Conflict in the Taiwan Strait: How would it develop?

[ English version]

"Breaking news: U.S., Taiwan and Japan defeat a conventional amphibious invasion by China and preserve Taiwan's autonomy. However, the defense has come at a high cost. The U.S. and its allies have lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft and tens of thousands of military personnel. Taiwan has seen its Economics devastated. Moreover, the high losses are going to damage the U.S. global position for many years to come."

Sound realistic? Although it's just a fictional scenario, this is what would probably happen if today China finally decided to launch an amphibious invasion of its neighboring island to the southeast. That's the main conclusion of 'The First Battle of the Next War,' the new war game developed by Washington's Center for Strategic and International programs of study (CSIS) to test all plausible scenarios should a conflict break out on and around the island of Taiwan.

The People's Republic of China sees Taiwan as a legitimate possession belonging to it, as well as an asset of enormous strategic value in expanding its control over the South China Sea and its surroundings. Xi Jinping's government considers that region to be Chinese territorial waters and has been undertaking serious modernization of its naval capabilities and technologies in recent years, transforming an armada from basically coastal patrol forces into a relevant fleet. In 2022 alone, Chinese shipyards launched its third aircraft carrier (CV-18 'Fujian'), an amphibious assault carrier subject 075, three units of its large destroyer subject 055 and several multipurpose frigates subject 054A; in addition, five destroyers subject 052D are nearing completion at the Dalian shipyard.

Thus, in the face of recent reports that an invasion is highly likely before the end of the decade, the war game provides an in-depth look at how it would be conducted. The information used for the development and the conduct of the exercise was drawn from numerous unclassified assessments, including that of military analyst Michael O'Hanlon and Bradley Martin of the RAND Corporation. Through public analysis and information available, war games are a very useful tool for policy makers and research institutions seeking to understand the forces involved, and thus then be able to predict how that status future might unfold.

"The first battle of the next war."

Playing the game a total of 24 times, in different combinations using all the variables involved, each repetition was played in five types of scenarios (base, pessimistic, optimistic, the 'Taiwan is alone' and 'Ragnarok' scenarios). The baseline scenario incorporated only the most likely values to write the assumptions core topic. In this assumption, the invasion begins with "an initial bombardment that destroys most of Taiwan's air and naval forces in the first few hours of hostilities." Shortly thereafter, however, the invasion ultimately fails as China's "struggle to build supplies and move inland" fails.

On the other hand, the 'Taiwan stands alone' scenario examines a hypothetical conflict in which Taiwan would not get any financial aid from the US; an abstention that would imply that no other country would come to the island's aid either. Under this premise, the Chinese forces slowly advance in their invasion until the Taiwanese authorities decide to capitulate several weeks later, handing over the island to Beijing.

Finally, the 'Ragnarok' scenario had as goal to examine all the conditions necessary for a Chinese victory against a Taiwanese resistance strongly supported by Washington. In the exercise it is revealed that China would only need to deny US air power (both its fighters and bombers). If the US were to attempt to use Guam-based aircraft, it would be vulnerable to Chinese ballistic missiles.

However, most of the scenarios in which Chinese forces fail to reach their goal (21 of the 24 played) have a common underlying assumption: Taiwan must be able to withstand the initial attack and hold out until the arrival of U.S. and other allied forces. Should they fail to do so, the consequences would most likely be catastrophic for the Taiwanese.

The main conclusions reached through the exercise (apart from the obvious fact that the issue human casualties would reach levels not seen in many decades) suggest four necessary conditions that would have to be met to ensure that a Chinese invasion could be adequately repelled: Taiwanese forces hold the line and can contain the aggression; the US uses its instructions in Japan as a platform for combat operations; US forces can quickly attack the Chinese fleet from outside its defensive area ; and the assumption that the model of the war in Ukraine (allied nations deliver arms and materiel without sending troops directly to the battlefield) is not - and should not be - applicable to Taiwan.

The fact that U.S. troops would have to engage in a direct confrontation with the enemy in the Strait if the United States aspires to have serious chances of success is a critical thing to consider. For years, many have stressed the need for a strong and permanent U.S. Navy presence in Southeast Asian waters as a prerequisite for controlling Chinese naval expansion. As Professor Jim Holmes says, "to counter China's cumulative strategy, U.S. naval forces, allies and partners must not only show up at critical points, but remain there, making it clear that China will not necessarily prevail if battle breaks out."

But more importantly, the isolated nature of the small island also means that any lack of immediate support with equipment and ammunition would undoubtedly be fatal to Taiwanese claims. In other words, having all equipment, weapons and troops ready before the operation begins is vital for success against Beijing. "The longer the U.S. delays in going to war, the more difficult the fight will be," suggests CSIS's report .

Therefore, to make this easier to achieve, the authors provide a series of recommendations on how to prepare for this scenario. Among them all, it is worth stressing the need to "strengthen and expand air base capabilities in Japan and Guam," the importance of relying on "smaller and more survivable ships" against Chinese anti-ship missiles, and developing "rescue mechanisms to deal with crippled ships and multiple sinkings" (which will take place).

Certainly a challenging and daunting business .

Despite this, "a lasting victory in the Taiwan Strait is possible," Professor Holmes believes, "and worth fighting for if China organizes an amphibious assault across the Strait." Such a victory, however, would in any case be undermined by the geographical configuration of the region, which gives China ample hope of victory: neither Taiwan nor the mainland is going to move. Therefore, "Beijing could attempt a rematch at a more propitious time; it exerts colossal pressure on the island," Holmes argues.

At the end of the day, however, the conclusions of the game speak for themselves: both sides would aim for a Pyrrhic victory, and tens of thousands of lives would be lost in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.