The trade dependence between the two countries - greater in the case of Brazil, but the Chinese also need certain Brazilian products, such as soybeans - ensures the understanding between the two countries.

The relationship between Brazil and China has proven to be particularly pragmatic: neither Jair Bolsonaro has reviewed the link with the Asian country as he promised before becoming president (in his first year in office he has not only kept Brazil in the BRICS but even made a highly publicized official trip to Beijing), nor has Xi Jinping punished partner for having accused him of mismanaging the coronavirus pandemic, as has happened with other countries. The convenience of mutual trade relations, revalued by the trade war between China and the US and by the present world crisis, has prevailed.

▲ Jair Bolsonaro and Xi Jinping in Beijing in October 2019 [Planalto Palace].

article / Túlio Dias de Assis

visit After years of criticizing the "perverse communist government of Beijing", Jair Bolsonaro surprised at the end of last October with a state visit to the Forbidden City, which he specially publicized on social networks. On that trip he gave Xi Jinping the jersey of the Club de Regatas do Flamengo (the soccer team that at the time represented Brazil in the Libertadores Cup, which he would end up winning) and expressed his total conviction of being in a capitalist country. In November he hosted a BRICS summit in Brasilia.

Bolsonaro's policy toward China had already begun to change since shortly after acceding to the presidency in January 2019, in contrast to his anti-China messages during the election campaign.

In fact, diplomatic relations between the two countries date back to the time of the board Militar of which Bolsonaro is sample so proud. In 1974 Brazil recognized the People's Republic of China as the only China, thus allowing, despite being unaware of it at the time, the creation of a huge trade link between the two nations of continental proportions. Since then, as China's openness to China progressed, relations between China and Brazil have been increasing, so that for almost a decade now China has been Brazil's main trading partner partner . China's dependence on Brazil is also remarkable in relation to some products, such as soybeans, although for the Chinese Brazil is the twentieth commercial partner , since logically they are economies of very different sizes.

When in 1978 Deng Xiaoping decided to open China's Economics to the rest of the world, Chinese GDP was close to $150 billion, 75% of Brazil's, which was already over $200 billion. Four decades later, in 2018, Brazilian GDP was $1.8 trillion and Chinese GDP was $13.6 trillion.

Soybeans and swine

Brazil's greatest commercial and even political rapprochement with China occurred during the presidency of Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva, during which the BRICS was formed, a club that helped create a greater level of economic and diplomatic proximity between member countries. This rapprochement led China to become Brazil's first commercial partner in exports and imports. Brazil's sales to China almost double exports to the USA.

Although trade with Brazil represents less than 4% of the total value of goods imported by China annually, the South American country continues to be an important commercial partner for the People's Republic, due to the fact that the main product imported from Brazil is soybeans, one of the instructions of the usual per diem expenses of a large part of the Chinese population. More than half of the soybean imported by China comes from Brazil and the trend is to increase, mainly due to the trade war with the USA - the second main exporter of soybean to China -, thus making Brazil practically the breadbasket of the Middle Kingdom. China is the destination of more than 70% of Brazilian soybean production.

Dependence on China, from the Brazilian consumer perspective, was accentuated at the end of 2019 due to an exorbitant rise in the price of meat. The average between different Brazilian states hovered between 30% and 40% compared to previous months. Producers were able to substantially increase their profits in the short term, but that the popular classes openly protested the uncontrolled price of a product very present in the usual per diem expenses of the average Brazilian. The rise in prices was due to a combination of factors, including an outbreak of swine fever that devastated a large part of Chinese production. Faced with a shortage of supply in its domestic market, China was forced to diversify its suppliers, and in the midst of a trade war with the United States, China had no choice but to turn to the Brazilian agricultural potential, one of the few countries capable of meeting China's huge demand for meat. During this period - brief, as it gradually returned to the previous status - Brazil obtained a certain coercive power over the Asian giant.

Huawei and credits

Brazil is extremely dependent on China at status subject technology: more than 40% of Brazil's purchases from China are machinery, electronic devices or parts thereof. Already in the last decade, with the arrival of the smartphone and fiber optics revolution in Latin America, Brazil decided to bet more on Chinese technology, thus becoming one of the main international markets for the now controversial Huawei brand, which has come to dominate 35% of the Brazilian cell phone market. While the US and Europe distrusted Huawei and from the beginning placed limits on its markets, Brazil saw Chinese technology as a cheaper way to develop and never let itself be swayed by suspicions of Chinese government interference in subject of privacy. Even several deputies of the PSL (former party to which Bolsonaro belonged) visited China in early 2020 in order to evaluate the possibility of acquiring Chinese facial recognition equipment to help state security forces in the fight against organized crime, proposal which was ultimately rejected by Parliament.

With the rise of the controversy over the risks of espionage that the use of the Chinese multinational's technology may pose, some voices have warned of the threat that Huawei's contracting may pose to many government agencies and offices: a couple of embassies and consulates, part of the infrastructure of the Chamber of Deputies, and even the headquarters of the Federal Prosecutor's Office and the Federal Justice in some federal states. Although given the lack of accusatory evidence against Huawei, little has been done by the government about it; only the cancellation of some purchases of Huawei devices has been given.

Brazil is the second country that has received the most public loans from China in Latin America: $28.9 billion (Venezuela is the first with $62.2 billion), spread over eleven loans between 2007 and 2017, of which nine come from the Chinese development Bank and another two from the Export-Import Bank of China. Despite being a high value, it represents a very small percentage of the Brazilian public debt, which already exceeds one trillion dollars. Most of the loans granted by Beijing have been earmarked for the construction of infrastructure for resource extraction. In addition, Chinese companies have invested in the construction of two ports in Brazil, one in São Luís (Maranhão State) and the other in Paranaguá (Paraná State).

Coronavirus rhetoric

Bolsonaro soon realized his dependence on China and opted for a policy of accommodation towards Beijing, far from his election campaign messages. Once again, then, Brazil was betting on pragmatism and moderation, as opposed to ideology and radicalism, in terms of Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) policy. Likewise, in the face of the instability caused by the US-China trade war and Trump's current weak position, Bolsonaro was demonstrating pragmatism by not closing himself off to high-potential trade partners because of his ideology, as was seen last November at the BRICS summit in Brasilia.

But sometimes a rhetoric emerges that is in line with the original thinking. In the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, Bolsonaro has copied Trump's anti-China narrative in some messages. A good example is the exchange of tweets that took place between Eduardo Bolsonaro, federal deputy and eldest son of the president, and the Chinese ambassador, Yang Wanming. The former compared the coronavirus to the Chernobyl accident, insinuating total irresponsibility, negligence, as well as concealed information, on the part of the Chinese Communist Party. The ambassador responded that the president's son "on his last trip to the US did not contract the coronavirus, but a mental virus", referring to his ideological proximity to Trump.

However, all this status seems to have calmed down after a call between the presidents of both countries, in which both reaffirmed their commitments, especially those of a commercial and financial nature. Also, once again Bolsonaro seems to follow Itamaraty's traditional line of neutrality, despite the constant insistence of his instructions in blaming China for the current tragedy. It is clear that the economic dependence on China is still much stronger than the ideological principles of Bolsonaro's political base, however Trumpist it may be.