The conflict in the gray zone, with Morocco in the background

The spectrum of conflict between countries ranges from a peaceful skill , where there is respect for international norms and other norms implicit in international relations - which means that, although the relationship may not be harmonious, at least it is bearable - to a status of armed confrontation, where we are talking about war. In between there is a space that we are going to call gray zone, which in reality is gradual, because in it there is room for escalation, with an increase in conflictivity.

Sometimes we also speak of hybrid warfare, and although in many occasions it is applied to the same situations, this expression has the problem of being confusing, using a metaphor in a definition: it calls war to something that generally is not, which is a gray zone. But if not to conflict, it is correct to apply the term hybrid to strategies.

From the realist perspective of international relations - which does not explain everything, but explains many of its phenomena - we see interactions between countries from the point of view of conflict: even between countries that are friends there is competition, because the relationship is not one hundred percent harmonious; we are human and since Genesis,3 there is an element of discord in human relations.

The gray zone is also known as the rivalry that exists below the threshold of war, but this is not very well defined, since this would also include the peaceful skill , which is not part of the gray zone. This has three common features: ambiguity, gradualism and multidimensionality, which refers to the employment of different power tools, which in turn allow us to speak of hybrid strategies in the sense that we combine different factors: economic, diplomatic, military, etc.

The concept of the gray zone is not new. In the Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union there was conflict in the gray zone, because thank God it did not lead to armed confrontation. Of course, there were wars, some of them by proxy, which is typical of the gray zone, but there was never a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. When we speak today of a new Cold War, we understand what is meant, but it is better to speak of conflict in the gray zone, because the historical precedent had an ideological component that is not so marked now: although the United States, in order to establish a line, speaks of democracy versus autocracies, it is something more complex than that.

It is always interesting to wonder about the causes of conflicts. These have very different etiologies; conflict being a disparity of interests, the interests may vary: territorial, political, ideological, geopolitical.... But if we are to give a general explanation of today's rivalry between the great powers - between China and the United States, between the United States and Russia or between Russia and the European Union - we must turn to the structural dimension of the international system as explained by Kenneth Waltz (1979): the distribution of power within the international system. And from a structural perspective, we have two theories. One is that of John Mearsheimer's offensive realism, whose basic propositions are the international anarchy inherent in realism and that great powers fear each other by definition, since a great power is one that can defeat another or cause it severe damage; the ultimate guarantee that a great power is safe from another is to have more power than it. As all the powers feel insecure they try to have more power than the rest, because they think that more power is equal to more security, so there is a continuous skill and that generates rivalry.

The other theory is that of defensive realism, which in certain regions explains better what is happening; this is the case in the EU countries, where we understand that more power than the other does not mean more security and that security can also be gained through more cooperation, dissipating possible conflicts that may arise.

On a global scale, the interactions between the main powers of the system and particularly between the United States and China are increasingly better understood from the point of view of offensive realism, with complicated relations that will be settled through conflict in the gray zone. Also through war? It could be, but let's hope not. In the world today there is an open war in Ukraine and a more limited one in the Middle East that could escalate into a regional war, but if there were a war between the United States and China, the systemic effects would be devastating. We are all aware of the destructive nature of war, especially if it pits nuclear powers against each other, which is why there is so much self-restraint. It is therefore to be expected that this conflict will be resolved through conflict in the gray zone, and therefore this is a concept with a future.

development

Having seen what the gray zone is and why it occurs, we will now deal with how it develops. When we talk about the employment of various tools of power we must be careful with the term synchronization, because it is not always clear that there is such an exact control of the various tools, with a master plan behind: politics is very complex, there is a lot of chaos in it and political decision making is not always carried out in such a rational way. The same can be assumed to happen with the execution of hybrid strategies: yes, there is a certain coordinated employment of some of them, but many other times we have opportunism, if not uncoordinated.

There is no template for what to expect from the employment of hybrid strategies. To counter them is core topic intelligence and detection, but one problem is that we do not always know where it is going to come from. Early warning occurs when one country is going to militarily attack another, as there are a series of steps that must necessarily be taken and that trigger indicators (we saw it in 2022: the Russian military deployment on the border warned us that they were not maneuvers, especially when they started with medical supplies and war ammunition), but with hybrid strategies there is no defined template that will always be fulfilled in a similar way. This is compounded by false positives: things that look like hybrids but are not; events that point to interference but are incidental or unconnected. False positives cloud the picture and can lead to paranoia.

Then there is economic coercion, with a wide range from limiting access to certain goods (China has done this quite often, by not providing certain rare minerals or not buying certain products from Australia, Norway, Sweden or Japan) to economic sanctions. Combined with that is also the employment of force for an economic purpose (such as the 2019 attack on Saudi Arabian oil plants).

Another area is cyberspace, with actions aimed at the information dimension (Russian interference in the 2016 US elections) or against infrastructures (the Czech Prime Minister said a few months ago that since the Ukraine war began Russia has carried out thousands of cyberattacks against railway infrastructures in Europe). Likewise, there are more aggressive intelligence actions than would be typical of the peaceful skill (the National Cryptologic Center, under the CNI, has said that China is behind many attacks against Spanish economic interests, more than those coming from Russia).

Harsher actions are also resorted to, such as the murder of defectors (in March the Russians killed a Russian helicopter pilot who had gone over to Ukraine in a village in Alicante) and military intimidation: having military capabilities and showing them off, which is part of deterrence (for example, Russian fighters violating the airspace of the Baltic countries).

Tactics also include gradualism, as Beijing is doing in the seizure of the South China Sea islets. Acting suddenly, with a fait accompli, is dangerous because it raises the stakes too high and can backfire (remember the 1982 Falklands war). The episode of the islet of Perejil, in July 2002, may seem at first sight a fait accompli, but it was not because Morocco did not consist of achieving in one blow what it wanted, since Perejil in itself had no value and that is not the end of Morocco's aspirations; it is better to see it from the point of view of gradualism and erosion tactics. If Spain had not reacted sharply and sent a message of strength, perhaps Morocco would have dared with something a little stronger on one of the rocks, on Al Hoceima, for example, and then on Ceuta or Melilla.

Upping the ante are proxy wars. If it were a direct war between two actors we would no longer be in a gray zone; here those engaged in a war are other actors supported by those actors. This can be seen in the evolution of the Ukrainian war itself: between 2014 and 2022 it was a war between Ukraine and the Donbass separatists, supported by Russia and denied by the latter any attribution (very difficult to deny with so many Russian soldiers 'lost' and crossing the border or Russian artillery support from the other side); the conflict has mutated and today we have an open war between Russia and Ukraine. This warns us that the gray zone does not have to stay in the gray, but can escalate into a war.

Climbing

We now turn to the question of escalation. The gray zone admits a variety of tones, levels of interference and aggressiveness. In the lower strata, purpose is the configuration of the environment: Morocco tries to erode the position of Ceuta and Melilla in the eyes of Spanish citizens and the Spanish government; it tries to make Spaniards see these two cities as a problem and to make them aware that Morocco does not recognize their Spanishness. For this purpose, Morocco takes advantage of multiple opportunities, with actions that fit in the hybrid: when in 2007 the King and Queen of Spain visited Ceuta and Melilla, Morocco called their ambassador for consultations and Mohamed VI made in his speech a very negative accredited specialization to that visit, even though they are Spanish territories that the King and Queen can obviously visit. There is also the question of the commercial customs, which the Moroccan authorities close without saying anything to anyone; they have not opened it in spite of the change of policy of the Government in relation to Western Sahara. Another aspect is how Morocco manages the immigration issue, with the intention of putting pressure on the Madrid government. Moreover, Rabat recognizes neither the airspace nor the territorial waters of this sovereign Spanish space. All these are configuration actions, which seek to generate the perception of an unresolved problem that in the long run will be contrary to Spain.

False positives can occur here: for example, last year the political party that cultivates the support of the Muslim population of Melilla bought votes for the local elections; everything indicates that it was a matter of political corruption, with no evidence of interference by Morocco. The surest way to know if we are facing a false positive is the most classic intelligence (communications intelligence, human intelligence...), but sometimes it may not be alerted: the Perejil action was a decision taken in the closest circle to the monarch, without the Moroccan military being warned, which made the previous knowledge difficult, as there were no military communications or preparations.

An escalation could occur if an operation of destabilization were to take place, in the event that the Moroccan migrants entering Ceuta not only do so by the thousands, but also provoke serious disturbances by throwing Molotov cocktails. But this has not happened.

One more step would be the employment limited and force prop. Today we are at a very high level of escalation between Iran and Israel, so high that it may be valid for someone to say that it is not a gray zone but a limited war, because in the end they are mental categories, but in any case it is not an open war.

Reply

Finally, we deal with the response. In the lower levels of the gray zone deterrence is not effective, because the adversary can penetrate through many places and not everything can be protected. This is of interest to us in Spain because it is in this part of the gray zone where we are with Morocco, at least as far as Ceuta and Melilla are concerned. It is advisable to dissuade, yes, but where we can be successful is in competing. If the Moroccan authorities question the Spanishness of these cities and want the Spanish population to perceive them as a problem, Ceuta and Melilla must be presented as an asset for Spain, providing a strategic plan for the economic and social development as promised by the Government of Madrid.

At somewhat higher levels of the gray zone, there is room for deterrence and obtaining guarantees so that there is no escalation that could end in conflict; as far as possible, a deactivation of the conflict is sought, moving from a relationship that offensive realism explains well to another more typical of defensive realism, settling issues through international tribunals, for example.

To avoid escalation, classical deterrence must be applied, both by denial and retaliation. In the case of Ceuta and Melilla, we must warn that if we escalate there will be a response and that Spain will defend those cities, even if the geography does not help. On the rocky outcrops we have a small detachment with barbed wire; this is not enough to defend them, but it does show the will to do so, proclaiming that if there is a fight there will be deaths and that Spain will not stand still, but will respond. This summer the Minister of Defense visited the garrisons of the Rockies, sending a message of political determination. In Ceuta and Melilla the Army has a contingent somewhat smaller than a brigade; being cities, in the event of a war there would be civilian casualties and the burden would fall on Morocco. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine I believe that the world has no stomach for tolerating more countries taking the law into their own hands in territorial matters, and that is to our advantage.

In any case, it must be taken into account that the Moroccan Armed Forces have advanced in their modernization. If we go back to 2002, Spain had a very important military superiority over Morocco, which the Moroccans had very much in mind at that time when deciding not to respond, because they knew that if they went to war with Spain they could come out badly. In these 22 years Morocco has modernized its Armed Forces, so that in certain capabilities we are equal and in some, as in the case of long-range fire, they have an advantage over us.

The change of policy of the Spanish government regarding Western Sahara is a disaster from the perspective of the gray zone, because Morocco has pressured us with tools such as immigration and has seen that we have shown weakness. It has seen that Spain is giving in on something as hypersensitive as the Sahara and that on top of that we are fighting with the Algerians. We have lost out and the worst thing is that we do not know why.

* Javier Jordán is Full Professor of Political Science at the University of Granada and director of Global Strategy. lecture delivered at seminar 'War in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities for Global Security' held at the University of Navarra on October 23, 2024.