In the picture
U.S. Marines conduct live-fire training on the flight deck of the USS Iwo Jima in the Caribbean Sea in late October 2025 [Southcom].
The recent U.S. military mobilization in the Caribbean, under the banner of the fight against drug trafficking, reopens an old chapter of hemispheric policy in the White House with the use of the security speech to legitimize interventions in the 'shared neighborhood'. The Trump administration has singled out Nicolás Maduro as the leader of the declared terrorist organization 'Cartel of the Suns'. While Maduro's role in this criminal organization is not yet known with certainty, the Miraflores government's involvement in facilitating the trafficking of narcotics to US and European markets from Venezuelan territory is recognized.
Beyond the stated goal of stemming the flow of flows through the Caribbean Sea, the operational deployment of the Southern Command forces near the Venezuelan coast reflects a complex web of geopolitical and strategic interests of the Trump administration aimed at overthrowing the Maduro regime. Some experts consider this move as a psychological operation to achieve a forced or negotiated exit with the dictatorship. Republican Senator Rick Scott warned the Venezuelan regime about the consequences: "If I were Maduro," he said, "I would go to Russia or China right now. His days are numbered, something is going to happen internally or externally." In this sense, the official narrative presents the operation as a surgical offensive against drug trafficking, but its scale and the length of time it has been prolonged suggest something more ambitious: the repositioning of Washington in hemispheric control and direct pressure to provoke fractures within the Venezuelan military apparatus.
The Caribbean: the exception to Trump's isolationism
During the inaugural speech at his first inauguration, President Trump stated: "We do not intend to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather let it shine as an example for all to follow", words that generated conjecture about an administration oblivious to global conflicts. However, the most recent events reinforce the argument of the economic and security motivations of the Washington government, already evidenced in the air deployment in support of Guyana due to territorial tensions and the reactivation of the Roosevelt Roads naval base in Puerto Rico during the summer of this year.
At the same time, the "America First" rhetoric has not meant that the United States has given up intervening in the neighborhood. In the Caribbean and Latin America, the administration has pursued what some analysts call a selective neo-interventionism to avoid engagement in distant regions while acting firmly where it perceives direct threats to its security and interests. This logic, framed under the 'Peace through Strength' policy, holds that deterrence and power projection are the best guarantee to maintain stability and avoid major conflicts. Under this strategy, the official narrative may emphasize cooperation and respect for sovereignty, but in internship the United States does not hesitate to mobilize its forces when it considers that its immediate sphere is at risk, thus ensuring that its presence and authority are unquestioned in the hemisphere.
The shared neighborhood or the 'US Backyard'.
This shift in U.S. policy toward the Caribbean reinforces a discursive return. The shift from the concept of a shared neighborhood to the re-emergence of the region as the 'backyard' of the United States. Although public language avoids that expression, several actions by the Trump administration suggest an explicit revival of that strategic perception that many countries in the region find favorable.
It is illustrative that US geopolitical interest with the return of Trump has intensified not only in Venezuela, but also in other strategic zones. Public comments about regaining greater influence in the Panama Canal, hints about incorporating Canada as a federated state, and even Trump's staff interest in acquiring Greenland from Denmark are clear signs of a strategic imaginary that conceives of the hemisphere as a natural sphere of control. These initiatives appeared in parallel to the growing skill with China, which has invested in Panamanian ports, infrastructure in Latin America and strategic telecommunications in several countries.
The 'Don-nroe' Doctrine
Interpretations of it do not emerge from a vacuum. The shadow of the Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed in 1823 and reinterpreted several times in unilateral core topic , inevitably reappears in this context under the presidency of Donald Trump with what could be called the 'Don-roe' doctrine. During the Obama administration it was declared dead, but geopolitical reality shows that this logic never disappeared, and has continued to evolve.
The case of Panama serves as an obvious historical precedent. The operation against Manuel Noriega in 1989 was similarly justified under the guise of the fight against drug trafficking and culminated in regime change. Likewise, the 1983 invasion of Grenada was presented as a humanitarian and anti-communist mission statement in the hemisphere. Both episodes demonstrate Washington's willingness to employ military instruments to shape domestic policy in its hemisphere when it perceives threats that could destabilize its strategic presence.
In the Venezuelan case, the magnitude of the deployment is even greater. With thirteen vessels, specialized air units and maritime intelligence capabilities, this is the largest mobilization in the Caribbean in more than a quarter of a century, surpassing even previous operations related to Noriega and Grenada. This is not just rhetoric, it is a sign of readiness and sustained operational capability for scenarios of naval confrontation and prolonged coercive pressure against the regime.
Regional reactions: support, tension and strategic calculations
The responses from Caribbean and Latin American governments, as expected, were disparate and strategically aligned. Some states have seen clear benefits in cooperation. Island nations that depend on logistical support, funding or migration agreements with Washington have chosen to support, explicitly and implicitly, the deployment. Trinidad and Tobago, in particular, facilitated the coordination of U.S. naval movements, prompting the Venezuelan government to declare the prime minister persona non grata in its territory. The Dominican Republic, increasingly aligned with the U.S. security diary in the Caribbean, also expressed support for the establishment of U.S. vessels in the Caribbean Sea.
On the sidelines of these operations, Colombian President Gustavo Petro criticized the brutality of lethal attacks by U.S. forces against vessels in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific. In response to the heated exchanges, President Trump withdrew significant aid to the Colombian government and sanctioned Petro and other officials by placing them on the U.S. Treasury department s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) list. These dynamics show that beyond drug trafficking, we are facing a reordering of the map of geopolitical loyalties that still survive in the hemisphere.
A dangerous mirror: hemispheric umbrella of revisionist powers
The fundamental problem lies in the message that this operation sends to the international system. If the United States reaffirms that the Western Hemisphere is its unquestioned sphere and that it can act militarily to correct governments that compromise regional stability, what prevents other powers from invoking these same principles?
The precedent is an uncomfortable one, and the Eastern powers, namely Russia and China do not seem to have the supreme interest in preventing U.S. dominance in the hemisphere. Russia has already justified its invasion of Ukraine by appealing to the defense of its 'Russian world'. China emphasizes that Taiwan is part of its core and historical space, a narrative that is reinforced with every unilateral U.S. action in the hemisphere. The big question is whether defending a rules-based international order is compatible with reviving logics of exclusive spheres of influence in the 21st century plenary session of the Executive Council .
Paradoxically, Washington's efforts to reassert its hemispheric primacy may generate collateral effects favorable to revisionist powers. By projecting reinforced regional control, Trump offers Putin and Xi Jinping a symbolic framework that they can instrumentalize in their own zones of influence.
Return to tradition
The U.S. military intervention in the Caribbean under the argument of combating drug trafficking cannot be understood in isolation. It is the most recent expression of a tradition of hemispheric policy that combines security interests, geopolitics and strategic projection. Although official rhetoric emphasizes cooperation and stability, the facts suggest an explicit return to the logic of considering Latin America as the U.S. backyard, cloaked in transnational priorities such as the fight against organized crime.
The United States moves in a delicate balance. Reasserting its influence in the Caribbean offers short-term tactical advantages, but it also sets a precedent that powers like Russia and China can use to consolidate their presence in their regions. How Washington manages its authority and projects its power will be a core topic not only for the stability of the Caribbean, but also for how rules are perceived and applied in the contemporary international system.