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The U-shaped ideological curve is fragmenting: the radical left is regaining momentum while the moderate right is losing ground
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A lack of interest in the news increases the likelihood of evasion by a factor of 2.5
News avoidance—defined as the deliberate and active practice of avoiding the news—has become a structural feature of news consumption in Spain. Since around 2024, the percentage of respondents who report avoiding the news “often” or “sometimes” has remained at 37%, and 2026 was no exception. The decline observed in 2023, when the figure dropped to 29%, was more of a blip, and all signs point to this behavior now being the norm among a significant portion of respondents, who choose to distance themselves from the news—whether to reduce information overload, protect themselves from fatigue, or distance themselves from content that causes them distress or discomfort.
Compared to the other countries analyzed, Spain falls below the global average (42%) and ranks 35th out of the 48 countries analyzed. In the European context, tax evasion in Spain is lower than the Western average (40%) and similar to that average countries such as Italy (36%), France (37%), and Portugal (37%), while it is lower than in Germany (40%) and Austria (41%). However, it has a higher level of information avoidance than Nordic countries such as Sweden (30%) and Finland (31%). At the other end of the spectrum are Croatia (63%), Bulgaria (60%), and Greece (60%).
The data on frequent patron saint avoidance (those who say they avoid the news “often”) reveals an patron saint . Spain stands at 11%, below the average (13%) and also below the Western average (13%). Furthermore, it is lower than in countries such as Germany (15%), France (13%), or Austria (17%). This means that, although the total percentage of Spaniards who avoid the news is similar to that of several neighboring countries, this avoidance tends to be somewhat more moderate: the “sometimes” response is more common than frequent or systematic avoidance. In comparative terms, Spanish disengagement appears to be more selective than intense.

As in previous years, women report avoiding the news to a greater extent than men (40% versus 34%). By age, this avoidance is higher among adults aged 25 to 34 (44%) than among those over 65 (27%) or those under 25 (36%).
In terms of ideology, evasion is highest among those who do not declare their ideological position (47%) and much lower at the two extremes of the political spectrum (31%). This suggests a twofold pattern: on the one hand, those who identify more clearly with a particular ideology—especially those at the extremes—seem to have a more intense connection to current events; on the other hand, those who do not identify with a particular political stance show greater detachment or less desire to participate in discussion .
Ideology: The " patron saint U-shape breaks asymmetrically
In 2025, political ideology revealed a patron saint clear U-shaped patron saint : levels of information avoidance were higher at the extremes of the ideological scale than in the middle positions. The data present a more complex picture. First, the far left experienced the sharpest decline in news avoidance: from 42% in 2025 to 30% in 2026, becoming the group to avoid the news within the self-identified political spectrum. On the other half of the ideological spectrum, the moderate right recorded the highest level of news avoidance in 2026 among those who identify ideologically, at 41%, compared to 32% in 2025. This shift could be linked to a growing perception of bias or lack of representation in the media among this segment, although this interpretation should be cross-checked with specific indicators of trust in or perceptions of the media. The far right, for its part, also reduces its media avoidance, from 38% to 31%, in a trend parallel to—though more moderate than—that observed among the far left.

The group to avoid the news continues to be those who do not identify with the left-right political spectrum (47%), a figure that confirms that political disengagement, rather than ideological polarization, may be the most robust ideological predictor of disengagement from the news.
In aggregate terms, the difference between the left (36%), the center (35%), and the right (38%) is practically nil and statistically insignificant. The U-shaped curve of 2025 has given way to a patron saint diffuse and irregular patron saint , suggesting that the relationship between ideology and tax evasion is more sensitive to the current political context than the data previous years indicated.
Disinterest and distrust: the strongest predictors
Beyond sociodemographic and ideological variables, the main predictors of news avoidance are interest in the news and trust in the media. Users who are least interested in the news are the ones who avoid it the most (69%): having little interest in current events increases the likelihood of avoiding the news by a factor of 2.5, regardless of profile respondent’s profile or ideological profile . Conversely, those who trust the media the most are less likely to avoid the news: 30% of them report avoiding it often or sometimes, compared to 47% among those who distrust the media. This represents a difference of 17 percentage points, or a relative reduction of approximately 36% compared to those who distrust the media.
The source as a new focus of analysis
One finding takes on particular significance this year is the association the source news source and the tendency to avoid the news. Citizens who get their news primarily through social media exhibit high levels of news avoidance (47% report avoiding the news often or sometimes), clearly higher than those whose source is television (33%) or online media (31%). Users who cite podcasts or artificial intelligence tools as source also show high levels of news avoidance (49% overall), although this figure should be interpreted with caution due to the small size of the subsample.
The association source news source and news avoidance is statistically highly significant, suggesting that the channel through which information is accessed is not neutral with respect to attitudes toward the news. However, the direction of causality cannot be established with this data: users of social media and AI may be exposed to news content in a more fragmented, algorithmic, and incidental manner, which could lead to news fatigue or disengagement; but it may also be the case that those who already tend to avoid the news prefer environments where information appears less prominently and does not require active searching.