The Caribbean country, with only 2 million inhabitants and barely 100,000 Muslims, sent proportionally the most fighters to Syria: a total of 130 fighters.

• Authorities in Trinidad and Tobago arrested four suspected jihadists on Feb. 8, 2018 for planning an attack on Carnival in Port of Spain

• The U.S. Treasury department sanctioned two Trinidadian nationals in September for participating in Islamic State financing activities.

• The insular government developed a new counterterrorism strategy in 2018, urged by White House fears of easy export of extremists to the U.S.

▲ T&T jihadists in Syria, in an image released by ISIS's Dabiq magazine.

report SRA 2019 / Ignacio Yárnoz[PDF Version].

Amidst Western concern over the unleashing of jihadists that is being brought about by the pacification of Syria, where radicalized elements from many other countries went to fight, the United States is taking a close look at a small neighbor. On February 8, 2018, four men were arrested in Mohammedville on suspicion of planning to commit a terrorist act. The place where the alleged attack was to happen may come as a surprise: the Caribbean carnival in the city of Port of Spain. Indeed, we are talking about a Caribbean nation that is also a victim - and exporter - of the globalized phenomenon of jihadist terrorism: Trinidad and Tobago. In recent years, Trinidad and Tobago has set off alarm bells among Western analysts, especially in the United States because of its geographic proximity to these islands and the possibility that this phenomenon could destabilize its backyard, the Caribbean.

The phenomenon of Islamist radicalism in Trinidad and Tobago is not new, considering that in 1990 there were already radical groups such as Jamaat Al Muslimeen, which even attempted to overthrow the government through a coup d'état. In addition, there were also known terrorists from this country such as Kareem Ibrahim, who in 2012 was sentenced to life imprisonment in the United States for planning an attack at JFK International Airport in New York.

However, the terrorist phenomenon on the island escalated in 2014 and 2015 with the rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham, or Daesh for its acronym in Arabic). This small Caribbean country contributed at least 130 fighters to the jihadist cause, from agreement with its own authorities, according to data also endorsed by the yearbook anti-terrorist department of the US State Department. This makes Trinidad and Tobago the country that proportionally sent proportionally more fighters to Syria to join the Islamic State (the Trinidadian Muslim community is only 104,000 faithful, 5% of a population that can reach 2 million inhabitants, although the official census is 1.3 million). Although it is estimated that some 300 fighters joined ISIS from the USA and Canada, the per capita figure is higher in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, a country which in absolute numbers also contributed more jihadists than other Latin American and Caribbean nations.

According to a research by Simon Cottee, Professor of Criminology at the University of Kent. Of these 130 Trinidadians, 34% were male, 23% female, 9% teenagers and the remaining 34% under the age of 13. This indicates that it was not just young people, but entire families who traveled to the Islamic State.

Reaction and surveillance

These data alarmed the Government of Port of Spain as well as that of Washington and other neighboring nations. The very fact that Trinidad and Tobago had no law prohibiting travel to the "Caliphate" to join the holy war was considered by the United States as a threat to its own security, considering that a Trinidadian citizen could cross the entire Caribbean without a visa to the Bahamas and be only a hop, skip and a jump away from Florida.

Within a month of becoming U.S. president, Donald Trump reached out in February 2017 to Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Keith Rowley, with whom he met at the White House. Rowley committed to greater measures to combat the threat posed by the departure of so many Trinidadians to jihad.

First, an amendment to the Anti-Terrorism Act was passed unanimously to improve the legal tools to detect, prevent and prosecute terrorism and its sources in Trinidad and Tobago. The measures also included a procedure called assessment, Comparison and Identification System staff (staff Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System, PISCES), agreed with the US and implemented at entrance posts in Trinidad and Tobago. Added to legislative action, in November 2017, the Trinidadian National Security committee approved a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy aimed at stopping those who support terrorism or glorify it. This strategy encourages close partnership between UK, Israeli and US intelligence agencies for information sharing.

As a fruit of that determined action and of the special partnership with Washington, in September 2018, the US Treasurydepartment placed sanctions on two Trinidadian nationals on the grounds that they were involved in procuring funding for the "Caliphate". In addition, the national authorities are vigilant about the return of fighters. The Supreme Court has authorized repatriating and taking custody of some minors.

Many of the fighters have died in battle and the few who have wanted to return have been arrested or placed under surveillance, but the threat is still latent. Also because with their return they can encourage a new radicalization of Trinidadian citizens who, given the impossibility of traveling to Syria due to the current status debacle of the Islamic State, decide to act within their borders or in neighboring countries. It should be noted that this has been the strategy of the Islamic State during the last few years, encouraging its followers in the West to commit "low cost" attacks with vehicles or with a knife.

Recruitment

What makes the status of Trinidad and Tobago an exceptional status is that there has not been a clear patron saint of recruitment, but rather in recent years there have been several different situations.

On page 64 of No. 15 of Dabiq, the propaganda magazine of the Islamic State, there was an extensive interview with a fighter of the "Caliphate" named Abu Sa'ad at-Trinidadi. This soldier of the "Caliphate", whose real name is Shane Crawford, was one of the first soldiers from Trinidad and Tobago to come to Daesh's call. It is curious that Dabiq dedicated several pages to him, but the fact is that the Trinidadian fighters were a valuable treasure for this organization, for two reasons: 

-First, by speaking English, which improved the organization's outreach radius. As former U.S. Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago John L. Estrada told the New York Times, "Trinidadians do very well in ISIS. They are very high up in their ranks, they are well respected, and they speak English."

-Secondly, they are an attraction for young Caribbean people who are disenchanted with society, regardless of their religion.

As much as Dabiq magazine insists on the testimony of Sa'ad at-Trinidadi - a young man supposedly disenchanted with the Christian religion, who discovered in Islam the true answer to his questions - religion was not in fact the fundamental motive that led the young Trinidadians to join the "Caliphate". As Simon Cottee points out in the research cited above, most of the 130 enlisted Trinidadians had been born into Muslim families of class average Indo-Eastern origin.

The motives that may have affected the young men recruited in Trinidad and Tobago probably had more to do with the sociological need to belong to a group or gang. As Dylan Kerrigan of the University of the West Indiesresearcher told the British newspaper The Guardian, "A gang provides a family, male role models, a social order, and promises access to what many young men think they want: money, power, women, respect. One imam told me that, rather than joining a local gang, some see the trip to the Middle East as joining another gang." Likewise, joining Daesh provided a means of escape for those facing judicial charges. In fact, the idealized Sa'ad at-Trinidadi (Shane Crawford) had already been arrested several times by the authorities and the two companions with whom he traveled to Syria had spent time in jail.

Young people in Trinidad and Tobago could have been radicalized through their visits to local mosques, not forgetting that, as elsewhere in the world, radicalization could also have occurred through online propaganda, the "Cybercaliphate". As for possible agents of radicalization in the first place is who Sa'ad at-Trinidadi mentions as his mentor, Shaykh Ashmead Choate. This man was the head of the conspiracy that in 2011 planned the assassination of the prime minister and other authorities and was ultimately written request foiled. Ashmead Choate studied natural sciences in his native country, but later studied hadith (the behaviors stemming from Muhammad's teachings; they are one of the fundamental pillars of the Sunna) at the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia. It is estimated that he left the country in 2013 to join the ranks of Daesh, as Sa'ad at-Trinidadi mentions in his interview, "He made the hegira to the Islamic State and found martyrdom fighting in Ramadi." The reasons for his radicalization are not known, but they could be related to his trip to Saudi Arabia, where he might have been attracted by a more Salafist version of Islam.

Similarly, there are indications pointing in other directions. One of the names that surface is that of Yasin Abu Bakr, former leader of the group Jamaat Al Muslimeen, who, having been the precursor of violence in the 1990s and the author of the coup, may have indirectly created a model to follow, although today he does not broadcast a clear call for violence. Likewise, the Boos mosque in Rio Claro, south of Trinidad, run by Imam Nazim Mohammed, was a stopover for many of those who later went on to fight in the ranks of ISIS, such as Shane Crawford and Fareed Mustapha. In an interview with Al Jazeera, the imam himself denied being a precursor of the Daesh cause, although fifteen members of his family have emigrated to Syria and several witnesses to his sermons state that he has on occasion praised the Islamic State. 

Also to be taken into account is Abdullah Al-Faisal, originally from Jamaica, who via the internet and social networks had engaged in Islamic State propaganda through Facebook groups and blogs such as Authentic Tauheed, where he distributed propaganda and posted videos of his sermons. His activity is suspected to have ranged from contact with Jesse Morton, an American citizen who worked with Zachary Chesser for apply for the murder of the South Park television show editors to the radicalization of Germaine Lindsay, one of the four Britons who perpetrated the July 7, 2007 London subway bombing. In September 2014, Faisal joined Mohammed Mizanur Rahman and other Islamist propagandists on an online platform where they urged their followers to join the ranks of ISIS. The U.S. government has linked Faisal to other terrorists such as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and suspects that he may also have been one of the instigators of radicalization in Trinidad and Tobago.

AMERICAN REGIONAL SECURITY, report 2019

The report American Regional Security (ARS) that we are launching has the purpose to address annually the most recent threats to the security of American countries. It deals with a space that is largely the security region of the United States, so that many aspects transcend the national sphere and become a geopolitical consideration. The security of the Western Hemisphere is therefore also the concern of the European Union or Spain, which have an interest in stability and prosperity on the other side of the Atlantic. Our SRA is a radar-like sweep of the most significant issues that have occurred in this field over the past year.

Open the full PDF of the report [pdf. 19,7MB] [pdf. 19,7MB

summary EXECUTIVE[PDF version].

The present global geopolitical tension is being played out in the near abroad of the three major powers. This term applies specifically to the space that was once part of the USSR and now surrounds Russia: the Kremlin's foreign policy is aimed both at securing its influence in these areas and preventing some of them from becoming the pawns of others. But such a struggle, like the one occurring in Ukraine or the Baltic republics, is also taking place in China's near abroad: the East and South China Seas. And similarly, albeit with less drama, the geopolitical game has also reached that near abroad of the United States, which goes beyond the backyard of the Greater Caribbean and could extend at least as far as the Equator.

Over the past year the security region of states has fully entered this new phase of acute geopolitics. This is due in particular to Russia's increased presence in the region, especially in Venezuela, where economic aid has in recent months given way to a succession of military gestures that defy the US. Furthermore, the agreement signed by Cuba to install a Glonass station, the Russian satellite navigator, raises the possibility that Moscow may once again want to use the island for intelligence work, as in the Cold War. Similar suspicions exist regarding a station already opened in Managua, where a Russian-run police academy has also been viewed with suspicion by the Pentagon.

Alongside such Russian activity in the region, Washington sometimes places China's activity in the region. While not seeking to anger the US, as can be attributed to the Kremlin's desire to reciprocate the pressure it has received in Ukraine, Beijing's commercial moves are perceived by the Americans as unfriendly. This is especially true in Central America, where in a few years China has been displacing the peculiar influence of Taiwan, which in 2018 lost the support of El Salvador and the Dominican Republic. Throughout the year, various US authorities expressed discomfort with China's position-taking in the Panama Canal area. Moreover, after a 2016 with hardly any loans to Venezuela and a blank 2017, Beijing granted in 2018 a 5 billion dollar loan to the Chavista regime (now 67.2 billion dollars).

The Venezuelan crisis is not only generating friction between the three main powers, but is also a source of insecurity for the surrounding countries. The space that Maduro's government has continued to give to Colombian guerrillas has contributed to the fact that 2018 can be considered the year of consolidation of the criminal activity of FARC dissidents, at partnership with the ELN, a guerrilla group that is still active as such and is also increasing its radius of action in Venezuela. The last year also saw a strengthening of the ELN, which, following the failure of its negotiations with the government, carried out an attack in Bogotá in January 2019, causing 21 deaths. FARC dissidents numbered around 2,000 at the end of 2018, including demobilised elements returning to arms as well as new recruits. Their coca production activity, concentrated in southwestern Colombia, spilled over into violence across the border with Ecuador in 2018, in part because of the activity of "el Guacho", a former FARC member eventually killed by Colombian security forces.

The worsening of the Venezuelan status , on the other hand, has reduced surveillance at sea, increased corruption of maritime authorities and coastal municipalities, and pushed the inhabitants of these localities to seek livelihoods. As a result, episodes of piracy off the coasts of Venezuela and its eastern neighbours have increased markedly. In a single attack in April 2018 in Surinamese waters, fifteen Guyanese fishermen were killed, while the authorities of Trinidad and Tobago decided to create an elite air unit to combat these actions.

It is not the only special alert in Trinidad and Tobago. The outflow of ISIS jihadists that is resulting from the pacification of Syria has put both Washington and Port of Spain on guard against the possible return to the Caribbean country of those who went to fight in the Middle East. Trinidad and Tobago was the nation that sent proportionally the most fighters to Syria: a total of 130, out of a population that may reach two million, of whom barely five per cent are Muslim. Authorities arrested four suspected jihadists in February 2018 for planning an attack on the capital's carnival. Urged by the US, which fears the spread of Trinidadian extremists in the region, the island government developed a new counter-terrorism strategy in 2018.

International success in ending the ISIS 'caliphate' thus shifts the risk to other parts of the world. The Trump Administration's pressure on Iran may also be encouraging greater Hizbollah activity in certain enclaves of South America - such as the TBA - to compensate for the reduction in funding that could result from the effectiveness of US sanctions on Tehran. In any case, 2018 saw a revival of the White House's interest in disrupting the drug trafficking, money laundering and smuggling networks carried out by Hezbollah operatives in Latin America: the Justice department reconstituted a specific research unit and the State department labelled group, already classified by the US as a terrorist organisation, as a transnational criminal organisation. Last year also saw a leap in the cooperation of the three TBA countries - Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay - which led to the arrest of Assad Ahmad Barakat, a major Hizbollah financial operator, and some 15 members of his clan.

While migration issues are constantly topical in the Americas, 2018 can be described as "the year of the caravans", due to the various marches that left Honduras for the US border and which met with a harsh response from the Trump Administration. One of the controversial aspects was the denunciation of the possible use of these marches by alleged Islamic extremists in order to reach the US unnoticed. What is certain is that Washington has been paying attention to the Central American route of people from other continents.

Thus, in 2018 it agreed to help Panama increase control of the Darién crossing, a jungle region on the border with Colombia where almost 9,000 migrants were located that year, 91% of them Africans and Asians. Of these, 2,100 entered the US grade as 'persons of concern' (from Bangladesh, Eritrea, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, among other countries).

The region has also seen some progress, such as halting the rise in opioid overdose deaths in the United States, an epidemic that set a record high in 2017. Throughout 2018, the eradication of poppy crops in Mexico, whose B increase in heroin production had pushed up consumption in the US (mixed with the synthetic fentanyl, mostly also coming through Mexico), and greater legislative and sanitary control by the US authorities, seem to show signs that the problem has stopped growing.

The possibility that Bolsonaro's government may seek to label the Landless Movement as terrorists for forcibly occupying farms reopens a historic controversy.

When Brazil passed its first anti-terrorism legislation around the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, the initiative was seen as an example to be followed by other Latin American countries, until then generally unfamiliar with a phenomenon that since 9/11 had become pre-eminent in many other parts of the world. However, the possibility that, with the political momentum of Jair Bolsonaro, some social movement, such as the Landless Movement, may be labeled as terrorist, revives old fears of the Brazilian left and accentuates social polarization.

Flag of the Movimento Dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST)

article / Túlio Dias de Assis

At the last Berlin Film Festival, the famous Brazilian actor and filmmaker Wagner Moura presented a somewhat controversial film, "Marighella". The film portrays the life of a character from recent Brazilian history, loved by some and hated by others: Carlos Marighella, leader of the Ação Libertadora Nacional. This organization was a revolutionary guerrilla manager of several attacks against the military dictatorial regime that ruled Brazil between 1964 and 1985. For this reason, the film provoked very different reactions: for some, it is the just exaltation of an authentic martyr of the anti-fascist struggle; for others, it is an apology of armed guerrilla terrorism. This small ideological dispute about "Marighella", although it may seem insignificant, is the reflection of an old wound in Brazilian politics that is reopened every time the country discussion on the need for anti-terrorist legislation.

The concept of anti-terrorism legislation is something that has taken hold in many parts of the world, especially in the West after 9/11. However, this notion is not so common in Latin America, probably due to the infrequency of attacks of this type subject suffered by the region. However, the lack of attacks does not imply that there is no presence of such movements in American countries; in fact, several of them are known to be a "refuge" for such organizations, as is the case in the Triple Frontier, the contact area between the borders of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. What happens in that area is largely due to the lack of direct and effective legislation against organized terrorism by national governments.

In the case of Brazil, as in some of its neighboring countries, the lack of anti-terrorism legislation is due to the historical fear on the part of leftist parties of its possible use against social movements of a certain aggressive nature. In Brazil, this was already reflected in the political transition of the late 1980s, when there was a clear protest by the PT(Partido dos Trabalhadores), then under the leadership of Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva, against any attempt to introduce the anti-terrorist concept into legislation. Curiously, the 1988 Federal Constitution itself mentions the word "terrorism" twice: first, as something to be rejected in Brazilian foreign policy, and second, as one of the unforgivable crimes against the Federation. In spite of this, no attempt to define this crime was successful, and although after the 9/11 attacks discussions about a possible law were resumed, the Labor left - already during Lula's presidency - continued to justify its refusal by invoking the persecution carried out by the dictatorship's board Militar. See that the same former president Dilma Rousseff was imprisoned for being part of the VAR-Palmares(Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares), an extreme left-wing revolutionary group that was part of the armed civil service examination to the regime.

Terrorist threat at the Olympic Games

During the PT's terms of office (2003-2016) there was no subject legislative initiative by the Government on topic; moreover, any other project arising from the Legislature, whether the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies, was blocked by the Executive. Often the Government also justified its position by alluding to a supposed "neutrality", hiding behind the desire not to get involved in external conflicts. This attitude would lead to several fugitives accused of participating or collaborating in attacks in other countries taking refuge in Brazil. However, in mid-2015, as the start of the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro approached, the risk of a possible attack in the face of such an important event was assessed. This, together with pressure from the right wing at congress (bear in mind that Rousseff won the 2014 elections with a very narrow margin of less than 1%), led the Petista government to ask the parliament to draft a concise definition of terrorism and other related crimes, such as those related to financing. Finally, the first Brazilian anti-terrorism law was signed by Rousseff in March 2016. Although this is the "official" version of that process, there are not few who defend that the real reason for the implementation of the law was the pressure exerted by the FATF (group Financial Action Task Force against Money Laundering, created by the G8), since this entity had threatened to include Brazil in the list of non-cooperative countries against terrorism.

The Brazilian anti-terrorism law was effective, as it served as the legal framework for the so-called Operação Hardware. Through this operation, the Brazilian Federal Police managed to arrest several suspects of a DAESH branch operating in Brazil, who were planning to carry out an attack during the Rio Olympics. Federal Judge Marcos Josegrei da Silva convicted eight suspects for membership to an Islamic terrorist group , in the first sentence of this kind subject in the history of Brazil. The judge's decision was quite controversial at the time, largely due to Brazilian society's unfamiliarity with this subject risky . As a result, many Brazilians, including part of the press, criticized the "disproportionality" with which the defendants were treated.

Bolsonarist Momentum

Since then, Brazil has come to be considered as a sort of example among South American countries in the fight against terrorism. However, it does not seem that the status quo maintained during the end of the Rousseff administration and the short term of Temer will remain intact for long. This is due to the fiery discussion stirred up by the Bolsonarista right wing, which advocates for the criminal activities of several far-left groups, especially the MST(Movimento Dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra) to be classified as terrorism. The MST is the largest agrarian social movement, Marxist in nature, and is known nationally for its occupations of lands that the group considers "useless or underutilized" in order to "put them to better use". The ineffectiveness of the State in stopping the invasions of private property carried out by the MST has been recurrently denounced in the congress, especially during the PT government years, without major consequences. However, now that the right wing has greater weight, the discussion has come back to life and not a few deputies have already mentioned their intention to seek to denounce the Landless Movement as a terrorist organization. Bolsonaro himself has been a fierce advocate of outlawing the MST.

Also, at the same time that the current Minister of Justice, Sergio Moro, announces the possibility of the creation of an anti-terrorist intelligence system, following the model of his American counterpart, and the congress discussion the expansion of the current list of terrorist organizations to include groups such as Hezbollah, other Brazilian politicians have decided to launch in the Senate a proposal legislation to criminalize the actions of the MST. If approved, this initiative would make real the fear that the left has invoked all these years. After all, this is not the best way to fulfill the promise of "governing for all". Moreover, such a disproportionate measure for this subject of activities would only increase the already intense political polarization present today in Brazilian society: it would be tantamount to rubbing salt in an old wound, one that seemed to be about to heal.

One of the poorest countries in the Americas may become the world's largest oil producer per capita, disrupting the relationship with its neighbors.

Promising oil discoveries in Guyana's waters augur greater regional relevance for this small and poor South American country. Territorial disputes between Venezuela and its neighbor, on account of the Essequivo territory that Caracas has historically claimed (more than half of Guyana's surface area), may be exacerbated by the opening of wells in deep waters that Guyana administers but over which Venezuela seeks fair international arbitration.

Image created by ExxonMobil about its exploration in Guyana's waters.

article / Ignacio Urbasos Arbeloa

Guyana has found oil deposits 193 km off its coast by the hand of ExxonMobil that can completely change the course of its Economics and its international influence. After several decades of failed attempts in the search for hydrocarbons in its subsoil and an exhaustive search since 1999, in 2015 the Liza field responded positively to seismic analysis showing subsequently abundant oil reserves at a depth of 1,900 meters offshore. At the moment estimates speak of 3.2 billion barrels of recoverable oil to be found in the Guiana Basin, which extends to Suriname, another country with a promising oil future. Companies such as Total, Repsol or Anadarko have already obtained exploration rights in the different blocks offered so far by the Guyanese government, however it is the Stabroek Block, exploited by Exxon (45%), Hess (30%) and the Chinese CNOOC (25%), which will be the first to start producing, in 2020.

Expected to reach 700,000 barrels per day by 2025, this is the largest finding of the lustrum in deepwater globally and one of the most valuable additions to conventional oil production. The crude is Pass for middle distillates, precisely what Gulf of Mexico refiners are looking for in a market saturated by light crude from fracking. If agreement is to optimistic estimates, by 2025 this impoverished country of about 700,000 people would surpass OPEC member Ecuador in oil production, making it the world's largest producer of barrels per capita (ahead of current leader Kuwait, which has a production of 3.15 million barrels per day and 4.1 million inhabitants). Production costs per barrel are estimated at $26 considering taxes, so profits are expected to be abundant in practically any future scenario (currently the barrel of WTI is around $50), making Guyana one of the great attractions in the oil industry at the moment. Prospecting led by Exxon, a company that already dominates exploitation in the so-called deepwaters, had in 2018 fees hit rates close to 80%, which has generated enormous expectation in a sector accustomed to fees of 25%.

The positive impact that this finding will have for the Guyanese Economics is evident, although it is not Exempt of challenges, given the high levels of corruption or a bureaucracy and political class inexperienced for negotiations at this level. The IMF, which is advising Guyana, has already recommended freezing further negotiations until the tax system is reformed and the country's bureaucratic capacity is improved. The same agency has estimated a 28% GDP growth for Guyana by 2020, a historic figure for a Economics whose exports are based on rice, sugar cane and gold. The government is already designing an institutional framework to manage oil tax revenues and cushion their impact on other sectors. Among the proposals is the creation of a sovereign wealth fund similar to those of Norway, Qatar or the United Arab Emirates, which could become effective this year with partnership of experts from the Commonwealth, to which the country belongs.

Historic dispute with Venezuela

These new discoveries, however, increase the tension with Venezuela, which maintains a territorial dispute over 70% of the Guyanese territory, the Guayana Esequiba belonging to the Captaincy General of Venezuela during the Spanish Empire. The disputed territory was later de facto colonized by the British Empire when the British took control over the Dutch territories of Guyana in 1814. In 1899 an international tribunal ruled unanimously in favor of the United Kingdom against Venezuelan claims. However, later revelations demonstrated the existence of serious elements of corruption in the judicial process, making the award "null and void" (non-existent) in 1962. In 1966 the United Kingdom, as representative of British Guyana, and Venezuela signed the Genevaagreement , which established the commitment to reach an agreement agreement: the Port of Spain protocol of 1970, which froze negotiations for 12 years. After the end of this period, Venezuela demanded Guyana to return to direct negotiations, and in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the diplomatic formula of good offices has been agreed upon and remains in force to this day, without any significant progress having been made. Since Guyana's independence in 1966, Venezuela promoted an indigenous separatist movement in the region, Rupununi, which was harshly repressed by Georgetown, setting a precedent of military tension on the border.

Although a formal agreement has never been reached on the territorial dispute, the arrival of the socialist People's Progressive Party (PPP) to government in Guyana in 1992 and the electoral victory of Hugo Chávez in 1999 in Venezuela ideologically aligned both countries, which allowed them to reach Degrees of unprecedented cooperation during the first decade of the 21st century. In the framework of this golden era, Guyana participated between 2007 and 2015 in the Venezuelan Petrocaribe initiative, receiving some 25,000 barrels per day of oil and derivatives, which constituted 50% of its consumption, in exchange for rice valued on market price. On the other hand, Guyana supported Venezuela's candidacy to the United Nations Security committee in 2006 in exchange for an express promise by Caracas not to use the privileged position it temporarily acquired in the territorial dispute. An important precedent was the declaration of Hugo Chávez in 2004 of not opposing Guyana "to unilaterally grant concessions and contracts to multinational companies, as long as this favors the development of the region". In spite of the existence of unfriendly acts between the two States during this period, the vital importance that the Venezuelan anti-imperialist foreign policy gave to the Caribbean during Chávez's mandate, obliged him to treat topic from the most absolute moderation to avoid a disagreement with CARICOM and to maintain Guyana's support in the OAS.

New tensions

As a result of the oil discoveries, the historic territorial dispute with Venezuela has returned to the forefront. A change of sign in the Georgetown government has also contributed to this. The 2015 elections brought to power in Guyana the A Partnership for National Unity, led by former military officer David Granger. This is a multi-ethnic coalition that could be described as center-right and with less ideological sympathies towards neighboring Venezuela than those professed by the previous president, Bharrat Jagdeo of the PPP. At the end of 2018 there was an escalation of tension, following the seizure on December 23 by the Bolivarian National Navy of two Guyanese-flagged vessels belonging to ExxonMobil that were prospecting in the area and which, of agreement to the version of the Government of Nicolás Maduro, had entered Venezuelan waters. The international response was not long in coming and the United States urged Venezuela to "respect international law and the sovereignty of its neighbors". Precisely one of the most complex issues in the territorial dispute is the projection of the waters of each country. The position defended by Venezuela is to draw the maritime limits of agreement to the projection of the delta of the Orinoco River, as opposed to the Guyanese position which draws the line in a manner favorable to its territorial interests. Although this was a secondary element in the territorial dispute, the economic potential of these waters places them at the center of the discussion.

To all this is added the declaration of the group of Lima, of which Guyana is part, not to recognize the May elections in Venezuela and to threaten to economically sanction the country (although, to date, it has not recognized the opposition candidate Juan Guaidó as interim president). The international ostracism of the Bolivarian Republic has allowed Guyana to obtain important diplomatic support from the aforementioned group of Lima, CARICOM and the United States in relation to its international dispute and the detention of the Exxon ships.

result The future of relations between Venezuela and Guyana depends to some extent on the outcome of the future elections in March in the latter country, which will pit the hitherto president, David Granger, recently ousted from power by means of a motion of censure, against the leader of the PPP, Bharrat Jagdeo, whose party has maintained the best relations with Chavista Venezuela. The no-confidence motion is a historic milestone for the South American country, which will have to prove its social cohesion and political stability amidst geopolitical tensions and an international investment community that is watching closely the development of events.

Increased defense revenues

Georgetown, for the moment, limits itself to diplomatic action to defend its territorial sovereignty, but documents of the Guyanese Defense Forces prior to the oil discoveries already identified the need to develop military capabilities in case such resources were found in the country. According to Exxon's estimates, agreement , Guyana would earn 16 billion dollars a year from 2020, which would increase the military expense , currently at around 1% of the GDP. The Army of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana conducted in August 2018 the largest military exercises in its history, mobilizing 1,500 troops out of an Army estimated at around 7,000. Information available about the material resources of navy and aviation show the need for quantitative and qualitative improvement. Overcoming the existing ethnic divisions between the population of Indian and African origin must be one of the priorities of the Armed Forces, which suffer from a clear under-representation of the Indian community, a cause of historical suspicion of the civil society.

At final, the Caribbean region of South America will be marked in the coming years by the economic potential of Guyana and its struggle for territorial survival in the face of Venezuela's legitimate demands. Achieving a real development of the oil industry will undoubtedly be the best armor for its future as a sovereign and independent country. The political uncertainty in Venezuela, immersed in an enormous crisis, generates the fear of a possible military escalation as an escape valve to the internal economic and political pressure against a rival that lacks the resources to face it. The capacity of Guyana's political class to manage the brutal increase in its economic resources after 2020 is still an unknown, but it is possible to imagine that the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere will reach great heights of development if it is capable of learning from its neighbors and managing a regional context that is favorable to its national interests.

Geopolitical misgivings about perceived foreign interests should not distract beneficiary countries from implementing sustainable use.

The Guarani Aquifer has given rise to a more political than scientific literature in South America, denouncing the alleged interest of great powers (formerly the United States, now China) to take away the water that naturally belongs to the countries of the region. These crusades often distract from a more indisputable fact: the risk comes not so much from outside as from uncontrolled practices and the lack of clear legislation in the aquifer countries themselves. This article reviews the results of some recent programs of study on the characteristics and status of the Guarani Aquifer.

▲ source: UC Irvine/NASA/JPL-Caltech

article / Albert Vidal

About one third of the large groundwater aquifers are at a critical status . Current technology does not allow us to accurately predict how much water we have left on the planet, and precisely because of this uncertainty, accelerated groundwater extraction is too great a risk not worth taking. 

The map above shows the 37 largest aquifers in the world, which have been studied by a NASA satellitemission statement known as the Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE). This mission statement has attempted to measure the water levels in the aquifers, in order to check the water stress to which they are subjected, as well as their level of renewal. Of these, there are 21 whose extraction is not sustainable, and they are losing water very rapidly. Among these, there are 13 whose status is particularly critical (darkest red), and threatens regional water security. There are 16 other aquifers that enjoy sufficient recharge to not lose water or even gain water; these are marked in blue.

This NASA research , the results of which are analyzed in a study by Water Resources Research, divides aquifer water stress into 4 different types, from highest to lowest intensity: extreme stress, variable stress, human-dominated variable stress, and no stress. Let us now look at another map, collected in that study, which shows sample the spatial distribution of groundwater abstraction in the world:

The color of the dots indicates the intensity of extraction, measured in millimeters per year. Thus, this statistic sample is the sum of withdrawals for industrial, agricultural and domestic use. At first glance, it can be seen that the countries that suffer the most accelerated extraction are India, Pakistan, China, Egypt and the United States. In the case of the Guarani Aquifer, the extraction points are located in Paraguayan territory and near Sao Paulo, with an extraction of between 0 and 5 millimeters per year.

The research has produced other maps that may be useful to financial aid for a deeper understanding of the problem. In this case, the following map sample shows an average of the annual recharge of aquifers in the world.

The yellow color represents negative recharge, i.e., systems that are losing water. The blue color, on the other hand, marks those aquifers that have a positive recharge (the more intense the blue color, the greater the recharge). The Guaraní aquifer, in particular, has a recharge of 225 millimeters per year.

Finally, we will see two maps referring to the water stress of aquifers.

The countries listed above (a) suffer from extreme water stress, i.e., natural recharge is negative, and there is also intense human use. This particularly affects the African continent, the United States, the Middle East and the heart of Asia.

Here we show (b) those aquifers with a variable stress level. This means that they have a positive natural recharge, but at the same time there is a human use that could be detrimental. The Guarani Aquifer is included in the latter group.

The Guarani Aquifer

Making reference letter to a famous phrase from one of Franklin D. Roosevelt's speech - "with great power comes great responsibility"- we can say that the countries that enjoy access to the Guarani Aquifer System (GAS), must assume the responsibility that comes with having been endowed with this important natural resource . They know that, many times, such riches bring competition, unrest and even problems such as internal instability and tensions between some large companies and governments.

The SAG is a transboundary aquifer that extends below the surface across 1.2 million km2 between Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina. According to the most recent research, this is the third largest groundwater reservation in the world in terms of surface area, and contains about 45,000 km3. The low recharge capacity is the most common problem in the aquifers of our planet, since it is usually not enough to cover the amount extracted, thus jeopardizing their sustainable use. This system is particularly important because of its very high renewal capacity (between 160 and 250 km3 per year), which takes place thanks to the abundant rainfall that feeds it.

Challenges posed by

Let us begin, then, with a brief historical contextualization. There have been several moments that will help us understand the current state of interests and challenges surrounding the SAG. In 1969 the La Plata Basin Treaty was signed, to carry out a series of programs of study on the hydrological basin of La Plata (which includes the Guarani Aquifer). Three decades later, in 2001, the agreement framework on the Environment of Mercosur was ratified, which highlighted the importance of the environment and proposed the creation of a legal framework to conserve it. Between 2003 and 2009, the project for the Environmental Protection and Sustainable development of the Guarani Aquifer System(PSAG) was developed thanks to the impulse of the four countries of the Rio de la Plata Basin, to prepare a framework of management of the SAG with environmental sustainability criteria (and to anticipate future problems). Finally, in 2010, the Treaty of San Juan was signed; a much broader treaty of cooperation, but one that was not ratified by all state parties. Also known as agreement of the Guarani Aquifer, it was influenced by many supranational bodies and transnational companies. So, the question arises, where are the problems?

Well, first of all, Argentina and Uruguay ratified the agreement of the Guarani Aquifer in 2012, which provided for a series of restrictions on water extraction, in order to manage the aquifer's resources in a more sustainable way. What happened is that neither Brazil nor Paraguay ratified it at that time and, their signatures are necessary for the agreement to enter into force. Surprisingly, Paraguay stepped forward in 2018 and ratified the agreement, showing signs of wanting more cooperation. Brazil depends heavily on the water extracted from the SAG (especially its southern provinces), so it wants to renegotiate the agreement of the Guarani Aquifer, to obtain more favorable conditions.

Of course, Brazil is not the only one that has problems with the current status . Paraguay, for example, did not ratify the agreement until 2018, alleging a violation of national sovereignty (something totally understandable, if we take into account that Paraguay owns the area aquifer recharge with the largest extension). As an example of all this, Miguel Giraut, from the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Argentina, commented in 2016 that coordination was non-existent.

In addition to these regional tensions, there are other subject problems related to interference from outside powers, international organizations and transnational corporations. Again, a reservation such as the SAG is especially attractive to companies and some countries that need to secure their supply of water resources. However, these dangers are relatively innocuous compared to others that could lead to aquifer contamination or irreversible change in the ecosystem.

If we face this question with some realism, it is unlikely that there will be intentional contamination of the aquifer (by chemical attack, for example), as this would benefit no one. Certainly, there is the danger of accidental contamination by the discharge of toxic substances from agriculture. In Brazil, specifically, there is a lot of agribusiness being developed over the aquifer (especially for soybean cultivation). It happens that, through the same cracks through which the water that recharges the aquifer passes, pesticides, residues and agrotoxins can also enter. In addition, the recent introduction of hydraulic fracturing techniques (known as fracking) is another potential source of contamination.

Another possible risk comes from an accelerated extraction by transnational companies or governments themselves, which would exceed the level of recharge and produce irreversible changes in the ecosystem. Deforestation brings another risk factor: water infiltration capacity is lower when trees are cut down, and the soil is exposed to erosion and pollutants as it loses nutrients (especially in recharge areas). In addition, population pressure and economic growth add even more variables to the uncertain future.

Uncertain but hopeful future

In summary, although these challenges may evolve negatively, there are many reasons that give us hope. After all, the aquifer water is highly valued for its medicinal purposes, its usefulness for the coffee industry and its use in geothermal energy production. That is why the owners of this precious resource are the first ones interested in conserving and managing it in a sustainable way, and they are fully aware that cooperation is crucial.

Moreover, the SAG could increase the geopolitical and geoeconomic importance of the region, which until now has been considered a peripheral region on the international scene. It is obvious that water is gaining importance as a natural resource given its scarcity and growing demand. Although it is unlikely that the region will become a major player, due to its geographical location and integration difficulties, it could give rise to the four Southern Cone countries taking leadership positions in areas related to sustainable extraction and fair distribution of water in the future. To seize this opportunity, it is necessary to adopt exemplary attitudes right now. If this happens, not only will they be considered exemplary countries, but they will surely attract investment in new and more efficient extraction methods. All this, in addition, will enhance the socio-economic development of the population living above the aquifer, which, if it can be maintained, will mark the future of South America.

The risk of military use of the facility, fuelled by confidentiality clauses, fuels discussion in Argentina and suspicion in Washington.

China's arrival on the far side of the moon has put the spotlight on Chinese space developments. For this new degree program, Beijing has a tracking and observation station in Patagonia, the first on its own territory. In Argentina, there has been an extensive discussion about possible unacknowledged purposes of these facilities and alleged secret clauses negotiated at the time by the Kirchner administration. The government of Mauricio Macri guarantees the peaceful uses of the station, but the controversy has not ceased.

Chinese space station in the Argentinean province of Neuquén [Casa Rosada] ▲ Chinese space station in the Argentinean province of Neuquén [Casa Rosada].

article / Naomi Moreno Cosgrove

After years of gradual economic penetration, which has led it to become the leading commercial partner in several South American countries and a major lender and investor throughout the region, China's incursion into Latin America is no longer silent. The influence it has achieved in various nations - for example, it acquires almost 90% of Ecuador's oil exports and its credits have been essential for the subsistence of Venezuela and certain Brazilian public companies - means that China's activities are attracting special attention and its expansion is becoming increasingly clear.

China's growing power in Latin America is especially noted by the United States, although its own neglect of the region, sometimes presented as a consequence of its pivot towards Asia, has contributed to national governments' attempts to meet its needs by seeking other partners from reference letter.

Already suspicious of China's growing presence in the Americas, any activity in strategic fields such as security arouses particular suspicion in Washington. This has also been the case with moves made by Moscow, such as the siting of a station for the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema or GLONASS) in Managua (Nicaragua). The secrecy surrounding the operation of the facility has caused mistrust among the population itself, raising suspicions as to whether its use is intended solely to provide a higher quality of the Russian navigation system or whether there is the possibility of strategic exploitation by Russian aerospace defence forces.

Negotiation

Suspicions about the so-called Far Space Station, the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA) station in Patagonia, in the province of Neuquén, stem from entrance from the fact that it was negotiated at a time of particular disadvantage for Argentina, due to the financial weakness of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's government and its need for urgent credit. When Argentina was out of the international credit markets for having defaulted on nearly 100 billion dollars in bonds, the Asian country was a blessing for the then president.

In 2009, in the midst of the financial crisis, China sent representatives to Latin America to discuss an issue that had little to do with currency fluctuations: Beijing's space interests. This was due to China's desire to have a centre in the other hemisphere of the globe that could support its space activity, such as the expedition to the far side of the moon.

After months of negotiation under great secrecy, the Chinese government and the government of the province of Neuquén signed a agreement in November 2012, giving China the right to use the land - rent-free - for fifty years. The technical agreement was signed by the Chinese state-owned business Launching Security and Control Satellite (CLTC) and the Argentinean National Commission for Space Activities (CONAE).

Enormous in size, the larger of the two circular antennas - it is twelve stories high, weighs 450 tons and has a large diameter - and visible from a great distance due to its location in the middle of a desert plain, the station soon became an ideal target for controversy and suspicion. Fears that, in addition to its declared civilian use, it might also have a military purpose and be used to gather information by intercepting communications in that part of South America, fuelled the controversy.

After becoming Argentine president in 2015, Mauricio Macri entrusted the then foreign minister Susana Malcorra and the Argentine ambassador in Beijing, Diego Guelar, with the task of negotiating that agreement should include the specification that the station would only be used for peaceful purposes, which the Chinese accepted.

In spite of everything, the discussion about the risks and benefits of the Chinese base is still alive in Argentine public opinion. Politicians from civil service examination in Neuquén consider that "it is shameful to renounce sovereignty in your own country", as Congresswoman Betty Kreitman said when provincial legislators heard about project.

Beyond Argentina's borders, White House officials have called project a 'Trojan Horse', reflecting US concerns about the initiative, according to sources quoted by The New York Times. Even apart from any strategic dispute with the United States, some Latin American leaders have doubts and regrets about established ties with China, worrying that previous governments have subjected their countries to excessive dependence on the Asian power.

Confidentiality

The main questioning of the Chinese base, then, has to do with its possible military use and the possible existence of secret clauses. The latter have been the main cause of international suspicion, as Macri himself came to validate the existence of these clauses when they became a weapon against the Kirchner government, and promised to reveal them when he became president, something he has not done. However, the Argentine space authorities themselves deny any section secrecy.

Perhaps the misunderstanding can be found in the fact that the contract signed between the Chinese CLTC and the Argentinean CONAE states that "both parties will maintain confidentiality regarding the technology, activities and monitoring, control and acquisition programmes of data". Although confidentiality regarding third parties in relation to technology is a common internship , in this case it contributes to public mistrust.

Given that the CLTC reports to the Chinese People's Army, it is difficult to deny that the data it obtains will come under the domain of the Defence hierarchy and may end up being put to military use, although not necessarily for military purposes. Experts also say that antennas and other equipment used to support space missions, similar to those the Chinese have in Patagonia, are likely to increase China's intelligence-gathering capabilities. "A giant antenna is like a huge hoover. It sucks up signals, information, all subject of things," Dean Cheng, an expert on China's national security policy, was quoted as saying in the NYT.

[Roberto Valencia, Letter from Zacatraz. Libros del K.O. Madrid, 2018. 384 pp.]

review / Jimena Villacorta

The story of El Directo – a young Salvadoran man who at the age of 17 was blamed for 17 murders, who was in and out of prison and was eventually sentenced by his fellow gang members – serves as a canvas for an even bigger picture: the serious social problem posed by violent gangs in Central America, particularly in El Salvador.

Roberto Valencia, a Spanish journalist who has lived in that Central American country for almost twenty years, has dedicated time and effort to addressing this problem in depth as a reporter for "El Faro". portal Salvadoran news outlet awarded for his research. Letter from Zacatraz (as the local media call the maximum security prison of Zacateoluca) is a journalistic story that through a concrete story exposes the broader panorama of a truly complex reality.

September 11, 2012 was the first time Valencia sat down to talk with Gustavo Adolfo Parada Morales, alias El Directo, someone who for years had garnered media attention, despite the existence of thousands of other young people involved in gangs. That contact staff encouraged the journalist to seek out other testimonies, including fill in a book that collects Parada's direct voice and that of people who knew him, based on interviews with those who loved him, such as his mother or his wife, and with those who confronted him, such as some judges.

As a result of an unwanted pregnancy, El Directo was born on January 25, 1982 in the city of San Miguel. Barely two decades later, he was already the most dangerous and feared man in El Salvador, or at least that's how the media projected him. A member of the Pana di Locos, a clique of the Mara Salvatrucha, he became the main public enemy. From the age of 17, accused of as many murders (of which he only admitted six) and various crimes, El Directo was in three juvenile detention centers and nine prisons. He had the opportunity to start a new life in Costa Rica, but it was ruined. He didn't make it to the United States. He was free for several months, but it wasn't long before the police recaptured him.

Through Parada's life, the author projects the phenomenon of the maras in El Salvador. It emphasizes how this phenomenon mainly affects the lower classes, while the rest of society does not realize the full magnitude of the problem and, therefore, is not interested in finding a solution. How is it possible, Valencia asks, that a society like El Salvador's, with 6.5 million inhabitants, tolerates an average of 10 homicides a day, not to mention the numerous other crimes, in a country where 1% of the population are gang members.

The repressive measures applied by the governments of the right (ARENA) and the left (FMLN) have not improved the gang problem. They have been growing, both inside and outside detention centres, many of which are in a deplorable state. It is precisely the condition of the prisons that aggravates the status: The infrastructure is damaged, there is a great deal of unsanitary conditions and overcrowding is extreme. In most prisons, gang leaders have a large share of control and dominate their respective organizations. "El Salvador's prison system is the most overcrowded in the hemisphere, according to the Organization of American States," Valencia said.

El Directo went through several prisons, where he was seriously wounded on multiple occasions, sometimes by order of the Mara Salvatrucha, which declared him a traitor and threatened to kill him, and other times by police and prison employees. After a few months in prison, he decided to reform himself and give up his activity in the MS. This brought him several opportunities, but he returned to prison. He was finally murdered in 2013, at the age of 31, by members of his new gang, La Mirada Locos, because he had been accused of ordering the killing of someone from the organization with whose wife he had had an affair.

It is interesting to note how in a country where a large number of crimes are recorded, for at least ten years the case of El Directo had an absolute priority in the media, which often exaggerated Parada's criminal record. "We live in a country where great murderers have been granted amnesty. The drugs circulate relatively freely and, despite the fact that police officials have said that there are important names in the business, of the state apparatus and the army involved in drug trafficking, we have not seen any arrests at that level," he told Valencia President of the Central American University, José María Tojeira. And he adds: "Income tax evasion is a fairly widespread vice among the wealthiest sectors. The police are still dealing with a Degree of significant corruption. Deputies are pardoned or investigated for acts in which the life or honor of other citizens has been severely threatened." For his part, Fernando Sáenz Lacalle, archbishop emeritus of San Salvador, regrets that journalists, commentators, analysts and politicians repeated over and over again, "like a church choir, the false refrain of the 17 years, 17 murders." In his opinion, "perhaps they went too far in terms of display and arrogance," according to Valencia.

Roberto Valencia concludes that the problem with the media is that at first they were benevolent towards the gangs, and then magnified the phenomenon, not to mention the repressive measures and the policies used to combat them.

Letter from Zacatraz is not a condescending book, but the criticism does not drown all hope. He warns that Salvadorans have become accustomed to living with this problem. Nowadays it is more common to avoid certain places that are known to be dangerous, than to try to fight for the betterment of the country. But it fosters confidence that shattered lives like El Directo's will serve to make new generations want something better for themselves.

Washington warns of the increase in violent transnational gangs, estimates that MS-13 has as many as 10,000 members

The Trump administration has drawn attention to an increase in violent transnational gangs in the United States, particularly the Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13, which maintains links to gang members in Central America's Northern Triangle. Although Trump has invoked this issue in a demagogic way, criminalizing immigration and forgetting that the Central American gangs were born in Los Angeles, the FBI notes that these organizations are recruiting more young people than ever before and demanding greater violence from their members. U.S. authorities believe that these gangs are governed to some extent from El Salvador, but that hierarchy is less clear.

▲ Mara Salvatrucha graffiti [Wikimedia Commons]

article / Lisa Cubías

Never before has the word "animal" caused so much controversy in the United States as when it was uttered by President Donald Trump in reference to the members of the Marasalvatrucha or MS 13, on May 16. It initially appeared to refer to all undocumented immigrants, prompting widespread pushback; He went on to say that the label he had wanted to apply it to gang members who come to the United States illegally to commit acts of violence. Trump placed his war on gangs in the framework of its zero-tolerance migration policy and the reinforcement of national agencies such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in order to reduce migratory flows from Latin America to the United States.

The description of the phenomenon of Latino youth gangs as a migration problem had already surfaced in the United States. speech of the State of the Union that Trump delivered on Jan. 28. In the face of the congress Trump told the story of two teenagers, Kayla Cuevas and Nisa Mickens, who had been brutally murdered by six MS-13 members on their way home. He said that criminals had taken advantage of loopholes in immigration legislation to live in the United States and reiterated that the congress It had to act to close them down and prevent gang members from using them to enter the country.

Despite Trump's demagogic simplification, the truth is that Latino gangs are a product of the United States. They are, as The Washington Post has put it, "as made in America as Google." They were born in Los Angeles, first to children of Mexican immigration and then fueled by the arrival of emigrants and refugees fleeing armed conflicts in Central America. Thus, El Salvador saw the emergence of a twelve-year civil war between the government and leftist guerrillas during the 1980s. The duration and brutality of the conflict, along with the political and economic instability that the country was experiencing, drove the exodus of Salvadorans to the United States. The influx of young people from El Salvador, as well as Honduras and Guatemala, led to the emergence of the Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 gangs, both of which were linked to the pre-existing Mexican Mafia (La M).

When peace came to Central America in the 1990s, many of these young people returned to their countries, following their families or being expelled by U.S. authorities because of their criminal activities. In this way, the maras began to operate in the Northern Triangle, where they constitute a serious social problem.

Transnationality

According to the department According to the U.S., there are about 33,000 violent street gangs, with a total of 1.4 million members. MS-13, with about 10,000 young people enrolled, accounts for only 1% of that total and in 2017 only 17 of its members were prosecuted, and yet it deserves the full attention of the White House. Apart from the possible political interests of the Trump Administration, the truth is that the US authorities have been highlighting its increase and its danger, in addition to warning that certain orders are issued from El Salvador. This transnationality is viewed with concern.

The United States does not recognize MS-13 as a terrorist organization, and therefore has not included it in its National Counterterrorism Strategy released in October 2018. It is, on the other hand, classified as a transnational criminal organization, as described by adocument of the department April 2017. According to the report, several of the gang leaders are incarcerated in El Salvador and are sending representatives to cross illegally into the United States in order to unify the gangs operating in the United States, while forcing the U.S. MS-13 organization to send its illegal profits to the leaders of the United States. group in El Salvador and to exert more control and violence over their territories.

The FBI says MS-13 and Barrio 18 "continue to expand their influence in the United States." These transnational gangs "are present in almost every state and continue to grow in the United States." issue of members, now targeting recruits younger than ever before." As indicated by the grade of the department of Justice, the Attorney General warned that "in the last five years alone" the issue "has gone up significantly." "Transnational criminal organizations like MS-13 pose one of the most serious threats to U.S. security," he said.

Stephen Richardson, director attachment of the Division of research FBI criminal,told the congressIn January 2018, the mass arrests and imprisonment of MS-13 members and mid-level leaders over the past year in the United States have caused frustration for MS-13 leaders in El Salvador. "They're very interested in sending younger, more violent offenders through their channels into this country to be gang thugs," he told the committee House of Representatives.

The transnational nature of MS-13 is questioned by expert Roberto Valencia, author of articles and books on the maras. She works as a journalist at El Faro, one of El Salvador's leading digital media outlets; his latest book, graduate Letter from Zacatraz, was published a few months ago.

"In the beginning, Los Angeles gangs served as moral guides for those who immigrated to El Salvador during the 1990s. Some of the veteran leaders now living in El Salvador grew up in Los Angeles and have maintained personal and emotional ties with the Structures of the gangs they belonged to," Valencia tells Global Affairs. "However," he adds, "that doesn't imply an international connection: everyone, no matter where they live, believes they are the essence of the gang and are not subordinate to another country's organization." "Some leaders in El Salvador share a very close relationship. staff with the organization in which they started in the United States, and that doesn't dissolve so easily, but the link as a single organization was broken a long time ago," he says.

Valencia firmly rejects any interference by the U.S. MS-13 in El Salvador. He admits, instead, that there may be some subject Salvadoran gang members in the United States "can be deported to El Salvador and end up in Salvadoran prisons, where they can be punished by prison mafias."

Migrants: Cause or Consequence?

Roberto Valencia also speaks out about Donald Trump's references to gangs: "Trump talks about MS-13 to win votes under the premise of an immigration policy that ends up criminalizing all immigrants. It is outrageous that Trump presents them as the cause, when gangs started in the United States. In fact, the vast majority of migrants from the Northern Triangle come to the U.S. escaping gangs."

In Central America, gang control over a society that is poor ranges from demanding "rent" (extortion) from companies and people who have small businesses, to forcing older women to take care of babies that gang members have had, to "asking" young girls to be girlfriends of the gang's main leader if they don't want to be killed themselves and their families. The application of young girls is an extremely common cause of migration, which also denotes the misogynistic culture in rural areas of Latin American countries.

In most of his comments, Trump has described MS-13 as a threat to public safety and the stability of American communities. However, the programs of study of Immigration, a leading organization of research independent and non-profit, conducted aresearch on the impact of MS-13 in the United States and addressed the immigration measures that the Administration should take to control its presence. He considered that MS-13 and other gangs are certainly a threat to public safety, thus sharing Trump's point of view, but he disagreed with him by not linking immigration to the impact of gangs.

U.S. attorney Greg Hunter, who has been a member of the panel for Criminal Justice Law in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia since 2001 and has worked on gang-related matters, says that shoplifting and illegal immigration cases are far more prevalent than those that can be categorized as threats to public safety or the "American community." such as drug trafficking and murders. It also alludes to the fact that these organizations are not centralized, and although they operate under the same identity, they do not follow the same orders. He says the gangs have made efforts to centralize operations, but they haveresult Ineffective.

It is crucial to take into account the statistics on the influx of immigrants when assessing the recent caravans of migrants from the Northern Triangle that Trump has sought to link to gangs. The U.S. president called those migrants "stone-cold criminals."

However, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection record does not suggest this. In hisreport The 2017 Security Agency counts a total of 526,901 illegal immigrants who were denied entrance, of whom 310,531 were arrested and 31,039 arrested; of the latter, only 228 belonged to MS-13 and as many were members of other gangs (61 of them from Barrio-18).

The text attempts to avoid stagnation, but does not open the door to decisive transformation

Cubans will vote in referendum next February 24 on the project of the new Constitution C by the National Assembly in December after a period of enquiry popular. In the preamble of the project the reference letter was introduced at the last minute to the goal communist which already existed in the 1976 Constitution, but which had not been initially incorporated in the draft, so that the final text is even less novel.

▲ Building of the committee Central of the Communist Party of Cuba [framework Zanferrari].

article / Alex Puigrefagut

Six decades after the Revolution, Cuba leaves behind the surname Castro, with the arrival in April 2018 of Miguel Díaz-Canel as head of state, and is preparing to approve a new Constitution, which will replace the one promulgated in 1976, to symbolize this new time. This new Magna Carta, whose initial text was C by the National Assembly in July 2018, then submitted to three months of popular enquiry for the presentation of amendments and finally C as by the deputies on December 22, has as its goal main objective to seek the modernization of the Cuban State and the sustainable development of the same, without losing the essence and the main ideals of the socialist ideology of the State.

entrance At the end of the Castro era at the helm of Cuba, the State has found it necessary to include in the new essay the socioeconomic transformations carried out in the country since the previous Constitution came into force, as well as to partially modify the State structure to make it more functional. It is also worth mentioning the willingness to recognize more rights for citizens, although with limitations.

When examining the constitutional project , four aspects are particularly noteworthy: the specification of the ideology of the State, the figures and Structures of the State and the government, the question of private property and finally the redefinition of citizens' rights.

Maintenance of socialism

The text C initially by the National Assembly did not include the reference letter at goal to reach a communist society, a fundamental point that was present in the previous Constitution. The article 5 of the 1976 Magna Carta established that society "organizes and orients common efforts towards the high goals of the construction of socialism and the advance towards a communist society".

The omission of this point was really only a change of language, since at no time was the idea of socialism abandoned, in fact, the socialist character of the Cuban State was ratified. In the words of Esteban Lazo, president of the National Assembly, this new Constitution "does not mean that we are renouncing our ideas, but rather that in our vision we are thinking of a socialist, sovereign, independent, prosperous and sustainable country". However, in case there were any doubts, after the period of popular deliberation, the Assembly introduced as an amendment the express accredited specialization to communism in the preamble of the final text, given the alleged pressure from the most immobilist sectors.

The new Constitution reaffirms the socialist character of the Cuban regime, both in the economic and social spheres, giving a leading role to the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) as the highest power in society. The socialist nature of the Cuban State is underscored by the maintenance of the single-party system.

Presidential limits

The new Constitution includes some changes in the state structure. The most outstanding characteristic is that the Antillean country will have a president of the republic as head of state and a prime minister as head of government, in contrast with the current status of the same position for both functions: president of the committee of State and of Ministers. Everything indicates that this distinction will result more in a distribution of work than in a division of powers between the two positions, so this change will not be transcendental, given the control that will continue to be exercised from the PCC.

Another transformation in the political system is the elimination of the provincial assemblies for the creation of provincial governorships, with the goal to give a greater decentralization to the administrative power and a greater dependence of the legislative command on the executive.

As for the presidential term, the new Constitution limits it to five years, with the option of a single reelection for the same period. This change is important since it should lead to a rotation of members, and it is assumed that with this there would also be a renewal of ideas both within the Party and the Executive. The purpose is to avoid the stagnation of a historic generation without new ideas.

Finally, the president will be elected directly by the deputies of the National Assembly; in other words, Cuba does not give entrance to the direct election of its leaders, but maintains the indirect election system.

Private property

The document includes several forms of property, among them socialist property, mixed property and private property. The accredited specialization to the latter does not imply its formal recognition, but the confirmation of a internship whose extension the new Constitution endorses. This implies, therefore, the recognition of the market, a deeper participation of private property and the welcome to more foreign investment to enliven the country's Economics .

This need to reflect in the Constitution the greater participation of private property has occurred because, in many cases, the contribution of property and foreign investments have exceeded in the internship what was established in the previous constitutional framework . But this step will also lead to greater control in this area.

These changes in the economic sphere are aimed at goal to support the adjustments initiated by Raúl Castro a decade ago to boost economic growth and counteract the embargo established by the United States more than fifty years ago; in addition to fixing some of the country's labor force in the private sector as self-employed workers, especially in micro and small enterprises.

Citizen's rights

Finally, regarding the redefinition of citizens' rights, the constitutional project establishes a new functioning in the interaction of the State with the population through the flexibilization of economic, legal and civil rights. From the approval of the new text, the Cuban State must guarantee citizens the extension of Human Rights, although only in accordance with the international treaties ratified by the Caribbean country.

This, which despite this limitation could be seen as an opportunity for citizens, in reality has little of an opening, because although Cuba has signed United Nations agreements on political, cultural, civil and economic rights, it has not actually ratified them. Thus, in principle, Cuba should not be obliged to recognize these rights.

Another highlight of the relaxation introduced is article 40, which criminalizes discrimination "on grounds of sex, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, ethnic origin, skin color, religious belief, disability, national origin or any other distinction harmful to human dignity". In the initial text that went to instructions , the recognition of same-sex marriage was introduced, but citizen rejection led to an amendment that finally withdrew the express protection of same-sex marriage.

After analyzing the main novelties of the constitutional project , it can be determined that the Cuban regime perceives a certain need for change and renewal. The new Constitution goes somewhat in that direction, but although it tries to avoid stagnation, it does not open the door to a decisive transformation either: neither complete continuity -although there is more of this- nor revolution within the system. It is clear that the new generation of leaders, with Miguel Díaz-Canel at the helm, can be seen as a continuity of the Castro regime, for the simple fact that the Castros directly determined the successor, in addition to the fact that many of their ideals are the same as those of the generation that made the revolution. But on the other hand, Cuba is certainly forced to slightly modify its course in order to be more present in the international system and to seek a more functional state and government.

(Updated January 3, 2019)

Global interest in this trendy grain has brought additional income to Andean communities

The location of quinoa production, especially in Peru and Bolivia (together they account for almost 80% of the world's exports), has given these nations an unexpected strategic value. The high protein component of this pseudocereal makes it attractive to those countries that have food security as a priority.

▲ Quinoa field in the Bolivian Andes [Michael Hermann-CC]

article / Elisa Teomiro

Quinoa, which is also called quinoa (in Latin Chenopodium quinoa), is an ancestral grain more than 5,000 years old cultivated by pre-Columbian Andean cultures. After the arrival of the Spaniards in America, it was partly displaced by the cereals that were brought from the peninsula. It does not belong to the grass family but to the chenopodiaceae family (spinach, chard or beets); Therefore, it is more correct to consider it as a pseudocereal.

It is the basis of the diet of the Andean population of South America, especially in the high Andean areas of Bolivia and Peru (between the two countries they concentrate approximately 76% of the total volume of quinoa exported in the world, 46% Bolivia and 30% Peru). At present, due to its adaptation to different climates (it survives frost, high temperatures, lack of oxygen in the air, lack of water and high salinity), its production has diversified and more countries produce it: Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, USA and Canada. in the Americas, as well as Great Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Sweden, Holland, Spain, Australia and the USSR, outside of it.

Quinoa has gone from being a perfect unknown, for the majority of the non-American population, to suffering a spectacular rise in a very short time. One of the reasons for this was the decision by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to declare 2013 as the International Year of Quinoa. FAO wanted to reward the great effort being made by the Andean peoples to preserve grain in its natural state, as food for current and future generations. The activities carried out during that year made quinoa and its nutritional properties known to the world.

Price Increase

The interest aroused by this grain tripled its price between 2004 and 2013, which curiously generated a discussion on a possible negative impact on producer populations. Thus, it was alleged that the high demand for this crop by developed countries had turned quinoa into a "article in the producing countries, where it already cost more than chicken or rice. It was considered that this status It could cause malnutrition in the Andean population, as they are unable to supplement their scarcity per diem expenses with quinoa.

A follow-up on this issue later showed that the quinoa boom was actually helping the communities at source. A study carried out by the International Trade Centre, a joint agency of the World Trade Organization and the United Nations based in Geneva, carried out over the period 2014-2015, pointed out that the consumption of quinoa by developed countries improved the living conditions of small producers; most of them are women.

Of agreement With this study, the rise in prices between 2004-2013 meant that both producers and consumers in producing regions benefited financially from trade. Thus, there was a 46% increase in their well-being in this period, measured through the value of goods and services consumed by families. The report It also highlighted how, on the contrary, the 40% drop in the price of quinoa grain, suffered towards the end of 2015, caused a decrease in the well-being of rural households (food consumption fell by 10% and wages by 5%). The study reached two clear conclusions: the continued decline in quinoa consumption in Peru since 2005 was probably due more to the change in consumer preferences due to globalization and the increased supply of products, than to the variation in grain prices; The global consumption of quinoa in developed countries undoubtedly contributed to the development of communities in the highlands with a lack of resources.

Production and trade

The reasons why this grain has become so attractive to consumers in Europe and the USA – increasingly also in China and Japan – are several: its protein content is very high, between 14% and 18%, and it is also proteins of high biological value that would allow it to be a substitute for animal protein (it contains the 10 essential amino acids for the production of animal protein). per diem expenses human). This factor, together with its high iron content, make it an ideal pseudocereal for vegetarians; It does not contain gluten so celiacs can also consume it; it has a low glycemic content and this allows it to be consumed by diabetics; Its fiber and unsaturated fatty acid content (mainly linoleic acid) is high, so all those concerned about their health have an option in quinoa. It's also a source It is rich in vitamin E and B2 (riboflavin) and is high in calcium, phosphorus, magnesium, potassium and iron. For all these reasons, the FAO considers that due to its high nutritional value financial aid to eradicate hunger and malnutrition.

The ranking of quinoa-producing countries is headed by Bolivia (its 118,913 hectares of cultivation accounted for 60% of the total quinoa planted area in the world in 2016), followed by Peru (64,223 hectares, representing 30% of the world's planted area) and Ecuador (2,214 hectares) [Table 1]. From 1990 to 2014, the area planted with quinoa went from 47,585 hectares to 195,342 hectares. The global value of exports increased from $135.5 million in 2012 to $321.5 million in 2015.

In terms of export volume in tons, Bolivia was the leading country in 2012 (more than 25,000 tons), which together with exports in 2013 represented an income of 80 million dollars for the country. In that same year, Peruvian quinoa exports exceeded 10,000 tons, which brought the country 38 million dollars into revenue. In 2014, Peru took over and dominated the market in 2015 and 2016 as well [Table 2].

The U.S. is the world's leading importer of quinoa, with 40%; it is followed by the European Union, with more than 30% of the total (France, Holland, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Belgium mainly) and then Canada. The average price per kilogram of quinoa was $3.2 in 2012 and $6.2 in 2014. In 2015 it dropped to $5. Per capita consumption is logically led by the two main producers: Bolivia consumes 5.2 kilos and Peru 1.8 kilos, followed at a distance by Ecuador, with 332 grams per person.

In non-producing countries, quinoa was first introduced into the organic sector, with consumers concerned about healthier diets, although today it is no longer exclusive to this market. The largest consumer of quinoa per capita worldwide is Canada, with more than 180 grams, followed closely by the Netherlands; France and Australia consume between 120 and 140 grams. In Spain, consumption is still small, around 30 grams. Global forecasts until 2025 are that per capita consumption of 200 grams will be reached (an achievement that Canada already has within reach) and that even traditional rice-consuming countries, such as Japan and South Korea, will also embrace quinoa.

Quinoa production has problems for the future of both subject environmental and market. Before its boom in 2013, nearly 60 different varieties of the grain were grown in the Andean highlands and virtually all quinoa was organic. Today, unbridled trade and large-scale production on large farms has reduced biodiversity to fewer than 20 different types.

The forecasts of the market research A study commissioned by the Trade for Development Center in 2016 on current and future markets for quinoa indicates that in ten years it is very likely that the global market will double, especially with conventional quinoa produced not only in Peru, but also in Australia, the United States and Canada. The production of organic quinoa, produced by small farmers in the highlands, will remain relatively stable. The skill The market will continue to be fierce, so farmers in the highlands will have to look for measures that will allow them to continue maintaining a market niche with certified organic quinoa, grown from traditional and fair trade methods.