Unshielded Peace and Security Agendas: Challenges and Opportunities from Latin America

1. Introduction

International peace and security are undergoing a process of transformation that challenges the traditional frameworks of multilateralism. Faced with a global scenario marked by transnational crises - armed conflicts, organized crime, institutional collapse and structural violence - the United Nations has promoted a strategic reorientation of its governance mechanisms. The Pact for the Future (A/RES/79/1), adopted by the General Assembly in 2024, summarizes this momentum, calling for a more inclusive, preventive and sustainable approach . However, its content reflects above all the priorities of the actors most active in its formulation, among which Latin America had limited participation. Its implementation will therefore depend on the region's capacity for adaptation and ownership, as well as on the generation of its own proposals in dialogue with the new multilateral agendas[1].

In this sense, although the region has historically promoted international law, disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes[2], today it faces common challenges that affect its international projection: persistent organized violence, institutional weakness, political fragmentation and leave capacity for global advocacy. This paradox - between a strong rules and regulations identity and a weak strategic projection - limits its role in shaping the new multilateralism.

This analysis examines how Latin America can move from being a recipient region of global agendas to participating as a co-designer of solutions in the area of peace and security. Based on a diagnosis of the disconnect between multilateral commitmentsdiary 2030, Our Common diary and the Pact for the Future) and regional realities, we outline a proposal for a Latin American peace and security architecture. This proposal is articulated around four strategic axes: a regional early warning system, a technical forum for multidimensional security, the strengthening of the role of the OAS and a Latin American diary for training, research and diplomacy for peace. In addition to these axes, there is a transversal structural condition: the strengthening of state capacities and coherence between international commitments and domestic practices. In a changing global scenario, we believe that Latin America has the opportunity to stop being a recipient of external agendas and become a promoter of a regional security diary that dialogues with and complements global agendas.

2. Regional radiography: structural insecurity and weak multilateralism

Latin America has for decades been perceived as a region without interstate wars, yet this image contrasts with the magnitude of its internal security crises. Despite concentrating only 9% of the world's population, it accounts for approximately one third of global homicides[3]. In 2021, the region recorded an average rate of 19.9 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and by 2024, according to InSight Crime data , the figure rose to 20.2. Of this total, organized crime was manager for 50% of the homicides, more than double the global average (22%)[4]. This violence, although it does not legally qualify as armed conflict, is systematic, widespread and destabilizing.

This status forces us to rethink the traditional categories of international security. The region faces a subject of structural and organized violence that manifests itself in transnational criminal networks, illicit markets, institutional collapse and loss of the state monopoly of force. More than a simple expression of criminality, it is a phenomenon that is both a consequence and a driver of the erosion of democratic governance, the fragility of the rule of law and the fragmentation of the social fabric, a status exacerbated by the criminalization of poverty and the persistent exclusion of historically marginalized sectors[5].

The case of Mexico is paradigmatic. From the beginning of the militarization strategy against drug trafficking in 2006 until the beginning of 2023[6], the country accumulated more than 430,000 intentional homicides[7] and 115,000 missing persons, according to figures from INEGI and the National Registry of Missing and Unaccounted for Persons[8]. These figures show a sustained deterioration of public security, the capture of state spaces by organized crime and the systematic violation of human rights. Violence is not only a consequence of drug trafficking, as it responds to the absence of the state, judicial impunity and institutional precariousness in large areas of the country.

Similar phenomena are observed in Central America's Northern Triangle. In El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, the maras have established parallel systems of informal justice and coercive control of communities, causing forced displacement and mass migration[9]. Violence disproportionately affects young people since, in the region, the homicide rate for males between 15 and 29 years of age was 53.6 per 100,000[10].

More recently, Ecuador has emerged as a critical case of accelerated deterioration. The homicide rate rose from 13.7 in 2021 to 44.5 in 2023, placing it among the most violent countries in the region[11]. This rapid change is due in part to its geographical position between Colombia and Peru, countries with a strong presence in cocaine production, and to the reorganization of drug trafficking following the demobilization of the FARC, which left a vacuum disputed by criminal gangs[12]. In a short time, Ecuador went from being a stable country to one with alarming levels of violence and criminal infiltration.

Colombia, for its part, offers a contrast between the progress made in formal peace subject and the limits of its actual implementation. Seven years after the Peace agreement with the FARC-EP (2016), only 32% of its provisions have been implemented to a greater Degree, while 39% are in a minimum state of development and 10% remain uninitiated, according to the KROC Institute report (2023)[13]. The persistence of illegal economies, the presence of armed dissidents and the assassinations of social leaders are a reflection of a fragile peace, deeply threatened by the lack of structural transformation and real presence of the State in the areas most affected by the conflict[14].

At the same time, institutional indicators in the region reflect a critical fragility. According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2023), several countries show a worrying erosion of the rule of law, marked by the concentration of power, the loss of judicial independence and the weakening of civic space. Corruption, leave procedural efficiency and unequal access to justice hinder the guarantee of fundamental rights. The measurement of SDG 16, focused on indicators such as homicide rate, perception of corruption, access to justice and freedom of the press, sample a persistent lag that makes it easy to predict that the region will not achieve any of its targets by 2030[15].

From a regional analysis, Latin America faces significant limitations in terms of an effective and articulated regional structure for security cooperation. Organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), although they have broad security mandates, have seen their concrete operational capacity reduced due to internal political tensions and lack of specific resources to address transnational threats in a coordinated manner[16]. Initiatives such as the South American Defense committee , promoted under the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), have been seriously weakened or practically disappeared due to ideological politicization, lack of effective leadership and the absence of sustained technical capabilities[17].

Unlike other regions of the Global South, Latin America lacks a robust and consolidated continental mechanism to effectively manage transnational threats with a technical, sustainable and non-politicized approach [18]. Africa has active mechanisms such as AFRIPOL, a continental police cooperation body established under the African Union since 2017, with specific mandates in organized crime, terrorism and financial crimes, which maintains close partnership with INTERPOL and other international partners[19]. In addition, the African Union Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) allows monitoring and anticipating insecurity dynamics from a regional perspective[20]. In Southeast Asia, the association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) implements an Action Plan to Combat Transnational Crime, managed through mechanisms such as the Ministerial meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and ASEANAPOL, which promote technical cooperation, police capacity development and information exchange among its members[21]. The absence of similar Structures in Latin America reveals a significant gap in the regional capacity to address shared threats through integrated, technical mechanisms with clear mandates.

In sum, Latin America faces a persistent form of insecurity that escapes the traditional categories of armed conflict, but undermines the minimum instructions for peace. Structural violence, institutional weakness and impunity combine with the absence of effective regional mechanisms for cooperation and prevention. While other regions of the Global South have managed to articulate technical and sustained responses to shared threats (even with limitations whose analysis is beyond the scope of this work), Latin America continues to be trapped between disjointed national efforts and weakened regional organizations. This shortcoming restricts the possibility of actively participating in the reform of global multilateralism. Overcoming this stagnation requires rethinking the tools available, strengthening state capacities and building a peace architecture that emerges from and for the region.

3. Between global standards and regional realities

Although the structural challenges analyzed so far allow us to understand many of Latin America's limitations in subject of security and governance, it is also necessary to recognize that the region has built, in parallel, a significant trajectory of rules and regulations Over the last decades, several Latin American states have shown an active willingness to participate in multilateral frameworks, to promote non-militarized security approaches and to promote respect for international law. The early signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), the defense of the peaceful settlement of disputes, the inclusion of the concept of multidimensional security in the OAS (2003) and the constant participation in processes such as the 2030 diary are an expression of the regional commitment to multilateralism. However, these normative advances coexist with persistent limitations in their internship implementation and a leave capacity for strategic projection in global decision-making spaces.

A relevant example of this mismatch is the implementation of SDG 16, focused on building peaceful, just and inclusive societies. Most Latin American countries have incorporated this goal in their national development plans and have submitted voluntary reports to the corresponding international forums[22]. However, according to the latest monitoring reports, SDG 16 is among the furthest behind in the region, with no forecast of achieving its targets by 2030[23]. Beyond technical problems in data collection, structural obstacles such as impunity, chronic violence, systemic corruption and institutional weakness persist[24]. Indicators such as access to justice, perception of corruption or freedom of the press show a stagnant or declining trend, which evidences a disconnect between the commitments adopted and the real capacity for compliance[25].

The gap between commitments and results can also be seen in the regional reception of Our Common diary (2021), where the UN University Secretary proposed a renewal of multilateralism, focused on conflict prevention, institutional resilience and long-term peacebuilding. Although the region shares many of these premises -such as the importance of social justice and the preventive approach , the document does not make reference letter to contexts where violence does not manifest itself as open armed conflict, as is the case of Latin America. Therefore, the proposed mechanisms are insufficient if they are not accompanied by tools adapted to these dynamics.

Subsequently, the Pact for the Future (2024) expanded this framework by recognizing that peace and security cannot be separated from sustainable development , social inclusion and respect for human rights. Action 24 expressly identifies organized crime and illicit financial flows as direct threats to peace and development[26]. This recognition constitutes a significant step forward, especially for Latin America. However, the document still fails to provide operational mechanisms to address these threats in contexts where there are no conventional wars, but where there is a sustained breakdown of the institutional fabric. Thus, the multilateral architecture continues to operate, to a large extent, on rigid categories that leave out contemporary forms of insecurity that particularly affect the region.

This tension between global norms and regional realities cannot be resolved with greater formal adherence to international frameworks, but rather with a transformation in the way multilateral policies are designed, financed and executed. Latin America needs not only to apply global agendas, but to participate actively in their construction by influencing their content and scope.

4. The Latin American Paradox

As we have been pointing out, although Latin America has a solid rules and regulations base and a historical commitment to multilateralism, this position has not translated into a real capacity to influence the international peace architecture. The region lacks mechanisms to transform its regulatory frameworks into tools for strategic influence. The causes of this lack include intergovernmental fragmentation, the absence of stable regional platforms and the discontinuity of the foreign policies of the region's states.

Often, regional positions depend on the thrust of individual governments (or actors) or on specific diplomatic junctures, instead of being based on a shared and sustained institutional framework. A clear example was the Brazilian proposal of "Responsibility while Protecting", presented by Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti to the Security committee in November 2011, under the leadership of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Patriota. Emerging after the controversial intervention in Libya, the initiative sought to introduce safeguards and accountability mechanisms to the emerging principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)[27]. While it achieved some echo at the multilateral level during 2012, it lost momentum the following year with Patriota's departure, reflecting how fragile these proposals can be when they are not backed by institutional Structures that keep them active beyond their initial promoters.

The problem, however, is not limited to the lack of interstate coordination. The scarce articulation between external agendas and internal governance conditions reinforces this paradox. The region's projection is conditioned by its own domestic vulnerability. In other words, without a domestic underpinning consistent with the values defended in multilateral forums, any aspiration for regional leadership is fragile and difficult to sustain. Overcoming this paradox requires a shared vision, permanently operational regional Structures and external action consistent with democratic and institutional strengthening within the States themselves.

If these obstacles -both internal and external- can be overcome, there are references with a proven capacity to exercise regional leadership in the area of international peace. Brazil and Mexico are the most visible examples. Brazil, by assuming the military command of the United Nations Stabilization mission statement in Haiti (MINUSTAH) between 2004 and 2017, played a central role in one of the most complex UN operations. Its participation was a core topic both at the operational level and in the consolidation of a narrative of Latin American solutions to Latin American challenges[28].

Mexico, for its part, showed an active diplomatic projection during its term as a non-permanent member of the Security committee between 2021 and 2022. It led initiatives on preventive diplomacy, corruption and arms trafficking; chaired the 1540 committee on non-proliferation; promoted the Informal group on Women, Peace and Security; and promoted accountability through the International Criminal Court. In addition, he achieved a role as a co-rapporteur on resolutions on Colombia and Haiti, a function normally reserved for permanent members of the committee. These actions reflect a significant diplomatic potential in the region, with the capacity to influence strategic issues, which can - and should - serve as a basis for a more articulated and proactive regional diary [29].

5. The reform of multilateralism in security: a core topic for Latin American projection.

It is essential to clarify that there has been no reform of the international peace and security system in legal or institutional terms. However, the United Nations is undergoing a process of strategic and discursive reorientation that seeks to update and strengthen multilateralism[30]. This will has guided the three documents discussed throughout this analysis: the report Our Common diary (2021), the proposal a New diary for Peace (2023) and the adoption of the Pact for the Future by the General Assembly in September 2024. These documents do not modify the UN Charter or alter the structure of the Security committee , but they do propose a transformation of the global approach security and call for a more inclusive, preventive and sustainable architecture.

These documents have progressively focused on recognizing that inter-state armed conflicts are not the only threat to peace. The interdependence between international security, structural inequalities, environmental crises, digital vulnerabilities and weakening institutions requires rethinking collective action from a multidimensional approach . The call for the renewal of multilateralism proposes a more cooperative vision of peacekeeping, in which regional actors not only execute mandates defined in the Global North, but also actively participate in the design of solutions.

This context represents an opportunity for Latin America despite its limited participation in the preparatory discussions for the Pact for the Future[31]. While other regional groups, such as the African Union, managed to introduce their own priorities - including the reinforcement of funding for peace operations led by regional organizations - Latin America has remained on the sidelines of the substantive negotiations.

Beyond this conjunctural absence, what is at stake is whether Latin America will be able to project a situated vision of international peace that responds to the concrete challenges faced by its population and at the same time dialogues with emerging multilateral agendas. Instead of replicating exogenous approaches or passively adapting to already defined frameworks, the region has the possibility of - and should - contribute with proposals based on its experience in transition processes, restorative justice, demilitarization of public security and territorial governance. In final, it is a matter of moving from being normative recipients to co-authors of the peace architecture[32].

This possibility, however, requires an articulated strategy. Latin America needs to coordinate regional positions, build interregional alliances, strengthen its diplomatic capacities and generate specialized knowledge to feed its voice in multilateral forums. It is not enough to adhere to the new peace agendas; it is necessary to dispute their interpretation, implementation and priorities. The current moment offers a window of opportunity that will not remain open indefinitely[33]. Taking advantage of it will depend on political will, regional convergence and the capacity to translate their aspirations into concrete and sustainable proposals.

6. Strategic Priorities for a Latin American Peace Architecture

If Latin America wishes to play an active role in the transformation of contemporary multilateralism, it needs to move towards the construction of a regional peace architecture that transcends the persistent institutional fragmentation and reliance on individual initiatives. This architecture should not be understood as a new supranational body, but rather as an articulated set of sustainable capacities, networks and mechanisms to anticipate risks, coordinate responses and represent regional interests in the international governance of peace.

The first step is to establish a regional early warning and risk analysis system capable of identifying and monitoring the dynamics of structural violence, organized crime and institutional destabilization. This system should be based on reliable sources of information, technical cooperation between states and alliances with research centers, universities and social organizations. The anticipation of crises cannot depend exclusively on global agencies, as it must emerge from a diagnosis that is localized and sensitive to the specificities of the Latin American context.

Second, it is essential to create a permanent technical forum for multidimensional security[34], where national experiences can be shared, best practices can be exchanged and joint strategies can be defined in the face of common threats. This forum could operate under the umbrella of the OAS or a flexible subregional mechanism, provided it guarantees technical continuity, operational autonomy and regional representativeness.

In addition, the revitalization of the OAS is another core topic, since the OAS can be the platform for articulation between regional needs and global agendas. Although its legitimacy has been questioned at different times, its rules and regulations capacity and its hemispheric coverage are its main assets. Reorienting its role towards strengthening democracy, protecting rights and consolidating peace would require avoiding its politicization, strengthening its technical units and promote greater participation of states in its strategic decisions.

It is also a priority to invest in a Latin American diary training, research and diplomacy for peace. The region needs a critical mass of experts, negotiators, analysts and diplomats capable of formulating proposals, leading processes and representing Latin America in multilateral spaces. Universities, diplomatic schools and regional academic networks can play a fundamental role in this task. The production of their own contextualized knowledge is an indispensable condition for strengthening the Latin American voice in the global architecture.

Finally, any regional strategy must be accompanied by a sustained commitment to institutional strengthening within the States. Consistency between the principles upheld at the international level and domestic practices is a basic requirement for any leadership aspiration. It is not possible to project a vision of peace without confronting impunity, corruption or state violence within one's own borders.

Building a regional architecture of peace, therefore, requires political will, shared vision and strategic diplomacy based on knowledge and cooperation. The window of opportunity opened by the drive towards multilateralism will not be indefinite. Latin America has the normative frameworks and the instructions to strengthen its regional infrastructures that will allow it to become a proactive region, not just a recipient of security initiatives. The challenge is to turn this potential into a coherent, sustained and forward-looking strategy.

María Gabriela Fajardo Mejía is a predoctoral researcher at the School of Law of the University of Navarra, Master's Degree in Human Rights and Master's Degree in International Law. 

* This essay is an abridged version of the paper presented at the Joint International Conference 'Positioning Latin America and Mexico in International Relations', organized by the International Studies Association together with the Mexican association of International programs of study .