From both shores, the 24 partner countries are seeking greater partnership South-South, but progress is slow

If NATO is in the North Atlantic, in the South Atlantic there is ZOPACAS (South Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation). Without repeating the model NATO's military club, ZOPACAS has as its goal cooperation in subject security and defence, but also the partnership for the development endogenous to the region. Created in 1986, the organization is an interesting forum for addressing common problems, but it lacks mechanisms for greater engagement.

▲ Countries that are part of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic [Wikimedia]

article / Alejandro Palacios

In recent decades, the proliferation of South-South cooperation forums has highlighted the desire of many countries around the world to seek their development and the partnership without the tutelage or interference historically exercised by the most industrialized countries. The goal has been the articulation of new forms of association to guarantee the independence of the South in its relations with the North and to promote a genuine development, without incurring the old imbalances.

In this context, the South Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation (ZOPACAS, also known as ZPCAS) was created in 1986 at the initiative of Brazil. It is a transcontinental consultative organization, composed of 24 countries on both sides of the Atlantic,1 and endorsed by the United Nations Assembly in resolution 41/11.

The organization was formed in the final stretch of the Cold War, a time during which some countries sought ways of cooperation outside the bipolar distribution of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was also born at a time when Angola and Brazil were becoming important regional players due to the high presence of hydrocarbons in their territories. Hence the need to create greater security conditions in the area so that economic operations by sea could be carried out with as little uncertainty as possible.

However, the growth and development of ZOPACAS was progressive, both in terms of the institutional aspect and in terms of the number of members. Of particular note is the case of South Africa, which did not join the organization until it put an end to its Apartheid policy. The incorporation of South Africa at the Brasilia summit in 1994 increased the prestige of the organization and marked the end of its constitution process.

Even so, ZOPACAS still lacked maturity at the institutional level. In the meeting in Montevideo in 2013, its members agreed to meet annually on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly and create a group of contact which, in addition to implementing the decisions adopted in the meetings, also coordinates issues relevant to the area related to peace and cooperation.

In the short term, ZOPACAS made significant progress towards peace and security in the South Atlantic. One of the most noteworthy concerns the signature in 1996 of the Treaty of Pelindaba (African Treaty for training of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone), which made Africa, following South Africa's accession,2 the third nuclear-free zone in the world. The move followed the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which made Latin America and the Caribbean the first nuclear-free region.

Re-emergence?

Despite his remarkable achievements in subject peace and security, ZOPACAS is currently in a status lack of momentum. While it is true that some analysts speak of re-emergence, others say that in order for the organization to re-emerge it must first undergo an institutional restructuring that allows it to better face the threats and challenges posed by the new geopolitical realities.

As mentioned, the aspirations for the revival of the organization are based on a greater importance of maritime trade, on the exploitation of the new oil fields under Brazil's deep waters (pre-salt layer), and on the need to protect maritime transport against piracy, among other issues. Split the director of the South American Defense School, Antonio Jorge Ramalho, all this is increasing the geopolitical importance of the South Atlantic region, which would make ZOPACAS a "tool ready to be used in case there is a perception of threat in the area" that puts at risk the extraction and trade of the region's raw materials.

However, there are also risks associated with a possible re-emergence of ZOPACAS. Paradoxically, these have to do with greater interference by countries in the Northern Hemisphere, some of which have expressed the intention of extending their area of action to the South Atlantic. France has the purpose to expand its influence from French Guiana, while Russia has already received approval from Equatorial Guinea to use the country's main port.

It is clear that the zone of peace and cooperation has the capacity to counteract that influence, primarily by increasing the partnership among the South Atlantic States. To make this happen, the area It has two defining characteristics: the fact that it is a fairly peaceful area per se and the fact that most of the countries involved have economies based on natural resources and commodity exports. These factors may encourage a cooperation that is more than necessary to fend off the alleged Western interference.

While, therefore, the ability to development of ZOPACAS is clear, it must be borne in mind that the organization does not currently have an institutional structure capable of promote synergies and cooperative practices in an effective way. In fact, some analysts argue that, contrary to what should be happening, countries are showing less and less interest in the project, as evidenced by the frequent absence of country presidents from the meetings of the Organization.

Thus, it can be concluded that both because of the lack of material resources and because of the consultative nature of the organization, ZOPACAS has not been able to project sufficient influence to become a leading organization. reference letter international. He's had more short-term success, in subject peace and security, but it is struggling to establish long-term economic cooperation. Greater commitment is therefore required on the part of the Member States in order to solidify a project necessary not only for peace and security in the region, but also for the political, economic and energy independence of the South Atlantic States.

(1) These are: Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo and Uruguay.

(2) The case of South Africa is interesting because it is the first and only country to date that, after having developed the nuclear bomb, decreed the complete dismantling of its nuclear programme after the signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991.

Did the Provisional IRA lose its 'Long War'? Why are dissident Republicans fighting now?

ESSAY / María Granados Machimbarrena

In 1998, the Belfast Agreement or Good Friday Agreement marked the development of the political relations between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom. Several writers, politicians and academics claimed the British had won the 'Long War'. (1)

However, according to other scholars and politicians(2), the armed struggle has not left the region. The following paper delves into the question as to whether the war is over, and attempts to give an explanation to the ultimate quest of dissident Republicans.

On the one hand, Aaron Edwards, a scholar writing on the Operation Banner and counter- insurgency, states that Northern Ireland was a successful peace process, a transformation from terrorism to democratic politics. He remarks that despite the COIN being seen as a success, the disaster was barely evaded in the 1970s.(3) The concept of 'fighting the last war', meaning the repetition of the strategy or tactic that was used to win the previous war(4), portrays Edward's critique on the Operation. The latter was based on trials and tests undertaken in the post-war period, but the IRA also studied past interventions from the British military. The insurgents' focus on the development of a citizen defence force and the support of the community, added to the elusive Human Intelligence, turned the 'one-size-fits-all' British strategy into a failure. The British Army thought that the opponents' defeat would bring peace, and it disregarded the people-centric approach such a war required. The 'ability to become fish in a popular sea', the need to regain, retain and build the loyalty and trust of the Irish population was the main focus since 1976, when the role of the police was upgraded and the Army became in charge of its support. The absence of a political framework to restore peace and stability, the lack of flexibility, and the rise of sectarianism, a grave partner-economic phenomenon that fuelled the overall discontent, could have ended on a huge disaster. Nonetheless, Edwards argues the peace process succeeded because of the contribution of the Army and the political constraints imposed to it.(5)

In 2014, writer and veteran journalist Peter Taylor claimed that the British had won the war in Northern Ireland. He supported his statement through two main arguments: the disappearance of the IRA and the absence of unity between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Former Minister Peter Robinson (DUP Party) firmly rejected the idea of such a union ever occurring: 'It just isn't going to happen'. Ex-hunger striker Gerard Hodgins was utterly unyielding in attitude, crying: 'We lost. (...) The IRA are too clever to tell the full truth of what was actually negotiated. And unionists are just too stupid to recognise the enormity of what they have achieved in bringing the IRA to a negotiated settlement which accepts the six-county state.' They were all contested by Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams, a political fighter and defender of a united Ireland, and Hutchinson, who stated that the republicans were fighting a cultural battle to eradicate Britishness. He agreed that the war had changed in how it was being fought, "but it is still a war" he concluded. (6) Former IRA commander McIntyre disagrees, in his book he suggests that the PIRA(7) is on its death bed. So is the army council that plotted its campaign. 'If the IRA ever re-emerges, it will be a new organisation with new people'. (8)

There is an important point that most of the above-mentioned leaders fail to address: the so- called cultural battle, which is indeed about the conquest of 'hearts and minds'. Scholars(9) find there is a deep misunderstanding of the core of republicanism among politicians and disbelievers of the anti-GFA groups' strength. In fact, there has been an increase on the number of attacks, as well as on the Provisional movement's incompetence. Historical examples show that the inability to control the population, the opponent's motivation, or the average leads to defeat. E.g.: C.W. Gwynn realised of the importance of intelligence and propaganda, and H. Simson coined the term 'sub-war', or the dual use of terror and propaganda to undermine the government. (10) T.E. Lawrence also wrote about psychological warfare. He cited Von der Goltz on one particular occasion, quoting 'it was necessary not to annihilate the enemy, but to break his courage.' (11)

On the other hand, Radford follows the line of Frenett and Smith, demonstrating that the armed struggle has not left Northern Ireland. There are two main arguments that support their view: (1) Multiple groups decline the agreement and (2) Social networks strengthen a traditional-minded Irish Republican constituency, committed to pursue their goals.

In the aftermath of the GFA, the rejectionist group PIRA fragmented off and the RIRA was born. The contention of what is now called RIRA (Real IRA) is that such a body should always exist to challenge Great Britain militarily. Their aim is to subvert and to put an end to the Peace Process, whilst rejecting any other form of republicanism. Moreover, their dual strategy supported the creation of the political pressure group 32CSM. (12) Nonetheless, after the Omagh bombing in 1998, there was a decline in the military effectiveness of the RIRA. Several events left the successor strategically and politically aimless: A new terrorism law, an FBI penetration, and a series of arrests and arms finds. (13) In spite of what seemed to be a defeat, it was not the end of the group. In 2007, the RIRA rearmed itself, an on-going trend that tries to imitate PIRA's war and prevents the weaponry from going obsolete. In addition, other factions re-emerged: The Continuity IRA (CIRA), weaker than the RIRA, was paralysed in 2010 after a successful penetration by the security forces. Notwithstanding, it is still one of the richest organisations in the world. Secondly, the Oglaigh na hEireann (ONH) is politically aligned with the RSF and the RNU. They have not been very popular on the political arena, but they actively contest seats in the council. (14)

In 2009, the Independent Monitoring Commission acknowledged an increase in 'freelance dissidents', who are perceived as a growing threat, numbers ranging between 400-500. The reason behind it is the highly interconnected network of traditional republican families. Studies also show that 14% of nationalists can sympathetically justify the use of republican violence. Other factors worth mentioning include: A growing presence of older men and women with paramilitary experience; an increase of coordination and cooperation between the groups; an improvement in capability and technical knowledge, evidenced by recent activities. (15)

In 2014, a relatively focused and coherent IRA ('New IRA') emerged, with poor political support and a lack of funding, but reaching out to enough irredentists to cause a potential trouble in a not so distant future.

Conclusion

Von Bülow predicted: '[Our consequence of the foregoing Exposition, is, that] small States, in the future, will no more vanquish great ones, but on the contrary will finally become a Pray to them". (16) One could argue that it is the case with Northern Ireland.

Although according to him, number and organisation are essential to an army,(17) the nature of the war makes it difficult to fight in a conventional way. (18) Most documents agree that the war against the (P)IRA must be fought with a counterinsurgency strategy, since, as O'Neill thoughtfully asserts, 'to understand most terrorism, we must first understand insurgency.' In the 1960s, such strategies began to stress the combination of political, military, social, psychological, and economic measures. (19) This holistic approach to the conflict would be guided by political action, as many scholars put forward in counterinsurgency manuals (e.g.: Galula citing Mao Zedong's '[R]evolutionary war is 80 per cent political action and only 20 per cent military'.( 20) Jackson suggests that the target of the security apparatus may not be the destruction of the insurgency, but the prevention of the organisation from configuring its scenario through violence. Therefore, after the security forces dismantle the PIRA, a larger and more heavy response should be undertaken on the political arena to render it irrelevant. (21)

One of the main dangers such an insurgency poses to the UK in the long term is the re-opening of the revolutionary war, according to the definition given by Shy and Collier. (22) Besides, the risks of progression through repression is its reliance on four fragile branches, i.e.: Intelligence, propaganda, the secret services and the police. (23) The latter's coordination was one of the causes of the fall of the PIRA, as aforementioned, and continues to be essential: '(...) these disparate groups of Republicans must be kept in perspective and they are unlikely, in the short term at least, to wield the same military muscle as PIRA (...), and much of that is due to the efforts of the PSNI, M15 and the British Army' maintains Radford. Thus, 'Technical and physical intelligence gathering are vital to fighting terrorists, but it must be complemented by good policing'.

Hence, unless the population is locally united; traditional, violent republican ideas are rejected, and the enemy remains fragmented, the remnants of the 'Long War' are likely to persist and cause trouble to those who ignore the current trends. There is an urgent need to understand the strong ideology behind the struggle. As the old Chinese saying goes: 'It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred battles'. (24)

1. Writer and veteran journalist Peter Taylor, Former Minister Peter Robinson (DUP Party), ex-IRA hunger striker Gerard Hodgins, and former IRA commander and Ph.D. Anthony McIntyre.

2. M. Radford, Ross Frenett and M.L.R. Smith, as well as PUP leader Billy Hutchinson and Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams.

3. Edwards, Aaron. "Lessons Learned? Operation Banner and British Counter-Insurgency Strategy" International Security and Military History, 116-118.

4. Greene, Robert, The 33 Strategies of War. Penguin Group, 2006.

5. Edwards, Aaron. L.C.

6. Who Won the War? [Documentary]. United Kingdom, BBC. First aired on Sep 2014.

7. Provisional WRATH


8. McIntyre, Anthony. Good Friday: The Death of Irish Republicanism, 2008.

9. E.g.: R. Frenett, M. L. R. Smith.

10. Pratten, Garth. "Major General Sir Charles Gwynn: Soldier of the Empire, father of British counter- insurgency?" International Security and Military History, 114-115.

11. Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. New York: Anchor, 1991.

12. 'The 32 County Sovereignty Movement'

13. For instance, Freddie Scappatticci, the IRA's head of internal security, was exposed as a British military intelligence agent in 2003.

14. Radford, Mark. 'The Dissident IRA: Their 'War' Continues' The British Army Review 169: Spring/ Summer 2017, 43-49 f.f.

15. 'Terrorists continue to plot, attack and build often ingenious and quite deadly devices' Ibidem.

16. Von Bülow, Dietrich Heinrich. 'The Spirit of the Modern System of War'. Chapter I, p. 189. Cambridge University Press, Published October 2014.

17. Von Bülow, D.H., l.c. P. 193 Chapter II.

18. Indeed, some authors will define it as an 'unconventional war'. E.g.: 'revolutionary war aims at the liquidation of the existing power structure and at a transformation in the structure of society.' Heymann, Hans H. and Whitson W. W., 'Can and Should the United States Preserve A Military Capability for Revolutionary Conflict?' Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Ca., 1972, p. 5.p. 54.

19. O'Neill, Board E. Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005. Chapter 1: Insurgency in the Contemporary World.

20. Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger, 1964.

21. Jackson, B. A., 2007, 'Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a "Long War": The British Experience in Northern Ireland.' January-February issue, Military Review, RAND Corporation.

22. 'Revolutionary War refers to the seizure of political power by the use of armed force'. Shy, John and Thomas W. Collier. "Revolutionary War" in Peter Paret, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986.

23. Luttwak, Edward. (2002). Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Cambridge, US: Belknap Press.

24. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Attack By Stratagem 3.18.

Bibliography

Edwards, Aaron. Lessons Learned? Operation Banner and British Counter-Insurgency Strategy International Security and Military History, 116-118.

Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger, 1964.

Greene, Robert. The 33 Strategies of War. Penguin Group, 2006.


Heymann, Hans H. and Whitson W. W.. Can and Should the United States Preserve A Military Capability for Revolutionary Conflict? (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Ca., 1972), p. 5.p. 54.

International Monitoring Commission (IMC), Irish and British governments report on the IRA army council's existence, 2008.


Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. New York: Anchor, 1991.


Luttwak, Edward. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Cambridge, US: Belknap Press, 2002.

McIntyre, Anthony. Good Friday: The Death of Irish Republicanism, 2008.


O'Neill, Board E.. Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005.


Pratten, Garth. Major General Sir Charles Gwynn: Soldier of the Empire, father of British counter-insurgency? International Security and Military History, 114-115.


Radford, Mark. The Dissident IRA: Their 'War' Continues The British Army Review 169: Spring/Summer 2017, 43-49.


Ross Frenett and M.L.R. Smith. IRA 2.0: Continuing the Long War—Analyzing the Factors Behind Anti-GFA Violence, Published online, June 2012.


Sepp, Kalev I.. Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Military Review 85, 3 (May-Jun 2005), 8-12.


Sun Tzu, S. B. Griffith. The Art of War. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. Print.


Taylor, Peter. Who Won the War? [Documentary]. United Kingdom, BBC. First aired on Sep 2014.


Thompson, Robert. Defeating Communist Insurgency. St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005.


Von Bülow, Dietrich Heinrich. The Spirit of the Modern System of War. Cambridge University Press, Published October 2014.

ESSAY / Blake Bierman

The Common Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy (CFSDP) of the European Union today acts a chameleonic hybrid of objectives and policies that attempt to resolve a plethora of threats faced by the EU. In a post 9/11 security framework, any acting policy measure must simultaneously answer to a wide array of political demands from member states and bureaucratic constraints from Brussels. As a result, the urgent need for consolidation and coherency in a common, digestible narrative has evolved into a single EU Global Strategy that boldly attempts to address today's most pressing security whilst proactively deterring those of tomorrow. In this analysis, I will first present a foundational perspective on the external context of the policy areas. Next, I will interpret the self-perception of the EU within such a context and its role(s) within. Thirdly, I will identify the key interests, goals, and values of the EU and assess their incorporation into policy. I will then weigh potential resources and strategies the EU may utilize in enacting and enforcing said policies. After examining the aforementioned variables, I will end my assessment by weighing the strengths and weaknesses of both the EU's Strategic Vision and Reflection Paper while identifying preferences within the two narratives.

EU in an External Context: A SWOT Analysis

When it comes to examining the two perspectives presented, the documents must be viewed from their correlative timelines. The first document, "From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1," (I will refer to this as the Implementation paper) serves as a realist review of ongoing action within the EU's three policy clusters in detailing the beginning stages of integrated approach and outlook towards the internal-external nexus along with an emphasized role of public diplomacy in the mix. On the other hand, the second document, "Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence," (I will refer to this as the Reflection paper) acts more so as a planning guide to define the potential frameworks for policies going forward into 2025. Once these documents are viewed within their respective timelines, a balanced "SWOT" analysis can assess the similarities and divergences of the options they present. Overwhelmingly, the theme of cooperation acts as a fundamental staple in both documents. In my opinion, this acts a force for unification and solidarity amongst member states from not only the point of view of common interest in all three policy areas, but also as a reminder of the benefits in the impact and cost of action as prescribed in the UN and NATO cases. Both documents seem to expand the EU's context in terms of scope as embracing the means and demands for security in a global lens. The documents reinforce that in a globalized world, threats and their responses require an approach that extends beyond EU borders, and therefore a strong, coherent policy voice is needed to bring together member states and allies alike to defeat them.

Examining the divergences, much is left to be desired as far as the risks and opportunities are presented. In my perspective, I believe this was constructed purposefully as an attempt to leave the both areas as open as possible to allow for member states to interpret them in the context of their own narratives. In short, member state cohesion at literally every policy inroad proves to be the proverbial double-edged sword as the single largest risk and opportunity tasked by the organisation. I think that the incessant rehashing of the need to stress state sovereignty at every turn while glamorizing the benefits of a single market and economies of scale identifies a bipolar divide in both documents that seems yet to be bridged by national sentiments even in the most agreeable of policy areas like diplomacy. The discord remains all but dependent on the tide of political discourse at the national level for years to come as the pace maker to materialize sufficient commitments in everything from budgets to bombs in order to achieve true policy success.

Who is the EU? Self-Perception and Potential Scenarios

After understanding the external context of the EU policy areas, we now turn to the element of self-perception and the roles of the EU as an international actor. Examining the relationship between the two stands as a crucial understanding of policy formulation as central to the core identity to the EU and vice versa. In this case, both documents provide key insight as to the position of the EU in a medium-term perspective. From the Implementation Paper, we see a humbled approach that pushes the EU to evolve from a regional, reactionary actor to a proactive, world power. The paper hones in on the legal roots and past successes of an integrated approach outside EU borders as a calling to solidify the Union's mark as a vital organ for peace and defence. The paper then broadens such an identity to incorporate the elements of NATO and the UN cooperation as a segmenting role for member states contributions, such as intelligence collection and military technology/cyber warfare. In the Reflection Paper, I think the tone and phrasing speak more to the self-perceptions of individual citizens. The emotive language for the promotion of a just cause attitude stands reinforced by the onslaught of harmonizing buzzwords throughout the paper and the three scenarios such as "joint, collaborative, solidarity, shared, common, etc.". In my perspective, such attempts draw in the need to reinforce, protect, and preserve a common identity both at home and abroad. This formation speaks to the development of both military and civilian capabilities as a means of securing and maintaining a strong EU position in the global order while supplementing the protection of what is near and dear at home.

Policy Today: Interests, Goals, and Values

When developing a coherent line of key interests, goals, and values across three focal policy structures, the EU makes strategic use of public perception as a litmus test to guide policy narratives. In the Reflection Paper, indications clearly point to a heightened citizen concern over immigration and terrorism from 2014-2016 taking clear priority over economic issues as the continent recovers. Such a reshuffling may pave the way for once-apprehensive politicians to re-examine budgeting priorities. Such a mandate could very well be the calling national governments need to allocate more of their defence spending to the EU while also ramping up domestic civilian and military infrastructure to contribute to common policy goals. Extending this notion of interest-based contributions over to the goals themselves, I think that member states are slowly developing the political will to see that a single market for defence ultimately becomes more attractive to the individual tax payer when all play a part. As the Reflection Paper explains, this can be translated as free/common market values with the development of economies of scale, boosted production, and increased competition. In each of the three scenarios outlined, the values act as matched components to these goals and interests. Therefore, readers retain a guiding set of "principles" as the basis for the plan's "actions" and "capabilities." The alignment of interests, goals, and values remains a difficult but necessary target in all policy areas, as the final results have significant influence over the perception of publics that indirectly vote the policies into place. In my perspective, a lack of coherence between the three and the policies could be a potential pitfall for policy objectives as lost faith by the public may sink the voter appetite for future defense spending and action.

Making it Happen: Resources and Strategies

As the balance between the EU's ways and means become a focal point for any CFSDP discussion, I wanted to enhance the focus between the resources and strategies to examine the distribution between EU and member state competencies. When it comes to resources in all three policy areas, individual member states' own infrastructures become front and centre. Even in the "collaborative" lens of a 21st century EU, foreign affairs, defence, and security mainly revolve as apparatuses of a state. Therefore, in order to achieve a common strategy, policy must make a concerted effort to maximize collective utilization of state assets while respecting state sovereignty. In the Reflection paper, an attempt to consolidate the two by bolstering the EU's own defence budget acts as a middle ground. In this regard, I think the biggest opportunity for the EU to retain its own resources remains in technology. States are simply more eager to share their military tech than they are their own boots on the ground. Similarly, technology and its benefits are more easily transferrable between member states and the EU. Just as well, selling the idea of technology research to taxpayers that may one day see the fruits of such labor in civilian applications is an easier pill to swallow for politicians than having to justify the use of a state's limited and precious human military capital for an EU assignment not all may agree with. A type of "technological independence" the third scenario implies would optimally direct funding in a manner that balances state military capacity where it acts best while joining the common strategy for EU technological superiority that all member states can equally benefit from.

Narratives and Norms: A Final Comparison

After reviewing the progress made in the Implementation Paper and balancing it with the goals set forth in the Reflection paper, it remains clear that serious decisions towards the future of EU CFSDP still need to be made. The EU Global Strategy treads lightly on the most important topics for voters like immigration and terrorism that remain works in progress under the program's steps for "resilience" and the beginnings of an integrated approach. That being said, my perspective in this program lens remains that the role and funding of public diplomacy unfortunately remains undercut by the giant umbrella of security and defense. To delve into the assessment of counterterrorism policy as a solely defensive measure does a disservice to the massive, existing network of EU diplomatic missions serving abroad that effectively act as proactive anti-terrorism measures in themselves. At the same time, supplementing funding to public diplomacy programs would take some of the pressure off member states to release their military capabilities for joint use. In this facet, I empathize with the member state politician and voter in their apprehensiveness to serve as the use of force in even the most justifiable situations. A refocus on funding in the diplomacy side is a cost effective alternative and investment that member states can make to reduce the likelihood that their troops will need to serve abroad on behalf of the EU. The success of diplomacy can be seen in areas like immigration, where the Partnership Framework on Migration has attempted to work with countries of origin to stabilize governments and assist civilians.

Turning the page to the Reflection Paper, I think much is left to be desired in terms of the development of the three scenarios. Once again, the scenario parameters are purposefully vague to effectively sell the plan to a wide variety of narratives. At the same time, I found it reprehensible that despite the massive rhetoric to budgetary concerns, none of the three scenarios incorporated any type of estimate fiscal dimension to compare and contrast the visions. Obviously, the contributions of member states will vary widely but I think that a concerted campaign to incentivize a transparent contribution table in terms financing, military assets, diplomatic assets, or (ideally) a combination of the three would see a more realpolitik approach to what the EU does and does not possess in the capacity to achieve in these policy areas. Ultimately, I believe that Scenario C "Common Defense and Security" retains the most to offer member states while effectively balancing the contributions and competencies equally. I think that the scenario utiles the commitments to NATO and reinforces the importance of technological independence. As such, the importance of a well-defined plan to develop and maintain cutting-edge technology in all three policy areas cannot be overstated and, in my opinion, will become not only the most common battlefield, but also the critical one as the world enters into a 21st century of cyber warfare.

WORKS CITED

European Union (2016). From Shared Vision to Common Action: The EU's Global Strategic Vision: Year 1.

European Union (2016). Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence.

The Fleet was restored in 2008 due to Venezuela's geopolitical alliances

Of the U.S. naval forces, the Sixth and Seventh Fleets — based in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, respectively — have traditionally been the most in the news. Usually the Fourth Fleet goes unnoticed. In fact, it barely has any staff, and when you need boats you have to borrow them from other units. However, its restoration in 2008, after being deactivated in 1950, indicates that Washington does not want to neglect security in the Caribbean in the face of moves by Russia and China.

▲The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower arriving in 2010 in Mayport, Florida [US Navy]

article / Dania del Carmen [English version]

The Fourth Fleet is part of the U.S. Southern Command . It is located in Mayport, Florida, and its area of operations are the waters that bathe Central and South America. The ships that are based in Mayport do not strictly belong to the base and there are currently none deployed in the waters of the region. The staff The fleet is stationed at approximately 160 people, including military, federal civilians and contractors. They work at the headquarters of the U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (USNAVSO). The commander of Southern Command is also commander of the Fourth Fleet, currently Rear Adm. Sean S. Buck.

It was originally established in 1943, during World War II, to protect the United States from German naval actions, both surface attacks and blockade operations and submarine incursions. After the war ended in 1945, the FOURTHFLT remained active until 1950. At that time, his area was handed over to the Second Fleet, which had just been established to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). [1]

The Fourth Fleet was reactivated in 2008, during the presidency of George W. Bush, as a reaction to possible threats stemming from anti-American sentiment promoted by then-Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. During that time, Venezuela received loans from Russia for the purchase of weapons and for the development of the country. development Venezuelan military. In 2008, Venezuela conducted a joint naval exercise with Russia in the Caribbean as a way of supporting Russia's intentions to increase its geopolitical presence, in counterweight to the power of the United States.

The fact that Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador had an ideology similar to Venezuela's reinforced Washington's conviction to reactivate the fleet, as a reminder that the United States maintained its interest in being the sole military power in the Western Hemisphere. Although the U.S. territory could hardly be threatened, preventing any status free access to the Panama Canal has been a permanent task for the Southern Command. In recent years, Russia has sought to expand its military presence in the Americas, through particular relations with Cuba and Nicaragua, while China has increased its military presence . investments in the area of the Panama Canal.

Current Activity

According to the USNAVSO/FOURTHFLT website In your section from "mission statement", the Fourth Fleet "employs maritime forces in cooperative maritime security operations to maintain access, improve interoperability, and establish lasting partnerships that foster regional security in the region." area responsibility of USSOUTHCOM." As mentioned, when ships and other equipment are assigned to SOUTHCOM and the Fourth Fleet, they are provided by other U.S. Navy commands with broader geographic responsibilities, based in other parts of the world.

FOURTHFLT has three main lines of action: maritime security operations, security cooperation activities and contingency operations.

—In terms of its maritime security operations, it currently provides maritime forces to Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South) in support of Operation MARTILLO. JIATF South "conducts detection and monitoring (D&M) operations throughout its area joint operation to facilitate the interdiction of illicit trafficking in support of national security and the partner nation." It utilizes the resources of the Fourth Fleet or temporarily employs other assets, such as the USS George Washington Carrier Strike Group or individual ships from other fleets such as Norfolk, VA Fleet Forces Command, or the Third Fleet, based in San Diego, California. For its part, Operation MARTILLO is mainly aimed at combating international drug trafficking, improving regional security and promote peace, stability and prosperity in Central and South America. As part of Operation MARTILLO, in a joint operation with the U.S. Coast Guard, the USS Vandegrift stopped a suspicious vessel off the coast of Central America in 2014. The staff security found nearly 2,000 pounds of cocaine. Most recently, in January 2015, the USS Gary and the U.S. Coast Guard seized more than 1.6 tons of cocaine from a fast vessel. However, the Fourth Fleet's absence of dedicated assets demonstrates that its counternarcotics missions are a lower priority for the U.S. Navy, though they are significantly less demanding, operationally.

As far as security cooperation activities are concerned, the two main events of participation with other nations are the UNITAS and PANAMAX exercises. UNITAS was conceived in 1959 and first realized in 1960. It is an annual exercise whose purpose is to demonstrate the United States' commitment to the region and to maintaining strong relationships with its partners. PANAMAX dates back to 2003 and has become one of the largest multinational training exercises in the world. It is primarily focused on ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal, one of the most strategic and economically important infrastructure in the world.

"Finally, the Fleet is always ready to carry out contingency operations: basically attendance humanitarian and financial aid in the event of a disaster. The U.S. Navy's hospital ship regularly travels throughout the area of the Caribbean and Central America to provide humanitarian support. In the framework As part of the Continuing Promise 2015 program, the Comfort visited a total of 11 countries, from Guatemala to Dominica, performing procedures such as general surgery, ophthalmic surgery, veterinary services and training in public health. The vessel previously participated in the 2007, 2009 and 2011 programs.

Objectives met at reasonable cost

As an integrated part of U.S. Southern Command, the Fourth Fleet has been involved in major humanitarian operations, such as the response to the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010. FOURTHFLT had naval command in Operation Unified Response, which was the largest contingency response in the world. attendance humanitarian and financial aid in disasters.

The budget for these missions, it does not depend only on the Navy, as stated by a spokesperson for the Southern Command, but there is also a contribution of resources from "other U.S. entities, such as the Coast Guard and the Customs and Border Protection agency, which also provide platforms and forces, both maritime and air, which are core topic for the support of those missions. So, we're looking for a good counterweight of expense-reward."

In addition to carrying out effective humanitarian actions, at a limited economic cost, the Fourth Fleet also fulfils the purpose that the United States has a significant military presence in the Western Hemisphere in the eyes of Latin American and Caribbean states, and also of superpowers such as Russia and China.

1. The Second Fleet was deactivated in 2011 and re-established in 2018.

2. REICH, Simon and DOMBROWSKI, Peter. The End of Grand Strategy. US Maritime Operations In the 21st Century. Cornell University Press. Ithaca, NY, 2017. p. 144

[Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski, The End of Grand Strategy. US Maritime Operations In the 21st Century. Cornell University Press. Ithaca, NY, 2017. 238 pages]

review / Emili J. Blasco

The concept of Grand Strategy is not univocal. In its most abstract sense, used in the field of geopolitics, the Grand Strategy refers to the geopolitical imperatives of a country and determines what a state must necessarily do in order to achieve its success. purpose primary and fundamental in their relationship with others, usually in terms of power. In a minor Degree In abstraction, the Grand Strategy is understood as the principle that should govern the way in which a country deals with conflicts on the international stage. This is what, in the case of the United States, is often referred to as the Doctrine of a President and aspires to create a rule for the response, especially the military one, that must be given to the challenges and threats that arise.

This second, more concrete sense is used in The End of Grand Strategy. Its authors do not question that there are geopolitical imperatives that should mark a certain action of the United States, constant over time, but that it is intended to provide a unique strategic response to the variety of security risks that the country faces. "Strategies need to be calibrated in a timely manner. agreement with operational circumstances. They exist in the plural, not in a singular grand strategy," warn Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski, professors at Rutgers University and the Naval War College, respectively, and both experts on defense affairs.

For both authors, "the notion of a grand strategy implies the vain search of order and coherence in an increasingly complex world", "the very idea of a single grand strategy that serves everything is of little use in the twenty-first century. In fact, it's often counterproductive."

Despite the doctrines that are sometimes invoked in some presidencies, in reality different strategic approaches often coexist in the same mandate or there are even specific strategies that transcend presidencies. "The U.S. does not favor a dominant strategy, nor can it," Reich and Dombrowski warn.

"The concept of grand strategy is discussion in Washington, in academia and in the media in the 'singular' rather than the 'plural'. The implication is that there is a path to securing U.S. interests in a complicated world. Debaters even tend to accept a fundamental premise: that the United States has the ability to control events, and that in this way it can afford to be inelastic in the face of a changing and increasingly challenging strategic environment," the two authors write.

The book examines U.S. military operations so far this century, focusing on naval operations. As a maritime power, it is in this domain that the actions of the United States have the greatest strategic expression. The result of that review is a list of six strategies, grouped into three types, that the U.S. has operated "in parallel" and "out of necessity."

1. Hegemony. It is based on the global dominance of the United States: a) primacist forms are commonly associated with American unilateralism, which in the twenty-first century has included the neoconservative variant of nation building (Iraq and Afghanistan); b) leadership strategy or "cooperative security" is based on the traditional coalition in which the United States assumes the role of first inter par; it seeks to ensure greater legitimacy for U.S. policies (military exercises with Asian partners).

2. sponsorshiptags. It involves the provision of material and moral resources in support of policies basically advocated and initiated by other actors: a) formal strategies, which are specifically authorized by law and international protocols (partnership against pirates and terrorists); (b) informal strategies, which respond to the request of a loose coalition of states or other entrepreneurs rather than being authorized by intergovernmental organizations (catches at sea).

3. Entrenchment: a) isolationism wants to withdraw U.S. forces from the instructions reducing U.S. commitments in international alliances and reassuring U.S. control through strict border control (a barrier against drug trafficking from South America); b) containment, which implies selective participation or balancing from outside (Arctic).

The description of all these different actions shows that, in the face of the approach As a theorist looking for a unifying principle, there are actually a variety of situations, as the military knows. "Military planners, by contrast, recognize that a variety of circumstances require a menu of strategic choices," say Reich and Dombrowski. U.S. policy, in the internship, does not replicate any single strategy. It reflects all of them, with the application of different strategic approaches, depending on the circumstances."

The authors conclude that "if observers were to accept that no grand strategy is capable of prescribing responses to all threats to U.S. security, they would necessarily recognize that the purpose The primary part of a grand strategy is only rhetoric – a statement of values and principles that lack operational utility." "By definition, the design The architectural structure of any single, abstract strategy is relatively rigid, if not static in fact – intellectually, conceptually, analytically, and organizationally. And yet that one grand strategy is expected to work in a context that demands enormous adaptability and routinely punishes rigidity. The military leadership is far more aware than academics or politicians of this inherent problem."

What are the benefits of a plurality of calibrated strategies? According to the authors, it underscores to politicians and citizens the limits of U.S. power, sample that the U.S. is also influenced by global forces that it cannot fully control and tempers expectations about what U.S. military power can achieve.

COMMENTARY / Daniel Andrés Llonch

Cyberspace has established itself as a new domain in which the security of States and their citizens is decided. On the one hand, attacks no longer have to involve the employment armaments; On the other hand, non-military actions, such as certain operations of interference in the affairs of other countries, can be especially effective given the access to millions of people that information technologies allow.

These capabilities have contributed to a climate of growing mistrust among world powers, characterized by mutual accusations, cover-ups and secrecy, since cyberspace makes it possible to conceal the origin of aggression to a large extent. That makes it difficult to mission statement of the State to protect national interests and complicates its management of individual freedoms (the tension between security and privacy).

The governments of Russia and China have frequently been singled out by the West as sponsors of cyberattacks aimed at damaging sensitive computer networks and stealing data confidential transactions of both individuals and companies, and operations aimed at influencing world opinion. In the case of China, the activities of secret units dependent on the People's Liberation Army have been targeted; in the Russian case, organizations such as Fancy Bear are mentioned, behind which many see directly the hand of the Kremlin.

The latter agents are blamed for Russian cyberattacks or interference in Europe and the United States, whose goal it is to destabilize those powers and diminish their capacity for global influence. There are several sources that suggest that these organizations have intervened in processes such as Brexit, the presidential elections in the United States or the separatist process in Catalonia. This activity of influence, radicalization and mobilization would have been carried out through the management of social networks and also possibly through the use of the Dark Web and the Deep Web.

One of the most prominent organizations in this activity is Fancy Bear, also known as APT28 and linked by various means to the Russian military intelligence agency. The group serves the interests of the Russian government, with activities that include support for certain candidates and personalities in foreign countries, as happened in the last elections to the White House. It operates many times through what is called Advanced Persistent Threat or APT, which consists of continuous hacking of a given system through computer hacking.

Although an APT is normally addressed to private organizations or States, either for commercial reasons or for political interests, it can also have the following characteristics: goal citizens who are perceived as enemies of the Kremlin. Behind these actions is not a lone hacker or a small hacker. group of people, but a whole organization, of very vast dimensions.

Fancy Bear and other similar groups have been linked to the dissemination of confidential information stolen from world banks, the World Anti-Doping Agency, NATO, and the electoral process in France and Germany. They were also credited with an action against the network in which there was theft of data and extensive spying over a long period of time.

The European Union has been one of the first international actors to announce measures in this regard, consisting of a considerable increase in the budget to strengthen cybersecurity and increase research by technicians and specialists in this field. The new figure of the Data Protection Officer (DPO) is also being created, which is the person in charge of overseeing all issues related to the protection of data and your privacy.

The sophistication of the Internet and at the same time its vulnerability have also given rise to a status of insecurity in the network. Anonymity makes it possible to perpetrate criminal activities that know no borders, neither physical nor virtual: this is cybercrime. This was confirmed on May 12, 2017 with the Wannacry virus, which affected millions of people worldwide.

Reality, then, warns us of the dimension that the problem has acquired: it speaks to us of a real risk. Society is increasingly connected to the network, which, together with the advantages of all kinds that this entails, also implies a exhibition cybercrime. Hackers can use our data personal data and the information we share for their own purposes: sometimes as a way of blackmail or as a key to access fields of the subject's privacy; other times that private content is sold. The fact is that the magnitudes to which such a problem can reach are overwhelming. If one of the world's leading security agencies, the U.S. National Security Agency, has result hacked, what should simple users expect, who in their innocence and ignorance are vulnerable and usable subjects?

Added to the problem is the progressive improvement of the techniques and methods used: identity theft and viruses are created for mobile phones, computer systems, programs, emails and downloads. In other words, there are few areas within the cyber world that are not considered susceptible to hacking or that do not have some weak point that represents an opportunity for threat and intrusion for any person or organization for illicit purposes.

▲signature of the agreement in Cartagena, in September 2016, before the referendum that rejected it and led to some modifications to the text [Government of Chile]

ANALYSIS / Camila Oliveros

The agreement The peace agreement signed on November 26, 2016 between the Colombian government and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) is one of the most decisive issues in the elections of June 17, in its second round, and of the next presidential term.

After lengthy negotiations between the government and the FARC in Havana, and the introduction of modifications to the text initially agreed, following the triumph of the "no" vote in the plebiscite, the agreement The peace agreement was finally signed in November 2016. The long duration of the negotiations and the result of the plebiscite show that the agreement The 52-year conflict has resulted in the deaths of 220,000 people and the forced displacement of nearly 6 million, as well as 25,000 disappeared and nearly 30,000 kidnapped.

Clearly, all Colombians yearn for a lasting peace, but while some believe that what was drafted in Havana is the solution to achieve that peace, others believe that several modifications can still be made to the text. The decision on that and on the speed of the implementation of the agreement it is in the hands of the next president.

Degree Implementation

For now, after more than a year of the signature of the agreement In the end of the Conflict, both negative and positive elements can be highlighted in the implementation of what was agreed in Havana. According to the Observatory for Monitoring the Implementation of the agreement at the beginning of 2018, before the country entered the long electoral process in which it finds itself, only 18.3% of the agreement. That's a relatively small number. leave, which may be partly due to insufficient financial and human resources to implement the agreements quickly and effectively, rather than a lack of commitment on the part of the Government.

However, in the face of this low percentage of what has already been implemented, there are other figures that show that the agreement It's having some positive results. This is the case of the decrease in the homicide rate in Colombia. This became one of the lowest in thirty years, with 24 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. In addition, the issue The number of displaced persons fell by almost half, from 91,045 displaced persons in 2016 to 48,335 in 2017, according to the Victims Unit. The issue The number of displaced persons had already been declining significantly in previous years, even at a faster rate: in 2002 the figure had been 757,240; in the following 14 years there was a decrease of 47,598 people on an annual average, including the 8 years of the presidency of Álvaro Uribe, who has been the great opponent of the terms of the agreement of peace.

Also the issue The number of victims of landmines has decreased, from 72 in 2016 to 58 in 2017, which has helped to generate a climate of greater trust in rural communities.

It is important to note that in the areas that had been most affected by the armed conflict, agreement with the provisions of the agreement It has been possible to set up new companies that benefit from the mechanisms envisaged for the "areas most affected by the armed conflict" or Zomac. However, these companies find themselves in a complicated environment, because although the FARC has completed the various phases of its demobilization, such as the submission and the return of recruited minors, FARC dissidents and other drug trafficking groups continue to operate in various areas.

Although there has been some progress, most of the implementation of the agreement. How do the two presidential candidates, Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro, deal with it?

Duque or Petro

Iván Duque is a lawyer and politician who has been a senator of the Republic for the Democratic Center, a party headed by former President Uribe, a great opponent of the agreement of peace. That has led many to think that if Duque becomes president, he will leave the agreement of Havana, without complying with it in his four years in office. His proposal is aimed at improving the Economics, reducing taxes on large companies, financing young entrepreneurship and prioritizing investment. In addition, it promotes a major reform of the Colombian justice system.

Gustavo Petro is an economist and politician, but he is also a demobilized member of the M-19 guerrilla group. He is from the center-left Progressive Movement political party. Petro proposes a model that focuses on "changing the model extractivist approach" and to promote agricultural policies. The central axes of its proposal are in the public sphere, fully guaranteed the rights to health, Education "quality, pluralistic, universal and free".

Colombia has never chosen a candidate He is a leftist to be president of the Republic, perhaps because the left is identified with communism and that associates it with the FARC. In any case, Petro has not been against the Havana agreements, and that makes him attractive to many Colombians who want to preserve what was agreed in 2016, in the hope of ending the armed conflict experienced by the country.

The truth is that it is difficult to legally go back on the agreement A constitutional reform established that the next three governments are obliged to comply with the agreement. If Duque wins, the agreement of peace may be subject to further changes, but in no way is Duque synonymous with war and Petro synonymous with peace. 

As Duque has said, making certain modifications to the agreements is not ending them. The candidate of the Democratic Center maintains that the agreement It must have certain adjustments that allow for the achievement of a peace that is "credible, sustainable and based on justice". Of agreement With his proposals, the main changes he would promote would be the following two:

Special Jurisdiction and Political Participation

The first has to do with the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), since Iván Duque in his government plan seeks to simplify the Colombian justice system, going from the current six courts to just one, with the aim of simplifying the Colombian justice system. purpose to achieve greater speed and efficiency in judicial processes. However, with this change, power can be seen as highly concentrated and centralized. A modification of the JEP provided for in the agreement The peace crisis may cause some uncertainty among the former guerrillas, with whom a certain leniency had been agreed.

On the other hand, the big change that Duque could make has to do with political participation. He believes that former FARC members who have been responsible for crimes against humanity cannot be brought to justice. congress without having served a sentence. Duque assures that he does not seek to do away with point 2 of the agreement of peace, which talks about the political participation of former guerrillas in the congress. If a member of the congress A conviction for such a crime is upheld subject, he should leave his seat and be replaced by someone of his own group that he does not have any crimes against humanity.

Although in the event of winning the elections, Gustavo Petro will not propose special modifications to the agreements, whoever the next president is will have serious challenges in relation to the peace process.

Most Important Challenges in the Next Presidential Term

The presence of FARC dissidents in border areas of the country is one of the challenges that the next president will face; Not only because of security issues, but also because of its link to drug production, which has increased by 52%. The Government is aware that about 10 per cent of the FARC fighting force has remained in the armed struggle, representing a total of at least 700 individuals, although other entities even double that figure. This dissident group is active in fifteen different groups, which have been concentrated in areas of the country such as Nariño, Norte de Santander and Cauca. In addition, another of the armed groups, the ELN (National Liberation Army), has begun to increase its presence in certain border areas, such as Norte de Santander. This not only poses a threat to Colombian security, but could also trigger a war between guerrilla groups and organized crime for control of the illegal coca production and drug trafficking business.

Faced with the continued presence of armed groups in part of Colombian territory, both candidates defend the increase in military personnel in conflict zones. However, in the face of the eradication of illegal crops, Iván Duque advocates the use of glyphosate, a strong herbicide whose employment it is rejected by Gustavo Petro on the grounds of its environmental effects. The use of this chemical, which is controversial in Colombia, could be seen as an effective way to eradicate illicit crops if their contamination is counteracted, for example, by planting new trees in areas where coca production can be eradicated. In any case, some environmentalists have used the negative image of glyphosate to ask for a vote for Petro in the second round of elections.

Another of the great challenges that the next president is going to face is the topic of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace. The JEP is a body that is in charge of judging former guerrillas. It has judicial powers and "represents the backbone of the agreements signed". It is composed of five organs, each responsible for ensuring that essential parts of the agreement: "The conference room of Truth and Responsibility, the conference room of Amnesty and Pardon, the conference room Definition of Legal Situations, the research and indictment, and the tribunal for peace." The JEP is a complex body that depends especially on the progress of the peace process. In fact, one of the reasons for the major delays in the implementation of the agreement It has been slow in the constitution of this institution, which did not begin to function until last January. However, the obstacles suffered by the JEP have not only had to do with lack of activity, but also with issues such as the case of Jesús Santrich.

Santrich, one of the guerrilla leaders, who was a negotiator in Havana on behalf of the FARC and received one of the positions assigned to the new party in the congress, was arrested in April on charges of participating in a scheme to bring 10 tons of cocaine into the United States. Based on a research of the DEA, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. judicial authorities requested his arrest and are now awaiting his extradition. However, considering that all FARC members must be tried by the JEP, and that this body does not contemplate extradition, Jesús Santrich could not be handed over to the United States. In addition, at the moment there is no evidence of when the alleged drug trafficking crimes were committed, so for now it has not been possible to determine whether they occurred before or after the creation of the JEP. The former guerrilla is imprisoned in a Bogota jail and the FARC insists that he be released. The next president will have to determine how to proceed with the case. This is also a sample that there are gaps in the agreement, which generates a lot of uncertainty and gives room for the next president to take several directions.

Beyond Peace

On June 17, in the second round of the presidential election between Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro, the future of Colombia will be decided. As much as many Colombians believe that the decision is between war or peace, it is wrong to say this. As discussed above, the agreement It is very difficult to go back legally. The substance of the agreement must be respected by the next three governments. Even if it's true that with the candidate of the Democratic Center in power on agreement may undergo more modifications than would be applied by the candidate of the Progressive Movement, the possibility of consolidating peace remains open with either of them. Beyond peace, what is also at stake is the model of Colombian society. Although peace is one of the most important issues, the next president must not leave behind other important elements such as corruption, security, trade and poverty. Economics in the 2018-2022 presidential term of the Republic of Colombia. Candidates' position on these issues should also influence voters.

▲ISIS Toyota convoy in Syria [ISIS video footage]

ANALYSIS / Ignacio Yárnoz

When you go to a Toyota distributor to buy a Toyota Land Cruiser or a Toyota Hilux, what they proudly tell you is how resistant, fast and reliable the truck is. However, what they do not tell you is how implicated in wars and conflicts the truck has been due to the very same characteristics. We have seen in recent newscasts that in many of today's conflicts, there's a Toyota truck; no matter how remote the country is. This is because, if the AK47 is the favourite weapon for militias in developing countries, the Toyota Hilux and Land Cruiser are the militia's trucks of choice.

This is no surprise when one considers that the Toyota Land Cruiser was initially designed to be a military car inspired by the famous Jeep Willis at the time Japan was occupied by the US after Japan's defeat in World War II. However, its popularity among terrorist groups, militias, as well as developing countries' national armies only gained ground in the 80's when a conflict between Chad and Libya proved the trucks' effectiveness as war machines; simultaneously calling into question the efficacy of traditional war strategies and military logistics.

This little-known story is about how an army comprising 400 Toyota pickups of the Chadian army outmanoeuvred and overwhelmed a vastly superior force equipped with soviet-era tanks and aircrafts of the Libyan army. The historical event demonstrated how a civilian truck was able to shape international borders, tipping the balance in favour of the inferior party to the conflict.

The Toyota War

The Toyota War is the name given to the last phase of the Chad-Libyan War that raged on for almost a decade, yet did not have relevance until its last phase. This last phase began in 1986 and ended a year later with a heavy defeat inflicted on the Libyan army by the Chadians. In total, 7,500 men were killed and 1.5 billion dollars worth of military equipment was destroyed or captured. Conversely, Chad only lost 1,000 men and very little military equipment (because they hardly had any).

The last phase of the conflict developed in the disputed area of the North of Chad, an area that had been occupied by Libyan forces in 1986 due to its natural resources such as uranium (highly interesting for Gadhafi and his nuclear armament project). At the beginning of 1987, the last year of the war, the Libyan expeditionary force comprised 8,000 soldiers, 300 T-55 battle tanks, multiple rocket launchers and regular artillery, as well as Mi-24 helicopters and sixty combat aircrafts. However, the Libyan soldiers were demotivated and disorganized. The Chadians, on the other hand, had nothing but 10,000 brave and motivated soldiers with neither air support nor armoured tanks. However, by 1987, Chad could count on the French Air Force to keep Libyan aircraft grounded but, perhaps more importantly, a 400 Toyota pickups fleet equipped with MILAN (Missile d ́infanterie léger antichar) anti-tank guided missiles sent by the French Government. Additionally, it could also be equipped with .50 calibre machine guns, with archaic flak cannons for anti-air purposes or even rocket clusters to be used as WWII-style artillery.

This logistical combination proved to be superior to that employed by the Libyan army as Toyota pickup trucks could easily outmanoeuvre the heavily armoured Russian tanks. Whereas the latter consumed around 200 L/100 km, the Toyota trucks consumed a fraction, at 10L/100 km. In addition, Toyota Trucks could mobilize groups of 20 people in a single truck, enabling faster transport and deployment of troops to the conflict scene; an advantage the Russian tanks did not have.

Reminiscent of the Maginot line when the Nazi army challenged the old trenches system utilizing a fixed artillery method with the innovative Thunder war strategy, the Chad Army emerged victorious over the Libyans through a simple strategic innovation in military logistics. Something clearly demonstrated in the Battle of Fada. In this instance, a Libyan armoured brigade defending Fada was almost annihilated: 784 Libyans and CDR (Democratic Revolutionary Council) militiamen died, 92 T-55 tanks and 33 BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles were destroyed, and 13 T-55s and 18 BMP-1s were captured, together with the 81 Libyan soldiers operating them. Chadian losses, on the other hand, were minimal: only 18 soldiers died and three Toyotas were destroyed.

All in all, this situation was one of the first deployments of the Toyota Hilux in a conflict zone, demonstrating the reliability of the truck and its high performance in harsh environments. A testament to the Toyota's endurance was its featuring in the famous TV show "Top Gear" where a 1980's Toyota Hilux was put to a wrecking ball, set on fire, submerged in a sea bay for 5 hours, then left on the top of a building waiting its final demolishment, yet still rolled.

Ever since, Toyota trucks have been sighted in conflicts in Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (CDR), Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, and Pakistan and as the New York Times has reported, the Hilux remains the pirates' 'ride of choice.'  The deployment of Daesh of a fleet of hundreds of Toyotas in Mosul in 2014 was a lasting testament of the trucks' durability.

Adaptability

How could the West deal with this issue? To deploy a massive fleet of Humvees? It would be naïve to attack an enemy with their own means. This hardly appears to constitute an effective solution. Humvees are already being substituted by JLTV (Joint Light Tactical Vehicle) due to their vulnerability to IED's (Improvised Explosive Devices); something insurgents are allowed to use but western countries are not due to international treaties and ethical values (how can a mine be designed such that it can distinguish a civilian truck from a Toyota driven by insurgents?). This proves the challenge that counterinsurgency policies (COIN) entail and the need to move to a next generation as far as COIN strategies are concerned.

The Toyota example is one of many that clearly signals a need for conventional state armies to adapt their logistical capabilities to better match the challenges of non-conventional warfare and insurgencies; the primary forms of conflict in which our nations are today engaged. The first lesson is clearly that the traditional focus on high power and the availability of resources is poorly suited to respond to contemporary insurgencies and military engagement with primarily non-state entities. Rather, there is a growing need for logistical versatility, combining both attack power and high manoeuvrability. The Toyota issue is an interesting example that illustrates how groups like Daesh have been able to mobilize an easily accessible, relatively non-expensive market commodity that has proven to be effective in lending the group precisely the kind of logistical aid required to successfully wage its insurgency. This being said, there are a number of dilemmas posed to nation states engaging in COIN strategies that prevent them from being able to employ the same methodology. Clearly there is a need to constantly engage in the adaptation of COIN strategies to respond to new threats and the surprising innovation of the adversary. However, COIN campaigns have been difficult to manage, and even harder to win, since time immemorial.

Recent research in political science and economics investigates a number of difficulties security forces face during conflicts with insurgent actors (Trebbi et al., 2017). Development and military aid spending have uneven effects, and conventional military strategies, including aerial bombardment, can erode civilian support for the COIN. Although states have historically used mass killings of non-combatants to undermine logistical support for guerrilla actors, evidence from modern insurgencies indicates that these measures may have the opposite effect: in some cases, such measures may encourage recruitment and mobilization (Trebbi et al., 2017). As such, the challenge is to constantly adapt to meet the requirements of contemporary warfare, whilst simultaneously assessing and remaining cognizant of the effects that COIN measures have on the overall campaign.

Adaptation through learning and innovation occurs on a much different time-scale than evolution. Although both involve information exchange with the environment and with elements within the system, evolution occurs over long periods of time through successive generations that have been able to successfully survive to changes (Hayden, 2013). Learning is the process of modifying existing knowledge, behaviours, skills, values, or preferences, and innovation involves the incorporation of a previously unused element into the system, or the recombination of existing elements in new ways.

Airstrikes

In the previous example of the conflict between Chad and Libya, it was mentioned that the Libyan army had its air force inoperative due to the presence of French air support. Another important point to make is that Toyotas may have been effective war machines for the terrain and surrounding environment, yet would nevertheless have been vulnerable to airstrikes had the Libyan army been able to engage air power against the Chadians. Air and space are part of the future of COIN strategies, despite composing only one element of them. They are our eyes (UAV systems), our way to get away or deploy forces (Chinook helicopters for example) and also the sword that can eliminate the threat (e.g. Predator drones). However, maintaining complete dominance over the battle space does not guarantee victory.

Due to the success of the air campaign in Operation Desert Storm, airpower seemed to be the predominating weapon of choice for future warfare. Yet, recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have called that assertion into question. Airstrikes in ground operations have proven to be controversial in small wars, especially when it comes to civilian casualties and its impact on civilian morale (an element that could enhance local support to insurgents). This is why, to win popular support, the US air force had to rethink its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to win popular support (this also a result of Taliban and Pakistani propaganda and political pressure). Most recently, the US, along with France and the UK, have engaged in massive airstrikes on strategic infrastructure devoted to chemical development supposedly for a military use. Although being calibrated, proportional and targeted, those attacks have created a lot of internal discussion in the West and have divided society. As such, the future environment seems certain to further limit the kind of strikes it can make with airpower and missiles.

Consequently, technologically superior air assets nowadays face significant challenges in engaging dispersed and oftentimes unseen opponents. The Air Force must determine how modern airpower can successfully engage an irregular opponent. Air power, the "strategic panacea" of Western policymakers (Maxey, 2018), will no longer maintain the same utility that it does against rural insurgents. Although tactical Predator strikes and aerial reconnaissance may have shifted the street-to-street fighting against Daesh, such operations are severely limited within expansive megacities. The threat of civilian casualties is often too high, even for precision-guided munitions with limited blast radius. Further. buildings and layers of infrastructure often obscure a clear overhead view.

For 2030, the United Nations (UN) suggests that around 60 percent of global population will live in urban areas. There are 512 cities of at least one million inhabitants around the world, and this is expected to grow to 662 cities by 2030. Many of the megacities that will emerge will come from the developing world. That is why it is so urgent to design strategies to adapt to operating within metropolitan environments where small roads prevent large tanks to manoeuvre, where buildings give cover to heavy cannon targets and where one is more exposed to the crosshairs of insurgents taking cover in civilian infrastructure. 

As U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley remarked in 2016; "In the future, I can say with very high degrees of confidence, the American Army is probably going to be fighting in urban areas. We need to man, organize, train and equip the force for operations in urban areas, highly dense urban areas, and that's a different construct. We're not organized like that right now".

In addition to this, National armies must be able to work through host governments, providing training, equipment and on-the-ground assistance to their local partners. The mere presence of a foreign army in the area often creates a negative perception among the local population and, unfortunately, in other cases, violent opposition. However, if the army patrolling the city wears the national flag, things change. Defeating an insurgency depends upon effective state building.

REFERENCES

Engel, P. (2018). These Toyota trucks are popular with terrorists — here's why. Business Insider. [Accessed 21 Apr. 2018].

S.L.P., I. (2018). The Toyota War in Syria. Instituto de Estrategia S.L.P. [Accessed 21 Apr. 2018].

Wang, A. (2018). How did the Toyota pickup become terrorists' favorite truck?. Quartz.

Maxey, L. (2018). Preparing for the Urban Future of Counterinsurgency.

Smallwarsjournal.com. (2018). Air and Space Power COIN / IW | Small Wars Journal.

Costas, J. (2018). The dark and warlike side of the Toyota Land Cruiser. Motorpasion.com.

Tomes, R. R. (2004). Relearning counterinsurgency warfare. Parameters, 34(1), 16-29.

Hayden, N. K. (2013). Innovation and Learning in Terrorist Organizations: Towards Adaptive Capacity and Resiliency. System Dynamics Society.

Ryan, A., & Dila, M. (2014). Disruptive Innovation Reframed: Insurgent Design for Systemic Transformation.

Trebbi, F., Weese, E., Wright, A. L., & Shaver, A. (2017). Insurgent Learning (No. w23475). National Bureau of Economic Research.

July 1 presidential election does not open a serious discussion on the fight against drug trafficking

The 'iron fist' that Felipe Calderón (PAN) began in 2006, with the deployment of the Armed Forces in the fight against drugs, was extended in 2012 by Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI). In these twelve years the status has not improved, but rather increased violence. In this 2018 elections none of the main candidates presents a radical change from model; the populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador (Morena) proposes some striking measures, but continues to count on the work of the Army.

▲The Mexican president on Flag Day, February 2018 [Presidency of the Republic].

article / Valeria Nadal [English version].

Mexico faces a change of sexenio after closing 2017 as the most violent year in the country's history, with more than 25,000 homicides. How has this status been reached ? Can it begin to be resolved in the coming years?

There are several theories about the beginning of drug trafficking in Mexico, but the most widely accepted argues that Mexican drug trafficking was born when Franklin Delano Roosevelt, president of the United States between 1933 and 1945, promoted the cultivation of poppy in Mexican territory with the veiled intention of promoting the production of large quantities of morphine to relieve the pain of U.S. soldiers during World War II. However, drug trafficking was not a serious national problem until the 1980s; since then, cartels have multiplied, violence has increased and crime has spread throughout Mexico.

The new phase of Felipe Calderón

In the fight against drug trafficking in Mexico, the presidency of Felipe Calderón marked a new stage. candidate of the conservative National Action Party (PAN), Calderón was elected for the six-year term 2006-2012. His program included declaring war on the cartels, with a "mano dura" (iron fist) plan that translated into sending the Army to the Mexican streets. Although Calderón's speech was forceful and had a clear goal , to exterminate insecurity and violence caused by drug trafficking, the result was the opposite because his strategy was based exclusively on police and military action. This militarization of the streets was carried out through joint operations combining government forces: National Defense, Public Security, the Navy and the Attorney General's Office (PGR). However, and despite the large deployment and the 50% increase in the expense in security, the strategy did not work; homicides not only did not decrease, but increased: in 2007, Calderón's first full presidential year, 10,253 homicides were registered and in 2011, the last full year of his presidency, a record 22,409 homicides were registered.

According to agreement with the high school of Legal Research (IIJ) of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), in that record year of 2011 almost a quarter of the total Mexican population over 18 years of age (24%) was assaulted in the street, suffered a robbery in public transport or was a victim of extortion, fraud, threats or injuries. The fees of violence was so high that it surpassed those of countries at war: in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 there was a average of 12 murders per day per 100,000 inhabitants, while in Mexico that average reached 18 murders per day. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the number of complaints about this indiscriminate wave of violence was quite high leave: only 12% of the victims of drug-related violence reported. This figure is probably related to the high rate of impunity (70%) that also marked Calderón's mandate.

Peña Nieto's new approach

After the failure of the PAN in the fight against drug trafficking, in 2012 Enrique Peña Nieto, candidate of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), was elected president. With this, this party, which had governed for uninterrupted decades, returned to power after two consecutive six-year periods of absence (presidencies of Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón, both from the PAN). Peña Nieto assumed the position promising a new approach , contrary to the "open war" proposed by his predecessor. He mainly focused his security policy on the division of the national territory into five regions to increase the efficiency and coordination of operations, on the reorganization of the Federal Police and on the strengthening of the legal framework . However, the new president maintained the Army's employment in the streets.

Peña Nieto's results in his fight against drug trafficking have been worse than those of his predecessor: during his term, intentional homicides have increased by 12,476 cases compared to the same period in Calderón's administration and 2017 closed with the regrettable news of being the most violent year in Mexico to date. With just months to go before the end of his six-year term, and in a last-ditch effort to right the wrongs that have marked it, Peña Nieto brought about the approval of the Internal Security Law, which was voted by Mexico's congress and enacted in December of last year. This law does not remove the military from the streets, but intends to legally guarantee that the Armed Forces have the capacity to act as police, something that previously only had the character of provisional. According to the law, the military participation in daily anti-narcotics operations is not to replace the Police, but to reinforce it in those areas where it is incapable of dealing with drug trafficking. The initiative was criticized by critics who, while recognizing the problem of the scarcity of police resources, warned of the risk of an unlimited military deployment over time. Thus, although Peña Nieto began his term in office trying to distance himself from Calderón's policies, he has concluded it by consolidating them.

What to expect from the 2018 candidates

Given the obvious ineffectiveness of the measures adopted by both presidents, the question in this election year is what anti-drug policy the next president will adopt, in a country where there is no re-election and therefore every six-year presidential term means a change of face. The three main candidates are, in the order of the polls: Andrés Manuel López Obrador, of the Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (Morena); Ricardo Anaya, of the PAN coalition with the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), and José Antonio Meade, of the PRI. López Obrador came close to reaching the presidency in 2006 and 2012, both times as candidate of the PRD (he had previously been leader of the PRI); he then created his own party.

Meade, who represents a certain continuity with respect to Peña Nieto, although in the electoral campaign he has adopted a more anti-corruption tone, has pronounced himself in favor of the Internal Security Law: "It is an important law, it is a law that gives us framework, that gives us certainty, it is a law that allows the participation of the Armed Forces to be well regulated and regulated". Anaya has also positioned himself in favor of this law, since he considers that a withdrawal of the Army from the streets would be "leaving the citizens to their fate". However, he supports the need for the Police to recover its functions and strongly criticizes the lack of responsibility of the Government in subject of public security, alleging that Mexico has entered a "vicious circle that has become very comfortable for governors and mayors". In any case, neither Meade nor Anaya have specified what turn they could take that would be truly effective in reducing violence.

López Obrador, from a left-wing populist stance, is a major change with respect to previous policies, although it is not clear how effective his measures could be. Moreover, some of them, such as granting amnesty to the main drug cartel leaders, seem clearly counterproductive. In recent months, Morena's candidate has changed the focus of his speech, which was first centered on the eradication of corruption and then focused on security issues. Thus, he has said that if he wins the presidency he will assume full responsibility for the country's security by integrating the Army, the Navy and the Police into a single command, to which a newly created National Guard would be added. He has also announced that he would be the only one to assume the single command: "I am going to assume this responsibility directly". López Obrador pledges to end the war against drugs in the first three years of his mandate, assuring that, together with measures of force, his management will achieve economic growth that will translate into the creation of employment and the improvement of welfare, which will reduce violence.

In conclusion, the decade against drug trafficking that began almost twelve years ago has result been a failure that can be measured in numbers: since Calderon became president of Mexico in 2006 with the slogan "Things can change for the better", 28,000 people have disappeared and more than 150,000 have died as a result of the drug war. Despite small victories for Mexican authorities, such as the arrest of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman during the Peña Nieto presidency, the reality in Mexico is one of intense criminal activity by drug cartels. From the electoral proposals of the presidential candidates, no rapid improvement can be expected in the next six years.

[Javier Lesaca, Weapons of mass seduction. Ediciones Península, 2017. 312 pages]

review / Alejandro Palacios Jiménez

What is it that drives a young man to abandon his friends and family and freely give up his dreams to join the Islamic State? With this question in mind, Javier Lesaca immerses us in this narrative in which he dissects the communicative apparatus used by ISIS to gain followers and spread its ideas and influence through the virtual Caliphate.

Thanks to his extensive professional career, the author sample in Armas de seducción masiva has a high Degree of depth and analysis, which is not incompatible with an entertaining and convincing narrative. Javier Lesaca Esquiroz (Pamplona, 1981), graduate in Journalism at the University of Navarra, works as researcher at the International Observatory of programs of study on Terrorism. His extensive knowledge on topic has allowed him to work in organisations such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Bank development and the Government of Navarre. Education Her work experience is complemented by her participation in forums such as the United Nations (UN) Security committee or the Euro-Arab Dialogue of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).

His main hypothesis is that the crisis of credibility in traditional institutions, which has been fuelled by the economic and financial crisis of 2008 and is palpable in the 15-O movement, coupled with the technological revolution of the 21st century, has allowed the Islamic State (ISIS, or Dáesh, by its Arabic nomenclature) to influence the perceptions of Western citizens, in particular millennials, in a way never seen before. Millennials, who do not feel represented by their respective state institutions, seek to feel important and to participate in a new project that helps them to make sense of their lives and to stand up every day for a cause worth fighting for. And ISIS offers them just that.

But what is Dáesh? Far from historical and religious explanations, Lesaca presents us with an unprecedented answer: the Islamic State embodies what is called modern terrorism, which uses the instruments of the new generations to get its messages across. In other words, Daesh presents itself as a global social movement that uses local communication campaigns that are disseminated throughout the world and whose terrorist acts are used as a mere "performance" within a broader communication strategy. Thus, Daesh defines itself as a leaderless movement that, paradoxically, moves away from the more purely religious elements to suit the concerns of the youth audience it plans to seduce.

The fact that it is a headless movement does not imply that it is internally unorganised. On the contrary, ISIS is a terrorist group that uses social networks very effectively and whose internal structure allows it not only to influence, but also to be in possession of some of the media. Its strategy consists of both developing its own media and using what is called "earned media". reference letter The former refers to Daesh's large communication structure based on: press releases, infographics, photographic reports, magazines in different languages, the Al Amaaq news agency, Al Bayan radio, Ajnabah music productions, the Isdarat website (now closed), audiovisual production companies and offline marketing in some parts of Iraq and Syria (billboards, posters and cybercafés). The media won is measured in terms of the number of times the terrorist group has succeeded in having its actions condition the diary of the traditional media.

The use of such a multitude of communication channels with the goal to create a parallel world, which its activists call the Caliphate, and to geographically segment the audience to modify the framing of the message - all under the cover of twisted interpretations of the Koran - is what is known as transmedia terrorism. To make this strategy as effective as possible, nothing is left to chance. One example given in the book, sample , is the control that the all-powerful Syrian executive producer Abu Mohamed Adnani, a friend of the caliphate's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, exercised over his subordinates, supervising and approving the content and messages that ISIS transmitted to the public. So much so that Adnani was considered by the West to be the de facto man who exercised the real day-to-day leadership within the terrorist organisation until his death in 2016.

All of this communicative strategy is precisely described in the book thanks to the large number of concrete examples that the author provides of massacres that Dáesh has carried out since its existence and the way in which these have been transmitted. In this sense, Lesaca emphasises the effectiveness with which ISIS, making use of the new media, camouflages real executions among images of video games(Call of Duty) or fictional films(Saw, Hunger Games, Sin City) in order to blur the line between reality and fiction, creating what is called a transmedia narrative. The idea is simple: how are these images going to seem cruel to you if they are similar to the ones you see in a cinema conference room eating popcorn?

In written request, Javier Lesaca attempts to define a useful strategy for dealing with the terrorism of the future. He argues that it is unclear what tools states should equip themselves with to confront this new form of terrorism. However, a good way to do so would be to make democracy fashionable, that is, to reinforce the values that have allowed the construction of the welfare society and development the greatest period of prosperity in our history. "The Islamic State has managed to win the victory of aesthetics, which is why we must make values such as democracy, freedom and equality attractive cultural products," says Lesaca. But this is not enough, he says. In addition, "we must promote institutional strengthening by eradicating corruption and implementing policies to create a Economics capable of absorbing all the talent of the new generations and achieving an effective management of public services".

At summary, this is a book that is a must-read for all those who want to familiarise themselves with the internal organisation and Structures of the power of Daesh, its objectives and the means it uses to achieve them group . It is also an invaluable guide for the study and subsequent reaction of the West to the communication campaigns not only of the Islamic State, but also of subsequent terrorist organisations that will form part of what is already known as modern terrorism.