Bahrain and UAE foreign ministers sign Abraham Accords with Israeli premier in September 2020 [White House].

essay / Lucas Martín Serrano * / Lucas Martín Serrano * / Lucas Martín Serrano * / Lucas Martín Serrano

It is interesting to incorporate to any geopolitical analysis subject some touches of history. History is a fundamental financial aid to understand the present. And most conflicts, problems, frictions or obstacles, whether between nations or public or private entities, always have an underlying historical background. Moreover, taken to the field of negotiation, regardless of its level, demonstrating a certain historical knowledge of the adversary is useful because, on the one hand, it does not stop being a sample of interest and respect towards him, which will always place us in an advantageous position, but, on the other hand, any pitfall or difficulty that appears has ample possibilities of having its historical counterpart, and precisely there we can find the way to the solution. The party that has a greater depth of that knowledge will notably increase the options of a solution more favorable to its interests.

In ancient times, the territory now occupied by the United Arab Emirates was inhabited by Arab tribes, nomadic farmers, artisans and traders. The plundering of the merchant ships of European powers that sailed along its coasts, approaching them more than was advisable, was commonplace. And, in a way, a way of life for part of its inhabitants. It was in the 7th century when Islam settled in the local culture. Of the two currents that emerged after the disputes that took place after the death of the Prophet, it was the Sunni current that gained hegemony from the 11th century onwards.

In order to put an end to piracy and secure the maritime trade routes, the United Kingdom, starting in 1820, signature with the sheikhs of the area, signed a peace treaty. In 1853 it went a step further and managed to sign another agreement whereby the entire territory was placed under the military protectorate of the United Kingdom.

signature The area attracted the attention of powers such as Russia, France and Germany, and in 1892, to protect their interests, the agreement was created, guaranteeing the British a monopoly on trade and exports.

The area encompassing the present seven United Arab Emirates plus Qatar and Bahrain became known as the "Trucial States".

During World War I, the airfields and ports of the Gulf played an important role in the development conflict in favor of the United Kingdom. At the end of World War II in 1945, the League of Arab States (Arab League) was created, formed by those who enjoyed some colonial independence. The organization attracted the attention of the Truce States.

In 1960, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created, with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela as founders and headquartered in Vienna, Austria. The seven emirates, which would later form the United Arab Emirates, joined the organization in 1967.

Since 1968, nine emirates on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula had begun negotiations to form a federal state. After the withdrawal final of British troops and after Bahrain and Qatar dissociated themselves from the process and gained independence separately, in 1971, six emirates became independent from the British Empire: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaywayn and Fujairah, forming the federation of the United Arab Emirates, with a legal system based on the 1971 constitution. Once consolidated, they joined the Arab League on June 12. The seventh emirate, Ras Al-Khaimah, joined the following year, with the emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the capital, as the strongest components.

It was the beginning of the exploitation of the huge oil wells discovered years earlier that turned the whole thing around at status. After the 1973 oil crisis, the Emirates began to accumulate enormous wealth, as OPEC members decided not to export any more oil to the countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War.

Oil and tourism based on urban growth and technological development are the main sources of prosperity in the country today, and a very important fact from all points of view is that 80-85% of the UAE's population is currently immigrant.

status current

It has been especially during the last decade, and partly as a consequence of the events in the region since what became known as the Arab Spring, that the US has emerged as a regional power with the capacity to influence the area.

The main characteristic that can be attributed to this appearance on the international scene is the transformation of a conservative foreign policy, very much directed towards "self-preservation", towards a more open-minded one with a clear vocation not only to play a relevant role in the region, but also to influence it in order to protect its interests.

What can be considered as Abu Dhabi's main ambition is to become a major player capable of influencing the definition and establishment of the Structures of governance throughout the region according to its own model, securing and expanding trade routes, bringing its neighbors into it to create a sufficiently powerful economic node with the capacity to strengthen ties with the entire East African region and with Southeast Asia, in what seems another clear example of how the global geopolitical center is already definitively shifting towards the Asia-Pacific axis.

The Emirati model has been able to evolve to integrate a growing economic openness along with a conservative political model and strong government whose main speech is built on the foundation of a well-entrenched and secure state. And all this combined with a great capacity as a service provider provider. And interestingly, the social model is relatively secular and liberal based by regional standards.

But a fundamental fact that cannot be forgotten is the outright rejection of any political or religious ideology that poses the slightest threat to the hegemony and supremacy of the State and its leaders.

It is Abu Dhabi, as the largest and most prosperous of the seven emirates, that exerts the most influence in setting the broad lines of policy, both domestic and foreign. Indeed, the evolution of model established by the UAE is firmly associated with Abu Dhabi's crown prince and de facto leader of the emirate, Mohamed bin Zayed (MbZ).

What cannot be lost sight of is that, although MbZ and his innermost circle of trust share the same vision of the world and politics, his actions and decisions do not necessarily follow a pre-established plan. There is no basic doctrine with marked tactical and strategic objectives and the lines of work to follow to achieve them.

Their way of carrying out the country strategy, if it can be called that, is based on a small group belonging to that inner circle, which puts on the table several options usually tactical and reactive to any problem or issue that arises to carry out. Based on these, the top leadership follows an ad hoc decision-making process that can lead to an excessive need for subsequent corrections and adjustments that in turn result in missed opportunities.

Threats - status security

Emirati authorities have a clear perception of what are the main geostrategic threats to their development: on the one hand, the Iranian-promoted transnational spread of Islamist political ideology and, on the other, the influence sought to be exerted by the Muslim Brotherhood and its promoters and supporters, including Qatar and Turkey, is perceived as an existential threat to their vision of a more secular form of government, as well as to the stability of the current regional status quo, given that they can act as a catalyst for radicalism in the area.

However, Abu Dhabi has been much more belligerent in its speech against the Muslim Brotherhood and those who support them, while remaining cautious in its stance against Iran.

The recent agreement with the State of Israel has served to undermine the credibility of many of the traditional and deep-rooted clichés while at the same time highlighting the birth of a Jewish-Sunni bloc as civil service examination to the belligerent and growing Shiite current led by Iran and its proxies, active in practically all countries in the area and in all regional conflicts.

This new status should serve the Western powers to confirm that in the Middle East region the vision of their own problems has changed and Iran and its particular way of exercising its foreign policy and defending its interests are now considered a much more destabilizing factor than the long-lasting Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The threat posed by Iran has acted as a catalyst in bringing together criteria while, in spite of everything, Israel is seen as an element that provides stability both militarily and economically.

The UAE-Israel Treaty

On September 15, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain formalized the normalization of their relations. This agreement means that four Arab states have now accepted Israel's right to exist, and this is undoubtedly a real diplomatic success.

The fact that it was precisely the UAE and Bahrain is no coincidence. Neither state has been involved in a direct war against Israel. And, if this characteristic is common to both states, Bahrain's relationship with Israel has been much more fluid than that of the UAE. This reality is supported by the Jewish community settled in Al-Qatif and its integration, which has translated into full and active participation in Bahrain's political life. This has helped to ensure that relations between Manama and Jerusalem have not been at all conflictive.

In spite of being seen in the eyes of the general public as a novelty, the truth is that the recent agreement reached is the third "Peace Treaty" that signature the Hebrew country has signed with an Arab nation. However, it is the first that has the appearance of being born with sufficiently solid foundations to augur a new, much more stable and lasting status , in clear contrast to the relations resulting from the previous agreements with Egypt and Jordan, which were very limited to personal relations and in the field of security and conventional diplomacy.

The new agreement with Israel sets out a new path for partnership affecting the entire Middle East, including substantially counterbalancing Iran's influence, fostering trade relations, tourism, partnership in subject military intelligence sharing, cooperation in the health area and thus help position the UAE to lead Arab diplomacy in the region by offering a solid civil service examination to Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its Palestinian arm in Gaza, Hamas, and thus open the door for other countries in the area to take steps in the same direction.

Israel's decision to fail the announced annexation under its sovereignty of certain areas of the West Bank is test that these moves in the region are much deeper and much more prepared and agreed in advance than can be imagined.

And this is precisely one of the major differences with previous agreements. The great expectation that has been created and the clear indications that other countries, including Saudi Arabia, will follow the UAE's lead.

In fact, a significant step has been taken in this direction, and it was something as simple as the fact that a plane of the Israeli company "EI-Al" flew over Saudi airspace carrying as passengers a large issue group of businessmen, staff officials and investors on their way to the Emirates as a gesture of goodwill. And contrary to what might have been expected at other times, this event did not have any repercussions in the Arab world, nor did it provoke any protest or demonstration against it, subject .

Places such as Amman, Beirut, Tunis and Rabat, where traditionally demonstrations against the Israeli "occupation" and similar accusations are usually large in terms of participation, remained completely calm on this occasion.

But if this fact has gone unnoticed by the general population, it has not gone unnoticed by the leaders of the Middle East powers and the violent organizations they use as proxies.

For those aspiring to follow in the UAE's footsteps and establish relations with Israel, this has served as a spur to reaffirm their decision, as the sense of unease or even danger emanating from the streets in the Arab world regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that such a move could provoke has diminished.

On the contrary, it has been a hard lesson for Iran and its proxies . Not only because the Palestinian cause, raised and put on the table for so long, has notably diminished its importance, but also because it has coincided in time with potestas in both Iraq and Lebanon in the complete opposite direction, that is, against Iran's interference in the internal affairs of both countries.

As a conclusion, it should be drawn that, although this absence of protests over the agreement between Israel and the UAE may seem surprising, it is nothing more than a clear sign of a long process of political maturation and evolution within the Arab world in general.

The population of the Middle East in general no longer aspires to a pan-Arabist, pan-Islamic unity, to the establishment of the Great Caliphate or, in the case of Iran or Turkey, to imperialist dreams that are a thing of the past. What the mass of the people and society really want is to improve their welfare, to have more and more attractive economic opportunities, to have a good system educational, to improve the levels of development in all areas, to have the rule of law, and for the rule of law to be equal for all in their respective countries.

The treaty that is the subject of this item fits perfectly within those aspirations and that outline mentality. The masses that once took to the streets no longer believe that the Palestinian cause is worthy of more effort and attention than their own struggle to achieve a better future for their nations.

And, this is very important, despite the opacity of the ayatollahs' regime, in Iran, the population is less and less submissive to policies that lead the country to a series of permanent conflicts with no end in sight, which cause a waste of the country's resources to maintain them.

Just two days after the advertisement of the peace agreement , the United Arab Emirates lifted the ban on telephone communication with Israel, with Hebrew Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi and his Emirati counterpart Abdullah binZayed symbolizing the opening of this new line of communication.

Almost immediately thereafter, a team from the Israeli Foreign Ministry traveled to Abu Dhabi to begin looking for possible sites for the future Israeli embassy headquarters.

A significant flow of investment from the UAE is being channeled to Israeli companies seeking new ways to treat COVID19 and to develop new tests to detect the disease. The increase in business deals between Israeli and Emirati companies has been almost immediate, and the "El-Al" company is already working to open a direct corridor between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi.

All this is favoring that, in view of the new status and the new approaches, in Morocco, Oman and other Arab countries, movements are taking place seeking to follow in the wake of the UAE. Israel's attractiveness is only increasing, in a significant evolution from being the most hated country in the region to the most desired partner .

However, one factor to consider is the impact in the US and Europe. In the West, in general, the Palestinian cause is gaining support mainly due to the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Therefore, changes in relations with Israel are likely not only to fail to undermine that support, but to spur increased efforts to prevent normalization through disinformation campaigns spreading hatred of Israel.

Finally, the civil service examination by Turkey, Qatar and Iran was something that can be described as predictable, but it is also a clarifying element. The Iranian president has called the agreement a "grave mistake", while his Turkish counterpart has threatened to close the UAE embassy in Turkey. In both cases, the ultimate reason for this reaction is the same: the use of the Palestinian cause for the benefit of their own interests and, coincidentally, both are on this occasion coincidental, to distract public opinion from the difficult economic status that for different reasons the two countries are going through.

Regional policy

The most important and enduring element in the UAE's foreign and security policy is its strategic alliances with the US and Saudi Arabia. Although the UAE has followed a more independent line over the last decade, the developments and this new direction would not have been possible without the support of the US, on whose protection the small but wealthy and at the same time sparsely populated state relies, and on whom it can count when exporting its energy resources in the event of a conflict.

Even during the time of the Obama administration, when relations became strained due to the policy taken by the US in relation to the events of the "Arab Spring" and with respect to Iran, the strategic alliance between the two nations was maintained.

The clearly defined anti-Iranian policy of the government led by Donald Trump, equivalent to that of the UAE, facilitated a rapid improvement in relations once again, and the new US administration saw the Emirates as a fundamental pillar on which to base its policy in the Middle East. Thus, today, together with Israel and Saudi Arabia, the UAE is the main US ally in the region.

Contrary to what happened with the US, Saudi Arabia became a strategic partner of the UAE's new regional policy during Obama's terms. In fact, the two nations have maintained close ties since the birth of the Emirates in 1971, but the new young state naturally remained in the shadow of the other, more established nation, following the policies of its "big brother".

This status changed with the rise to power of Mohamed Bin Zayed who, since 2011, was determined to champion a political line of joint actions in the region that ultimately have been decisive. MbZ found his perfect counterpart in Saudi Prince Mohamed Bin Salman, who gradually, since 2015 was taking the reins as the visible head of Saudi Arabia's policy. To such an extent that in certain cases such as Yemen and Qatar, the UAE's leadership and drive seems to have been the binding force of joint regional policies.

Alliances

United States

The US role as an ally of the UAE dates back to the early 1980s, just after the Iranian revolution of 1979, which meant the loss of its most important ally in the region and the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war.

However, it was the 1990-1991 Gulf War that, with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, showed the UAE how vulnerable the small Gulf States were to military aggression by any of their powerful neighbors.

In order to ensure protection, and in the same way as other countries in the region, the UAE favored during the years following the war an increased US presence on its territory. This concluded with a bilateral security agreement agreement signed in July 1994. Through this, the United States received access to the Emirates' air and port instructions and, in return, undertook to protect the country from possible external aggression. What is interesting, and gives a measure of how the status has evolved, is that the agreement remained secret at Abu Dhabi's request because of the UAE's fear of possible criticism and protests both internally and from Iran.

Initially, the UAE was just another US ally in the Persian Gulf. However, its importance as partner increased between 1990 and 2000, in part due to the port of Jebel Ali, which became the US Navy's most used base outside the country, and the Al Dhafra air base, a facility core topic for US activities in the region.

Moreover, since the end of the 1990s, the UAE began a process to show itself to its new ally as a reliable and more relevant partner , increasing the quantity and level of its cooperation. Following that line, Emirati military forces have participated in all major US operations in the Middle East, from the Gulf War in 1991 to Somalia in 1992, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan since 2002, Libya since 2011, and Syria (in the framework fight against Daesh) between 2014 and 2015. Only participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was avoided by Emirates, and in a very vehement way. From this involvement the UAE Armed Forces have gained a great deal of experience on the ground which has redounded to their effectiveness and professionalism.

This involvement in the not infrequently controversial US military actions in Arab countries has undoubtedly been a key element for the United States. Not only because of what it means from the point of view of image and narrative that at least one Muslim country supported them, but also because Abu Dhabi's contribution has not been limited to the military aspect. Humanitarian organizations have acted in parallel with the aim of gaining the support of the population wherever they have intervened by investing huge amounts of money. The clearest example is Afghanistan, where Emirates has spent millions of dollars on humanitarian projects and development to help stabilize the country, while providing a small contingent of special operations forces in the particularly dangerous southern part of the country since 2003. In addition, between 2012 and 2014 they expanded their deployment with six F16 aircraft to support air operations against the Taliban. Even when the US began its phased withdrawal after 2014, Emirati troops continued in Afghanistan.

Getting the UAE on board in the cause of fighting the jihadists was not a difficult task at all, as its leaders are particularly averse to any form of religious extremism that affects the political system within Islam. This is the main reason for its Air Force's involvement in the US-led coalition against Daesh in Syria between 2014 and 2015. To such an extent that, after the US aircraft, it was those from the UAE that carried out the most sorties against jihadist targets.

But partnership was not limited to the US. Both Australia and France had at their disposal the air instructions of the emirates to carry out their operations.

Only the open break in hostilities and the UAE's involvement in the 2015 Yemen War reduced its involvement in the fight against Daesh.

But it has not all been easy. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 caused deep misgivings in the UAE, which considered it a grave mistake. Their fear was that such an intervention would end up increasing Iran's influence over Iraq, or lead to a civil war, which would destabilize the whole region.

Fears were realized when in 2005 a Shiite coalition close to Iran won the elections in Iraq and war broke out, leaving the UAE with its hands tied to try to influence the status in any way. Their greatest concern then was that a premature withdrawal of all US forces would further complicate status.

The renewed relationship with the Trump administration has led to the signature of a new security and cooperation agreement signed in 2017. In contrast to what happened in 1994, the contents of the same have been made public, and make reference letter mainly the presence of US troops on Emirati soil on a permanent basis. The agreement also covers the training of Emirati Armed Forces and the conduct of joint exercises on a regular basis.

Thanks to this agreement, the US presence in the Emirates is larger than ever. There are currently some 5,000 men deployed between the Al Dhafra air base, the port of Jebel Ali and in some other small instructions or naval stations. At the aforementioned air base alone there are 3,500 men who, from there, operate from F-15, F-22 and F-35 fighter jets, in addition to reconnaissance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

For its part, the UAE has continued to develop its own military capabilities by acquiring US-made material, mainly anti-aircraft systems ("Patriot" and THAAD) and fighter planes (110 F-16s). In addition, for a couple of years now, the UAE has shown great interest in acquiring the new F-35, although negotiations, not without some reluctance, are still ongoing.

Problems arose in 2018 for the supply of precision-guided munitions to both the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as both countries were using them in the Yemen War. The murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Kashoggi compounded the resistance of the U.S. congress , forcing President Trump to use his veto power in order to maintain the supply. This gives a measure of how decisive the current administration's attitude towards both countries is.

Despite all the difficulties mentioned above, the current US administration has redoubled its efforts to support the UAE in its regional policies, as they are in line with US objectives.

The first goal has been to build an anti-Iran alliance among Middle Eastern states that includes the UAE as partner core topic along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This plan is entirely in line with Abu Dhabi's aspiration to gain some leadership in the region, and is likely to prosper, as the UAE is likely to support the US in a solution to the Palestinian conflict that is quite in line with the Israeli proposal .

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is currently the UAE's most important ally in the region. Both states are financed by crude oil exports and both are equally wary of the expansionist ambitions of their powerful neighbors, especially Iran.

However, for a long time, despite this alliance, the UAE has feared that Saudi Arabia, using its unequal size in terms of population, military strength and oil production capacity, would try to maintain a hegemonic position in the Persian Gulf.

In 1981, the countries of the Persian Gulf seized the opportunity to create an alliance that excluded the then major regional powers. Thus, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE created the committee Cooperation for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC). This committee had a joint military force that never reached a significant entity. The major test of the weakness of the GCC and its ineffectiveness was the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq without any civil service examination by the supranational body.

As result of the above, the UAE relied on the US for protection, the only country that was both willing and able to undertake the task of defending the small state against potential foreign aggression.

The consequence at the regional level is marked by the convergence of interests of Saudi Arabia and the UAE which, between 2011 and 2019, have pursued common regional political objectives relying if necessary on their military capabilities.

As an example, we have Bahrain's financial aid request to the GCC in 2011 when its rulers felt threatened by Shiite protest movements. However, its most relevant intervention was its support for the coup d'état in Egypt against President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013.

India

Socio-political and economic relations between the GCC members and India have always been very close, and have been based on the understanding that a secure and stable environment both politically and socially in the Persian Gulf environment and in the Indian subcontinent are critical factors for the development of the respective countries and their trans-regional ties.

From India's perspective, the enhancement of its technological and economic development goes hand in hand with New Delhi's ability to strengthen its partnerships around the world. In this regard, the Persian Gulf countries, and especially the UAE, are seen as a bridge to knowledge, capabilities, resources and markets to enhance that development.

In 2016, the until then bilateral relations between the two countries were formalized in a agreement of strategic cooperation called CSP(Comprehensive Strategic Partnership).

For the UAE, India is a modern country, a political phenomenon independent of the West that maintains strong religious and traditional roots without renouncing its diversity. In a way, and with some reservations, it is a mirror for the UAE to look into.

The cooperation agreement is cross-cutting and refers to issues as diverse as counter-terrorism, exchange information and intelligence, measures to combat money laundering, cybersecurity, as well as cooperation in subject defense, financial aid humanitarian, etc.

On the more economic side the initiative includes concrete actions to facilitate trade and investment, with the UAE committing to reach goal $75 billion to support the development of new generation infrastructure in India, especially railways, ports, roads, airports and industrial parks.

As far as the energy sector is concerned, the agreement envisages the UAE's participation in the modernization of the oil sector in all its branches, taking into account the development of a strategic reservation .

Very significant is the part dealing with the development of technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as well as cooperation in the aerospace sector including the development and joint launching of satellites, as well as the necessary ground control infrastructure and all necessary applications.

Today, India has growing and multifaceted socio-economic ties with both Israel and the Persian Gulf countries, and especially the UAE. The diaspora of Indian workers in the Persian Gulf accounts for annual remittances of nearly $50 billion. Trade relations bring in more than $150 billion to the Asian country's coffers, and almost two thirds of the country's hydrocarbon needs come from that region. Therefore, it is evident that the new status is viewed with special interest from this part of the world, assessing opportunities and possible threats.

Obviously, any agreement such as this one, which implies at least a priori more stability and a normalization of relations, will always be beneficial, but its weaknesses and the possible evolution of the status must also be taken into account.

Thus, from a geopolitical point of view, India has welcomed the re-establishment of relations between the UAE and Israel, as both are strategic partners.

The new scenario opening up between Israel and the GCC seems to bring closer a moderate and consistent solution to the Palestinian problem, making it much easier for Indian diplomacy to work .

But we must be cautious, and especially in this part of the planet nothing is of one color. This hopeful agreement may have a perverse effect that could further polarize the jihadist sectors of the Arab world, pitting them even more against each other.

The possibility of the Persian Gulf region becoming the new battleground where Iranian and Israeli proxies clash cannot be completely ruled out, especially in those areas controlled by the Shiites. However, it is not a likely option for the time being.

But for India, managing the economic implications of the new treaty is even more important. With defense and security cooperation as key pillars, both sides are now beginning to contemplate the real economic potential that will be opened up by complementing their economies.

Reactions to the treaty: scenarios   

Faced with an event as relevant as the one described above, it is to be expected that there will be reactions in several directions, and depending on these, the evolution of status may be different.

The actors that can play a relevant role in the different scenarios are the UAE and the new alliance, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Palestine and the Muslim Brotherhood.

It should not be forgotten that the background of this treaty is economic. subject If its development is successful, the contribution of stability to a region long punished by all kinds of conflicts and confrontations will be transformed into an exponential increase of commercial operations, transfer of technology and the opening of new routes and collaborations, mainly with Southeast Asia.

The role of the US will be decisive in any of the scenarios that may arise, but in any of them its position will be to minimize its physical presence and support the signatories of the treaty with political, economic and defense actions through the supply of military material.

The treaty has a strong economic component fixed on the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia. This is but one more sign of how the world's geopolitical center of gravity is shifting to the Asia-Pacific region and this is one of the main reasons for the unconditional support of the US.

Members of the UAE government have traditionally viewed more radical Islamist ideologies and policies as posing an existential threat to the country's core values. Both the Shiite sectarian regime in Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, group of Sunni persuasion, are seen as a constant threat to the stability of the region's powers.

For the UAE, these transnational movements are a catalyst for radicalism throughout the region.

In view of the above, the following scenarios are plausible:

Scenario 1

For the moment, the Palestinians are the ones whose interests will be most harmed by the new status . Prominent figures in Palestinian society, as well as senior officials of the Palestinian Authority, have considered the new treaty as a betrayal. As mentioned, the Palestinian issue is taking a back seat in the Arab world.

If, as is predicted, more countries join the new treaty in the coming months, the Palestinian Authority may try by all means to bring its claims and its struggle back to the forefront. To this end, it would count on the support of Iran and its proxies and Turkey. In this status, it would start by delegitimizing the governments of the countries that have aligned themselves with the UAE and Israel through a strong information campaign at all levels, with a massive use of social networks in order to mobilize the most sensitive and sympathetic population to the Palestinians. The goal would be promote demonstrations and/or revolts that would create doubts in those who have not yet adhered to the pact. These doubts could lead to a change of decision or delay in new accessions, or these new candidates to join the treaty could increase the conditions related to the Palestinians to join the treaty. This option is the most dangerous because of the possibility of generating dissension or internal discussions that could lead to an implosion of the pact.

It can be considered a likely scenario of intensity average/leave.

Scenario 2

The position taken by Saudi Arabia is core topic. And it will be decisive in gauging Iran's reaction. In the Middle East ecosystem, Iran is the power that has the most to lose from this new alliance. The struggle for hegemony within the Muslim world cannot be forgotten. And this struggle, which is also religious, as it pits Shiites and Sunnis against each other, has Iran and Saudi Arabia as its main protagonists.

Saudi Arabia is likely to join the treaty, but given the status, and in an attempt not to further tighten the rope with its main enemy, it may decide not to join the treaty, but to support it from outside with specific or bilateral agreements. Always with the rest of the Arab countries that are members of it, which would act as a bridge for its relations with Israel. It would be a way to wash its face and avoid the express recognition of the State of Israel or its direct relations with it. It is necessary to take into account the pockets of Shiite majority in the country, which could be encouraged by Iran.

However, in a worst-case scenario, Iran will react through its proxies, intensifying its activity in Yemen, trying to promote protests and revolts inside Saudi Arabia, reinforcing its support for Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon and even its militias in Iraq.

Support for the protests that have already taken place in Sudan will also be part of this campaign. Sudan is a very unstable country, with a very weak Structures of power that will hardly be able to quell high intensity revolts.

The goal would be to set the region on fire under the cover of support for the Palestinian people in order to dissuade further adherence to the treaty, as well as to undermine the effectiveness of the treaty, giving the image of instability and insecurity in the region. This will discourage potential investors from approaching the UAE attracted by the enormous economic possibilities it offers while keeping Saudi Arabia busy with its southern flank and its internal problems. Some action without clear or recognized perpetrator against ships transiting the Gulf, as has already happened, or the boarding of any by Iranian forces under any subject of accusation or legal chicanery, cannot be ruled out. Direct actions involving Iranian forces are not likely.

Turkey may become involved by providing weapons, technology and even mercenary fighters to any of the factions acting as Iran's proxy.

This scenario can be considered as a possible scenario with an intensity of average

Scenario 3

Iran needs either the governments or the population of the different countries of the Middle East to continue to see Israel as its main enemy and threat. Among other reasons, because it is a narrative of internal consumption that is recurrently used to divert the attention of its own population from other subject problems. So far, the unifying element of this way of looking at Israel has been the Palestinian conflict. Therefore, it is likely that actions will be taken that will provoke a reaction from Israel. These actions may be within the State of Israel itself coming from Palestinian or Lebanese territory, always at position from Iran's proxies. It cannot be ruled out some provocation that has as result an attack by Israel on Arab territory, probably against Iran or Syria. The final goal would not be the Hebrew State but to undermine the instructions of the treaty, to create social unrest in the signatories, to avoid the adhesion of Saudi Arabia and to be able to use the Palestinian conflict in its own interest.

This is a possible and high intensity scenario. 

Conclusions

The emergence of the UAE as an emerging geopolitical power in the Middle East has been as surprising as it has been precipitous, since not so long ago international observers did not give much hope for the life of the new federation of small states that had just been born.

On the contrary, the UAE and Abu Dhabi, its largest and most prosperous emirate, in particular, has been increasing its position over the last decade, playing a decisive role in the region. To such an extent that, to this day, the UAE's actions are considered to have facilitated to some extent the changes we are witnessing.

Western politicians are generally dazzled by the perceived liberalism of the UAE and the ability of its elites to speak both literally and figuratively their own language. It is important that they become familiar with the UAE's model in all its aspects and, what is the core topic, that they understand that Abu Dhabi expects to be treated by all as an equal. Dealing with the UAE in this way and considering it a robust and reliable partner also means sending them the message of a clear intention to support them.

One of the major consequences of this agreement may be to de-escalate the Palestinian conflict, if not end it, then permanently limit it. For generations, this conflict has been used by political and religious leaders throughout the Arab and Muslim world to distract their attention from other issues. It was an easy resource and always at hand. But it is now recognized that it is a territorial dispute between two peoples, and future negotiations have no choice but to go down that road, putting the focus on the outdated Palestinian leadership.

There is the not inconsiderable possibility that the agreement reached could have a domino effect and drag other states in the area to follow in the footsteps of the UAE, which in some cases would only mean publicizing the de facto relations they already have with the State of Israel. In this regard, talks between the Omani foreign minister and his Israeli counterpart are known to have taken place just after the signature of the treaty with the UAE.

Likewise, the Israeli Prime Minister held a meeting with Sudanese leader Abdel Fattah Burhan, which could be a sign of upcoming moves on that flank as well.

Although the leak had consequences for a high-ranking Sudanese official, the government did not deny the contacts. And everything has been confirmed when the US, at advertisement of Sudan's forthcoming removal from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, has followed the agreement between Israel and Sudan to normalize their diplomatic relations.

For years, US policy has been to demilitarize its position in the Middle East; the cost of its presence has been very high compared to the benefits it brings, as well as generating some animosity. Both the US and other G8 members support the UAE as the economic leader in the region. This support provides them with the ideal position to deploy their economic interests in the region(commodities, research and development & investment). 

This position of US/UAE support (plus some G8 countries), strengthens the role of the Arab country in the region at subject political and by default military, and in a certain way allows its new allies and supporters to have some influence in organizations such as OPEC, GCC, Arab League) and in neighboring countries, but from a more Arab and less Western position.

Regarding the issue of the UAE's purchase of the F-35, it is undeniable that this issue makes Israel uncomfortable despite the change in relations. The main reason is the fear of an equalization in military capabilities that could be dangerous. However, this will not be an obstacle to progress on future peace agreements and on the development of this one. Such a major operation would take years to materialize and by then, relations between Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi will have been consolidated. Moreover, it may even be welcomed by Israel, as it would strengthen its military capabilities vis-à-vis its main opponents in the region.

It is becoming increasingly apparent in the Arab world that Israel is too small to harbor imperialistic aspirations, in contrast to countries like Turkey and Iran, both of which formed former empires, and which seem intent on trying to restore what they once achieved or were.

Instead, Israel is increasingly seen as a strong, prosperous and dynamic enough country that cooperation with Jerusalem is a smart move that can provide benefits to both sides.

The agreement between Israel and the UAE may have been driven in part by their fear of Iran's advances and the danger it poses. But the benefits it can provide them go far beyond that issue.

These extend to economic investment possibilities, finance, tourism and especially know-how sharing. The UAE can benefit from Israel's technological and scientific advantage just as Israel can benefit from the UAE's position as a hub for international services and a key gateway to the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia entrance .

Regarding the entrance gateway to the Indian subcontinent, it should be noted that for India the most important part of agreement is to manage the economic facet of the synergies caused by it.

The UAE and Bahrain can become intermediaries for Israeli exports of both commodities and services to various parts of the world.

Israel has a strong defense, security and surveillance equipment industry. It is a leader in dryland farming, solar energy, horticulture, high-tech jewelry and pharmaceuticals.

Moreover, Israel has the capacity to provide highly skilled and semi-skilled labor to the GCC countries, especially if they come from the Sephardic and Mizrahim ethnic groups, many of whom speak Arabic. Even Israeli Arabs can find opportunities that help to further build ties and bridges that bridge the cultural divide.

Israel's incursion into the Gulf has the potential to influence the politico-economic architecture that India has been building for years, being, for example, one of the largest suppliers of workers, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals etc.

The largest customers in Dubai's real estate market, as well as the largest issue of tourists visiting the country come from India. But in this changing scenario there is scope for three-way synergies, making India a major player in this.

The final conclusion that can be drawn by way of evaluation for the future is that this new relationship will undoubtedly be a model to be followed by other Sunni states that will transform a region mired in 19th century conflicts into one of the power centers of the 21st century.

* Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry. Geopolitical Analyst

 

REFERENCES

Acharya, Arabinda, "COVID-19: A Testing Time for UAE-India Relations? A Perspective from Abu Dhabi," Strategic Analysis, September 2020.

Arab Center for Research and Policy studies, "The Abraham Agreement: normalization of relations or announcement of an existing Emirati - Israeli alliance?". Qatar, August 2020.

Karsh, Ephraim, ed., "The Israel-UAE Peace: A Preliminary Assessment", Ramat Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, cafeteria-Ilan University, September 2020.

Salisbury, Peter, "Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy", The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme, London: July 2020.

Steinber, Guido, "Regional Powers, United Arab Emirates", German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, July 2020.