▲ VCR 8x8 Program [framework Romero/MDE].

COMMENTARY / Salvador Sánchez Tapia

After a gap of eight years since the publication of the last one in 2012, last June 11, the President of the Government signed a new National Defense Directive (DDN), marking with it the beginning of a new Defense Planning cycle which, of agreement with what is established by Defense Order 60/2015, must be valid for six years.

The essay of the DDN 20 is a praiseworthy effort to bring National Defense up to date in order to adapt to the challenges of a complex strategic environment in continuous transformation. Its essay also offers an excellent opportunity to build along the way an intellectual community on such a relevant issue, which will be fundamental throughout the whole cycle.

This article addresses a preliminary analysis of DDN 20 focusing on its most relevant aspects. In a first approximation, the official document follows the line, already enshrined in other Directives, of subsuming the essentially military concept of Defense within the broader concept of Security, which affects all the capabilities of the State. In this sense, the first difficulty that the DDN 20 has had to overcome is precisely the lack of a statutory document similar to the DDN, drafted at the level of National Security, to illuminate and guide it. To tell the truth, the void has not been total, since as stated by the DDN 20 in its introduction there is a National Security Strategy (ESN) which, although published in 2017, has served as reference letter in its elaboration, despite the evident lack of consistency seen between the strategic scenarios described in both documents.

In this regard, it is worth noting the lack of specificity with which the new DDN defines the strategic scenario, in comparison with the somewhat greater specificity of the ESN. The DDN 20 draws a vague, almost generic scenario, applicable almost unchanged to any nation in the world, without reference to specific geographical areas; an accumulation of threats and risks to security with an impact on defense, none of which appears to be more likely or more dangerous, and to which is added the recognition of changes in the international order that once again bring the possibility of major armed conflicts closer.

Such an approach makes it difficult to subsequently define defense objectives and guidelines for action and, perhaps for this reason, certain inconsistencies can be observed among the three parts of the document. It is striking that, although the document raises certificate, somewhat hastily, the possibility of the emergence of COVID-19, the possibility of a pandemic not being triggered is not considered in the description of the strategic scenario, something that, on the other hand, is included in ESN 17.

Along with the description of this scenario, the DDN 20 is interspersed with a set of considerations of a programmatic nature, in themselves positive and relevant, but which have little to do with what is to be expected in a document of this nature, designed to guide the planning of National Defense. In some cases, such as the promotion of the gender perspective, or the improvement of the quality of life of staff in its dimensions of improving living facilities, reconciliation of professional and family life, and reintegration into civilian life once the link with the Armed Forces has ended, the considerations are more typical of the Policy of staff of department than of a DDN. In others, such as the obligation to respect local cultures in military operations, they seem more subject typical of the Royal Ordinances or another subject code of ethics.

Undoubtedly motivated by the COVID-19 emergency, and in view of the role that the Armed Forces have assumed during it, the DDN emphasizes the importance of partnership missions with and support to civilian authorities, something, moreover, consubstantial to the Armed Forces, and establishes the specific goal of acquiring capabilities that allow the partnership and support to such authorities in crisis and emergency situations.

The management of the pandemic may have highlighted gaps in response capabilities, shortcomings in coordination tools, etc., thus opening a window of opportunity to make progress in this area and produce a more effective response in the future. However, it is advisable to guard against the possibility, open in this DDN, of losing sight of the central tasks of the Armed Forces, to prevent an excessive focus on missions in support of the civilian population from ending up distorting their organization, manning and training, thereby impairing the deterrence capacity of the armies and their combat operability.

The DDN also contains the usual reference letter, which is obligatory and necessary, to promote a true Defense Culture among Spaniards. The accredited specialization is justified by the role that the Ministry of Defense should play in this effort. However, it is not the sphere of Defense that should be reminded of the importance of this issue. The impact of any effort to promote the Culture of Defense will be limited if it is not assumed as its own by other ministerial Departments , as well as by all the administrations of the State, being also aware that it is not possible to generate a Culture of Defense without a prior consensus at national level on such essential issues as the objectives or values shared by all. It is, perhaps, on this aspect that the emphasis should be placed.

Perhaps the most controversial point of the DDN 20 is that of financing. Achieving the objectives set out in the document requires a sustained financial investment over time that breaks the current ceiling of expense in defense. Maintain the Armed Forces in the technological elite, substantially improve the quality of life of the professional staff -which starts by providing them with the equipment that best guarantees their survival and superiority on the battlefield-, strengthen the capacity to support civilian authorities in emergency situations, strengthening intelligence and cyberspace action capabilities, or meeting with guarantees the operational obligations derived from our active participation in international organizations, for which, moreover, a commitment has been made to strengthen them by up to 50% for a period of one year, is as necessary as it is costly.

The final paragraph of DDN 20 recognizes this when it states that the development of the document's guidelines will require the necessary funding. This statement, however, is little more than a recognition of the obvious, and is not accompanied by any commitment or guarantee of funding. Taking into account the important commitments already subscribed by the Ministry with the pending Special Armament Programs, and in view of the economic-financial panorama that is on the horizon due to the effects of COVID-19, which has led the JEME to announce to the Army the arrival of a period of austerity, and which would deserve to be included among the main threats to national security, it seems difficult that the objectives of the DDN 20 can be covered in the terms that it proposes. This is the real Achilles' heel of the document, which may turn it into little more than a dead letter.

In conclusion, the issuance of a new DDN is to be welcomed as an effort to update the National Defense policy, even in the absence of a similar instrument that periodically articulates the level of the Security Policy, in which the Defense Policy should be subsumed.

The emergence of COVID-19 seems to have overtaken the document, causing it to lose some of its validity and calling into question not only the will, but also the real capacity to achieve the ambitious objectives it proposes. At least there is a chance that the document may act, even in a limited way, as a sort of shield to protect the defense sector against the scenario of scarce resources that Spain will undoubtedly experience in the coming years.