The Role of the Armed Forces in the Containment and management of social conflicts in Peru

report SRA 2024 / [PDF version]

° Throughout 2023, the president has resorted several times to the assimilation of situations of social tension to war, with the use of the Armed Forces as means for this.

° The 'militarization' of political and social conflicts and high crime situations damages social cohesion and the Army, whose neutrality and legitimacy are called into question.

° Any discredit has consequences on the deterrent capacity of the security forces and their operability in the fight against terrorism and violence associated with drug trafficking.

The participation of the Armed Forces in political, social and internal security issues in Peru has a long history. It is noteworthy, for example, the role they played in the country's counter-terrorist struggle during the 1980s and 1990s, which is still shrouded in controversy. More recently, the resource to the Armed Forces has been motivated by escalations in the level of violence in protests of social and political connotation, especially during three critical episodes in recent Peruvian politics. First, the attitude of the Armed Forces during the brief mandate of former president Pedro Castillo is discussed; then, their role in the protests against the crisis derived from the failed coup attempt is analyzed, and finally, in the demonstrations during the mandate of president Dina Boluarte.

First of all, it is necessary to establish a legal framework . The authorization of the intervention of the Armed Forces in social and political crises is facilitated by the trend towards the use of legal instruments such as the 'state of emergency'. This mechanism, stipulated in Article 137 of the Political Constitution of Peru, provides that the Armed Forces may assume "control of internal order if so ordered by the President", in cases of "disturbance of peace or internal order, catastrophe or serious circumstances affecting the life of the Nation". The application of this figure, however, is not exempt from controversy, both because of the deficiencies in its constitutional configuration, and because of the 'normalization' of the use of exceptional measures -and the consequent suspension of fundamental civil rights and liberties- to face any moderately critical eventuality.

Castillo vs. carriers

The most recent examples of the resource state of emergency, with the consequent standardization of the appeal to the Armed Forces for the containment of social order in situations of conflict, occur in three moments. The first refers to the short presidency of Pedro Castillo, from his election in July 2021 to December 2022. One of the most tense episodes of his mandate occurred during the transportation workers' strike that began on March 28, 2022, due to the increase in food, fuel and fertilizer prices. Part of the demonstrations consisted in blocking highways; as a measure to confront them and counteract the escalation of violence, Castillo declared a state of emergency on network Vial Nacional in April, authorizing the support of the Armed Forces to the National Police in its execution.

This event constitutes a first example of a break in the rule of extraordinary situation for the application of one of the instruments within the regime of exception provided for in Chapter VII of the Constitution. Thus, international organizations expressed their concern for the disproportionality of the measure, with special concern for the suspension of fundamental rights without sufficient justification. This apparent arbitrariness not only discredits the institutional protection of constitutional rights that the State can offer to its citizens in its capacity as guarantor. It is also dangerous because it assimilates situations of social tension to war (with the consequent provision of the Armed Forces with means prepared for the latter scenarios), as also happened in the following case.

Protests after the coup

The second moment refers to the serious crisis that the Peruvian democratic system underwent after the failed self-coup of Castillo on December 7. In the moments and months immediately following the presidential changeover, protests spread throughout the country, which again led to the declaration of a state of emergency by the current president Dina Boluarte. The level of violence was considerably higher; between December and March 2023 (taking as reference letter the dates called for the 'second Seizure of Lima') 59 deaths and 1,252 wounded were officially registered, although it is not specified whether the victims were result of a confrontation with the State security forces or not.

The rules and regulations by which this state of emergency was established, in order to delimit the extent of the authorized intervention of the Armed Forces, refers generically to the Legislative Decree
the extent of the intervention of the Armed Forces that is authorized, refers generically to Legislative Decree No. 1095, which regulates the rules of employment and the use of force of the Armed Forces, and its regulations. The problem with this reference letter 'grosso modo' is that it omits extremely important specificities to limit the use of force. For example, Article 3 of the Regulation distinguishes three categories depending on who assumes internal order in situations of state of emergency (only the Armed Forces confronting a hostile group ; only the Armed Forces to carry out military operations; or in support of the Police). Depending on these situations, different Degrees of use of force are authorized: non-lethal, potentially lethal, lethal.... The lack of precision in normative references authorizing the use of military means, therefore, may leave to the discretion of the police or military authority in charge the evaluation of the means necessary to fulfill its mission. This would imply that, in effect, the security forces self-regulate their actions in social and political conflicts, which in turn entails different risks: not being subject to the law, lack of clarity for the attribution of responsibility for possible victims, among others.

management of Boluarte

This deficient use of legal instruments is repeated during the last of the cases of social conflict in Peru to be analyzed. After the first wave of protests following the change of government, during Boluarte's own term in office, the state of emergency has also been used to facilitate the management of social problems. Specifically, this mechanism has been used to deal with the high crime rate in different districts of the capital and the region of Piura, as occurred in September and October 2023. The decree declaring the state of emergency makes reference letter a special protocol The decree declaring the state of emergency includes a special procedure to be followed in contexts of detention, retention and police intervention with women and people in vulnerable conditions. Among the institutions that are subject to this rules and regulations, from agreement to the text of protocol, is the National Police, but not the Armed Forces. Again, this poses a risk for the civilian population, since the different state security forces authorized to intervene in the fight against crime are subject to different legal obligations.

In line with all of the above, this 'militarization' of political and social conflicts and high crime situations is detrimental to the country both at the level of social cohesion and at the institutional level. On the one hand, the neutrality and legitimacy of the Armed Forces are called into question; they are accused of having committed extrajudicial executions and other abuses against international humanitarian law. Furthermore, this fight against criminality by appealing to the Armed Forces is to the detriment of the exercise of their own competences: guaranteeing the security of the Peruvian State and defending the nation. Any discrediting then has consequences on the dissuasive capacity of the Armed Forces and their operability, which are so necessary, for example, in the fight against security threats of greater relevance for Peru -such as terrorism and violence associated with drug trafficking in the VRAEM.

Finally, in terms of institutional quality, the recurrent appeal to the state of emergency is indicative of the weakness of the rule of law in the Peruvian system. The sense of urgency and immediate results, both for the containment of political conflicts and crime, allow security to be prioritized over the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. Thus, citizens seem more willing to accept (at least passively) the suppression of their constitutional guarantees and for longer periods of time for the sake of these objectives, which are also perceived as priority national problems. In short, resource both exceptional legal mechanisms and the Armed Forces in these situations of social conflict show that the institutions suffer from a diminished management capacity and depend on the use of force to enforce internal order and security. All this does not contribute to improving the state of democracy in Peru, but rather the opposite.