The 24 partner countries are seeking greater South-South partnership from both sides, but progress is slow

If in the North Atlantic there is NATO, in the South Atlantic there is ZOPACAS (Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic). Without repeating the military club model of NATO, ZOPACAS goal at cooperation in security and defense subject , but also at partnership for the endogenous development of the region. Created in 1986, the organization is an interesting forum for addressing common problems, but lacks mechanisms for further engagement.

▲ Countries that are part of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic [Wikimedia].

October 30, 2018

article / Alejandro Palacios

In recent decades, the proliferation of South-South cooperation forums has highlighted the desire of many countries in the world to seek their development and regional partnership without the tutelage or interference historically exercised by the more industrialized countries. The goal has been the articulation of new forms of regional association that guarantee the independence of the South in its relations with the North and promote true development, without incurring in the old imbalances.

In this context, the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS, also known as ZPCAS) was created in 1986 at the initiative of Brazil. It is a transcontinental consultative organization, made up of 24 countries on both sides of the Atlantic1 and supported by the United Nations Assembly through resolution 41/11.

The organization was formed in the final stretch of the Cold War, a period during which some countries sought ways to cooperate outside the bipolar power sharing between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was also born at a time when Angola and Brazil were becoming important regional players due to the high presence of hydrocarbons in their territories. This gave rise to the need to create greater security conditions in the area so that economic operations by sea could be carried out with as little uncertainty as possible.

Nevertheless, the growth and development of ZOPACAS was progressive, both institutionally and in terms of membership. It is worth mentioning the case of South Africa, a country that did not join the organization until it put an end to its apartheid policy. The incorporation of South Africa at the Brasilia summit in 1994 increased the organization's prestige and marked the end of its constitution process.

Even so, ZOPACAS still lacked maturity at the institutional level. At the 2013 meeting in Montevideo, its members agreed to meet annually on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly and to create a contact group which, in addition to implementing the decisions adopted at the meetings, also coordinates issues relevant to the region related to peace and cooperation.

In the short term, ZOPACAS achieved important advances in favor of peace and security in the South Atlantic. One of the most noteworthy was the signature in 1996 of the Treaty of Pelindaba (African Treaty for the training of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone), which made Africa, after South Africa's accession2 , the third nuclear-free zone in the world. This followed the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which made Latin America and the Caribbean the first nuclear-free region.

Re-emergence?

Despite its remarkable achievements in peace and security subject , ZOPACAS is currently in a status lack of momentum. While it is true that some analysts speak of re-emergence, others claim that in order for the organization to re-emerge, it must first undergo an institutional restructuring to better face the threats and challenges posed by the new geopolitical realities.

As mentioned above, the aspirations for the organization's revival are based on the increased importance of maritime trade, the exploitation of Brazil's new deepwater oil fields (pre-salt layer), and the need to protect maritime transport against piracy, among other issues. For the director of the South American Defense School, Antonio Jorge Ramalho, all this is increasing the geopolitical importance of the South Atlantic region, which would make ZOPACAS a "tool ready to be used in case there is a perceived threat in the area" that would put at risk the extraction and trade of the region's raw materials.

However, risks associated with a possible re-emergence of ZOPACAS are also noted. These have to do, paradoxically, with greater interference by countries in the Northern Hemisphere, some of which have expressed the intention of extending their zone of action to the South Atlantic. France purpose to extend its influence from French Guyana, while Russia has already received approval from Equatorial Guinea to use the country's main port.

It is clear that the zone of peace and cooperation has the capacity to counteract this influence, primarily by increasing the partnership between the South Atlantic states. For this to happen, the area has two defining characteristics: being a fairly peaceful zone per se and the fact that most of the countries involved have economies based on natural resources and raw material exports. These factors can encourage much-needed cooperation to ward off alleged Western interference.

While the development capacity of ZOPACAS is therefore clear, it must be kept in mind that the organization does not currently have an institutional structure capable of promote these synergies and cooperative practices in an effective manner. In fact, some analysts argue that, contrary to what should be happening, countries are showing less and less interest in the project, as evidenced by the frequent absence of country presidents at the organization's meetings.

Thus, it can be concluded that both because of the lack of material resources and the consultative nature of the organization, ZOPACAS has not been able to project sufficient influence to become an international reference letter organization. It has been more successful in the short term, in the subject peace and security, but is finding it difficult to establish long-term economic cooperation. A greater commitment is therefore required from the member states in order to solidify a project necessary not only for peace and security in the region, but also for the political, economic and energy independence of the South Atlantic states.

(1) Such are: Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo and Uruguay.

(2) The South African case is interesting because it is the first and only country to date that, after having developed the nuclear bomb, decreed the complete dismantling of its nuclear program following the signature the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991.