AUKUS and nuclear nonproliferation: allies or enemies?

The planned acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines by Australia, a country with no nuclear capabilities - neither civilian nor military - has created controversy because it puts pressure on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although this Treaty has a loophole that opens the door to this subject of developments, until now no country without the atomic bomb has had nuclear-powered submarines. Australia is committed not to carry nuclear missiles -which, in its agreement, neither Washington nor London contemplates to pass-, but the fact that the Australians significantly increase their military capabilities may lead to a degree program of armaments in the Indo-Pacific and encourage other countries to also take advantage of the same NPT loophole.

The agreement AUKUS is a strategic military alliance between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, announced in September 2021. Among its objectives is the strengthening of the defensive capabilities of the three party states, in aspects such as military technology or artificial intelligence. The aspect of AUKUS that has focused most attention concerns the commitment to transfer nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, something to which few countries have access: the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France and India. The three countries have spoken after also sharing another subject of capabilities.

Beyond the fact that the defensiveagreement involves prioritizing the Indo-Pacific area , opposing China with an alliance of countries willing to closely monitor Beijing's growing assertiveness, the international interest of the pact also has to do with one of the shortcomings of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT), known as the 'naval loophole' or 'naval legal loophole'.

goal When the NPT was drafted, the United States' main aim was to involve as many countries as possible issue so that it would bind almost the entire international community. Since important allies wished not to close off possibilities for an improvement of their strategic navigation capabilities, it was finally preferred that the NPT should have some legal uncertainty surrounding non-explosive military components, such as nuclear propulsion for submarines, something of which the NPT negotiators were fully aware. At present, this loophole is being strongly questioned because of the abusive use that some states party to the Treaty could make of it, as a result of the interest previously expressed by Brazil in having nuclear-powered submarines or of Iran's nuclear program pretensions.

Australia's commitment

The agreement AUKUS focuses on article 3 .2 of the NPT, on verification measures and safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Specifically, that article states that no state shall provide: "(a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon state for peaceful purposes (...)". Nuclear-powered submarines fall under the consideration of non-explosive military material, which is not mentioned in this list of prohibitions.

On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of its ratification of the NPT, Australia has expressed its commitment not to have nuclear weapons. Although the submarines it would obtain thanks to the transfer from the US and the UK would be capable of carrying nuclear missiles, Australia insists that this will not happen, subject to the express prohibition in this case of the NPT.

However, by acquiring the submarines envisaged at agreement of the AUKUS, Australia would consolidate its position as one of the non-nuclear weapon states that has nuclear propulsion instruments in its hands. This has created some concern in the non-proliferation world, as such propellants will likely be powered by highly enriched uranium (HEU), as is the usual case for U.S. and British submarines, rather than the low-enriched uranium (LEU) used by the French. This is an important consideration, since HEU can be used for nuclear weaponry development , as we are seeing in the IAEA's close monitoring of Iran's accumulation of increasingly enriched uranium, while LEU does not have this alternative option in any case.

All this is happening at a time of changes and tensions in world geopolitics in which the major nuclear powers seem to be moving their pawns in a disputed chess game that shapes the current international order. Taking advantage of the loophole in article 3.2 of the NPT could end up being a drawback for the AUKUS states, as other countries could follow suit.

Possible consequences

The implementation of the AUKUS may call into question the actual implementation of the NPT and have negative consequences for nuclear non-proliferation objectives. Claiming double standards of the nuclear weapon states is the perfect excuse for those who seek a nuclear development without effective control. As the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia are three of the countries that have been the most supportive and insistent on nuclear non-proliferation, they will have to be aware of the possible consequences of the transfer or development of this subject of submarines. Failure to do so could contribute to the gestation of a new Cold War of a markedly nuclear nature, leaving open the possibility of further proliferation, especially horizontally.

In addition, U.S. and U.K. actions also show a clear intention to strategically position themselves in the Indo-Pacific area , which could easily incite a defensive regional response to the growing involvement of new states with nuclear capabilities. Possession of this subject of submarines gives states a significant strategic capability to exert influence over the region.

The IAEA has a great responsibility to rigorously monitor the development of the agreement AUKUS to avoid covert actions or actions that encourage nuclear proliferation for military purposes. Similarly, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia must be mindful of the essential aims and objectives of the NPT, and act as transparently as possible. The United States presents itself as core topic piece for international cooperation, and it would be unwise to offer motives that would deteriorate its position as a global power.