues in the interest of greater freedom.
However, for the speaker it seems to be evident, as has already been said, that this state moral neutrality contains a certain moral option. An individualistic moral choice. Even if one votes strongly for the individual will, a clear, albeit hidden, moral choice is being made. In this sense, "a privatisation of life, which would turn it into available without legal obstacles to mere individual self-determination, would imply a public moral choice no less debatable than any other".
Andrés Ollero denounces the unfeasibility of this option. Individualism can only be feasible in an unreal solipsistic existence. The "other" and his rights always end up demanding and limiting our freedom. In the same way that each one of us does with respect to a third party. The unreality of solipsism becomes evident through law itself. According to Ollero, law has a fundamental ethical aspiration: to guarantee a sphere of coexistence through ethical minimums. It is the sociable nature of man that demands law as a vehicle for the justice that is aspired to in human relations. Reality itself tells us sample that no human being exists apart -separate- from others. Human life is not only a coexistence, but also a para-existence. We exist with and for others; each one sustains his or her life at the mercy of others. Law will seek to order this coexistence.
In this sense, too, an unconditional deployment of one's conscience often makes social coexistence impossible. On the borderline between moral and legal requirements, the public interest reasons that can be found for considering a good to be worthy of legal protection must be kept separate from the confessional evaluation they deserve. Otherwise, one would be opting for the adoption of a particular confession - for example, secularism or civil religion - ignoring the freedom of conscience of others.
On the contrary, it is admitted that "law, and particularly criminal law, is forced to assume moral demands". And this, even if an attempt is made to mask this reality through the moral deactivation of language, which in most cases only succeeds, in most cases, in hindering democratic dialogue. Nor can the pedagogical value of these penal norms be denied. Decriminalisation often coincides at the same time with the promotion of social conditions favourable to the multiplication of behaviours that had been considered reprehensible. It has normalising consequences. And it is not surprising that the decriminalisation of euthanasia will end up having a significant effect on the attitude of respect for life, characteristic of the staff health service. And on the doctor-patient relationship due to a deterioration in trust. Although it is true that, in a proper sense, we do not have the right to do everything that is not forbidden. Paradoxically, however, the decriminalisation of euthanasia would end up legally requiring conduct. This would mean that, as in the case of abortion, the staff healthcare provider would be forced to make use of conscientious objection for refusing to cooperate in conduct which, because it does not correspond to someone else's right, would not imply any duty whatsoever.
It is clear that law does not have to assume all moral demands. They invite us to give maximum meaning to our existence staff; the law seeks to guarantee coexistence through moral minimums. So where can the basis of moral demands be found? What makes some moral demands legally enforceable? Is it a question of a culture imposing its beliefs, or is there a basis goal that can justify such a demand?
One possible answer lies in the moral neutrality of the public sphere. And consequently cultural neutrality incompatible with cultural pluralism today. However, drawing the dividing line between public neutrality and private morality, between law and morality, also implies a radically moral decision. For "it is only on the basis of a certain conception of man and his relationship with society that we can offer an answer".
Admitting this and considering cultures as historical and plural expressions of a common human nature, one could have the foundation required for a true multicultural coexistence. The fact is that the "existence of legal requirements with a foundation goal becomes a condition for the establishment of binding rules, which do not imply the mere imposition of a colonialism dictated by a culture that - by means of relativism - proclaims itself to be indisputable". This cultural colonialism implies fundamentalism, as it rejects dialogue or democratic discussion . Ollero thus denounces the consequences of a forced attempt to unite democracy and relativism.
On the contrary, it can be argued that in a pluralistic society the law is the only train d'union valid for the whole of society. This is the role played today by international human rights treaties and constitutional charters within each state. They are a potentially meaningful reference letter for all members of a society. And they are also required by the relational character of the human person and by the future of coexistence itself. For this reason, it must be admitted that "only by relying on objective elements, when it comes to drawing the borderline between the overlap between moral and legal requirements, can we put a stop to any fundamentalist attempt to indiscriminately project an all-encompassing religious code onto public life. The denial of natural law, which is nowadays culturally dominant, paradoxically becomes an effective ally of these fundamentalisms, which it deprives of all restraint".
Andrés Ollero, throughout his exhibition , has once again stated that authentic democratic and multicultural dialogue is only possible between those who recognise themselves as equals - even though they are different in many aspects - that is to say, people who enjoy a common human nature and, therefore, between those who share common interests such as the right to life.