Federal prosecutors charge El Salvador gang leaders with crimes against national security

° The US continues to classify gangs as a criminal organization, not as a terrorist group , but in the last year has come to consider some of their leaders as terrorists.

° The department Justice considers the connection between the decisions made by the MS-13 leadership from Salvadoran prisons and crimes committed in the U.S. to be proven.

In the past five years, U.S. courts have convicted 504 gang members, 73 of whom received life sentences.

► Mara inmates in Salvadoran prisons, April 2020 [Gov. of El Salvador].

report SRA 2021 / Xabier Ramos Garzón [ PDF version].

MAY 2021-U.S. authorities have in the past year taken a significant leap in their reaction to the violence of the main Latino street gang, the Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13. For the first time, federal prosecutors filed terrorism charges against the gang's leaders, opening the door to a review of the classification of MS-13, which has been considered an international criminal organization in the United States since 2012 and could be designated a terrorist group , as is already the case in El Salvador.

The Justice department s focus on violence with a Central American connection, however, may have been due to the Trump Administration's prioritization of the fight against illegal immigration. It is unknown at this time whether the Biden Administration, which has less interest in criminalizing immigration, will insist on the category of terrorism. However, police and judicial pressure on gang members responsible for crimes on U.S. soil does not appear to be abating for the time being.

Tax offensive

In July 2020, the U.S. department Justice released terrorism charges against Armando Eliú Melgar Díaz, alias Gangster Blue, sealed since the previous May in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The charges included conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, committing cross-border acts of terrorism, financing terrorist actions and conducting narcoterrorism operations. Melgar had lived in Virginia, with some absences, between 2003 and 2016, when he was deported. In November 2018, he was arrested and imprisoned in El Salvador. Prosecutors believe that from that country he directed MS-13 criminal action on the East Coast: he apparently ordered and approved murders, oversaw drug trafficking businesses, and collected money for local cliques or organizations.

Having opened the way for terrorism charges, which carry heavier penalties, against leaders who allegedly ordered the commission of crimes from El Salvador, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York proceeded a few months later with the broadest and most far-reaching indictment against the MS-13 and its command and control structure in the history of the United States, alleging crimes "against national security. Thus, in January 2021, the U.S. Attorney's Office made public an indictment, secretly formalized the previous month, with accusations against fourteen MS-13 leaders, all of them members of the gang's Ranfla Nacional or leadership, which was headed, according to the Public Ministry, by Borromeo Enrique Henríquez, a.k.a. Diablito de Hollywood. Eleven of them are in Salvadoran prisons and three are fugitives. The charges were similar to those brought against Melgar, although the indictment does not provide details on specific actions. The crimes of different cliques of the MS-19 are attributed to them because, as part of its leadership, they were ultimately responsible for ordering the commission of many of the crimes. According to the prosecutor when announcing the case, "MS-13 is the manager of a wave of death and violence that has terrorized communities, leaving neighborhoods awash in bloodshed". The US proceeded to prepare the respective extradition requests.

In addition to these two cases, which would fit into a conceptual framework that appears to seek to prosecute the figure of terrorist group leadership (despite the fact that terrorist status has not been applied by the United States to any gang, nor is there consensus on a narrow centralization of criminal decision-making), several prosecutions were launched in 2020 against MS-13 members for crimes strictly related to murder, kidnapping, drug trafficking, weapons possession, and other organized crime activities. On the same day in July 2020 that the Melgar indictment was announced, the Eastern District Court of New York filed a case against eight members of the organization, and the District Court of Nevada filed a case against thirteen others; in August, the Eastern District of Virginia proceeded to arrest eleven more individuals associated with the gang.

These actions showed a commitment to make effective the investigations that had recently intensified, at the end of a presidential mandate that had made the fight against gangs one of the priorities of the Justice department . Precisely at the end of 2020, this department published a report taking stock of the "efforts" carried out in this field between 2016 and 2020, graduate "Large Scale Response". The report, which estimates that there are about 10,000 members of different gangs in the U.S., counts that in that period charges were filed in U.S. courts against 749 gang members; of them, 74% were in the country illegally, 8% were U.S. citizens and 3% were legal residents. These prosecutions led to the conviction of at least 504 individuals, of whom 37 received life sentences.

The attorney general also opened the procedure to apply for the death penalty for two defendants involved in crimes that had a special social resonance. They are Alexi Sáenz, who is accused of seven murders, almost all using a machete or a baseball bat, and Elmer Zelaya, accused of coordinating the stabbing of two young people; most of the victims were teenagers. This extreme violence was highlighted by Donald Trump at various times during his term in office and he referred to it last July when the aforementioned terrorism cases were announced. He called the gang members "monsters who murder children," and indicated that US authorities would not rest until "every member of MS-13" was brought to justice.

For its part, the FBI has formed Transnational Anti-Gang Units (TAG) with security forces from several Central American countries, which since 2016 have been responsible for hundreds of arrests and have assisted in the extradition to the US of 68 defendants, 35 from Guatemala, 20 from Honduras and 13 from El Salvador.

Trajectory

Barack Obama's 2011 provisions empowering the consideration of gangs as international criminal organizations, in the framework of a new National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, were used by the Treasurydepartment in 2012 to apply that consideration to MS-13. In 2017, the department of Justice resorted to the same categorization as the basis for the "war on gangs" launched by Trump. In the congress itself, the dangerousness and incidence of gangs was already highlighted in 2018, in actions decided from El Salvador.

In 2019, Attorney General William Barr traveled to El Salvador, where he gathered information from authorities in the country, whose Supreme Court had already designated the maras as a terrorist group in 2015. Alleged evidence of the chain of command, which connects the orders for assassinations and other crimes given from Salvadoran prisons and their execution in the United States, would have supported the 2020 decision to open terrorism cases against gang members in U.S. federal courts.

This change in the subject of the crime may be a core topic in the future of the fight against gangs as it offers a series of advantages, since there is no statute of limitations on terrorism charges and these have harsher penalties associated with them. International laws also provide greater leeway for countries fighting terrorism, so cooperation between countries could be greatly increased; in fact, the fact that the charges are homologous in the United States and El Salvador could speed up extradition requests.

However, the move is not Exempt controversy. In the same way that international drug trafficking charges against the gang members have been of little use, since they do not properly constitute a transnational drug cartel, it remains to be seen how effective it would be to invoke terrorism charges in this case, given that the maras, at least in the United States, do not have the variety of traits of a terrorist organization: there is certainly not the element of wanting to be a political actor. In any case, as Steven Dudley, co-director of Insight Crime and author of MS-13: The Making of America's Most Notorious Gang, has said, the US government's decision to charge the visible leaders of MS-13 in El Salvador with terrorism "may be a sign of how poorly they understand this gang or how well they understand their judicial system."

USSOUTHCOM chief's appearance on Capitol Hill raises annual Degree Alert to Chinese influence and U.S. pushback

° In his last appearance, Admiral Craig Faller warned that the US "is losing its positional advantage' and called for "immediate action to reverse this trend".

° In recent years, the Southern Command speech to congress has highlighted the penetration of China, Russia and Iran, hand in hand with Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua.

° The analysis of the Pentagon chief's interventions in the region sample the Maduro regime's increasing involvement in criminal activities.

► visit of the head of the U.S. Southern Command to Montevideo in April 2021 [SouthCom].

report SRA 2021 / Diego Diamanti [ PDF version].

MAY 2021-The United States Southern Command -the military structure, within the US Armed Forces, which is responsible for Latin America and the Caribbean- has been progressively raising the alarm about the growing influence of Russia and above all China in the Western Hemisphere, to the detriment of the US position. This, combined with the threat coming from organized crime organizations, especially involved in drug trafficking, led the head of USSOUTHCOM, Admiral Craig Faller, to confess in March to feeling "an incredible sense of urgency": "the hemisphere in which we live is under attack", he said in his annual appearance before the US congress , dedicated to analyzing the threats and opportunities presented by the region in terms of security.

In his third "posture statement" to congress since heading Southern Command, Faller warned that the United States is losing its "edge" in the hemisphere and argued that "immediate action is needed to reverse the trend." Analyzing his 2019 and 2020 speeches, as well as the 2018 speech of his predecessor, Admiral Kurt Tidd, there is a worsening perception of the rivalry with China. Increasingly, the reference letter to the Chinese threat is more explicit and occupies more space. What was first seen as an economic influence, through increased trade and credit allocation, is now presented as more global and strategically more dangerous. According to Faller, China is seeking "to establish a global logistics and infrastructure base in our hemisphere to project and sustain military power at greater distances.

The change of Administration has not brought about any change in this worsening perception of the risks being generated in Latin America. Although Joe Biden's presidency has meant a change in the tone maintained by his predecessor, hostility towards Beijing and the desire to closely monitor other authoritarian regimes such as Russia or Venezuela remain. Hence, the "posture statement" presented this year by the head of the Southern Command is consistent with previous ones in pointing to the growing activity of Russia and China in the region (and of Iran, in coordination with Hezbollah), as well as their partnership with Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, countries that Faller called "malign regional state actors".

The use of Cuba

One of the constant threats that is repeated and that is gradually increasing is the economic diplomacy strategy implemented by China in several countries of the region: how Beijing incorporates these countries into its international trade network through loans and investments, sometimes integrating them into the New Silk Road initiative. The 2018 statement did not mention the issue of Latin American nations participating in the initiative; the 2019 statement counted 16, and the 2020 statement spoke of 19, indicating a clear trend that China is gradually increasing its activities and influence in the hemisphere. The 2020 strategy also said that 25 of the 31 countries in the region have Chinese infrastructure projects, which, as the head of the Southern Command expressly points out, could be used in the future to support Chinese military interests. Added to all this is the COVID-19 crisis, which China has taken advantage of to increase its regional influence thanks to the potential of health material and vaccines.

Venezuela occupies a prominent place in the last four statements. Over the years, the situation progressively worsens and the Southern Command's stance towards the Maduro regime hardens: it goes from not calling it illegitimate to calling it illegitimate, and then openly accuses it of being involved in drug trafficking activities. It underlines its close military collaboration with Russia and with Colombian narco-terrorist groups - the ELN and FARC dissidents - which it hosts on its territory.

Another aspect that is reiterated is the emphasis on Cuba's destabilizing role: how Havana interferes in internal affairs in Venezuela and Nicaragua, instructing those oppressive regimes on how to repress opposition movements and demonstrations, sometimes sending its own agents to fulfill that repressive function. The strategy also discusses how Russia uses Cuba as a base for its intelligence operations against the United States and to project its power in the region.

The Southern Command's statements are in line with the concerns expressed in the Strategicframework for the Western Hemisphere, prepared by the National Security committee in 2020. Although the Trump Administration will have to formulate its own strategic plan for the region, no substantial changes can be expected, given that there is the same interest in restoring democracy for Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba; in promote transparency and fighting corruption; in combating illicit activities, such as drug and human trafficking; and in addressing the growing Chinese presence in the region.

With oil production at a record low, the Maduro regime has turned to the precious metal to pay for Tehran's services.

° With no more credits from China or Russia, Caracas consolidated in 2020 the reborn relationship with the Iranians, who are in charge of trying to reactivate the country's paralyzed refineries.

° In the last year, cargo ships dispatched by Iran have brought to the Caribbean nation more than 5 million barrels of gasoline, as well as products for its Megasis supermarket.

° The involvement of entities related to the Revolutionary Guard, declared a terrorist group by Washington, makes any gesture towards the Biden Administration difficult.

► Venezuelan Vice President and Iranian Vice Minister of Industry inaugurate Megasis supermarket in Caracas, July 2020 [Gov. of Venezuela].

report SRA 2021 / María Victoria Andarcia [ PDF version].

MAY 2021-Venezuela's relationship with extra-Hemispheric powers has been characterized in the last year and a half by the resumption of the close ties with Iran already seen during the presidencies of Hugo Chávez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. With the financing possibilities provided by China (it has not granted credits to Caracas since 2016) and Russia (its oil interest in Venezuela, through Rosneft, was particularly constrained in 2019 by the Trump Administration's sanctions on Pdvsa's business) exhausted, Nicolás Maduro's regime knocked again on Iran's door.

And Teheran, once again encircled by US sanctions, as was the case during the Ahmadinejad era, has once again seen in the alliance with Venezuela the opportunity to stand up to Washington, while at the same time obtaining some economic return in times of great need: shipments of gold, worth at least 500 million dollars, according to Bloomberg, would have left Venezuela in 2020 as payment for the services rendered by Iran. If the credits from China or Russia were in exchange for oil, now the Chavista regime must also get its hands on gold, since the production of the state-owned PDVSA was at historic lows, with 362,000 barrels per day in the third quarter of the year (Chávez took over the company with a production of 3.2 million barrels per day).

The change of partners was symbolized in February 2020 with the arrival of Iranian technicians to start up the Armuy refinery, abandoned the previous month by Russian experts. The lack of investment had led to the neglect of the maintenance of the country's refineries, which was causing major gasoline shortages and long lines at service stations. Iranian attendance would barely manage to improve refinery status , and Tehran had to make up for this inefficiency by sending gasoline freighters. Likewise, food shortages offered another avenue of relief for Tehran, which also dispatched ships with foodstuffs.

Gasoline and food

The Venezuelan-Iranian relationship, which without being completely eliminated had been reduced during the presidency of Hassan Rohani, as the latter focused on the international negotiation of the nuclear agreement to be reached in 2015 (known as JCPOA), was resumed throughout 2019. In April of that year, the controversial Iranian airline Mahan Air received operating permits in Venezuela to cover the Tehran-Caracas route. Although the airline has not marketed the air route, it has chartered several flights to Venezuela despite the closure of territorial airspace ordered by Maduro due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Mahan Air's operations served to transport Iranian technicians who were to be employed in efforts to restart gasoline production at the refineries of the Paraguaná complex, as well as material necessary for these tasks.

These and other steps would have been prepared by the Iranian embassy in Venezuela, which since December 2019 has been headed by Hojatollah Soltani, someone known for "mixing Iran's foreign policy with the activities" of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), according to researcher Joseph Humire. He believes that Mahan Air would have made about forty flights in the first half of 2020.

Similarly, Iran has been sending multiple fuel tankers to Venezuela to address gasoline shortages. The first shipment arrived in a flotilla of tankers that, in defiance of U.S. sanctions, entered Venezuelan waters between May 24 and 31, carrying a combined 1.5 million barrels of gasoline. In June another vessel arrived with an estimated 300,000 barrels, and three others brought 820,000 barrels between September 28 and October 4. Between December 2020 and January 2021 another flotilla would have carried 2.3 million barrels. To this total of at least 5 million barrels of gasoline should be added the arrival of 2.1 million barrels of condensate to be used as a diluent for Venezuelan extra-heavy oil.

In addition to fuel, Iran has also sent medical supplies and food to help combat the humanitarian emergency suffered by the country. Thus, it is important to highlight the opening of the Megasis supermarket, which is linked to the Revolutionary Guard, the Iranian military corps that the Trump Administration included in the Catalog of terrorist groups. The retail establishment sells products of brands owned by the Iranian military, such as Delnoosh and Varamin, which are two of the subsidiaries of the Ekta company, allegedly created as a social security trust for Iranian military veterans. The Ekta supermarket chain is subordinate to the Iranian Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces Logistics, an entity sanctioned by the United States for its role in the development of ballistic missiles.

Gold and Saab

This activity is of concern to the United States. An Atlantic Council report details how Iranian-backed networks prop up the Maduro regime. Venezuelan oil minister Tareck El Aissami has been identified as the core topic the illicit network . He allegedly agreed with Tehran to import Iranian fuel in exchange for Venezuelan gold. agreement to the above-mentioned Bloomberg information, the Venezuelan Government had delivered to Iran, until April 2020, around nine tons of gold with a value of approximately 500 million dollars, in exchange for its attendance in the reactivation of the refineries. The gold was apparently transported in Mahan Air flights to Teheran.

The negotiations may have involved the Colombian-born businessman Alex Saab, who already centralized a good part of the food imports carried out by the Chavista regime under the Clap program and was getting involved in the Iranian gasoline supplies. Saab was arrested in June 2020 in Cape Verde when his private plane was being refueled on an apparent flight to Tehran. Requested to Interpol by the United States as Maduro's main front man, the extradition process is still open.

The entities participating in many of these exchanges are sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control for their connection to the IRGC. The IRGC's ability to operate in Venezuela is due to the reach of the Hezbollah support network , an organization designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. Hezbollah has managed to infiltrate Venezuela's Lebanese expatriate communities, giving Iran a foothold to grow its influence in the region. These links make it difficult for Caracas to make any gesture that might be attempted to facilitate any de-escalation by the new Biden Administration of the sanctions applied by Washington.

Beijing is no longer just a trading partner and credit provider for infrastructure: it is catching up with the West in pharmaceutical and healthcare provider excellence.

° Only Peru, Chile and Argentina have contracted more Chinese and Russian doses; in Brazil and Mexico, doses from the USA and Europe predominate, as in the rest of the countries in the region.

° Huawei wins entry into Brazilian 5G tender in exchange for vaccines; Beijing offers them to Paraguay if it abandons its recognition of Taiwan

° In addition to clinical trials in several countries in the second half of 2020, Argentina and Mexico will produce or package Sputnik V starting in June.

► Arrival of a shipment of Sputnik V vaccines to Venezuela in February 2021 [Miraflores Palace].

report SRA 2021 / Emili J. Blasco [ PDF version].

MAY 2021-Vaccination in Latin America is being done substantially with preparations developed in the United States and Europe, although media attention has favored doses from China and Russia. The particular vaccine diplomacy carried out over the last few months by Beijing and Moscow -which with public funds have promoted the export of injections, ahead of the needs of their own inhabitants- has certainly been active and has managed to give the impression of a greater influence than in reality, with the promise of volumes of supplies which have rarely been delivered on time.

When, from June onwards, with a large part of the American population already immunized, the Biden Administration turns its attention to providing vaccines to the region, the imbalance in favor of formulas from "Western" laboratories - also basically used in the United Nations Covax system stockpiles - will be even greater. However, the development the health crisis over the last year will have served to consolidate the footing of China and Russia in Latin America.

To date, only Peru, Chile and Argentina have contracted more vaccines from China (CanSino, Sinopharm and Sinovac) and Russia (Sputnik V) than from the United States and Europe (AstraZeneca, J&J, Moderna and Pfizer). In the case of Peru, of the 116 million doses committed, 51 correspond to European and/or US laboratories, 45 million to Chinese laboratories and 20 million to Russian laboratories. In the case of Chile, of the 79.8 million doses, 18 million are from the first group, while 61.8 million are Chinese. As far as Argentina is concerned, of the 62.4 million doses reserved, 22.4 million are "Western", 10 million Russian and 30 million Chinese. These are data from AS/COA, which keeps a detailed account of various aspects of the evolution of the health crisis in Latin America.

As for the two largest countries in the region, the preference for US and European formulas is notorious. Of the 661.4 million doses contracted by Brazil, 481.4 million have this origin, compared to 100 million Chinese doses and 80 million Sputnik V (moreover, it is not clear that the latter will actually arrive, given the recent rejection of their authorization by Brazilian regulators). Of the 310.8 million contracted by Mexico, 219.8 million are "Western" vaccines, 67 million are Chinese vaccines and 24 million are Sputnik V vaccines.

Tables: reproduction of AS/COA, onlinedatabase , information as of March 31, 2021.

Testing and production

Vaccines from China and Russia were not unknown in Latin American public opinion, since in the second half of 2020 they were frequently in the news as a result of clinical trials carried out in some countries. South America was of particular interest to the world's leading laboratories, as it hosted a high incidence of the epidemic together with a certain medical development that allowed serious monitoring of the efficacy of the preparations, compatible with a level of economic need that facilitated having thousands of volunteers for the trials. This made the region the center of the world's clinical trials of the main anti-Covid-19 vaccines, with Brazil being the epicenter of the degree program in experimentation. In addition to trials conducted by Johnson & Johnson in six countries, and by Pfizer and Moderna in two, Sputnik V was tested in three (Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) and in two by Sinovac (Brazil and Chile) and Sinopharm (Argentina and Peru).

Experimentation, however, was due to private agreements between laboratories, which hardly required the involvement of the health or political authorities of the country in question. The commitment of certain governments to the Chinese and Russian vaccines came with the purchase negotiations and then with their subsequent authorization for use, a last step that has not always taken place. A further alliance in the case of Sputnik V has been Argentina's project to produce the Russian preparation in its territory as from June, for its own vaccination and distribution to neighboring countries, as well as that of Mexico for the packaging of the doses, also as from June. Argentina was the first country to register and approve Sputnik V, using information it has since shared with other countries in the region. Mexico's move has been interpreted as a way of pressuring the United States to liberalize the export of its vaccines as soon as possible.

China has also exerted pressure on some South American countries. It has taken advantage of Brazil's dire need for vaccines to force Jair Bolsonaro's government to allow Huawei to bid for the Brazilian 5G network , despite having initially vetoed the Chinese business . Likewise, Beijing seems to have promised vaccines to Paraguay in exchange for the country ceasing to recognize Taiwan. In addition, the Chinese government averaged last year a credit of one billion dollars for the acquisition of medical equipment, as the head of the US Southern Command has warned, drawing attention to China's use of the crisis to achieve greater penetration in the hemisphere.

Consolidation

Whatever the final map of the application of each preparation in the vaccination process, what is certain is that above all Beijing, but in some way also Moscow, has achieved an important victory, even though its vaccines may be far behind in the total issue of doses injected in Latin America. In a region accustomed to identifying the United States and Europe with scientific capacity and high medical and pharmaceutical development , for the first time China is no longer seen as the source of cheap and unsophisticated products, but on a par in terms of research and health efficacy. Beyond Beijing's successful management of the pandemic, which can be relativized considering the authoritarian nature of its political system, China emerges as a leading country, capable of achieving a vaccine as quickly as the West and, to a certain extent, comparable to it. Russia's image is somewhat inferior, but Sputnik V allows consolidating Russia's "return" to a position of reference letter that it had absolutely lost in recent decades.

As a result of the emergence of Covid-19, in the collective Latin American imagination, China is no longer just a factor of trade, infrastructure construction and credit granting for the development of these infrastructures, but has established its penetration as a power with full dimensions, also with regard to a central element in the lives of individuals, such as overcoming the pandemic.

Latin American countries have suffered the health and economic crisis of the coronavirus like no other region in the world. With 8.2% of the world's population, by October 2020 it accounted for 28% of global Covid-19 positive cases and 34% of deaths. The worsening of the status in countries such as India may have changed these percentages somewhat, but the region has maintained important hotspots of infection, such as Brazil, followed by Mexico and Peru. To cope with this status, Latin America receives two-thirds of the IMF's global financial aid because of the pandemic: the region has 17 million more poor people and will not recover its previous per capita income until 2025, later than the rest of the world.

Increase in Chinese fishing fleets prompts complaints of alleged encroachment into exclusive economic zones and illegal activity

° The presence of more than 500 vessels creates concern due to continued radar evasion, use of non-permitted extraction systems and disobedience of the coast guard.

° The governments of Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru issued a statement calling for the supervision of an activity that Beijing refuses to submit to international inspection.

° Intimidation is reminiscent of the use of Chinese fishermen as a "shock force" in the South China Sea; here the goal is not to gain sovereignty, but to gain fishing space.

► The Chinese vessel Hong Pu 16, followed by the Argentine patrol vessel ARA Bouchard, in May 2020 [Argentine Navy].

report SRA 2021 / Paola Rosenberg [PDF version] [PDF version].

MAY 2021-Several Latin American countries have complained over the past year about Chinese economic predation, due to the massive presence of Chinese fishing vessels in the vicinity of their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the poaching that has occurred there. They have also denounced the use by Chinese fishing vessels of unauthorized fishing techniques that deplete the main fishing grounds and erode marine sustainability.

The arrival from China of fishing vessels of what is normally categorized as Distant Water Fleet (DWF) began to occur in the Latin American maritime contour in 2001 with about twenty ships; since then the issue has been increasing rapidly and the most recent figures speak of about 500 ships. The discomfort of the most affected countries is not new, but in 2020 the complaints were louder and more formal. Moreover, in the open era of confrontation with Beijing, Washington came out in defense of the interests of its hemispheric neighbors.

China has the world's largest offshore fishing fleet, which is expanding as the fleets of other fishing countries are shrinking. The Issue is not clear, as it often operates through small front companies that blur its national origin, but it has been estimated to total 17,000 vessels. In this activity far from China itself, the fleet catches two million tons of fish, which is 40% of the world total in distant waters. Part of its catches are the result illegal fishing; China is the country with the worst record in the world in terms of illegal fishing practices, according to the Global Initiative evaluation .

Map taken from China Dialogue and Global Fishing Watch

The strategic Galapagos

Fishing is one of the most important resources for several Latin American countries, hence the massive Chinese presence in the vicinity of their exploitation waters, if there has been no penetration in them, has generated concern. In the last year there have been many reports of Chinese fishing off Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Argentina, especially linked to the capture of squid, but also of other species such as jack mackerel, mackerel, tuna and southern hake. These countries believe that there is overfishing and the capture of endangered species, such as the giant squid, with the consequent threat to the preservation of fishing wealth and biodiversity; in addition, they believe that there is also the possession of false licenses and the violation of the sovereignty of the coastal states by presumably illegally entering their EEZ. Fishermen from these coastal countries increasingly report the presence of Chinese vessels in an intimidating attitude, carrying out acts that threaten not only their natural resources but also their safety.

The main accusations began in July in Ecuador. Earlier that month, the Ecuadorian navy warned of the presence of a Chinese fishing fleet of some 260 vessels fishing just outside the EEZ of the Galapagos Islands, which are under Ecuadorian sovereignty. By the end of the month, the fleet had increased to more than 342 vessels. The Galapagos archipelago was declared a biosphere reservation by UNESCO because it is home to hundreds of species of flora and fauna that are unique in the world. For this reason, exploitation in this area implies very large losses in terms of marine biodiversity.

In addition, half of the Chinese fleet behaved suspiciously, turning off the tracking and identification system. It was an evasion of marine radars that lasted for almost three weeks, as denounced by the Ecuadorian Minister of Defense, Oswaldo Jarrín. The minister implied that this attitude was intended to hide illegal fishing and perhaps also incursion into waters under Ecuador's protection in order to fish in them. In any case, he said that the Ecuadorian Navy was only able to find a couple of vessels within the Galapagos EEZ, which claimed to be using "innocent passage".

The country's president, Lenin Moreno, formally raised the complaints to the Beijing authorities, informing them that Ecuador would strongly assert its maritime rights over its EEZ, and announced a coordinated position with other Latin American governments. In fact, other countries in the region soon saw the Chinese fleet arrive in the vicinity of their waters. The ships left the corridor of international waters that exists between the Galapagos EEZ and the Ecuadorian coast, where they spent some time to capture the fish that migrate from one side to the other, and then moved south, first in the vicinity of the waters of Peru and Chile and then, passing from the Pacific to the Atlantic, of Argentina.

These countries were supported by the United States, whose State department said in August that the massive presence of Chinese fishing vessels and their internship to disable tracking systems, rename vessels and dispose of marine debris was "very troubling". President Donald Trump also spoke negatively on the occasion of his September speech to the United Nations. Washington has long been attentive to the growing Chinese presence on the continent, not only commercially, but also in the management of strategic infrastructure such as port terminals. The Galapagos, specifically, have a special strategic value because of their status access routes to the Panama Canal.

Request for inspections

After Ecuador, due to the threat off its waters, Peru and Chile activated the Global Fisheries Surveillance and mobilized air and naval patrols to closely monitor the advance of the Chinese fishing fleet. When it moved into the Atlantic, in December 2020, the Argentine naval force also deployed naval and air units to ensure control over its maritime spaces.

In November, the governments of Ecuador, Chile, Peru and Colombia (the latter's EEZ borders the corridor between the two Ecuadorian maritime areas) issued a joint statement, in which they expressed their concern over the presence "of a large fleet of foreign-flagged vessels that have carried out fishing activities in recent months in international waters, close to our jurisdictional waters". The grade preferred not to expressly mention China (moreover, several vessels of the fleet had a different flag, although they were Chinese to all intents and purposes), but it was clear in which direction they were directing their denunciation of "fishing activities not subject to control or report".

Latin American countries are demanding that China agree to carry out inspections, in the presence of Chinese staff if necessary, of those vessels that raise suspicions, even if their navigation has remained in international waters. Beijing responds that it has already established moratoriums at certain times of the year for squid fishing in the region. However, the lack of cooperation evidenced so far and the growing demand of the Chinese market suggests that this subject of activities will continue to increase.

As it has done in the Pacific, in order to face Chinese incursions, the United States has sent Coast Guard ships to the South Atlantic, in this case in joint exercises with Brazil and Uruguay. Precisely, with the latter country, Washington is trying to establish a partnership subject allow a greater inspection of the maritime area , as it considers that Argentina may lend itself excessively to Chinese requirements.

► Image of the world map produced by the John Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center.

download the complete PDF]

REPORT SRA 2021

May 2021

PRESENTATION

Covid-19, an unexpected factor

MAY 2021-The pandemic caused by the Covid-19 virus has had a major impact on the entire world and especially on the American nations: three of the four countries with the most deaths - the United States, Brazil and Mexico, which together account for more than one million deaths - are in the Western Hemisphere. Latin America has been the area of the planet most affected by the disease, in proportion to its population, and with the worst economic consequences. This status has meant, in terms of security, a special regional vulnerability to external powers and internal mafias.

If two years ago we launched this American Regional Security report (ARS) stating that geopolitics had returned to the continent, due to the growing interest of China and Russia in the area of traditional US influence, it can now be said that these two extra-hemispheric powers have taken advantage of the health emergency to deploy a "diplomacy of vaccines" and consolidate their influence, while the United States prepares its own flow of neighboring financial aid , about to conclude the inoculation of its population.

In this context, significant episodes occurred throughout 2020. China's food security demands have reinforced the presence of Chinese fishing fleets in the vicinity of the waters of several South American countries, which see their fishing grounds threatened by illegal fishing practices and alleged invasion of their exclusive economic zones. This has led to a certain collective security movement and increased dialogue with the U.S. Southern Command.

On the other hand, organized crime has also taken advantage of the pandemic status , relying on the authorities' distraction from other efforts subject In the last year, Paraguay has emerged as a major hub for the exit of cocaine from the interior of the continent, while at the same time establishing itself as the main producer of marijuana in South America, at a time when this crop is emerging as a legal business opportunity in new countries. For their part, Guatemala and Honduras are consolidating their 'trials' in coca cultivation, taking a leap - hardly quantitative, but certainly qualitative - in the universe of drug trafficking. The positive news is that the peace process and the confinements of the pandemic have reduced homicides in Colombia to historic lows.

CONTENTS

SUMMARY EXECUTIVE

Covid makes Latin America more vulnerable to external powers and internal mafias

MARITIME SAFETY

China's uncontrolled fishing alerts governments with major fishing grounds under threat

Paola Rosenberg

EXTRAHEMISPHERIC PRESENCE

Vaccine diplomacy: more 'Western' doses, but China and Russia consolidate penetration

Emili J. Blasco

EXTRAHEMISPHERIC PRESENCE

Iran takes gold from a Venezuela that no longer has oil to pay favors with

Maria Victoria Andarcia

REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES

U.S. Southern Command issues dire warning about China's advance in the region

Diego Diamanti

MARAS

U.S. begins to prosecute MS-13 members as terrorists

Xabier Ramos Garzón

PUBLIC SAFETY

Peace process and Covid reduce homicides in Colombia to record lows

Isabella Izquierdo

NARCOTRAPHIC

Coca cultivation 'trials' increase in Honduras and Guatemala, previously only transit countries

Eduardo Villa Corta

NARCOTRAPHIC

Paraguay remains South America's leading marijuana producer

Eduardo Uranga

May 3, 2021

ESSAY / María Rodríguez Reyero

One of the main questions that arise after a conflict comes to an end is what the reconstruction process should be focused on. Is it more important to forget the past and heal the wounds of a community or to ensure that the perpetrators of violence are fairly punished? Is the concept of peacebuilding in post-conflict societies compatible with justice and the punishment for crimes? Which one should prevail? And most importantly, which one ensures a better and more sustainable future for the already harshly punished inhabitants?

One of the main reasons in defence of the promotion of justice and accountability in post-conflict communities is its significance when it comes to retributive reasons: those who committed such atrocious crimes deserve to get the consequences. The accountability also discourages future degradations, and some mechanisms such as truth commissions and reparations to the victims allow them to have a voice, as potentially cathartic or healing. They may also argue that accountability processes are essential for longer-term peacemaking and peacebuilding. Another reason for pursuing justice and accountability is how the impunity of past crimes could affect the legitimacy of new governments, as impunity for certain key perpetrators will undermine people's belief in reconstruction and the possibilities for building a culture of respect for rule of law.[1] The following is an example of a case in point.

On the other hand, peacebuilding, which attempts to address the underlying causes of a conflict and to help people to resolve their disputes rather than aiming for accountability, remains a quite controversial term, as it varies depending on its historical and geographical context. In general terms, peacebuilding encompasses activities designed to solidify peace and avoid a relapse into conflict[2]. According to Brahimi, those are undertaken to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide tools for building up those foundations, more than just focusing on the absence of war[3]. Some of the employed tools to achieve said aims typically include rule of law promotion and with the tools designed to promote security and stability: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), and security sector reform (SSR) and others such as taking custody of and destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, offering advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening government institutions and promotion of the formal and informal process of political participation.[4] The latter are also used as a means of promoting the rule of law and with the tools designed to promote security and stability.

Those conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities can be disrupted by accountability processes.[5] The concern is that accountability initiatives might even block possible peace agreements and lengthen the dispute as they remove the foundations of the conflict, making flourish bad feelings and resentment amongst the society. The main reason behind this fear is that those likely to be targeted by accountability mechanisms may therefore resist peace deals. This explains why on many occasions and aiming for peace, amnesties have been given to secure peace agreements Likewise, there is a prevailing concern that transitional justice tools may reduce the impact in the short term the durability of a peace settlement as well as the effectiveness of further peace-building actions.

Despite the arguments in favor and against both mechanisms, the reality is that in practice post-conflict societies tend to strike a balance between peacebuilding and transitional justice. Both are multifaceted processes that do not rely on one system to accomplish their ends, that frequently converge. However, their activities on occasions collide and are not complimentary. This essay examines one of the dilemmas in building a just and durable peace: the challenging and complex relationship between transitional justice and peacebuilding in countries emerging from conflict.

To do so, this essay takes into consideration Rwanda, a clear example of the triumph of transitional justice, after a tragic genocide in 1994. From April to July 1994, between 800,000 and one million ethnic Tutsis were brutally killed during a 100-day killing spree perpetrated by Hutus[6]. After the genocide, Rwanda was on the edge of total collapse. Entire villages were destroyed, and social cohesion was in utter deterioration. In 2002, Rwanda boarded on the most arduous practice in transitional justice ever endeavoured: mass justice for mass atrocity, to judge and restart a stable society after the bloody genocide. To do so, Rwanda decided to put most of the nation on trial, instead of choosing, as other post-conflict states did (such as Mozambique, Uganda, East Timor, or Sierra Leone), amnesties, truth commissions, selective criminal prosecutions.[7] In 2002, Rwanda boarded on the most arduous practice in transitional justice ever endeavored: mass justice for mass atrocity, to judge and restore a stable society after the bloody genocide.

On the other hand, Sierra Leone is a clear example of the success of peacebuilding activities, after a civil war that led to the deaths of over 50,000 people and a poverty-stricken country. The conflict faced the Revolutionary United Front (RUF[8]) against the official government, due to a context of bad governance and extensive injustice. It came to an end with the Abuja Protocols in 2001 and elections in 2002. The armed factions endeavoured to avoid any consequences by requesting an amnesty as well as reintegration assistance to ease possible societal ostracism. It was agreed only because the people of Sierra Leone so severely needed the violence to end. However, the UN representative to the peace negotiations stated that the amnesty did not apply to international crimes, President Kabbah asked for the UN's assistance[9] and it resulted in the birth of Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL or Special Court).[10] The UN's assistance to Sierra Leone was not forthcoming[11].

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and transitional justice

Promoting short- and longer-term security and stability in conflict-prone and post-conflict countries in many cases requires the reduction and structural transformation of groups with the capacity to engage in the use of force, including armies, militias, and rebel groups. In such situations, two processes are of remarkable benefit in lessening the risk of violence: DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) of ex-combatants; and SSR (security sector reform).

DDR entails a range of policies and programs, supporting the return of ex-combatants to civilian life, either in their former communities or in different ones. Even if not all ex-combatants are turned to civilian life, DDR programs may lead to the transfer and training, of former members of armed groups to new military and security forces. The essence of DDR programming and the guarantees it seeks to provide is of utmost importance to ensuring peacebuilding and the possibility of efficient and legitimate governance.

It is undeniable that soldiers are unquestionably opposing to responsibility processes enshrined in peace agreements: they are less likely to yield arms if they dread arrest, whether it is by an international or domestic court. This intensifies their general security fears after the disarming process. In many instances, ex-combatants are integrated into state security forces, which makes the promotion of the rule of law, difficult, as the groups charged with enforcing new laws may have the most to lose through the implicated reforms. It is also likely to lessen citizen reliance on the security forces. The incorporation of former fighters not only in the new military but also in new civilian security structures is common: for example, in Rwanda, the victorious RPF dominated the post-genocide security forces.

While the spectre of prosecutions most obviously may impede DDR processes, there is a lesser possibility that it might provide incentives for DDR, as might happens where amnesty or reduced sentences are offered as inducements for combatants to take part in DDR processes. For them to be effective, the reliability of both the threat of prosecution and the durability of amnesty or other forms of protection are essentials whether it is in national or international courts. Even if this is not related to the promotion of transitional justice processes, it is another example of how it can have a long-term effect on the respect of human rights and the prevention of future breaches.

As previously stated, some DDR and transitional justice processes may share similar ends and even employ similar mechanisms. A variety of traditional processes of accountability and conflict resolution often also seek to promote reconciliation. DDR programs increasingly include measures that try to encourage return, reintegration, and if possible, reconciliation within communities. This willingness of victims to forgive and forget could in theory be promoted through a range of reconciliation processes like those promoted by transitional justice with the assistance of tools like truth commissions, which facilitate a dialogue that allows inhabitants to move forward while accepting the arrival of former perpetrators.  

The triumph of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1994 finally put an end to the genocide in the country. The new government focused on criminal accountability for the 1994 genocide and as a result of this prioritization, the needs of survivors have not been met completely Rwanda is the paradigm and perfect example of prosecution of perpetrators of mass atrocity by the employment of transitional justice mechanisms, that were kept separated from DDR programs in order not to interfere with the attribution of responsibilities.[11] The Rwandan one is a case where DDR largely worked notwithstanding firmly opposing amnesty. Proof of this outstanding DDR success is how Rwanda has managed to successfully reintegrate around 54,000 combatants since 1995 thanks to the work of the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC). Another clear evidence of the effectiveness of DDR methods in Rwanda is the reintegration of child soldiers. Released child soldiers were installed in a special school (Kadogo School), which started with 2,922 children. By 1998 when it closed, the RDRC reported that 73% of its students had reunited with one or both parents successfully.[12] In addition, the RDRC reported that the school had been able to successfully reunite with one or both parents.

On the other hand, Sierra Leone's case on DDR was quite different from Rwanda's success, as Sierra Leone's conflict involved the prevalence of children associated with armed forces and groups (CAAFG). By the time the civil war concluded in 2002, data from UNICEF estimates that roughly 6,845 children have been demobilized,[13] although the actual number could be way higher. Consequently, the DDR program in Sierra Leone is essentially focused on the reintegration of young soldiers, an initiative led by UNICEF with the backing of some local organizations, such as the National Committee on DDR (NCDDR)of Sierra Leone. Nonetheless, in practice, Sierra Leone's military did not endure these local guidelines, and as a result the participation of children in the process often had to be arranged by UNICEF peacekeepers in most cases. In addition to that initial local reluctance, some major quandaries aroused when it came to the reintegration of children in the new peace era in Sierra Leone, mainly due to the tests and requirements for children to have access to DDR programs, such as to present a weapon and demonstrate familiarity with it.[14] As a result, many CAAFG were excluded from the DDR process, primarily girls who were predominantly charged with non-directly military activities such as "to carry loads, do domestic work, and other support tasks."[15] In practice, Sierra Leone's military did not tighten these local guidelines, and as a result the participation of children in the process often had to be arranged by UNICEF peacekeepers in most cases.

Thus, the participation of girls in Sierra Leone's DDR was particularly low and many never even received support. While it is not clear how many girls were abducted during the war, data from UNICEF calculates that out of the 6,845 overall children demobilized, 92% were boys and only 8% were girls. The Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children has pointed out that as many as 80 per cent of rebel soldiers were between the ages of 7 and 14, and escapees from the rebel camps reported that the majority of camp members were young captive girls.[16] Research also reported that 46% of the girls who were excluded from the program confirmed that not having a weapon was the reason for exclusion. In other cases, girls were not permitted by their husbands to go through the DDR,2 whilst others chose to opt-out themselves due to worry of stigmatization back in their neighbourhoods.[17] It is worth noting that many of those who succeeded to go through the demobilization phase "reported sexual harassment at the ICCs, either by male residents or visiting adult combatants," while others experienced verbal abuse, beatings, and exclusion in their communities.[18] The research also reported that the majority of the girls who escaped from the rebel camps reported that the majority of the camp members were young captive girls.[ 19] Research also reported that 46% of the girls who were excluded from the program reported that 46% of the girls who were excluded from the program confirmed that not having a weapon was the reason for exclusion.

Another problem that underlines the importance of local leadership in DDR processes is that the UN-driven DDR program lets children decide to receive skill training rather than attending school if they were above 15 years. However, the program provided little assistance with finding jobs upon completion of the apprenticeship. Besides, little market examination was done to learn the demands of the local economy where children were trying to reintegrate into, so they are far more than the Sierra Leonean economy could absorb, which resulted in a lack of long-term employment for demobilized child soldiers. Studies by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers[19] and Human Rights Watch[20] revealed that adolescents who had previously been part of armed organizations during the war in Sierra Leone were re-recruited in Liberia or Congo because of the frustration and the lack of economic options for them back in Sierra Leone.

Promotion of the rule of law and its contributions to peacebuilding

Amongst many others, the promotion of the rule of law in post-conflict countries is a fundamental factor in peacebuilding procedures. It contributes to eradicating many of the causes of emerging conflicts, such as corruption, disruption of law... Even if it may seem contradictory, peacebuilding activities in support of the rule of law may become contradictory to transitional justice. Sometimes processes of transitional justice may displace resources, both capital, and human, that might otherwise be given to strengthening the rule of law. For instance, in Rwanda, it has been claimed that the resources invested in the development and assistance to national courts should have been equal to those committed to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the extent to which trials at the ICTR have had an impact domestically remains to be seen.

However, transitional justice also presents other challenges to the reconstruction of the rule of law. Transitional justice processes might also destabilize critically imperfect justice sectors, making it more difficult to improve longer-term rule of law. They can stimulate responses from perpetrators which could destabilize the flimsy harmony of nascent governments, as they might question its legitimacy or actively attempt to undermine the authority of public institutions. Judging former perpetrators is an arduous task that is also faced with corruption and lack of staff and resources on many occasions. Additionally, the effort by national courts to prosecute criminals is an undue burden on the judicial system, which is severely damaged after a conflict and in many cases not ready to confront such atrocious crimes and the long processes they entail. Processes to try those accused of genocide in Rwanda, where the national judicial system was devastated after the genocide, have put great pressure on the judicial system, and the lack of capacity has resulted that many arrested remained in custody for years without having been convicted or even having had their cases heard, in the majority of the cases in appalling prison conditions. Such supposed accountability initiatives may have a counterproductive effect, contributing to a sense of impunity and distrust in justice processes.

Despite the outlined tensions, transitional justice and rule of law promotion are also capable to work towards the same ends. A key goal of transitional justice is to contribute to the rebuilding of a society based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, essential for durable peace. The improvement of a judiciary based on transparency and equality is strictly linked to the ability of a nation to approach prior human rights infringements after a conflict.[21] Both are potentially mutually reinforcing in practice if complementarities can be exploited. Consequently, rule of law advancement and transitional justice mechanisms however combine in some techniques.

To start with, the birth of processes to address past transgressions perpetrated during the conflict, both international and domestic processes, can help to restore confidence in the justice sector, especially when it comes to new emerging democratic institutions. The use of domestic courts for accountability processes helps to place the judiciary at the centre of the promotion and protection of human rights of the local population, which contributes to the intensification of trust not only in the judicial system but also in public institutions and the government in general. Government initiation of an accountability process may indicate an engagement to justice and the rule of law beforehand. Domestically-rooted judicial processes, as well as other transitional justice tools, such as commissions of inquiry, may also support the development of mechanisms and rules for democratic and fair institutions by establishing regularized procedures and rules and promoting discussions rather than violence as a means of resolving differences and a reassuring population that their demands will be met in independent, fair and unbiased fora, be this a regular court or an ad hoc judicial or non-judicial mechanism. This is not to assume that internationally driven transitional justice mechanisms do not have a role to play in the development of the rule of law in the countries for which they have been established, as the hybrid tribunal of Sierra Leone demonstrates.[22] The international community should not assume that such mechanisms do not have a role to play in the development of the rule of law in the countries for which they have been established.

In general terms, the refusal of impunity for perpetrators and the reformation of public institutions are considered the basic tools for the success of transitional justice. Transcending the strengthening of the judiciary, different reform processes can strengthen rule of law and accountability: institutions that counteract the influence of certain groups (including the government) like human rights commissions or anti-corruption commissions, may contribute to the establishment of a strong institutional and social structure more capable of confronting social tensions and hence evade the recurrence to conflict.[23] In general terms, the refusal of impunity for perpetrators and the reformation of public institutions are considered the basic tools for the success of transitional justice.

Achieving an effective transitional justice strategy in Rwanda is an incredible challenge taking into consideration the massive scale as well as the harshness of the genocide, but also because of the economic and geographical limitations that make perpetrators and survivors live together in the aftermath. To facilitate things, other post-conflict states with similarly devastatingly high numbers of perpetrators have opted for amnesties or selective prosecutions, but the Rwandan government is engaged in holding those guilty for genocide responsible, thus strongly advocating for the employment of transitional justice. This is being accomplished through truth commissions, Gacaca traditional courts, national courts, and the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda combined. This underlines the dilemma of whether national or international courts are more efficient in implementing transitional justice.

Gacaca focuses on groups rather than individuals, seeks compromise and community harmony, and emphasizes restitution over forms of punishment. Moreover, it is characterized by accessibility, economy, and public participation. It encourages transparency of proceedings with the participation of the public as witnesses, who gain the truth about the circumstances surrounding the atrocities suffered during the genocide. Also, it provides an economic benefit, as Gacaca courts can try cases at a greater speed than international courts, thus reducing considerably the monetary cost as the number of incarcerated persons waiting for a trial is significantly reduced.

Alongside the strengths of the Gacaca system come flaws that seem to be inherent in the system. Many have come to see the Gacaca as an opportunity to require revenge on enemies or to frighten others with the threat of accusation, instead of injecting a sense of truth and reconciliation: the Gacaca trials have aroused concern and intimidation amongst many sectors of the population. Additionally, the community service prescribed to convicted perpetrators frequently is not done within the community where the crime was committed but rather done in the form of public service projects, which enforces the impression that officials may be using the system to benefit the government instead of helping the ones harmed by the genocide. Another proof of the control of Gacaca trials for benefit of the government is manifested by the prosecutions against critics of the post-genocide regime.

On the other hand, Sierra Leone's situation is very different from the one in Rwanda. To help restore the rule of law, the Special court settled in Sierra Leone must be seen as a role model for the administration of justice, and to promote deterrence it must be deemed credible, which is one of its main problems.[24] There is little confidence in the international tribunals amongst the local population, as the Court's nature makes it non-subordinated to the Sierra Leonean court system, and thus being an international tribunal independent from national control. 25] Nevertheless, it is considered as a "hybrid" tribunal since its jurisdiction extends over both domestic and international crimes and it relies on national authorities to enforce its orders. Still, in practice, there is no genuine cooperation between the government and the international community, as there is a limited extent of government participation in the Special Court's process and the lack of consultation with the Sierra Leonean population before the Court's endowment. This absence of national participation, despite causing scepticism over citizens, has the benefit that it remains more impartial when it comes to the proceedings against CDF leaders.

Another major particularity of the case of Sierra Leone and its process of implementation of transitional justice is once again the high degree of implication of children in the conflict, not only as victims but also as perpetrators of crimes. The responsibility of child soldiers for acts committed during armed conflict is a quite controversial issue. In general, under international law, the prosecution of children is not forbidden. However, there is no agreement on the minimum age at which children can be held criminally responsible for their acts. The Rome Statute, instituting the International Criminal Court (ICC), only provides the Court jurisdiction over people over eighteen years. Although not necessarily directly addressed to the prosecution of child soldiers, Article 40 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child foresees the trials of children (under eighteen), ordering that the process should consider their particular needs and vulnerabilities due to their shortage.

The TRC for Sierra Leone was the first one to focus on children's accountability, directly asserting jurisdiction over any person who committed a crime between the ages of fifteen and eighteen. Concerning child soldiers, the commission treated all children equally, as victims of war, but also studied the double role of children as both victims and perpetrators. It emphasized that it was not endeavouring to guilt but to comprehend how children came to carry out crimes, what motivated them, and how such offences might be prevented. Acknowledging that child soldiers are essentially victims of serious abuses of human rights and prioritizing the prosecution of those who illegally recruited them is of utmost importance. Meticulous attention was needed to guarantee that children's engagement did not put them at risk or expose them to further harm. Proper safeguard and child-friendly procedures were ensured, such as special hearings, closed sessions, a safe and comfortable environment for interviews, preserving the identity of child witnesses, and psychological care, among others.

However, shall children that have committed war crimes be prosecuted in the first place? If not, is there a risk that tyrants may assign further slaughter to be performed by child soldiers due to the absence of responsibility they might possess? The lack of prosecution could immortalize impunity and pose a risk of alike violations reoccurring eventually, as attested by the re-recruitment of some child soldiers from Sierra Leone in other armed conflicts in the area, such as in Liberia. Considering the special conditions of child soldiers, it becomes clear that the RUF adult leaders primarily are the ones with the highest responsibility, and hence must be prosecuted.[26] The RUF's role in this regard is to ensure that the child soldiers' rights are respected.

It is known that both the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF were involved in the recruitment of child soldiers as young as ten years old, which is considered a violation of both domestic and international humanitarian law. Under domestic law, in Sierra Leone, the minimum age for voluntary recruitment is eighteen years. International humanitarian law, (Additional Protocol II) fifteen is established as the minimum age qualification for recruitment (both voluntary or compulsory) or participation in hostilities (includes direct participation in combat and active participation linked to combat such as spying, acting as couriers, and sabotage). Additionally, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child[27] to which Sierra Leone is a signatory, requires "state parties . . . to take all necessary measures to ensure that no child below age eighteen shall take direct part in hostilities" and "to refrain in particular from recruiting any child."

Nevertheless, victims who have been hurt by children also have the right to justice and reparations, and it also comes to ask whether exempting children of accountability for their crimes is in their best interest. When the child was in control of their actions (not coerced, drugged, or forced) acknowledgement might be an important part of staff healing that also adds to their acceptance back in their communities. The prosecution, however, should not be the first stage to hold child soldiers accountable, as TRC in Sierra Leone also performs alternatives, so the possibility of using those should first be inquired, as these alternatives put safeguards to ensure the best interest of the child and the main aim is restorative justice and not criminal prosecution.

Conclusions

Finally, after parsing where peacebuilding and justice clash and when do they have shared methods, we can assert that establishing an equitable and durable peace requires pursuing both peacebuilding and transitional justice activities, taking into consideration how they interact and the concrete needs of each community, especially when it comes to the needs of former child soldiers and the controversial discussion around the need for their accountability and reinsertion in communities, as despite the pioneer case of Sierra Leone, the unusual condition of a child combatant, which is both victim and perpetrator still presents dilemmas concerning their accountability in international criminal law.[28]

Additionally, it becomes of utmost importance in assessing post-conflict societies, whether it is to implement peacebuilding measures such as DDR or to apply justice and search for accountability, that international led initiatives include in their program's local organizations. Critics of international criminal justice often assume that criminal accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are better handled at the national level. While this may well hold for liberal democracies, it is far more problematic for post-conflict successor regimes, where the benefits of the proximity to the affected population must be seriously weighed against the challenges facing courts placed in conflict-ridden societies with weak and corrupt judiciaries. 

Local systems however have more legitimacy and capacity than devastated formal systems, and they promise local ownership, access, and efficiency, which seems to be the most appropriate way to ensure peace and endurability of peace. Additionally, restorative justice methods put into place thanks to local initiatives emphasize face-to-face intervention, where offenders have the chance to ask for forgiveness from the victims. In many cases restitution replaces incarceration, which facilitates the reintegration of offenders into society as well as the satisfaction of the victims.

To conclude, it has become clear that improving the interaction between peacebuilding and transitional justice processes requires coordination as well as a deep knowledge and understanding of said community. It is therefore not a question of deciding whether peacebuilding initiatives or transitional justice must be implemented, but rather to coordinate their efforts to achieve a sense of sustainable and most-needed peace in post-conflict countries. Taken together, and despite their contradictions, these processes are more likely to succeed in their seek to foster fair and enduring peace.

[1] Sooka, Y., 2006. Dealing with the past and transitional justice: building peace through accountability. [online] International Review of the network Cross. https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/a21925.pdf [Accessed 5 April 2021].

2Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An diary for Peace:Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and peace-keeping.Report of the Secretary-General UN: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/145749 [Accessed 5 April 2021].

[Brahimi (n.d.). Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. 55th Session: Brahimi Report | United Nations Peacekeeping [Accessed 5 April 2021].

[4] United Nations Secretary General (1992). "An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June.", title VI, paragraph 55.<A_47_277.pdf (un.org)>. [Accessed 5 April 2021].

[5] Sooka, Y., 2006. Dealing with the past and transitional justice: building peace through accountability. [online] International Review of the Red Cross. Available at: < https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/a21925.pdf > [Accessed 5 March 2021].

[6] Roser, M. and Nagdy, M., 2021. Genocides. [online] Our World in Data. Available at: < Genocides - Our World in Data > [Accessed 5 March 2021].

[7] Waldorf, L., 2006. Mass Justice For Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice As Transitional Justice. [online] Temple Law Review. Available at: < https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/temple79&div=7 > [Accessed 5 March 2021].

[8] Gibril Sesay, M. and Suma, M., 2009. Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Sierra Leone. [online] International Center for Transitional Justice. Available at: < https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Sierra-Leone-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf > [Accessed 5 March 2021].

[9] Roht-Arriaza, N., & Mariezcurrena, J. (Eds.). (2006). Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2, Sigal HOROVITZ: Transitional criminal justice in Sierra Leone. <(PDF) Transitional Criminal Justice in Sierra Leone | Sigall Horovitz - Academia.edu >[Accessed 5 March 2021]

[10] Connolly, L., 2012. Justice and peacebuilding in postconflict situations: An argument for including gender analysis in a new post-conflict model. [online] ACCORD. Available at: < https://www.accord.org.za/publication/justice-peacebuilding-post-conflict-situations/ > [Accessed 5 March 2021].

[11] Waldorf, L., 2009. Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda. [online] Intenational Center for Transitional Justice. Available at:    < https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Rwanda-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf >[Accessed 5 April 2021].

[13] UNICEF (2004). From Confict to Hope:Children in Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme. [Accessed 5 April 2021].

[14] SESAY, M.G & SUMA, M. (2009), "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Sierra Leone",International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) [Accessed 5 April 2021].

[15] WILLIAMSON, J. (2006), “The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers: social and psychological transformation in Sierra Leone”, Intervention 2006, Vol. 4, No. 3, Available from: < http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.600.1127&rep=rep1&type=pdf> [Accessed 5 April 2021].

[16]: A. B. Zack-Williams (2001) Child soldiers in the civil war in Sierra Leone, Review of African Political Economy, 28:87, 73-82, DOI: 10.1080/03056240108704504 [Accessed 5 April 2021].

[MCKAY, S. & MAZURANA, D. ( 2004), "Where are the girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique: Their Lives During and After War",Rights & Democracy. International Centre for Human Rights & Democratic Development, [Accessed 5 April 2021].

[18] UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) (2005), “The Impact of Conflict on Women and Girls in West and Central Africa and the Unicef Response”, Emergencies, pg.19,Available from: < https://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Impact_conflict_women.pdf>  [Accessed 5 April 2021].

[19] Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2006), "Child Soldiers and Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration in West Africa". [Accessed 5 April 2021].

[20] HRW (Human Rights Watch) (2005), “Problems in the Disarmament Programs in Sierra Leone and Liberia [1998-2005]”, Reports Section, Available from: <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/westafrica0405/7.htm>  [Accessed 5 April 2021].

[21] Herman, J., Martin-Ortega, O. and Sriram, C., 2012. Beyond justice versus peace: transitional justice and peacebuilding strategies. 1st ed. Routledge. <Beyond justice versus peace: transitional justice and peacebuilding strategies | Taylor & Francis Group> [Accessed 5 March 2021]

[22] Young, G., n.d. Transitional Justice in Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis. [online] PEACE AND PROGRESS – THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY GRADUATE STUDENT JOURNAL. Available at: < https://postgraduate.ias.unu.edu/upp/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/upp_issue1-YOUNG.pdf > [Accessed 5 March 2021].

[23] Herman, J., Martin-Ortega, O. and Sriram, C., 2012. Beyond justice versus peace: transitional justice and peacebuilding strategies. 1st ed. Routledge. <Beyond justice versus peace: transitional justice and peacebuilding strategies | Taylor & Francis Group> [Accessed 5 March 2021]

[24] Stensrud, E., 2009. New Dilemmas in Transitional Justice: Lessons from the Mixed Courts in Sierra Leone and Cambodia. [online] Journal of peace research. Available at: <New Dilemmas in Transitional Justice: Lessons from the Mixed Courts in Sierra Leone and Cambodia on JSTOR> [Accessed 5 March 2021].

[25] Roht-Arriaza, N., & Mariezcurrena, J. (Eds.). (2006). Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2, Sigal HOROVITZ: Transitional criminal justice in Sierra Leone. <(PDF) Transitional Criminal Justice in Sierra Leone | Sigall Horovitz - Academia.edu >[Accessed 5 March 2021]

[26] Zarifis, Ismene. "Sierra Leone's Search for Justice and Accountability of Child Soldiers." Human Rights Brief 9, no. 3 (2002): 18-21. [Accessed 5 April 2021].

[27] Article 22 of the AFRICAN CHARTER ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE CHILD , achpr_instr_charterchild_eng.pdf (un.org). [Accessed 5 April 2021].

[28] Veiga, T. G. (2019). A New Conceptualisation of Child Reintegration in Conflict Contexts. E International Relations: https://www.e-ir.info/2019/06/21/a-new-conceptualisation-of-child-reintegration-in-conflict-contexts/.[Accessed 5 April 2021].

[Carlos Lopes, Africa in Transformation: Economic Development in the Age of Doubt (London: Palgrave, 2018), 175 pp.]

May 3, 2021

REVIEW / Emilija Žebrauskaitė

The emergence of a new discourse about 'Africa rising' is not at all surprising. After all, the continent is home to many fastest-growing economies of the world and the African sub-regions experienced economic growth way above the world average for more than a decade. New opportunities are opening up in the continent and Africa is becoming to be viewed as an attractive opportunity for investments and entrepreneurship. 

However, Carlos Lopes views the discourse about 'Africa rising' as a narrative that was created by foreigners interested in the continent and the economic opportunities it offers, without the consideration to the Africans themselves. In his book Africa in Transformation: Economic Development in the Age of Doubt Lopes presents an alternative view of the continent, it's challenges and achievements: an alternative view that is centered on Africans and their needs as opposed to the interests of the foreign investors.

The book describes a wide scope of topics from political to economic to intellectual transformation, all of them focusing on the rethinking of the traditional development models and providing a new, innovative approach to building the continent and its future.

One of the main points Lopes highlights is the importance of the agricultural transformation in Africa as a starting point for industrialization and development. The agricultural sector provides nearly 65% of Africa's population with employment. It is, therefore, one of the most important sectors for the continent. Drawing on historical evidence of other countries successfully climbing out of poverty relying on the transformation of the local agriculture, he comments that while some African countries have managed to increase their agricultural production, comparing to the rest of the world, the progress so far is pretty modest.

Lopes also points out that countries with low agricultural production are less industrialised as well. The solution he offers for Africa's industrialisation starts with agricultural transformation. He argues that the first step is the need for agricultural transformation that would lead to increased labor productivity, which would, in turn, lead to greater access to food per unit of labor, reducing the price of food relative to the income of the worker of the agricultural sector, allowing for the budget surplus to appear and become an impetus for the demand of goods and services beyond the agricultural sector.

While Lopes argues that the increase of Africa's labor productivity is as best "modest" compared to other developing regions of the world, at first glance this statement might seem contradictory to the fact that many African countries are among the fastest-growing economies of the world. However, the critique of Lopes highlights that despite the economic growth of the continent, it did not generate sufficient jobs, nor was it equally distributed across the continent. Furthermore, the growth did not protect African economies from the rocky nature of the commodity exports on which the continent relies, making the growth unstable.

According to Lopes, not only the diversification of the production structures is required, there is a need for the creation of ten million new jobs in order to absorb the immense youth number entering the markets. As the trade liberalisation forced unequal competition upon local African industries, Lopes suggests using smart protectionist measures that are not directly trade-related and therefore outside of the influence of WTO. In the end, the African economy must be internally driven and less dependent, and the policies should focus to protect it.

This leads us to another focus of the book, namely the lack of policy space for African countries. The economic and political theories reflected upon Africa by the developed countries, specifically the US, do not leave enough space for African countries to develop their own policies based on local circumstances and necessities. In cases where the ideas imposed from abroad fail to function in African circumstances, the continent is left without much space for adjustment. Lopes discusses the failure of the Bretton Woods institutions to remain impartial in their policymaking, and the disastrous effect the neo-liberal policies, enforced on the whole world until the crisis of 2008.

While Lopes agrees that the lack of the capability of enforcing the IMF and World Bank policies by the implementing countries contributed to their ineffectiveness, the lack of flexibility from the part of the international organizations to adapt the policies to the regional circumstances and the arrogant denial to admit their inefficiency were the major factors contributing to the negative social impact, namely inequality, that neo-liberalism enhanced in Africa. According to Lopes, now that the trustworthiness of the international financial institutions has decreased, more space is left for Africa to reformulate and enforce its own policies, adapting them to the existing circumstances and needs.

In the end, the book approaches the problems faced by modern-day Africa from a multidisciplinary point of view, discussing topics ranging from ideology and ecology to economy and politics. Carlos Lopes is a loud and confident voice when it comes to the contribution of the 'Africa rising' narrative. While he does not deny the accomplishment of the continent, he is cautious about the narrative that portrays Africa as an economic unit, interesting due to and only because of new economic possibilities that are opening for foreign interests. His alternative is the idea of 'Africa in transformation' - the view that focuses on the growth of the possibilities for the people of Africa and transformation of a continent from an object of someone's exploitation, to a place with its own opportunities and opinions, offering the world new ideas on the most important topic of contemporary international debates.

First US-China high-level meeting of the Biden era to be held in Alaska on March 18, 2021 [State Department].

essay / Ramon Barba

President Joe Biden is cautiously building his Indo-Pacific policy, seeking to build an alliance with India on which to build an order to counter the rise of China. Following his entrance the White House, Biden has kept the focus on this region, albeit with a different approach than the Trump Administration. While it is true that the main goal is still to contain China and defend free trade, Washington is opting for a multilateral approach that gives greater prominence to QUAD[1] and takes special care of the relationship with India. As the standard-bearer of the free world and democracy, the Biden Administration aims to renew US leadership in the world and particularly in this crucial region. However, although the relationship with India is at a good moment, especially in view of the signature thescholarship agreement [2] reached at the end of the Trump Administration, the interaction between the two countries is far from consolidating an alliance.

The new US presidency is faced with a very complicated puzzle to solve in the Indo-Pacific, the main players being China and India. In general, we find that, of the three powers, only Beijing has been able to successfully manage the post-Pandemic status [3], while Delhi and Washington continue to face both a health and economic crisis. All this may affect the relationship between India and the United States, especially in terms of trade[4], however, and despite the fact that Biden has not yet demonstrated what his strategy in the region will be, it seems that the relationship between the two powers is set to grow[5]. However, although the United States wants to pursue a policy of multilateral alliances and deepen its relationship with India, the Biden Administration will have to take into account several difficulties before being able to speak of an alliance as such.

Biden started to act in this direction from the very beginning. First of all there was the February meeting of QUAD[6], which some consider a mini NATO[7] for Asia, at which issues relating to vaccine distribution in Asia (aiming to distribute one billion doses by 2022), freedom of navigation in the region's seas, denuclearization of North Korea and democracy in Myanmar were discussed. In addition, the UK seems to be showing increased interest in the region and in this dialogue group . On the other hand, in mid-March there was a meeting in Alaska[8] between the Chinese and US diplomacy (headed respectively by Yang Jiechi, director the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and Antony Blinken, Secretary of State), in which both countries strongly reproached each other's policies. Washington remains firm in its interests, although open to a certain partnership with Beijing, while China insists on rejecting any interference in what it considers its internal affairs. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Biden seems to be willing to organize a summit of democracies[9] in his first year in office.

Following contacts that also took place in Alaska between the Chinese and US defense chiefs, Austin Lloyd[10], head of the Pentagon, visited India to stress the importance of Indo-US cooperation. In addition, early April saw the participation of France in the La Pérouse[11] naval maneuvers in the Bay of Bengal, giving rise to the possibility of a QUAD-plus in which, in addition to the four original powers, other countries would also take part.

The Indo-Pacific, let us remember, is the present and the future of international relations due to its economic importance (its main players, India, China and the USA represent 45% of the world's GDP), demographic (hosting 65% of the population of the entire globe) and, as we will see throughout this article, geopolitical[12].

U.S.-China-India relations

The Biden Administration seems to be continuing the line followed by Trump, since the objectives have not changed. What has changed is the approach to the object of the issue, which in this case is none other than the containment of China and freedom of navigation in the region, albeit on the basis of a strong commitment to multilateralism. As George Washington's new successor said at his inauguration[13], the United States wants to resume its leadership, but in a different way from that of the previous Administration; that is, through a strong policy of alliances, moral leadership and a strong defense of values such as dignity, human rights and the rule of law.

The new presidency sees China as a rival to be reckoned with[14], as does the Trump Administration, but it does not see this as a zero-sum game, since, while openly declaring itself to be against Xi's actions, it opens the door to dialogue[15] on issues such as climate change or healthcare. In general, in line with what has been seen in New tensions in Asia Pacific[16], the United States is committed to multilateralism that seeks to reduce tension. It should be remembered that the United States advocates the defense of free navigation and the rule of law, as well as democracy in a region in which its influence is being eroded by the growing weight of China.

A good understanding of the state of US-China-India relations goes back to 2005[17], when everything seemed to be going well. As far as the Sino-Indian relationship was concerned, the two nations had resolved their disputes over the 1998 nuclear tests; moreover, their presence in regional forums was growing and it seemed that the issue of cross-border disputes was beginning to be settled. For its part, the United States enjoyed good trade relations with both countries. However, changing patterns in global Economics , driven by the rise of China, the 2008 financial crisis in the United States and India's inability to maintain its growth rate upset this balance. Donald Trump's tightening attitude contributed to this. However, some argue that the breakdown of the post-Cold War order in the Asia Pacific began with the Obama Administration's "pivot to Asia"[18]. To this must be added the minor frictions China has had with both nations.

Briefly, it is worth mentioning that there are border problems between India and China[19] that have been flaring up again since 2013. In turn, India is opposed to Chinese hegemony; it does not want to be subjugated by Beijing and is clearly committed to multilateralism. Finally, there are problems with regard to maritime dominance because the Strait of Malacca is at the limit of its capacity. In addition, Delhi claims the Adaman and Nicobar Islands on the Malacca access route as its own. Moreover, as India is now far below China's military and economic power[20] - the balance between the two powers in 1980 has been broken - it is trying to hinder Beijing in order to contain it.

The United States has ideological frictions with China, due to the authoritarian nature of Xi Jinping's regime[21], and commercial frictions, in subject dispute[22] that Beijing intends to take advantage of to reduce US influence in the region. In the midst of this conflict is India, which supports the United States because, although it does not seem to want to be completely against China[23], it rejects a Chinese regional hegemony[24].

According to the latest CEBR report [25], China will overtake the United States as a world power in 2028, earlier than expected in previous projections, partly thanks to the way it has managed the coronavirus emergency: it was the only major country to avoid a crisis after the first wave. On the other hand, the United States has lost the battle against the pandemic; economic growth between 2022-2024 is expected to be 1.9% of GDP and to slow to 1.6% in the following years[26], while China, according to the report , will grow at 5.7% between 2021-2025[27].

For China, the pandemic has been a way of signaling its place in the world[28], a way of warning the United States that it is ready to take over as leader of the international community. To this can be added China's belligerent attitude in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as its hegemonic growth in the area and its trade projects with Africa and Europe. All of this has led to imbalances in the region that involve Washington's QUAD moves. Recall that, despite its waning role as a power, the United States is interested in freedom of navigation for both commercial and military reasons[29].

Thus, the Chinese economic boom has led to a worsening of the relationship between Washington and Beijing[30]. Moreover, although Biden is committed to cooperation on the pandemic and climate change, there is talk from some quarters of American politics of an inevitable competition between the two countries[31].

The Degree of alliance between the US and India

In line with the above, we can see that we are in a delicate situation after the change in the White House. January and February have been months of small movements on the part of the United States and India, which have not left China indifferent. Although the Sino-US relationship has benefited both sides since its inception (1979)[32], with trade between the two countries growing by 252% since then, the reality is that trust levels are now at rock bottom, having suspended more than 100 dialogue mechanisms between them. Therefore, although a conflict is not foreseen, an increase in tension is predicted since, far from being able to cooperate in broad fields, only slight and limited cooperation seems feasible at the moment. At the same time, let us recall that China is very much affected by the Malacca Dilemma[33], and is therefore seeking other access to the Indian Ocean, giving rise to territorial disputes with India, with whom it already has the territorial problem of Ladakh[34]. In the midst of this Thucydides Trap[35], in which China seems to threaten to overtake the United States, Washington has been moving closer to New Delhi.

Consequently, the two countries have been developing a strategic partnership [36], based essentially on security and defense, but which the United States is seeking to extend to other areas. It is true that Delhi's problems are in the Indian Ocean and Washington's in the Pacific; however, both have China[37] as a common denominator. Their relationship, moreover, is strongly marked by the already mentioned "tripartite crisis"[38] (health, economic and geopolitical).

Despite the intense cooperation between Washington and New Delhi, there are two different points of view regarding thispartnership. While the United States claims that India is a very important ally, with which it shares the same political system and an intense commercial relationship[39], India prefers a less strict alliance. Traditionally, Delhi has conveyed a policy of non-alignment[40] in international matters. In fact, although India does not want Chinese supremacy in the Indo-Pacific, neither does it wish to align itself directly against Beijing, with whom it shares more than 3,000 km of border. Nevertheless, Delhi sees a great need for cooperation with Washington on security and defense subject . In fact, some say that today India needs the US more than ever.

Although last February Washington began to review the US Global Posture Strategy, everything suggests that the Biden Administration will continue Trump's line regarding the partnership with India as a way of containing China. However, although Washington speaks of India as its ally, there is some reluctance on the part of Delhi, thus speaking of an alignment[41] rather than an alliance. Although the reality we are living in is far from that of the Cold War[42], this new containment[43] in which Delhi is sought as a base, support and standard, is materialized in the following:

i) Intense cooperation in security and defense subject .

Here there are different forums and agreements. Firstly, the aforementioned QUAD[44]. This new multilateral cooperation alliance that began to take shape in 2006[45] agreed at its March meeting to development its vaccine diplomacy, with India at the center, in order to counter the successful international campaign led by Beijing in this field. In fact, there was a commitment to spend 600 million to deliver 1 billion vaccines[46] by 2022. The idea is that Japan and the USA will finance the operation[47], while Australia will be in charge of logistics. However, India is committed to greater multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific, giving entrance to countries such as England and France[48], which already participated in the last Raisina Dialogues together with QUAD. The meeting also dealt with other issues such as the denuclearization of Korea, the restoration of democracy in Myanmar and climate change[49].

India seeks to contain China, but without provoking a direct confrontation with China[50]. In fact, Beijing has given the impression that if things go further, it is not only India that knows how to play Realpolitik. Let us recall that New Delhi will chair this year's meeting with the BRICS. Moreover, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will host joint military exercises between China and Pakistan, a country with a complex relationship with India.

On the other hand, during his March trip to India, the Pentagon chief[51] discussed with his counterpart Rajnath Singh increased military cooperation, as well as issues related to logistics, information exchange , possible opportunities for mutual attendance and the defense of free navigation. Lloyd said he did not frown upon Australia and Korea participating as permanent members in the Malabar exercises. Since 2008, trade in military subject between Delhi and Washington has totaled $21 billion[52]. In addition, $3,000 has recently been spent on drones and other aerial equipment for reconnaissance and surveillance missions.

A week after this meeting, two Indian and one US ship conducted a subject PASSEX maritime exercise[53] as a way to consolidate the synergies and interoperability achieved in last November's Malabar exercise.

In this context, a special accredited specialization should be made to the 2+2 dialogue platform and the aforementioned scholarship agreement basic exchange and cooperationagreement for cooperation in geospatial subject ). The former is a subject of meeting in which the Foreign and Defense Ministers of both countries meet every two years to discuss issues of interest to them. The most recent meeting took place in October 2020[54]. Not only was the scholarship agreed upon, but the United States reaffirmed its support for India with regard to its territorial problems with China. Other memoranda of understanding were also signed on nuclear energy and climate issues.

The scholarship, signed in October 2020 during the last months of the Trump Administration, makes it easier for India to better locate enemies, terrorists and other subject of threats coming from land or sea. This agreement is intended to consolidate the friendship between the two countries, as well as to help India outperform China technologically. This agreement concludes the "troika of foundational pacts" for deep security and defense cooperation between the two countries[55].

Prior to this agreement, the LEMOA (Logistics exchange Memorandum of agreement ) was signed in 2016 and the COMCASAagreement Communications Compatibility and Securityagreement ) in 2018. The former allows both countries access to each other's instructions for supply and replenishment; the latter allows India to receive systems, information and encrypted communication to communicate with the United States. Both agreements affect land, sea and air forces[56].

ii) United for democracy

From Washington, special emphasis is placed on the fact that both powers are very similar, since they share the same political system, and it is emphasized with a certain grandiloquence that they are the oldest and the largest democracy ( issue terms of population)[57]. Because this presupposes the sharing of a series of values, Washington likes to speak of "likeminded partners"[58].

From the Brookings Institution think tank , Tanvi Mandan defends this idea of ideological bonding. The same system of government makes both countries see each other as natural allies, who think alike and also believe in the value of the rule of law. In fact, in all matters relating to the spread of democracy around the globe, there is strong cooperation between the two nations: for example, supporting democracy in Afghanistan or the Maldives, launching the US-India Global Democracy Initiative and providing legal and technical attendance on democratic issues to other countries. Finally, it should be noted that democracy and the values it entails have facilitated the exchange and flow of people from one country to another. As for the economic relationship between both countries, it becomes more viable, since both are open economies, they share a common language and their legal system has Anglo-Saxon roots.

iii) Growing economic cooperation

The United States is India's main trading partner , with whom it has a significant surplus[59]. Trade between the two has grown by 10% annually over the last decade, and in 2019 was $115 billion[60]. About 2,000 US companies are based in India, and about 200 Indian companies are based in the US[61]. Between the two there is a Mini-Trade Deal, believed to be signed shortly, which aims to deepen this economic relationship. In the context of the pandemic, everything related to the health field plays an important role[62]. In fact, despite the fact that both countries have recently adopted a protectionist attitude, the idea is to reach 500 billion dollars in trade[63].

Divergences, challenges and opportunities for India and the U.S. in the region

Briefly, between the leaders of both countries there are small frictions, opportunities and challenges to be nuanced in order to make this relationship a strong alliance. Among the points of conflict, we highlight India's purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia, which is against the CAATSA(Countering America's Adversaries tough Sanctions Act) [64], for which India may receive a sanction, although in the meeting between Sigh and Lloyd, the latter seemed to overlook the topic [65]. However, it remains to be seen what happens once the missiles arrive in Delhi. There are also minor divergences regarding freedom of expression, security and civil rights, and how to relate to non-democratic countries[66]. Among the challenges that both countries must take into account is the possible loss of support in some sectors of U.S. policy for the relationship with India. This is due to India's actions in Kashmir in August 2019, protection of religious freedom and attention to dissent. On the other hand, there has been no shortage of weakening of democratic norms, immigration restrictions and violence against Indian nationals[67].

Lastly, let us recall that both are facing a deep health and therefore economic crisis, the resolution of which will be decisive in relation to the competition with Beijing[68]. The crisis has affected the bilateral relationship since, although trade in services has remained stable (around 50 billion), trade in goods declined from 92 billion to 78 billion between 2019 and 2020, increasing the Indian trade deficit[69].

Finally, it is worth mentioning the opportunities. First, both countries can develop democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific as well as in a rules-based international order[70]. In security and defense, there are also opportunities such as the entrance the UK and France as allies in the area, for example by trying to get both countries to enter the Malabar exercise or France to chair the Indian Ocean Naval Symposiumin 2022[71]. Although the medium-term trend is for cooperation between the United States and India, skill with Russia will be a growing threat[72], so cooperation between the United States, India and Europe is very important.

The possibility of cooperation in MDA (Maritime Warning Environment) and ASW (Anti Submarine Warfare) mechanisms is also opened, as the Indian Ocean is of general importance for several countries due to the value of its energy transport routes. The possibility of cooperation through the use of the US P-8 "Poseidon" aircraft is opened up. Despite the disputes over the Chagos Archipelago, India and the United States should take advantage of the agreements they have over islands such as Andaman or Diego Garcia for the conduct of these activities[73]. 73] Therefore, India should use regional bodies and work groups to cooperate with European countries and the United States.

Europe seems to be gaining increasing importance due to the possibility of entering the Indo-Pacific game through QUAD Plus. European countries are very much in favor of multilateralism, the defense of freedom of navigation and the role of rules in regulating it. While it is true that the EU has recently signed a trade treaty with China - the IAC - increasing the European presence in the region takes on greater importance, since Xi's authoritarianism and his actions in Tibet, Xinjiang, or central China are not to the liking of European countries[75].

Finally, it should be recalled that there are some voices that speak of a decline or weakening of globalization[76], especially after the coronavirus epidemic[77], so reviving multilateral exchanges through joint action becomes a challenge and an opportunity for both countries. In fact, it is believed that in the short term, protectionist tendencies, at least in the Sino-Indian relationship, will continue, despite the intense economic cooperation[78].

Conclusion

The geopolitical panorama of the Indo-Pacific is complex to say the least. Chinese expansionism clashes with the interests of the other major regional power, India, which, while avoiding confrontation with Beijing, takes a dim view of its neighbor's actions. In a bid for multilateralism, and with an eye on its regional waters, threatened by the Malacca Dilemma, India seems to be cooperating with the United States, but clinging to regional forums and groups to make its position clear, while seeming to open the door to European countries, whose interest in the region is growing, despite the recent trade agreement signed with China.

On the other hand, the United States is also threatened by Chinese expansionism and sees the moment of its rival's economic overtaking approaching, which the coronavirus crisis may even have brought forward to 2028. In order to avoid such status, the Biden Administration is betting on multilateralism at the regional level and is deepening its relationship with India, beyond the military aspect. Washington seems to have understood that US hegemony in the Indo-Pacific is far from being real, at least in the medium term, so that only a cooperative and integrating attitude is possible. On the other hand, in the midst of this supposed retreat from globalization, we see how Washington, together with India, and surely in the medium term with Europe, are defending the Western values that govern the international sphere, i.e. the defense of human rights, the rule of law and the value of democracy.

We are faced with two factors. On the one hand, India does not want to see an order imposed by any subject, neither American nor Chinese, hence its reluctance to confront Beijing directly and its preference to expand the QUAD. On the other hand, the United States seems to perceive that it is at a delicate moment, since its competition with China goes beyond the mere substitution of one power for another. Washington is still a traditional power which, for its presence in the Indo-Pacific, has relied above all on military power, while China has based the extension of its influence on the establishment of strong trade relations that go beyond the belligerent logic of the Cold War. Hence the United States is trying to form a front with India and its European allies that goes beyond military cooperation.

REFERENCES 

[1] The QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) is a dialogue group formed by the United States, India, Japan and Australia. Its members share a common vision on the security of the Indo-Pacific region contrary to that of China; they advocate multilateralism and freedom of navigation in the region.

[2] scholarship (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement). Treaty signed by India and the United States in October 2019 to improve security in the Indo-Pacific region. Its goal is the exchange of tracking, tracing and intelligence systems.

[3]Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective." Chinawatch. Connecting Thinkers ... http://www.chinawatch.cn/a/202102/05/WS60349146a310acc46eb43e2d.html,(accessed February 5, 2021),

[4] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating and Rebalancing Ties," in Tanvi Madan, "India And The Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties,". German Marshal Found of the United States. https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/02/11/india-and-biden-administration-consolidating-and-rebalancing-ties,(accessed February 11, 2021).

[5]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake,diary 2021: A Blueprint For U.S.-Europe-India Cooperation," US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security. GMF India Trilateral Forum. Pg:1. https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2021/02/16/us-india-cooperation-indo-pacific-security, (accessed February 16, 2021).

[6] "'QUAD' Leaders Pledge New Cooperation on China, COVID-19, Climate." Aljazeera.com. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/12/quad-leaders-pledge-new-cooperation-on-china-covid-19-climate (accessed March 2021).

[7] Mereyem Hafidi, "Biden Renews 'QUAD' Alliance Despite Pressure From Beijing." Atalayar. https://atalayar.com/content/biden-renueva-la-alianza-de-%E2%80%98QUAD%E2%80%99-pesar-de-las-presiones-de-pek%C3%ADn.(accessed February 2021).

[8] "`Grandstanding`: US, China trade rebukes in testy talks." Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/19/us-china-top-diplomats-trade-rebukes-in-testy-first-talks (accessed, March 2021).

[9] Joseph R. Biden, "Why America Must Lead Again." Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again (accessed February, 2021).

[10] Maria Siow. "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind." South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3126091/india-receives-us-defence-secretary-lloyd-austin-china-its-mind.(accessed March 19, 2021).

[11] Seeram Chaulia, "France and sailing toward the 'QUAD-plus'". The New Indian Express. https://www. newindianexpress.com/opinions/2021/apr/06/france-and-sailing-toward-the-QUAD-plus-2286408.html (accessed, April 4, 2021).

[12] Juan Luis López Aranguren. "Indo-Pacific: The new order without China at the center." The Indo-Pacific as a new global geopolitical axis. Global Affairs Journal. Pg.:2. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/indo-pacifico-el-nuevo-orden-sin-china-en-el-centro?_33_redirect=%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fglobal-affairs%2Fpublicaciones%2Finformes.(accessed, April 2021).

[13] Biden, "Remarks By President Biden On America's Place In The World | The White House"...

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/

[14] Ibid.

[15] Derek Grossman, "Biden's China Reset Is Already On The Ropes." Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Biden-s-China-reset-is-already-on-the-ropes.(accessed, March 14, 2021).

[16] Ramón Barba Castro, "New Tensions in Asia Pacific in a Scenario of Electoral Change." Global Affairs and Strategic Studies. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/nuevas-tensiones-en-asia-pacifico-en-un-escenario-de-cambio-electoral-en-eeuu.(accessed, April 2021).

[17] Sankaran Kalyanaraman, "Changing Pattern Of The China-India-US Triangle." Manohar Parrikar Institute For Defence Studies And Analyses. https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/changing-pattern-china-india-us-triangle-skalyanaram (accessed March 2021).

[18] Pang Zhongying, "Indo-Pacific Era Needs US-China Cooperation, Not Great Power Conflict." South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3125926/indo-pacific-needs-us-china-cooperation-not-conflict-QUAD (accessed March 19, 2021).

[19] Sankaran Kalayanamaran, "Changing Pattern of the China-India-US Triangle.

[20] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective."

[21] Joseph R. Biden, "Remarks By President Biden On America's Place In The World

[22]Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective.

[23] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind."

[24]Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties."

[25] CEBR (Centre for Economics and Business Research) is an organization dedicated to the analysis and economic forecasting of companies and organizations. link https://cebr.com/about-cebr/. This entity prepares every year agraduate report World Economic League Table¸in which it analyzes the positioning of each country of the Globe regarding the state of its Economics. The latest edition(World Economic League Table 2021), published on December 26, 2020, presents a prediction of the state of world Economics in 2035, in order to know who will be the main world economic powers (CEBR, "World Economic League Table 2021". Centre for Economics and Business Research (12th edition), https://cebr.com/reports/world-economic-league-table-2021/ (accessed March 2021).

[26] Ibid., 231.

[27] Ibid., 71.

[28] Vijay Gokhale, "China Doesn't Want a New World Order. It Wants This One." The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/opinion/china-america-united-nations.html(accessed April 2021).

[29] Mereyem Hafidi, "Biden renews `QUAD` alliance despite pressure from Beijing.

[30] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective."

[31] Ibid.

[32] Wang Huiyao, "More cooperation, less competition". Chinawatch. Connecting Thinkers. http://www.chinawatch.cn/a/202102/05/WS6034913ba310acc46eb43e28.html(accessed March 2021).

[33] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective."

[34]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security." Page 5.

[35] Chilamkuri Raja Mohan, "Trilateral Perspective."

[36] Ibid.

[37]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security." Page 5.

[38] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating And Rebalancing Ties."

[39] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship". Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/democracy-and-the-us-india-relationship/ (accessed March 2021)

[40] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind."

[41] Bilal Kuchay, "India, US sign key military deal, symbolizing closer ties." Aljazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/2/india-us-military-deal(accessed March 2021)

[42] Wang Huiyao, "More cooperation, less competition".

[43] Alex Lo, "India-the democratic economic giant that disappoints". South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3126342/india-democratic-economic-giant-disappoints(accessed March 21, 2021).

[44] Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific." South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3125344/QUAD-summit-us-india-australia-and-japan-counter-chinas.(accessed, March 13, 2021).

[45]Mereyem Hafidi, "Biden renews `QUAD` alliance despite pressure from Beijing.

[46] Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific."

[47] Aljazeera, "'QUAD' leaders pledge new cooperation on China, COVID-19, climate".

[48]Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security." Page 2.

[49]Simone McCarthy, "QUAD summit: US, India, Australia and Japan counter China's 'vaccine diplomacy' with pledge to distribute a billion doses across Indo-Pacific."

[50] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind".

[51] "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner." Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/us-defense-secretary-lloyd-austin-says-us-considers-india-to-be-a-great-partner-101616317189411.html.(accessed, March 21, 2021)

[52] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind."

[53] The term PASSEX is an abbreviation of the English military jargon, it comes from Passing Exercise. It consists of taking advantage of the fact that a Marine unit is passing through a given area to deepen the military cooperation of the army of the area through which it is passing. As an example we find the news cited in this article: "India, US begin two-day naval exercise in eastern Indian Ocean region". The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-us-begin-two-day-naval-exercise-in-eastern-indian-ocean-region/articleshow/81735782.cms (accessed March 28, 2021).

[54] Annath Krishnan, Dinakar Peri, Kallol Bhattacherjee; India-U.S. 2+2 dialogue: U.S. to support India's defence of territory. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-us-22-dialogue-rajnath-singh-raises-chinas-action-in-ladakh/article32955117.ece.(accessed March 2021).

[55] Maria Siow, "India Receives US Defence Secretary With China On Its Mind."

[56] Ibid.

[57] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship".

[58] Hindustan Times, "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner".

[59] "Committed to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/committed-to-achieving-goal-of-500-bn-in-bilateral-trade-with-us-ambassador-sandhu/articleshow/80878316.cms.(accessed, March 2021).

[60] Joe C. Mathew, "India-US mini trade deal: Low duty on medical devices; pact in final stages." Business Today. https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/india-us-mini-trade-deal-low-duty-on-medical-devices-pact-in-final-stages/story/413669.html.(Accessed, March 2021).

[61] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[62] Joe C. Mathew, "India-US mini trade deal: Low duty on medical devices; pact in final stages".

[63] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[64] Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security". Page 2.

[65] Hindustan Times "US defense secretary Lloyd Austin says US considers India to be a great partner".

[66] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship."

[67] Ibid.

[68] Tanvi Madan, "India and the Biden Administration: Consolidating and Rebalancing Ties.

[69] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[70] Tanvi Madan, "Democracy and the US-India relationship."

[71] Darshana Baruah, Frédéric Grére, and Nilanthi Samaranayake, "US-India cooperation on Indo-Pacific Security." Page3.

[72] IBIDEM page 3

[73] IBIDEM. Page 6

[74] IBIDEM. Page 7

[75] Seeram Chaulia, "France and sailing toward the 'QUAD-plus'". The New Indian Express

[76] Elisabeth Mearns, Gary Parkinson; "With a pandemic, populism and protectionism, have we passed peak globalization?". China Global Television Network. https://newseu.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-28/With-a-pandemic-populism-and-protectionism-has-globalization-peaked--QOQMPg3ABO/index.html.(accessed, April 2021).

[77] Abraham Newman, Henry Farrel; "The New Age of Protectionism." Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2021-04-05/new-age-protectionism.(accessed April 5, 2021).

[78] Economic Times, "Commited to achieving goal of $500 bn in bilateral trade with US: Ambassador Sandhu".

[Mondher Sfar, In search of the original Koran: the true history of the revealed text (New York: Prometheus Books, 2008) 152pp].

REVIEW / Marina G. Reina

Not much has been done regarding research about the authenticity of the Quranic text. This is something that Mondher Sfar has in mind throughout the book, that makes use of the scriptural techniques of the Koran, the scarce research material available, and the Islamic tradition, to redraw the erased story of the transmission of the holy book of Muslims. The same tradition that imposes "a representation of the revelation and of its textual product-which (...) is totally alien to the spirit and to the content of the Quranic text."

The work is a sequencing of questions that arise from the gaps that the Islamic tradition leaves regarding the earliest testimony about the Koran and the biography of Prophet Muhammad. The result is an imprecise or inconclusive answer because it is almost impossible to trace the line back to the very early centuries of the existence of Islam, and due to an "insurmountable barrier" that "has been established against any historical and relativized perception of the Koran (...) to consecrate definitively the new orthodox ideology as the only possible and true one." 

As mentioned, Sfar's main sources are those found in the tradition, by which we mean the records from notorious personalities in the early years of the religion. Their sayings prove "the existence in Muhammad's time of two states of the revealed text: a first state and a reworked state that have been modified and corrected." This fact "imperils the validity and identity of Revelation, even if its divine authenticity remains unquestioned."

The synthesis that the author makes on the "kinds of division" (or alterations of the Revelation), reducing them to three from certain ayas in the Koran, is also of notorious interest. In short, these are "that of the modification of the text; that of satanic revelations; and finally, that of the ambiguous nature of the portion of the Revelation." The first one exemplifies how the writing of the Revelation was changed along time; the second is grounded on a direct reference to this phenomenon in the Koran, when it says that "Satan threw some [false revelations] into his (Muhammad's) recitation" (22:52), something that, by the way, is also mentioned in the Bible in Ezekiel 13:3, 6.

Another key point in the book is that of the components of the Koran (the surahs and the ayas) being either invented or disorganized later in time. The manuscripts of the "revealed text" vary in style and form, and the order of the verses was not definitively fixed until the Umayyad era. It is remarkable how something as basic as the titles of the surahs "does not figure in the first known Koranic manuscript", nor was it reported by contemporaries to the Prophet to be ever mentioned by him. The same mystery arises upon the letters that can be read above at the beginning of the preambles in the surahs. According to the Tradition, they are part of the Revelation, whilst the author argues that they are linked to "the process of the formation of surahs", as a way of numeration or as signatures from the scribes. As already mentioned, it is believed that the Koran version that we know today was made in two phases; in the second phase or correction phase surahs would have been added or divided. The writer remarks how a few surahs lack the common preambles and these characteristic letters, which leads to think that these elements were added in the proofreading part of the manuscript, so these organizational signals were omitted.

It may seem that at some points the author makes too many turns on the same topic (in fact, he even raises questions that remain unresolved throughout the book). Nonetheless, it is difficult to question those issues that have been downplayed from the Tradition and that, certainly, are weighty considerations that provide a completely different vision of what is known as the "spirit of the law." This is precisely what he refers to by repeatedly naming the figure of the scribes of the Prophet, that "shaped" the divine word, "and it is this operation that later generations have tried to erase, in order to give a simplified and more-reassuring image of the Quranic message, that of a text composed by God in person," instead of being "the product of a historical elaboration."

What the author makes clear throughout the book is that the most significant and, therefore, most suspicious alterations of the Koran are those introduced by the first caliphs. Especially during the times of the third caliph, Uthman, the Koran was put on the diary again, after years of being limited to a set of "sheets" that were not consulted. Uthman made copies of a certain "compilation" and "ordered the destruction of all the other existing copies." Indeed, there is evidence of the existence of "other private collections" that belonged to dignitaries around the Prophet, of whose existence, Sfar notes that "around the fourth century of the Hijra, no trace was left."

The author shows that the current conception of the Koran is rather simplistic and based on "several dogmas about, and mythical reconstructions of, the history." Such is the case with the "myth of the literal 'authenticity'," which comes more "from apologetics than from the realm of historical truth." This is tricky, especially when considering that the Koran is the result of a process of wahy (inspiration), not of a literal transcription, setting the differentiation between the Kitab ("the heavenly tablet") and the Koran ("a liturgical lesson or a recitation"). Moreover, Sfar addresses the canonization of the Koran, which was made by Uthman, and which was criticized at its time for reducing the "several revelations without links between them, and that they were not designed to make up a book" into a single composition. This illustrates that "the principal star that dominated the period of prophetic revelation was to prove that the prophetic mission claimed by Muhammad was indeed authentic, and not to prove the literal authenticity of the divine message," what is what the current Muslim schools of taught are inclined to support.

In general, although the main argument of the author suggests that the "Vulgate" version of the Koran might not be the original one, his other arguments lead the reader to deduce that this first manuscript does not vary a lot from the one we know today. Although it might seem so at first glance, the book is not a critique to the historicity of Islam or to the veracity of the Koran itself. It rather refers to the conservation and transmission thereof, which is one of the major claims in the Koran; of it being an honorable recitation in a well-guarded book (56:77-78). Perhaps, for those unfamiliar with the Muslim religion, this may seem insignificant. However, it is indeed a game-changer for the whole grounding of the faith. Muslims, the author says, remain ignorant of a lot of aspects of their religion because they do not go beyond the limits set by the scholars and religious authorities. It is the prevention from understanding the history that prevents from "better understanding the Koran" and, thus, the religion.