Arctic: From cooperation to friction

A proverb of the Arctic indigenous Inuit people says that in the Arctic, "you cannot tell friend from foe until the ice breaks." In a sense, this expression sums up the status of the region today. This analysis examines the changes that the region has undergone from the perspective of the most relevant actors. The effects of climate change and melting ice, combined with global political changes, have led to a gradual deterioration in the cooperation that has characterized the region for decades and result increased geostrategic tensions.

The Arctic Ocean is a vast region covering approximately one-sixth of the Earth's surface, with more than 15 million square kilometers. This ecosystem functions as a "global air conditioner," regulating the planet's climate. However, it has no legally binding international protection, despite its ecological and climatic importance.

Climate change is having a very obvious effect on the Arctic Ocean. As warmer ocean and atmospheric currents move northward, the ice has begun to melt more rapidly. In addition, permafrost, the layer of soil that has remained frozen for the longest time and accumulates gases such as CO2 and methane beneath it, has also been shrinking in recent years, worsening the status.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), over the last 30 years, Arctic sea ice extent has decreased by approximately 12.8% per decade, agreement measurements taken in September, when the short summer ends. In fact, between 1981 and 2010, the average rate of loss was 12.6% per decade; in 2024, the extent of ice in September was the sixth lowest in the last 46 years, with a daily loss of 113,000 km², the second highest on record.

For its part, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) notes that since 1971, the air temperature has risen by 3.0 °C, an increase three times higher than the average . The temperature of the permafrost has also risen by between 2 and 3 °C since the 1970s, and the total extent of the ice cover has decreased by 58% since 1979.

This melting has profound consequences, as sea ice plays an essential role: it reflects much of the sun's heat back into space, helping to stabilize global weather systems. When it melts, this white, reflective surface is replaced by the dark ocean, which absorbs more solar radiation, accelerating global warming. As the ice recedes, new navigable areas open up, increasing CO₂ emissions, underwater noise, and the risk of spills, seriously affecting marine wildlife and ecosystems.

The retreat of the ice perimeter has opened up the possibility of new, shorter and therefore more economical trade routes, while also bringing to the table the exploitation of the region's natural resources, such as oil, gas, minerals, and fishing. This status therefore status a range of strategic opportunities for countries in the region, and even for others that, despite not having a coastline on the Arctic, have shown great interest in participating decisively in regional affairs. This is the case with China, which is pushing hard to play a leading role in this new frontier, often hand in hand with Russia, in a cooperation that has put the United States and other members of committee who are NATO partners on alert.

Russia and its frozen border

Russia, occupying more than half of the region's coastline and controlling two-thirds of the area gas and oil reserves area its Exclusive Economic Zone, has sought to expand its influence by promoting the Northern Sea Route (NSR). It imposes environmental regulations and tariffs on foreign vessels, requiring them to pay for reports, pilots, and icebreaker services from Russia.

Rusia is expanding its fleet of icebreakers, which was already the largest on the planet and includes nuclear icebreakers, giving it current dominance over the region. Projects such as'22220'and'Líder'allow it to navigate this new route all year round, significantly shortening transport times between Europe and Asia.

Moscow sees the Arctic as a strategic hub for exporting its hydrocarbons and has promoted massive investments in port, rail, and airport infrastructure. The most notable example is theYamal LNGmegaproject, in which Chinese and European companies are participating, although most of the capital remains in Russian hands. At the same time, the nation is strengthening its military presence: instructions , air and submarine patrols, and large-scale maneuvers demonstrate its desire to control both navigation and natural resources.

The outbreak of war in Ukraine, first in 2014 with Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and the sanctions that followed, and then the attempted invasion that began in 2022, has brought Moscow and Beijing closer together. In fact, also as result the 2022 invasion, the committee , chaired at the time by Russia, was paralyzed after condemnation was expressed by the other seven members of the forum.

The chairman of committee Arctic and Antarctic Expert committee stated in 2015 at a parliamentary session that there is "a high probability" that the Russian Arctic will be "the first line of defense" in the event of a global military conflict, because that is "the most likely direction of a nuclear ballistic missile attack by the adversary."

Since then, Russia has increased its military forces in the region and its routine maneuvers, mobilizing more than 50,000 soldiers, 40 ships, and 5 submarines in some of them. In addition, the country has refurbished 13 instructions , 10 radar stations, 20 border posts, and 10 emergency coordination centers, using facilities, many of which had been abandoned since the Cold War. This militarization was also evident when, in December 2020, it was decided to elevate the region's status to a military district.

People's Republic of China

In recent years, China has shown a strong interest in the Arctic despite being a distant state. Since 2005, it has increased its activity in the region through scientific cooperation and economic presence. test this is its entry in 2013 as an observer state in the committee and the publication in 2018 of the Arctic White Paper, in which it proclaims itself a "state close to the Arctic." Since then, Chinese policy has shifted from "monitoring" to "creative participation," combining national security, energy, science, and defense objectives. At the same time, it has increased its fleet of icebreakers, mainly for scientific purposes, but it is important to remember that China has a long history of masking military interests under the guise of science and research.

China's interest in the region is mainly focused on economic and commercial aspects. Among its objectives are improving its energy security by facilitating access to gas from the Yamal region and promoting new routes that may open up in the not-too-distant future: the aforementioned NSR, along the Russian Arctic coastline (also known as the Northeast Passage), and the Northwest Passage, crossing the Canadian and Greenland coastlines. Both would provide Europe and Asia with a shorter and faster connection, while reducing China's dependence on the Strait of Malacca. The NSR, for example, would reduce the distance between Europe and East Asia via the Suez Canal by some 3,000 nautical miles, thus offering commercial and strategic advantages.

Beijing uses its Arctic presence to reinforce its status as a major power and counter Western pressure. It thus seeks to consolidate its presence in the Arctic as part of its strategy for global hegemony planned for 2049, combining political, economic, scientific, and diplomatic objectives under the cover of civilian activities. Its interest is focused on access to strategic resources such as gas, oil, minerals, rare earths, and fisheries. This strategy includes investments in port infrastructure, mining, energy, and high technology, as well as the construction of icebreakers and dual-use civilian-military vessels capable of supporting future naval operations or nuclear deterrence.

Beijing has sought to strengthen its ties with countries in the region, such as Iceland, Finland, Sweden, and Norway, and especially with Russia. Increased cooperation with Moscow since 2022 has result growing tensions with Western countries, which have stepped up sanctions related to the conflict in Ukraine and refused to collaborate on projects such as Russia's LNG 2. Meanwhile, several Chinese entities have increased their investments in Arctic infrastructure, particularly in Russian ports.

Beijing has also collaborated with Russia in the field of security, conducting joint air exercises near Alaska and naval exercises in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk.

However, this understanding may be threatened by China's intention to influence Arctic governance and develop the future Polar Silk Road, which could compete with a Russian-sponsored NSR. China is acting with patience and discretion: it is making strategic investments and engaging in influence activities, and withdrawing when its initiatives are unsuccessful, while maintaining a growing and sustained presence.

In 2025, China took a historic step in the Arctic, consolidating its commercial and strategic presence in the region. For the first time, a Chinese container ship, the Istanbul Bridge, completed a regular voyage along the Northern Sea Route off the Russian coast. The voyage, carrying some 4,000 containers, reduced transit time to 20 days, compared to the 40–50 days it takes via the Suez Canal route. This not only marks a logistical breakthrough, but also underscores Beijing's strategy of diversifying trade routes and reducing its dependence on traditional channels, while bolstering its influence in Europe.

China plans to expand services in the summer and, starting in 2026, will increase its fleet of ice-reinforced ships, with the goal consolidating the Polar Silk Road as a strategic hub for global trade. Also recently, the deployment of five Chinese icebreakers off Alaska has set off alarm bells in Washington. The simultaneous presence of these units nearly triples the capacity of the US Coast Guard in the region, highlighting the urgency for the United States to modernize its polar fleet and maintain influence in an Arctic where skill Russia and China is rapidly intensifying. The recent agreement with Finland and Canada for the construction and acquisition of several ships has made clear the change in mindset in Washington, but much work remains work done.

Washington and NATO look north again

Since Washington gained territory in the Arctic as a result of its purchase of Alaska in 1867, the US vision of the region has varied according to the priorities of different administrations. Despite this, climate, economic, and national security interests have always been the most important. Currently, the latest developments related to the Arctic have been the result of actions taken by the Trump administration.

At the beginning of his second term, the president publicly expressed his interest in buying Greenland, a Danish territory. This interest was based on the premise that Denmark was unable to defend itself against the growing presence of China and Russia in the area, which Trump sees as a threat to Washington's security. This concern about the presence of potentially hostile actors is not new, and the country has strengthened its military capabilities over the last decade. Among other things, fighter jets have been deployed, and radar and air defense systems have been modernized in Alaska (where two instructions have also been installed instructions the presence of troops reinforced). However, the claims on Greenland had a negative effect within the Alliance, resulting in a war of words from both sides.

On the other hand, the entrance NATO of two Arctic countries, Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024), has raised the Arctic's priority on the Alliance's agenda . The entrance these countries, which until now have been neutral, into the organization brings more advantages than might appear at first glance. Firstly, because both add significant deterrent capability with their military capabilities, which are specialized in the harsh conditions typical of the region. Furthermore, as researcher Félix Arteaga analyzes, their accession also "facilitates the control of maritime lines of communication and the maritime reinforcement of the eastern flank." However, as the same author adds, the Alliance should pay greater attention to the region, given that "the Strategic Concept C Madrid in 2022 merely noted that the modernization and accumulation of Russian military capabilities also affect the northern flank due to the risk they pose to lines of communication and reinforcement in the North Atlantic." The changes that have taken place in the region since then undoubtedly deserve greater attention.

New opportunities

final, the changes brought about by climate change and its effects on the Arctic have led to renewed interest in the region from various actors. The pre-existing interest of Russia and the United States has been joined by the new NATO membership of Arctic countries such as Finland and Sweden, as well as entrance into the region in search of new commercial opportunities. China has gone from being an observer to a power with growing influence, combining science, investment, and diplomacy to secure its presence in the Arctic. Its increasingly visible role in governance and polar routes is redefining the geopolitical balance and anticipating a future in which Beijing will be an influential player in Arctic affairs.

final, the Arctic has become a new arena for global skill and economic skill , where melting ice is accelerating profound transformations. All of this has result greater militarization and presence in the region, while destabilizing the framework cooperation between entities such as the committee . The ice has broken, and as the Inuit reminded us, traditional cooperation in the region has given way to clear tensions with consequences that are still difficult to predict.